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SUMMARY 
Online social network sites have gained considerable importance in everyday life. 
Their use results in the unprecedented share of personal data: individuals from all over the 
globe share personal information in a quality and quantity never seen before. Employees 
and prospective employees are amongst users as well, which raises privacy and data 
protection issues specific to the context of employment. 
Although the “traditional” ways of employee monitoring, such as CCTV 
surveillance, monitoring of the use of Internet and e-mail, etc. are already regulated both at 
the international and at the national (French and Hungarian) level, the comprehensive 
regulation of social network sites with regard to the context of employment is yet to be 
elaborated. Social network sites have fundamentally influenced conceptions of privacy and 
data protection, resulting in the boundaries of work and personal life becoming 
increasingly blurred, both within and outside working hours. Yet, the processing of 
personal data obtained from social network sites increasingly raises the question of the 
protection of employees’ rights – particularly the protection of the right to privacy and the 
right to data protection. These rights must be balanced notably against the employer’s right 
to control and monitor, which ensue from the employer’s right to property (ensuring the 
equipment provided by the employer is used in accordance with the purpose of the 
employment relationship), the right to protect his/her economic interest (e.g. through 
ensuring productivity, the protection of reputation) and occupational safety and health 
(which confers obligations on the employer). 
Thus, the dissertation examines how the existing rules of labour law and of data 
protection law in France and in Hungary can be applied to social network sites and what 
the main challenge posed by them are, particularly in the phase of recruitment and during 
the use of social networks during and outside working hours. The main question to be 
answered by the dissertation is: in the light of the increasingly blurred boundaries, where 
should the balance be struck between the employees’ and the employer’s rights? 
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RÉSUMÉ 
Les sites de réseaux sociaux en ligne ont acquis une importance considérable dans la 
vie quotidienne. Leur utilisation conduit à une circulation sans précédent de données 
personnelles : des individus du monde entier partagent des données à caractère 
personnel dans une qualité et une quantité jamais vues auparavant. Parmi les utilisateurs de 
ces réseaux sociaux en ligne se trouvent des salariés et des candidats à l’embauche. Cela 
pose des problèmes spécifiques dans le contexte de l'emploi en ce qui concerne la vie 
privée et la protection des données. 
Bien que les moyens «traditionnels» de surveillance des salariés, tels que la 
surveillance CCTV ou encore la surveillance de l'utilisation d'internet et du courrier 
électronique,soient déjà réglementés à la fois au niveau international et au niveau national 
(français et hongrois), la réglementation complète des réseaux sociaux en ce qui concerne 
le contexte de l'emploi nécessite encore une élaboration. Les sites de réseaux sociaux ont 
fondamentalement influencé les conceptions de la vie privée et de la protection des 
données, ce qui a pour conséquence une dilution des limites entre vie professionnelle et vie 
personnelle, tant pendant qu'au-delà des heures de travail. Or, le traitement des données 
personnelles des réseaux sociaux pose de plus en plus la question de la protection des 
droits des salariés, et notamment la protection du droit au respect de la vie privée et du 
droit à la protection des données. Ces droits doivent être mis en balance avec les pouvoirs 
de l'employeur, qui découle du droit de l'employeur à la propriété (s'assurer que 
l'équipement fourni par l'employeur est utilisé conformément à la finalité de la relation de 
travail), du droit de protéger son intérêt économique (par exemple en assurant la 
productivité, la protection de la réputation) ou encore de la sécurité et la santé au travail (ce 
qui confère des obligations à l'employeur). 
Ainsi, la thèse examine comment les règles existantes du droit du travail et du droit 
de la protection des données en France et en Hongrie peuvent être appliquées aux sites de 
réseaux sociaux et quels sont les principaux défis qu'ils posent, notamment dans la phase 
de recrutement et en ce qui concerne l'utilisation des réseaux sociaux pendant et en dehors 
des heures de travail. La principale question à laquelle la thèse répond est la suivante : à la 
lumière des frontières de plus en plus floues entre vies privée et professionnelle, où trouver 
un équilibre entre les droits des salariés et ceux de l'employeur en matière d’usage des 
réseaux sociaux numériques et des données qui y sont produites ? 
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ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ 
Az online közösségi oldalak jelentős szerepet játszanak a mindennapi életben. 
Használatuk során az egyének soha nem látott minőségben és mennyiségben osztják meg 
személyes adataikat, szerte az egész világon. A munkavállalók és a leendő munkavállalók 
szintén a felhasználók közé tartoznak, ami a foglalkoztatás kontextusában specifikus 
kérdéseket vet fel a magánélet és a személyes adatok védelme terén.  
Bár a munkavállalók megfigyelésének „hagyományos” módszereit, mint például a 
kamerás megfigyelést, az internet és az e-mail használatának megfigyelését, már mind 
nemzetközi, mind tagállami (francia és magyar) szinten szabályozzák, a közösségi oldalak 
foglalkoztatással összefüggő kimerítő szabályozása még kidolgozás alatt áll. A közösségi 
hálózati oldalak alapjaiban hatnak a magánéletre és a személyes adatok védelmére, aminek 
eredményeként a munka és magánélet határai egyre inkább elmosódnak, mind a 
munkaidőn belül, mind azon kívül. Ugyanakkor a közösségi oldalakról származó 
személyes adatok kezelése fokozottan felveti a munkavállalók jogainak védelmének 
kérdését – különös tekintettel a magánélet védelmére és a személyes adatok védelméhez 
való jogra. Ezeket a jogokat össze kell vetni különösen a munkáltató ellenőrzési és 
felügyeleti jogával, amely a munkáltató tulajdonhoz fűződő jogából (pl.: annak biztosítása, 
hogy a munkáltató által biztosított felszerelést a munkavállaló a munkaviszony céljának 
megfelelően használja), valamint a jogos gazdasági érdekeinek védelméből. (pl. 
produktivitás biztosítása, jó hírnév védelme) és a munkahelyi biztonság és 
egészségvédelemből (amely kötelezettségeket ró a munkáltatóra) következik. 
Következésképp, a disszertáció azt vizsgálja, hogy a Franciaországban és 
Magyarországon már létező munkajogi és adatvédelmi rendelkezések miként 
alkalmazhatók a közösségi oldalakra, és melyek az általuk felvetett legfőbb kihívások, 
különösen a munkaerőfelvétel, valamint a közösségi oldalak munkaidőben és azon kívül 
történő használata terén. A disszertáció által megválaszolandó fő kérdés az, hogy a 
fokozottan elmosódó határok fényében hol kell megtalálni az egyensúlyt a munkavállalók 
és a munkáltatók jogai között? 
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NAIH Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság (Hungarian 
National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information) 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Privacy Act Hungarian Act LIII of 2018 on the Protection of Private Life 
SNS social network site 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
WP29 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1. New information and communications technologies (hereinafter referred to 
as: ICT)1 are omnipresent and exert a fundamental impact on everyday life in the 21st 
century – including the world of work as well:2 digitalisation fundamentally changes not 
only working conditions, but also the possibilities in workplace monitoring.3 Innovations 
of ICT, such as personal computers, Internet, e-mail, blogs or social network sites 
essentially influence and transform the way individuals live their lives – together with 
working, creating new challenges for labour market participants.4, 5 These challenges can 
relate to a number of matters, such as the arrangement of working time,6 occupational 
health and safety,7 organisation of work or controlling and monitoring employees. 
 
1 According to Eurostat the term ICT “covers all technical means used to handle information and aid 
communication.” Source: Eurostat (no date) Glossary: Information and communication technology (ICT). 
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Glossary:Information_and_communication_technology_(ICT) (Accessed: 25 October 
2019). According to the Cambridge Dictionary, ICT refers to “the use of computers and other electronic 
equipment and systems to collect, store, use, and send data electronically.” Source: Cambridge Dictionary 
(no date) ‘ICT’ in Business English. Available at: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/ict 
(Accessed: 22 September 2019) 
2 Rey, B. (2013) ‘La vie privée au travail. Retour sur la place du privé en contexte hiérarchique à l’ère du 
numérique’, Les Cahiers du numérique, 9(2), p. 108. 
3 Fritsch, C. (2015) ‘Data Processing in Employment Relations; Impacts of the European General Data 
Protection Regulation Focusing on the Data Protection Officer at the Worksite’, in Gutwirth, S., Leenes, R., 
and de Hert, P. (eds) Reforming European Data Protection Law. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London: 
Springer, p. 149.  
4 In its report the French Employment Orientation Council (“Conseil d’orientation pour l’emploi”) drew 
attention to the diversified impacts social network sites, and in general Internet exercise on the world of 
work, notably in the field of recruitment through the appearance of online job forums, social network sites 
(professional or personal ones used for professional purposes) or even platform work. See more in: Conseil 
d’orientation pour l’emploi (2015) L’impact d’internet sur le fonctionnement du marche du travail : synthese 
du diagnostic du conseil. Available at: 
http://www.coe.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Synthese_rapport_Version_finale.pdf (Accessed: 25 October 2019) 
5 On the impacts of technological development on the organisation of work, see more in the following article 
discussing the impacts through the examples of a textile factory and a fish factory. Lovesio, B. (1993) 
‘Changements techniques et procès de travail. Qualification et déqualification de la main d’œuvre’, Cahiers 
du GEDISST (Groupe d’étude sur la division sociale et sexuelle du travail), (7), pp. 41–59. The organisation 
of work was essentially influenced by the appearance of division of work (partly possible due to the 
appearance of machines), described in "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations" by 
economist Adam Smith published in 1776. On its effects on the organisation of work and different theories 
relating to it see more in: Boyer, R. and Schméder, G. (1990) ‘Division du travail, changement technique et 
croissance. Un retour à Adam Smith.’, Revue française d’économie, 5(1), pp. 125–194. 
6 Especially it is the case of knowledge workers who – notably due to mobile and smartphones, personal 
computers and e-mail – are capable of working anytime, anywhere, considerably challenging the previous 
separation of the concept office equals working time, home equals private life. These matters will be 
addressed in detail in Part I. 
7 Being available to the employer constantly has important implications for the employees’ right to rest and 
can possibly affect their health as well. These matters will be further addressed in Part I. 
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2. As part of ICT, online social network sites (hereinafter referred to as: SNSs) 
have caused profound changes through shaking up the previously existing forms of 
communication and self-expression. SNSs are gaining growing importance in individuals’ 
everyday lives: according to Eurostat, in 2017 one of the most frequent online activities in 
the European Union (hereinafter referred to as: EU) was the use of SNSs.8 As Alissa Del 
Riego et al. phrased it, the use of SNSs “[…] is not a luxury or a lifestyle choice, but part 
of the reality of the modern world.”9 The first SNS – SixDegrees – appeared in 1997,10 and 
since then several others have followed.11 Today the most popular SNSs have millions of 
users worldwide. Facebook is the biggest “country” in the world with its 2.2 billion users, 
while YouTube, Twitter and Instagram has 1.9 billion, 335 million and 1 billion active 
users, respectively, just to mention a few examples.12 There exist hundreds of different 
international and national (social media) and SNSs.13 The reasons lying behind such 
popularity are threefold, according to James Grimmelmann. In one of his articles,14 he 
identifies and describes three main forms of motivations, all three originating from basic 
human needs that existed before the invention of SNSs, but gained a new form through 
their appearance.15 These human needs are self-expression (identity), communication 
 
8 Digital economy and society statistics - households and individuals (2018) Eurostat. Available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Digital_economy_and_society_statistics_-
_households_and_individuals#Internet_usage (Accessed: 4 January 2018) 
9 Del Riego, A., Sánchez Abril, P. and Levin, A. (2012) ‘Your Password or Your Paycheck?: A Job 
Applicant’s Murky Right to Social Media Privacy’, Journal of Internet Law, 16(3), p. 23. 
10 boyd, danah m. and Ellison, N. B. (2008) ‘Social Network Sites: Definition, History and 
Scholarship’, Journal of Computer Mediated Communication, 13(1), p. 214. 
11 For example, Myspace and LinkedIn were launched in 2003, Facebook in 2004, YouTube in 2005, Twitter 
in 2006, Instagram in 2010 and Snapchat in 2011. 
12 Most famous social network sites worldwide as of October 2018, ranked by number of active users (in 
millions) (2018) Statista. Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-
ranked-by-number-of-users/ (Accessed: 4 January 2018). These sites enjoy a likewise popularity in France 
and in Hungary: in France approximately 45 % of the population is estimated to use SNSs (65 % of these 
users possess a Facebook account), while in Hungary 5.4 million users are present on Facebook. Sources: 
L’usage des réseaux sociaux en France - Faits et chiffres (no date) Statista. Available 
at: https://fr.statista.com/themes/2761/l-usage-des-reseaux-sociaux-en-france/ (Accessed: 4 January 2019) 
and Lévai, R. (2017) Magyarok a közösségi médiában 2017 elején, Közösségi kalandozások. Available 
at: http://kozossegikalandozasok.hu/2017/01/04/magyarok-a-kozossegi-mediaban-2017-elejen/ (Accessed: 4 
January 2019) 
13 For an illustrative list of the most popular SNSs see more in: List of social networking websites (no 
date) Wikipedia. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_social_networking_websites (Accessed: 
4 January 2018).; Mehra, G. (2017) 105 Leading Social Networks Worldwide, PracticalEcommerce. 
Available at: https://www.practicalecommerce.com/105-leading-social-networks-worldwide (Accessed: 4 
January 2019); 2019: Top 57 Social Media Platforms Every Executive Should Know (Updated) (2010) 60 
Second Marketer. Available at: https://60secondmarketer.com/blog/2010/04/09/top-52-social-media-
platforms-2/ (Accessed: 4 January 2019) 
As such, it is impossible to examine all SNSs, therefore the dissertation focuses on the most commonly used 
ones. 
14 Grimmelmann, J. (2009) ‘Saving Facebook’, Iowa Law Review, 94(4), pp. 1137–1206. 
15 Grimmelmann, J. (2009) ‘Saving Facebook’, Iowa Law Review, 94(4), p. 1159. 
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(relationships) and being part of a community; constituting the basic elements of social 
interaction.16 During the use of such services, the personal data of individuals become 
publicly available in a quantity and quality never experienced before, on a global scale,17 
which results in the appreciation of the examination of their right to privacy and right to 
data protection. 
3. Employees are among SNS users as well, which can raise several challenges 
in multiple fields relating to employment: starting from recruitment,18 through SNSs’ 
effects on working hours,19 leaking business secrets20 or the collective enforcement of 
employees’ rights,21 till questions relating to employees’ freedom of expression on SNSs.22 
These fields notably raise the question of ensuring the employer’s rights (manifested in 
controlling and monitoring employees) during employee use of SNSs, which can enter into 
collision with the above-mentioned right to privacy and right to data protection. 
4. As opposed to the right to privacy and right to data protection, the employer 
has different rights, the enforcement of which might justify employee control and 
 
16 First, users can express their identity through their profiles, by allowing the individual to carefully shape 
what kind of image of himself/herself he/she wants to express towards other users. Second, they can 
communicate and maintain different relations with other users in several ways. Third, users can feel that they 
are a part of a community and they can establish their social position within the community. Source: 
Grimmelmann, J. (2009) ‘Saving Facebook’, Iowa Law Review, 94(4), pp. 1151-1159. 
17 International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications (2008) Report and Guidance on 
Privacy in Social Network Services – “Rome Memorandum” -. 675.36.5. Rome. p. 10. 
18 See more on the roles and importance of (online and offline) social networks in relation to employment and 
recruitment in: Fondeur, Y. and Lhermitte, F. (2006) ‘Réseaux sociaux numériques et marché du travail’, La 
Revue de l’Ires, (52), pp. 101–131.; Fontaine, F. (2006) ‘Les réseaux de relations : quelles perspectives pour 
l’économie du marché du travail ?’, Revue française d’économie, 21(1), pp. 127–172. 
19 Illustrated by cases where the termination of employment was a response to the employee’s excessive use 
of SNSs at the expense of working hours. See, for example: Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 18 mars 
2009, N° 07-44247 and Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 26 février 2013, N° 11-27372 
20 See, for example, the case of a French police officer who revealed confidential information relating to the 
organization of the municipal police, and especially to the video surveillance system applied in the 
municipality. Source: Conseil d'État (2017): N° 393320 (ECLI:FR:CECHR:2017:393320.20170320), 3ème - 
8ème chambres réunies, 20 mars 
21 For more information on this subject see: Larher, Y.-M. (2017) Les relations numériques de travail. 
Doctoral dissertation. Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas and Ray, J.-E. (2012) ‘CGT, CFDT, CNT, CE et 
TIC. Rapports collectifs de travail et nouvelles technologies de l’information et de la communication’, Droit 
social, (4), pp. 362–372. 
22 This phenomenon is supported by the growing number of “Facebook firings”: employees being dismissed 
for content published on SNSs. On this issue – which will be addressed in detail in Part II. – see more, for 
example, in: Ray, J.-E. (2018) ‘Des “licenciements Facebook” à la sanction d’un “Like” ?’, Semaine sociale 
Lamy, (1830), pp. 10–12.; Julien-Paturle, D. (2018) ‘Critiquer son employeur sur internet peut entraîner un 
licenciement au titre d’un abus de la liberté d’expression’, Jurisprudence sociale Lamy, (456), pp. 26–28.; 
Mihos, S. (2012) ‘Social networking and the employment relationship’, in Maria, B., Eugenia, A., and 
Iglezakis, I. (eds) Values and Freedoms in Modern Information Law and Ethics. (Proceedings of the 4th 
International Conference on Information Law and Ethics), Available 
at: https://www.linkedin.com/redir/redirect?url=http%3A%2F%2Fbit%2Ely%2F1m9O6SY&urlhash=n43A&
trk=public_profile_publication-button (Accessed: 11 December 2019). pp. 565-569. 
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monitoring. These rights notably include the right to property (including the economic 
freedom to decide how to use the employer’s property), the right to protect his/her 
economic interest (e.g. through ensuring productivity, the protection of reputation, the 
protection of business secrets, the protection of legitimate economic interests) and 
occupational safety and health (which mostly confers obligations on the employer). In 
order to ensure the protection of these rights, the employer is entitled to control employees’ 
behaviour and to monitor whether employees respect the relevant rules and requirements. 
5. Controlling and monitoring employees is not a new phenomenon as early 
examples, such as Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon,23 the scientific management of Frederick 
Taylor24 of Henry Ford’s Sociological Department25 illustrate it.26 Controlling and 
monitoring are inherent to the employment relationship as the employee is subordinated to 
the employer: he/she is usually integrated into the organisation of the employer, uses the 
materials provided by him/her and is expected to follow his/her instructions regarding the 
work.27 According to general labour law principles, employers have “a contractually 
based right to control contract fulfilment and to monitor work performance and the proper 
 
23 He created a surveillance model, the Panopticon, which could be applied in “any sort of establishment, in 
which persons of any description are to be kept under inspection; and in particular to penitentiary-houses, 
prisons, houses of industry, work-houses, poor-houses, lazarettos, manufactories, hospitals, mad-houses, and 
schools[.]” [Source: Bentham, J. (1995) The Panopticon Writings. Edited by M. Božovič. London, New 
York: Verso. p. 29.] His Panopticon was a circular-shaped prison, where one guard placed in the centre could 
monitor every inmate through mirrors. An essential part of his project was giving guards the ability of 
“seeing without being seen” as the inmates would be aware of the possibility of being watched at any time 
but would never know when they are watched in reality. This would motivate inmates to act as if they were 
watched all the time, regulating their own behaviour. [Bentham, J. (1995) The Panopticon Writings. Edited 
by M. Božovič. London, New York: Verso. p. 43. 
24 In his quest of improving efficiency, Frederick Taylor established the direction of scientific management 
and wrote his book The Principles of Scientific Management in 1911. His method consisted of increasing 
efficiency through the extreme monitoring of workers, who were under constant surveillance by a manager, 
who watched and measured every move they made. [Source: Sprague, R. (2007) ‘From Taylorism to the 
Omnipticon: Expanding Employee Surveillance Beyond the Workplace’, The John Marshall Journal of 
Information Technology & Privacy Law, 25(1), p. 1.] 
25 At the beginning of the 20th century, Henry Ford, owner of the Ford Motor Company decided to put his 
employees under extreme surveillance, by investigating their private lives in order to be able to decide 
whether they live their lives according to the “American standards”. These investigations covered every 
aspect of their private lives, such as their marital status, living conditions and behaviour. The Ford Motor 
Company also indicated, by issuing guidance, how employees should live their lives. [Source: Meyer, S. 
(1980) ‘Adapting the Immigrant to the Line: Americanization in the Ford Factory, 1914-1921’, Journal of 
Social History, 14(1), p. 70.] 
26 On the different organizational theories see more at: Desreumaux, A. (2014) ‘Un inventaire des principales 
écoles ou courants en théorie des organisations’, in Présentation générale des théories des organisations. 
Available at: http://bricks.univ-lille1.fr/M29/cours/co/chap01_01.html (Accessed: 25 October 2019) 
27 European Network of Legal Experts in the field of Labour Law (2009) Characteristics of the Employment 
Relationship. Thematic Report 2009. Contract No. VC/2008/1211. p. vi. 
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use by employees of company equipment facilities.”28 However, since these historical 
examples of work organisation and employee monitoring, technology has experienced such 
a leap that it put this existing phenomenon into a different light through facilitating control 
and monitoring from a technological point of view.29 
6. Employee control and monitoring have a close relationship with 
technological development:30 various innovations make it possible to monitor one’s every 
step in an extremely detailed way, giving privacy and data protection an increased value.31 
Employers also benefit from these developments and use them to control and monitor their 
employees in order to ensure the protection of their rights. While earlier monitoring took 
place in the form of closed-circuit television (hereinafter referred to as: CCTV) 
surveillance, geo-localisation, monitoring of telephone use and computer/e-mail use, and 
concentrated mainly on employees’ activities within the workplace, today new ways of 
monitoring – such as obtaining information through SNSs – go beyond the physical 
workplace and enable the employer to try to monitor activity taking place outside the 
workplace. Although from a technological point of view everything is possible, everything 
will not be legally permissible.32 
7. From a legal aspect both the right to privacy and the right to data protection 
are regulated by different legal documents. From the international level particularly various 
human rights agreements33 must be mentioned, guaranteeing that everyone has the right to 
privacy, altogether with the relevant documents in the field of data protection, issued by 
 
28 Hendrickx, F. (2002) ‘Protection of workers’ personal data in the European Union, Two studies’. EC. p. 
114. 
29 Moreira, T. C. (2016) ‘The Electronic Control of the Employer in Portugal’, Labour & Law Issues, 2(1), p. 
5. 
30 For the purposes of the thesis, “technological development” or “technological innovations” will relate to 
the means used for employee control and monitoring. By “traditional means” of monitoring, CCTV 
monitoring, monitoring the use of e-mail, Internet, work computer, telephone, GPS monitoring will be meant. 
The expression “traditional” is employed due to the fact that the detailed rules relating to these types of 
monitoring are already elaborated (in doctrine, in case law, in the practice of the data protection supervisory 
authorities) – compared to the “new” forms of monitoring, not (yet) being subject to detailed and exhaustive 
regulations due to their relatively recent appearance (e.g. SNSs). 
31 For example, already two decades ago according to Scott McNealy, former CEO of Sun Microsystems: 
“[y]ou have zero privacy. Get over it.” Source: Smith-Butler, L. (2009) ‘Workplace Privacy: We’ll Be 
Watching You’, Ohio Northern University Law Review, 35(1), p. 55. 
32 Ray, J.-E. (2017) Droit du travail: droit vivant. 25th edn. Paris: Wolters Kluwer France. p. 118. 
33 United Nations (1948) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 12.; United Nations (1966) 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 17.; Council of Europe (1950) European 
Convention of Human Rights, Article 8.; European Union (2000) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, Article 7 
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the International Labour Organization (hereinafter referred to as: ILO),34 the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereinafter referred to as: OECD),35 the 
Council of Europe (hereinafter referred to as: CoE)36 and the EU.37 At the national level 
both in France and in Hungary constitutional protection is guaranteed to these rights,38 as 
well as civil law protection.39 Also, both countries enacted a data protection act.40 With 
regard to privacy and data protection challenges specific to the context of employment, 
both labour codes address the question of respecting employees’ rights at a general level.41 
Also, the “traditional” ways of employee monitoring are already regulated – both in France 
and in Hungary –: the relevant applicable rules and their interpretation were already 
elaborated notably through case law and the practice of the data protection authorities, and 
doctrine as well. 
However, specific privacy and data protection challenges brought by SNSs are not 
(yet) addressed in an exhaustive manner (neither in France, nor in Hungary). Although 
existing case law,42 the practice of the data protection authorities43 and a number of 
 
34 ILO (1997) Protection of workers’ personal data. An ILO code of practice. Geneva: International Labour 
Office 
35 OECD (1980) Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD 
(2013) Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data - revised 
36 CoE: Council of Europe (1981) Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, ETS No.108, 28 January; Council of Europe (2018) Modernised Convention for 
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data. CM/Inf(2018)15-final, 
Elsinore, Denmark, 18 May; Council of Europe (2015) Recommendation CM/Rec(2015)5 of the Committee 
of Ministers to Member States on the processing of personal data in the context of employment. (Adopted by 
the Committee of Ministers on 1 April 2015, at the 1224th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies) 
37 European Union (2000) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 8.; Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. OJ L 281, 23/11/1995 
P. 31 – 50; Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88 
38 Conseil constitutionnel: décision n° 94-352 DC du 18 janvier 1995; Conseil constitutionnel: décision n° 
94-352 DC du 18 janvier 1995; Conseil constitutionnel: décision n° 99-416 DC du 23 juillet 1999 and Article 
VI of the Fundamental Law of Hungary (2011)  
39 Article 9 of the French Civil Code and Items b) and e) of Section 2:43 of the Hungarian Civil Code 
40 In France it is the “Loi informatique” [Act No. 78-17 of 6 January 1978 on Information Technology, Data 
Files and Civil Liberties (“loi relative à l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés”)] and in Hungary it is Act 
CXII of 2011 on the Right to Informational Self-determination and Freedom of Information. 
41 See especially Article L1121-1 of the French Labour Code stating: “[n]o one may limit the rights of the 
individual or individual or collective liberties by any restriction which is not justified by the nature of the 
task to be performed and proportionate to the aim sought[,]” and Subsection (2) of Section 9 of the 
Hungarian Labour Code stating that “[t]he rights relating to personality of workers may be restricted if 
deemed absolutely necessary for reasons directly related to the intended purpose of the employment 
relationship and if proportionate for achieving its objective.” 
42 Especially in France. See notably the decisions of the Court of Cassation: Cour de cassation, Civ. 1re, 10 
avr. 2013, n°11-19530.; Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 20 déc. 2017, n°16-19609; Cour de cassation, 
chambre sociale, 12 sept. 2018, n°16-11.690. 
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existing legal articles44 already examined SNSs in the context of employment, usually they 
concentrate on one or two aspects of the subject, thus its exhaustive analysis is yet to be 
 
43 For example, both the French and the Hungarian data protection authorities have addressed the question of 
data protection and recruitment. Sources: CNIL (no date) Recrutement : l’employeur peut-il rechercher des 
données sur moi sur Internet ? Available at: https://www.cnil.fr/fr/cnil-direct/question/354. (Accessed: 29 
October 2019) and NAIH (2016) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a 
munkahelyi adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről. Budapest 
44 Articles co-examining labour law and data protection and SNSs include, but are not limited to: Allix, B. 
(2014) ‘L’employeur, le salarié et Facebook’, Feuillet Rapide Social F Lefebvre. ; Baugard, D. (2015) 
‘L’usage par les salariés des réseaux sociaux’, in Ndior, V. (ed.) Droit et réseaux sociaux. Issy-les-
Moulineaux: Lextenso (Collection LEJEP), pp. 75–89. ; Bello, A. (2012) ‘Le licenciement pour motif tiré de 
Facebook : un changement ... dans la continuité’, JCP S (édition sociale), (26), pp. 12–16. ; Cantero, I. and 
Coupez, F. (2014) ‘L’utilisation des réseaux sociaux par l’entreprise : des risques maîtrisés ?’, Revue Banque, 
(769), pp. 36–39. ; Caprioli, É. A. (2012) ‘Les propos tenus par une salarié sur Facebook peuvent justifier 
son licenciement’, Communication Commerce Électronique, (4), pp. 37–40. ; Caprioli, É. A. (2013) ‘Faute 
grave du salarié ayant tenu des propos dénigrants sur son “mur public” Facebook’, Communication 
Commerce Électronique, (5), pp. 47–49. ; Caprioli, É. A. (2018) ‘Licenciement : obtention loyale de la 
preuve sur le réseau social Facebook afin de caractériser une faute grave’, Communication Commerce 
Électronique, (6), pp. 43–43. ;Caprioli, É. A. (2018) ‘Licenciement sans cause réelle et sérieuse et propos 
injurieux sur Facebook’, Communication Commerce Électronique, (6), pp. 43–43. ; Caron, M. (2018) ‘Les 
limites à la liberté d’expression d’un salarié sur Facebook’, Les Cahiers Sociaux, (305), pp. 131–133. ; 
Castel, Delphine: Licenciement - Réseaux sociaux - De l'utilisation des preuves venant de Facebook Juris 
tourisme 2018, n°205, p.13.; Corrignan-Carsin, D. (2018) ‘Tenir des propos injurieux sur Facebook au sein 
d’un groupe fermé ne justifie pas un licenciement’, JCP G Semaine Juridique (édition générale), (40), pp. 
1762–1762. ; Costes, L. (2010) ‘Licenciement de salariés qui avaient dénigré leur hiérarchie sur 
Facebook’, Revue Lamy droit de l’immatériel, (66), pp. 42–42. ; Costes, L. (2011) ‘Réseaux sociaux : 
nouveaux enjeux et nouveaux défis pour les entreprises’, Revue Lamy droit de l’immatériel ex Lamy droit de 
l’informatique, (74), pp. 131–38. ; Fel, C. and Sordet, E. (2010) ‘L’utilisation des réseaux sociaux par 
l’entreprise et ses collaborateurs’, JCP S (édition sociale), (29), pp. 19–24.; Grégoire, F. (2018) ‘L’usage 
immodéré de Facebook peut conduire directement à Pôle emploi’, JCP G Semaine Juridique (édition 
générale), (9), pp. 437–437.; Griguer, M. (2010) ‘Les réseaux sociaux sous le contrôle des DSI’, Cahiers de 
droit de l’entreprise, (6), pp. 62–64.; Hardouin, R. (2011) ‘Facebook ou l’établissement de la frontière entre 
espace public et sphère privée’, Revue Lamy droit de l’immatériel ex Lamy droit de l’informatique, (67), pp. 
54–55.; INFOREG (2015) ‘Pouvoir disciplinaire : vie personnelle, vie professionnelle et Facebook’, Cahiers 
de droit de l’entreprise, (6), pp. 67–69.; Julien-Paturle, D. (2018) ‘Critiquer son employeur sur internet peut 
entraîner un licenciement au titre d’un abus de la liberté d’expression’, Jurisprudence sociale Lamy, (456), 
pp. 26–28.; Le Clainche, J. (2012) ‘Expression des salariés sur internet : attention aux « faux amis »’, Revue 
Lamy droit de l’immatériel ex Lamy droit de l’informatique, (81), pp. 45–50.; Le Clainche, J. (2011) 
‘Licenciement pour des propos tenus sur Facebook ou les dangers de la porosité des sphères publique et 
privée’, Revue Lamy droit de l’immatériel, (67), pp. 51–53.; Le Cohu, P. (2018) ‘Un salarié peut-il critiquer 
son employeur sans être sanctionné ?’, La Gazette du Palais, (10), pp. 58–59.; Loiseau, G. (2018) ‘Réseaux 
sociaux et abus de la liberté d’expression : l’exception de cercle privé’, La Semaine Juridique Social, (41), 
pp. 22-25.; Mayoux, S. (2018) ‘Licéité de la preuve recuillie sur Facebook par l’employeur’, Jurisprudence 
sociale Lamy, (449), pp. 23–26.; Netter, E. (2015) ‘La liberté d’expression sur les réseaux sociaux en droit 
français’, in Ndior, V. (ed.) Droit et réseaux sociaux. Issy-les-Moulineaux: Lextenso (Collection LEJEP), pp. 
39–63.; Picq, M. (2011) ‘Facebook et les salariés : vie privée, liberté d’expression et humour’, Revue des 
droits et libertés fondamentaux, (11); Pierroux, E. (2015) ‘Facebook, Twitter et autres résaux sociaux: petites 
injures entres “amis”’, La Gazette du Palais, (336–337), pp. 4–8.; Pottecher, M.-C. and Bakhtiari, Z. (2016) 
‘Travailler ou tweeter, le salarié n’a pas (forcément) à choisir’, Cahiers sociaux du Barreau de Paris, (285), 
pp. 233–234.; Ray, J.-E. (2010) ‘Little Brothers are watching you’, Semaine sociale Lamy, 1470, pp. 10–13.; 
Ray, J.-E. (2011) ‘Facebook, le salarié et l’employeur’, Droit social, (2), pp. 128–40.; Ray, J.-E. (2013) 
‘Facebook, espace public plus que privé. A propos de l’arrêt de la 1 ère Chambre civile du 10 avril 
2013’, Semaine sociale Lamy, (1599), pp. 14–19.; Ray, J.-E. (2018) ‘Des “licenciements Facebook” à la 
sanction d’un “Like” ?’, Semaine sociale Lamy, (1830), pp. 10–12.; Tricoit, J.-P. (2013) ‘Recrutement, 
rupture du contrat de travail et TIC’, La Semaine Juridique Social, (40), pp. 9–14.; Verkindt, P.-Y. (2010) 
‘Les “amis” de nos “amis”..’, JCP S (édition sociale), (48), pp. 3–5. 
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elaborated. This is one of the voids that the dissertation aims to fill, by addressing this 
question through the examination of the conclusion, management and termination of the 
employment relationship. The other specific feature of the dissertation is that it adopts a 
comparative approach and co-examines France and Hungary, providing a currently non-
existent angle of examination of the subject. 
8. Scope of the dissertation. Regarding the material scope, the dissertation 
will focus on the collision between the employees’ rights (notably right to privacy and 
right to data protection) and the employer’s rights (notably right to property, right to the 
protection of business secrets, right to reputation, right to the protection of economic 
interests) during the use of SNSs, manifested in the employer’s right to control and 
monitor. On the one hand, the employee is entitled to the right to privacy and the right to 
data protection during controlling and monitoring.45 On the other hand, it is inherent to the 
employment contract that the employer has the power/right to control and monitor46 
employees’ activities in order to enforce different rights.47 These rights are manifested in 
different dimensions: e.g. choosing the most adequate candidate during recruitment, 
monitoring whether the employee truly spends working hours working or controlling and 
monitoring that the employee does not violate the employer’s right to reputation. The 
rights of the employee and the employer are in close interaction, as what is a right on one 
side is manifested as an obligation on the other side (e.g. employees’ obligation to perform 
 
Horváth, L. and Gelányi, A. (2011) ‘Lájkolni vagy nem lájkolni? A közösségi oldalak használatának 
munkajogi kérdései’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (2), pp. 60-66. ; Kajtár, E. (2015) ‘Európai ügyek a Facebook 
sötét oldaláról - A munkavállalók közösségi oldalakon tanúsított kötelezettségszegő magatartása’, in 
Horváth, I. (ed.) Tisztelgés: ünnepi tanulmányok Dr. Hágelmayer Istvánné születésnapjára. Budapest: ELTE 
Eötvös Kiadó, pp. 199–213. Kajtár, E. and Mestre, B. (2016) ‘Social networks and employees’ right to 
privacy in the pre-employment stage: some comparative remarks and interrogations’, Hungarian Labour Law 
E-journal, (1), pp. 22-39.; Kun, A. (2013) ‘Közösségi média és munkajog – avagy „online” munkaidőben és 
azon túl’, Munkaügyi Szemle, (3), pp. 12-19.; Németh, J. (2013) ‘Internet és közösségi háló mint 
munkaeszköz’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (1). pp. 37-40.; Németh, J. (2013) ‘Az internet nem felejt – 
közösségi media-használatra alapított munkáltatói és munkavállalói felmondások’, Infokommunikáció és jog, 
(2), pp. 96-98.; Pók, L. (2012) ‘A közösség hálójában – Közösségi oldalak munkajogi 
vonatkozásai’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (1), pp. 10-17.; Pók, L. (2012) ‘Lájkolni szabad? Munkavállalói 
véleménynyilvánítás az új Munka Törvénykönyve tükrében’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (4), pp. 160-165.; 
Rácz, I. (2015) ‘A közösségi média használatának árnyoldalai a munkaviszonyban’, in Deres, P. and Grad-
Gyenge, A. (eds) Acta Iuvenum Caroliensia VII.Budapest: Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem Állam- és 
Jogtudományi Kar, pp. 279–305. 
45 Hendrickx, F. (2002) ‘Protection of workers’ personal data in the European Union, Two studies’. EC, pp. 
23-24.  
46 In French law it is called “pouvoir” meaning power, while in Hungarian doctrine the expression “jog” 
meaning right is used. 
47 Blanpain, R. (2002) ‘Employment and Labour Law Aspects. Setting the Scene. Asking the Right 
Questions?’, in Blanpain, R. (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society. Use and 
Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. 43-44. 
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work, obligation of loyalty, obligation to respect business secrets, etc.).48 Therefore, there 
is a collision between the employer’s and the employees’ rights, and the task of the law is 
to weigh the two sides and to find an appropriate balance between them. As “labour law is 
the law protecting the employee to counterbalance the employee’s subordination[,]”49 the 
dissertation will primarily approach the subject from the employees’ perspective and will 
focus on the question how their right to respect for private life and right to data protection 
should be ensured.  
Relations between privacy and data protection are complex and far from being 
unequivocal, however, it seems to be undeniable that there is a certain connection between 
these two rights.50 Because of their more personal nature in comparison to social media, 
the thesis will focus on SNSs, although social media will not be completely excluded from 
the discussion considering the fact that they also constitute platforms used in the course of 
the private life of the employee. As the main focus is on the examination of the right to 
respect for private life and the right to personal data protection, the dissertation will 
address the subject of how employees can use these platforms in the course of their private 
lives and whether/to what extent this use might be controlled or monitored. The employer’s 
use of social media and SNSs for public relations purposes (even if it is executed by the 
employee) constitutes a separate field, distinct from the subject of the present work. The 
dissertation aims to exhaustively address the employment context, through the examination 
of SNSs and employees’ right to privacy and right to data protection during the conclusion, 
management and termination of the employment relationship. 
9. The dissertation is on the position that in order to effectively address SNSs, 
a double, privacy-data protection approach is applied, which assesses controlling from the 
aspect of privacy, while monitoring from the aspect of data protection. The question of 
controlling and monitoring SNSs can be observed from two separate, but interconnected 
approaches: it can be addressed through a privacy approach and also through a data 
protection approach. While acknowledging that the right to privacy and the right to data 
protection are separate rights, when it comes to SNSs, both are necessary to ensure the 
protection of employees’ personal lives. Although both rights are “present” during the 
 
48 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2017) Munkajog. ELTE Eötvös Kiadó. Budapest. p. 235.; Breznay, T. (ed.) (2006) A 
munkajog nagy kézikönyve. Budapest: Complex Kiadó, p. 329. 
49 Kiss, Gy. (2015) Opportunities and limits of application principles and Civil Code rules in Hungarian 
labour law Crisis management with means of civil law. ELLN Working Paper No. 4. p. 4. 
50 Bygrave, L. A. (2001) The Place of Privacy in Data Protection Law. Available 
at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLJ/2001/6.html (Accessed: 28 February 2018) 
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whole existence of the employment relationship, depending on various factors either the 
right to privacy or the right to data protection is more emphatic and raises more substantial 
challenges. 
Which approach being more dominant depends on several factors, such as the 
activity (controlling or monitoring), the phase of the employment relationship (recruitment, 
fulfilment or termination) or the examined country (France or Hungary). Controlling 
employees (regulating what conduct they can or cannot adopt) relates mostly to privacy, 
while monitoring whether employees comply with the former regulations raises mostly 
data protection questions. While during the recruitment process the application of the data 
protection requirements pose more significant challenges, when it comes to employees’ 
expressing themselves on SNSs, the right to privacy gains more importance. Concerning 
the use of SNSs at the expense of working hours, both approaches are equally significant. 
Also, in relation to employee monitoring in French labour law, the foundations of privacy 
seem to be more emphatic,51 while in Hungary emphasis is put on a data protection 
approach.52 As it will be demonstrated in the dissertation, due to the connection between 
privacy and data protection, the privacy and the data protection approaches complement 
each other and are both necessary to ensure the protection of employees’ rights while 
engaging in SNSs. 
The dissertation will focus on the private sector employment law. The dissertation 
will focus on individual labour law, as the aim is to analyse the employee’s right to 
privacy and right to data protection, which are individually enforceable, while the use of 
SNSs as a collective mostly raises questions in relation to collective enforcement of 
interest and not in relation to the boundaries and respect of the right to privacy.53 The use 
of SNSs and collective enforcement of interests constitute a separate field, distinct from the 
subject of the present dissertation. 
 
51 Especially manifested in the central concept of personal life (“vie personnelle”) unique to labour law. 
52 This can be confirmed by the fact that when it comes to employee monitoring, though privacy is present in 
Hungarian law as well, when the detailed rules applying to certain types of employee monitoring were 
elaborated, the Hungarian data protection authority had a preponderant role. 
53 On issues related to collective labour law see especially: Larher, Y.-M. (2017) Les relations numériques de 
travail. Doctoral dissertation. Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas; or: Ray, J.-E. (2007) ‘Droit du travail et 
TIC (III). Droit syndical et TIC : sites, blogs, messagerie’, Droit social, (4), pp. 423–444.; Ray, J.-E. (2009) 
‘Actualité des TIC. Rapports collectifs de travail’, Droit social, (1), pp. 22–37.; Ray, J.-E. (2012) ‘CGT, 
CFDT, CNT, CE et TIC. Rapports collectifs de travail et nouvelles technologies de l’information et de la 
communication’, Droit social, (4), pp. 362–372. 
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10. In this context the dissertation aims to answer the overarching question – in 
the light of employees’ right to privacy and right to data protection – whether the employer 
is entitled to control and/or monitor employees’ activities on online SNSs during the 
different phases of the employment relationship, and if yes, to what extent. The dissertation 
aims to provide answers to questions in relation to how the existing rules54 of control and 
monitoring should be applied to the case of SNSs, such as what the conditions of such 
monitoring are, what data protection requirements the employer must respect and how, 
what legal risks arise in relation to such monitoring, etc. 
11. While keeping in mind that the examined phenomenon is universal in 
societies where SNSs are available,55 the examination will focus on the jurisdictions of 
France and Hungary. The aim of examining two jurisdictions is to identify separate or 
common good practices, as well as to introduce the jurisdiction of both countries for 
research, legislative and teaching reasons. 
The comparison of the two countries will not be implemented through pure 
comparative research, but the two systems will be assessed (mostly) in the light of EU 
legislation.56 In recent years individuals could witness the adoption and the entering into 
force of the new EU data protection framework. Driven by the occurring societal and 
technological changes, the EU decided to modernize its data protection legislation and 
adopted new rules, notably the General Data Protection Regulation57 (hereinafter referred 
to as: GDPR), which replaced the previously existing Data Protection Directive58 
(hereinafter referred to as: DPD), which regulated matters of data protection for two 
decades. By opting to regulate data protection in the form of a regulation instead of a 
 
54 Laid down in the labour codes, or elaborated by case law, by doctrine or by the practice of the data 
protection authorities. 
55 Which is supported by the fact that, as these platforms are used worldwide, cases related to SNSs and 
employment emerge in most of the advanced countries. For an extensive presentation of issues relating to the 
subject see more in: Lambert, P. (2014) International Handbook of Social Media Laws. Haywards Heath: 
Bloomsbury. 
56 Besides the EU, both France and Hungary are members in the same international organisations. As such, 
examining national legislations in a vacuum is not possible: due to both countries being members in the same 
European (e.g. CoE, EU) and international organizations (e.g. UN, OECD), it is indispensable to examine the 
international environment into which national legislations are integrated. Thus, the most important 
international organizations for our subject are also referred to in the research. 
57 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88. 
58 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. Official 
Journal L 281, 23/11/1995 p. 31 – 50. 
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directive, the EU unified data protection law throughout Member States,59 including 
France and Hungary as well. However, in certain fields the GDPR itself authorizes 
Member States to adopt more specific rules.60 One of these fields is data processing in the 
context of employment, as Article 88 of the GDPR allows Member States to adopt specific 
rules in relation to data protection and employment. As such, differences might arise 
between Member States in the field of workplace data protection. 
Consequently, it is worth examining what differences might arise, despite the 
common EU legal background, between different Member States with regard to 
employment. This narrowing of the scope of investigation is justified by practical and 
theoretical considerations. Its theoretical reason is that data protection was of different 
significance regarding its historical development in France and Hungary. The choice of 
jurisdictions is also supported by France being a country with considerable history in data 
protection law.61 With its data protection act, the “Loi informatique”,62 France was 
amongst the first countries in the world to enact a data protection act, which considerably 
influenced subsequent regulations,63 such as the Council of Europe’s Convention 108,64 the 
EU’s DPD65 or the United Nations’ data protection guidelines.66, 67 In contrast to such a 
background, Hungary – a country formerly attached to the Eastern Bloc countries – lagged 
behind and adopted its first data protection act in 1992,68 14 years after the adoption of 
France’s pioneer legislation. The aim of the dissertation is to demonstrate that in these two 
states with different historical, cultural, economic and legal traditions – despite their 
common membership in international organisations –: what different approaches are 
 
59 European Commission (2018) The GDPR: new opportunities, new obligations. What every business needs 
to know about the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union: European Union. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/data-protection-factsheet-sme-obligations_en.pdf (Accessed: 30 October 2019). p. 2. 
60 E.g. in relation to the processing of deceased persons’ personal data [Recital (27) of the GDPR] or in the 
field of obligations of secrecy (Article 90 of the GDPR). 
61 Grynbaum, L., Le Goffic, C. and Morlet-Haïdara, L. (2014) Droit des activités numériques. Paris: Dalloz. 
p. 747. 
62 Act No. 78-17 of 6 January 1978 on Information Technology, Data Files and Civil Liberties (“loi relative à 
l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés”) 
63 Hennette-Vauchez, S. and Roman, D. (2017) Droits de l’homme et libertés fondamentales. 3rd edn. Paris: 
Dalloz. p. 553. 
64 Council of Europe (1981) Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data. ETS No.108. Strasbourg 
65 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
66 United Nations (1990) Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files. Adopted by 
General Assembly resolution 45/95 of 14 December 
67 Féral-Schuhl, C. (2010) Cyberdroit: le droit à l’épreuve de l’internet. 6th edn. Paris: Dalloz (Praxis 
Dalloz). p. 35. 
68 Act LXIII of 1992 on the Protection of Personal Data and the Disclosure of Information of Public Interest 
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present in these two systems and what are the existing common and separate good 
practices that could be introduced to lawmakers. On the other hand, its practical reason is 
that, as the dissertation was prepared in the frame of a French-Hungarian joint PhD 
programme, the examination of both France and Hungary was an inevitable requirement 
set by the two universities. 
12. Main hypotheses. The dissertation aims to answer several hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 is that in the case of SNSs, the collision between the employees’ rights and 
the employer’s rights appears in a more intense form compared to the “traditional” 
methods of employee monitoring. It was already mentioned that the employee has certain 
rights (right to privacy and right to data protection) that must be balanced against the 
employer’s rights (e.g. right to control and monitor, right to reputation, protection of 
business secrets, etc.). In the case of monitoring SNSs, due to the increasingly blurred 
boundaries of work and private life, this collision of rights is more intense than in the case 
of “traditional” employee monitoring, both from the employees’ and the employer’s point 
of view. Through allowing being available all the time, ICT (and SNSs) blurred the 
boundaries of work and private life:69 they did not only allow work to flow into the private 
life of the employees but vice versa.70 From the employees’ perspective, a change of 
paradigm in the scale of employee monitoring can be observed, as the control and 
monitoring of SNS use not only goes beyond the physical workplace and the physical 
working hours, but also constitutes a more severe intrusion into employees’ private lives 
due to the role SNSs play in modern societies. As on SNSs employees often share details 
regarding their private lives, controlling and monitoring provide the possibility for the 
employer to glimpse into the employees’ private lives to an unprecedented extent. From 
the employer’s perspective, the employer’s rights are increasingly at stake as well for 
several reasons. In relation to the right to property (and the use of the employer’s 
equipment according to the purpose of the employment relationship), the respect of 
working hours and the appropriate use of the employer’s equipment must be mentioned. 
With this urge to be connected all the time, a change of paradigm took place, as SNSs can 
create a veritable addiction resulting in employees spending their working hours on these 
platforms, and failing to perform one of the main obligations arising from the employment 
 
69 Rey, B. (2013) ‘La vie privée au travail. Retour sur la place du privé en contexte hiérarchique à l’ère du 
numérique’, Les Cahiers du numérique, 9(2), p. 108. 
70 El Wafi, W. (2016) Perméabilité des frontières vies « personnelle et professionnelle » et usage des TIC : 
modèles d’articulation. Université de Lorraine, p. 13., p. 15.  
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relationship might possibly lead to the termination of their employment.71 As regards the 
employer’s right to reputation, SNSs provide a unique platform for employees to express 
themselves. While prior to SNSs such expressions usually took place either in an oral form 
or in front of a small audience (e.g. gossiping with or complaining to friends or 
colleagues), SNSs brought a change of paradigm through fundamentally altering the 
publicity and the discoverability of such expressions. As a result, both parties of the 
employment relationship are more intensely interested in enforcing their rights, as the 
possible harm – on both sides – is more significant than prior to the age of SNSs. 
13. The remaining hypotheses relate to the examined matters of the employment 
relationship and SNSs. Hypothesis 2 holds that in the phase of recruitment, the protection 
of job applicants’ rights can be better ensured through regulating pre-employment SNS 
screenings, instead of prohibiting them. As it will be addressed in detail, applying pre-
employment SNSs screenings raise several (privacy) and data protection challenges. As a 
response to these challenges, different solutions were proposed from the complete ban of 
these screenings,72 through acknowledging their existence,73 to the involvement of an 
independent third party in the decision-making.74 Due to the difficulties connected to the 
enforcement of a prohibition (e.g. invisibility of background checks), the dissertation holds 
that adopting a more flexible regulation, through aiming to make employers realize that 
respecting data protection requirements will lead to more reliable decision-making, is a 
more effective way to protect job applicants’ rights instead of completely prohibiting these 
searches. 
 
71 As it is demonstrated by the number of cases related to the personal use of the employer’s 
computer/Internet connection, more precisely employees surfing Facebook during working hours instead of 
performing work. 
72 Gros, M. (2010) Recrutement : une Charte pour contrer les dérives liées aux réseaux sociaux, Le Monde 
Informatique. Available at: https://www.lemondeinformatique.fr/actualites/lire-recrutement-une-charte-pour-
contrer-les-derives-liees-aux-reseaux-sociaux-29715.html(Accessed: 13 August 2019); CNIL (no 
date) Recrutement : l’employeur peut-il rechercher des données sur moi sur Internet ? Available 
at: https://www.cnil.fr/fr/cnil-direct/question/354.; Kajtár, E. and Mestre, B. (2016) ‘Social networks and 
employees’ right to privacy in the pre-employment stage: some comparative remarks and 
interrogations’, Hungarian Labour Law E-journal, (1), p. 36.; McGeveran, W. (2006) Finnish Employers 
Cannot Google Applicants. Available at: https://blogs.harvard.edu/infolaw/2006/11/15/finnish-employers-
cannot-google-applicants/ (Accessed: 2 July 2018) 
73 Information Commissioner’s Office (2011) The employment practices code. Available 
at: https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1064/the_employment_practices_code.pdf(Accessed: 8 October 2018), p. 23.; 
NAIH (2016): A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi 
adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről, p. 19. 
74 Ebnet, N. J. (2012) ‘It Can Do More Than Protect Your Credit Score: Regulating Social Media Pre-
Employment Screening with the Fair Credit Reporting Act’, Minnesota Law Review, 97(1), p. 327. 
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14. Hypothesis 3 intends to prove that in most regards, the personal use of SNSs 
during working hours can be adequately addressed through the already existing rules 
relating to the monitoring of Internet and e-mail use, as all of them are Internet based. No 
specific law aiming to regulate SNSs exists either in France, or in Hungary: in both 
countries the general labour law and data protection rules are applicable to these relatively 
new platforms. Although SNSs put the existing provisions into different light and raise 
questions regarding their exact application and possible adjustments, it is the matter of 
personal SNS use at the expense of working hours where the already existing rules need 
the least adjustment, as in most regards75 the already elaborated regulations to the personal 
use of Internet and e-mail can be adequately applied to SNSs. 
15. Hypothesis 4 aims to prove that as regards employees’ activities and 
presence on SNSs76 mainly beyond working hours, in the light of the intensification that 
SNSs brought to the collision of rights, employers have found themselves in an even more 
vulnerable position, rendering it necessary to tilt the balance towards the protection of 
employer’s rights. Although the limits of employees’ off-duty conduct are already 
determined both in France and in Hungary, SNSs put these existing rules into new light. In 
connection with the intensified collision between the employee’s and the employer’s rights 
(particularly the right to reputation), the dissertation holds that these changes put the 
employer into an even more vulnerable position. 
16. As the outcome of the research, the dissertation aims to answer two main 
research questions. First, in the light of the more intense collision of rights and interests 
(whether and) how the employer is entitled to control employees’ conduct on online SNSs 
with regard to their right to privacy. Second, in the light of the more intense collision of 
rights and interests, (whether and) how the employer can process employees’ personal data 
obtained from these platforms? 
17. Methodology used and structure of the dissertation. The research is based 
on a mixture of descriptive-analytical methods, as the dissertation systematically examines 
the existing legal framework while it also contains the critical evaluation of the relevant 
legislation, court decisions, soft law documents or academic literature. The primary 
 
75 Also, the differences and specific characteristics of SNSs will be examined in detail.  
76 For example, through posting, sharing, liking either matters directly relating to the workplace (e.g. opinion 
on or criticism of the employer) or matters indirectly relating to the workplace (e.g. posting racist content, 
etc.). 
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sources of the research were international, European (EU and Council of Europe), French 
and Hungarian legislation, jurisdictions and doctrine. Amongst the secondary sources a 
wide range of publications was used, especially focusing on – but not limited to77 – the 
works of French and Hungarian scholars. It should be noted in the beginning that one of 
the greatest difficulties (and differences between the two examined countries) was that 
while in France courts – both lower and supreme – already addressed cases related to SNSs 
in a number of cases, in Hungary such cases are very recent.78, 79 Also, brief outlooks to 
other European or international cases and proposed solutions will be made in order to 
enrich the research. Furthermore, as the examined phenomenon is universal, in order to 
raise awareness to certain universal aspects of the subject, these sources will be referred to 
as well – while keeping France and Hungary in the focus of the dissertation. When 
examining these norms, throughout the dissertation several criteria will be taken into 
consideration and followed when determining the order of discussion. Usually the analysis 
of a sub-topic will start from the international (universal, regional) norms before focusing 
on national ones. Also, first general matters will be discussed before examining more 
specific ones. The analysis will also move from the analysis of the legal framework to 
existing jurisprudence and existing practice of the data protection authorities or other 
authorities.  
18. In relation to the terminology used, as today the most popular SNS is 
Facebook, throughout the thesis references will often be made to Facebook instead of 
SNSs in general, as well as Facebook terminology will often be used. 
19. As regards the structure, the dissertation is composed of two Parts: Part I. 
analyses the collision of the rights, while Part II. focuses on how this collision is 
manifested particularly in the context of SNSs. Part I. will examine the collision of rights 
in detail, through analysing the colliding rights both on the side of the employee and the 
employer and will address how this collision is influenced by the innovations of ICT. Part 
I. provides the conceptual and theoretical background of the research. More precisely, Part 
I. will address (1) the conceptual fundaments of the two sides of the collision: the right to 
respect for private life, right to data protection and employee monitoring and then (2) will 
 
77 The dissertation also contains sources in English from several authors outside these two countries, 
especially from Europe and the United States, as the examined phenomenon is universal. 
78 Particularly, the case should be mentioned where a Hungarian prosecutor was dismissed due to three 
(political) Facebook posts. The case will be discussed in detail in Part II. 
79 This also applies to publications, as in Hungary the number of publications related to the subject of 
employee monitoring and SNSs is lower compared to France. 
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examine how this collision has become more intense, and how the boundaries of work and 
private life have become increasingly blurred due to ICT, particularly to SNSs. 
After addressing the conceptual and theoretical foundations, Part II. will especially 
focus on this collision in relation to SNSs and will analyse French and Hungarian law 
regulating the right to privacy and right to data protection during the controlling and 
monitoring of the use of SNSs in the employment context. Part II. identifies the main areas 
where specific challenges arise regarding employee control and monitoring and SNSs, 
aiming to provide an extensive analysis covering the conclusion, management and 
termination of the employment relationship. Three subjects will be examined in detail: (1) 
recruitment and the protection of prospective employees’ rights, (2) SNS use at the 
expense of working hours and (3) off-duty conduct and SNSs. It will be explored, in the 
light of the collision of rights and interests presented in Part I., where exactly boundaries 
are/should be established in France and Hungary; what privacy and/or data protection 
questions arise and what answers can be provided to them. 
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PART I. 
PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES’ PRIVATE LIFE AND PERSONAL DATA IN 
THE CONTEXT OF ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS 
 
20. Technological innovations have not only made a fundamental impact on 
how expectations of privacy have changed,80 but they have also caused profound changes 
in the world of work, blurring the boundaries between work and non-work.81 However, as 
a preliminary point it must be emphasized that this phenomenon is mainly relevant to 
employees performing office work, and especially knowledge work.82 In an age when on 
social media and SNSs users share such a rich amount of data that a few decades ago 
would have been called a “dossier”,83 the appearance of such a huge “database” has serious 
implications for the employment relationship as well.84 
As a consequence, the use of SNSs can have different impacts on the employment 
relationship: during such a use, notably employees’ right to privacy and right to data 
protection might raise challenges. The growing number of internal social media policies 
and “Facebook firings” raise questions in relation to where the boundaries of personal and 
professional life are, while the monitoring of such a use can also raise data protection 
challenges. 
21. The respect of employees’ rights when applying “traditional forms of 
monitoring” or regulating their conduct is already regulated both at international and 
national levels. When it comes to employee monitoring, the fundamental legal challenge 
that arises is the collision of the employer’s and the employee’s rights. On the one side, 
there are the employees’ rights (especially the right to privacy and the right to data 
protection), while on the other side the employer’s rights can be found (e.g. right to 
 
80 Flint, D. (2009) ‘Law shaping technology: Technology shaping the law’, International Review of Law, 
Computers & Technology, 23(1–2), p. 7. 
81 Peck, S. (2012) Social media, monitoring and surveillance at work – a practical guide for trade unionists. 
London: LRD Publ. (Labour Research Department Booklets). p. 5. 
82 Eurofound and International Labour Office (2017) Working anytime, anywhere: The effects on the world of 
work. Joint ILO–Eurofound report. Luxembourg, Geneva: Publications Office of the European Union, 
International Labour Office. p. 3. The report acknowledges that certain kinds of occupations require the 
physical presence at the workplace or simply do not involve the use of ICT. Source: Ibid. pp. 17-18. 
83 Tobok, D. (2013) ‘Social Network Recruiting: Implications of this New Hiring Model’, in Law Society of 
Upper Canada, Employment law and the new workplace in the social media age. Toronto: Irwin Law, p. 95. 
84 Starting from employers screening job applicants’ SNS profiles, through monitoring how employees 
behave on SNSs, to monitoring whether they surf on SNSs during working hours. 
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reputation, protection of business secrets, protection of legitimate economic interests, etc.), 
manifested in the employer’s right to control and to monitor. No right is absolute; they 
must be carefully weighed against each other in order to find a proper balance between the 
two sides.85 
However, technological development has a huge effect on the already established 
regulations, as employee misconducts can have more serious consequences, and the 
employer’s intrusion into employees’ personal lives can also be deeper.86 Hypothesis 1 of 
the dissertation holds that the collision of rights is more intense in the case of monitoring 
employees’ activities on SNSs – compared to the already regulated, traditional forms of 
employee monitoring.  
22. In addition, privacy and data protection play an important role in ensuring 
the exercise of other fundamental rights as well, as SNSs also constitute an important 
forum of freedom of expression and represent an important source of accessing 
information. Privacy (and data protection) also plays a crucial role in SNSs considering 
that their guarantee and respect by the employer is a condition for being able to fully enjoy 
the possibilities given by SNSs. If users are afraid to use SNSs because of the fear that 
someone – in the present case the employer – might use the information available on these 
sites, the freedom and fundamental rights of the individual will be impaired.87 
Table 1: Presentation of the collision of rights 
Rights at stake in relation to SNSs 
Employees’ rights Employer’s rights 
• Right to privacy 
• Right to data protection 
• (Right to freedom of 
expression) 
• Right to reputation 
• Right to the protection of business 
secrets 
• Right to property 
• Right to the protection of legitimate 
economic interests 
 
Manifested in the employer’s right to control and right to monitor, during which balance 
must be found between the two sides 
Source: the author’s own summary 
23. Aim and structure of Part I. The aim of Part I. is to analyse and to prove 
Hypothesis 1 of the dissertation, according to which in the case of SNSs, the collision 
 
85 Hajdú, J. (2005) A munkavállalók személyiségi jogainak védelme. Szeged: Pólay Elemér Alapítvány, p. 20. 
86 Michel, S. (2018) ‘TIC et protection de la vie privée du salarié’, Bulletin Joly Travail, (2), p. 149. 
87 Clark, L. A. and Roberts, S. J. (2010) ‘Employer’s Use of Social Networking Sites. A Socially 
Irresponsible Practice’, Journal of Business Ethics, 95(4), p. 518. 
 36 
 
between the employees’ rights and the employer’s rights appears in a more intense form 
compared to the “traditional” methods of employee monitoring. Therefore, first, Title 1 
will discuss the employees’ relevant rights at stake, and then present how they collide with 
the employer’s different rights. Then, Title 2 will focus on how these already established 
boundaries between work and private life are changed due to the proliferation of ICT, and 
especially to SNSs. As a result of Part I., the conceptual background of the collision will be 
explored, which will serve as a theoretical foundation for Part II., addressing the specific 
challenges raised by SNSs. 
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Title 1: Collision of the employees’ right to privacy and to data 
protection and the employer’s rights 
24. Scope of Title 1. In the dissertation’s focal point employees’ personal life – 
and the rights aiming to protect personal life – are found.88 Despite certain common 
characteristics,89 the right to privacy and the right to data protection are two separate 
rights, both playing an important role in ensuring the protection of personal life. On the 
one hand, employees, just as any individual, are entitled to the enjoyment of the right to 
privacy and the right to data protection.90 On the other hand, the enjoyment of these rights 
is naturally influenced by being qualified as an employee: the employee status will 
automatically limit these rights.91 Originating from the employment relationship, the 
employer has rights that justify the limitations on privacy and data protection,92 such as 
right to property, right to the protection of legitimate economic interests, etc. The rights of 
the two parties are interconnected: what is a right on one side will be an obligation on the 
other side,93 and during their enforcement a balance must be found.94 
25. Aim and structure of Title I. The aim of this title is to provide conceptual 
foundations for the dissertation, through analyzing in detail the rights with utmost 
importance for the main topic of the dissertation. Consequently, the employees’ and the 
employer’s relevant rights will be analysed.95 Chapter 1 of Title I will analyse the rights 
 
88 The expression personal life is used to designate a concept very similar to the personal life employed by 
the Social Chamber of the French Court of Cassation, having a close connection with private life (aiming to 
protect the parts of employees’ life which they wish to conceal from the public) and also with the concept of 
privacy in public (private life interpreted in a broad way, breaking with the concept of secrecy). The (legal) 
definitions of these concepts are to be found in Chapter 1. 
89 “The roots of the right to data protection lie in the right to privacy.” Source: Kranenborg, H. (2014) 
‘Protection of Personal Data’, in Peers, S. et al. (eds) The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. A commentary. 
Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing, p. 228. 
90 See, for example, the ILO Code of practice 1997 or documents issued by the EU’s former Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party in the field of workplace privacy and data protection. 
91 Hendrickx, F. (2002) ‘Privacy and Employment Law: General Principles and Application to Electronic 
Monitoring’, in Blanpain, R. (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society. Use and 
Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. 49. 
92 See especially the labour codes (Article L1121-1 of the French Labour Code and Sections 9-11/A of the 
Hungarian Labour Code) laying down the rules on limiting employees’ rights. 
93 Prugberger, T. (2011) ‘A munkaszerződés és a munkaviszonyból származó alapvető jogok és 
kötelezettségek a Munka Törvénykönyvének rekodifikációs tervezetében’, Gazdasági élet és társadalom, (1–
2), p. 283. 
94 Hajdú, J. (2005) A munkavállalók személyiségi jogainak védelme. Szeged: Pólay Elemér Alapítvány, p. 20. 
95 Title 1 will limit itself to the examination of these rights from an angle focusing on the context of 
employment in general: the specific changes and challenges brought by SNSs will be addressed under Title 
2. 
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that are evoked in relation to the dissertation’s subject: first, the right to privacy; then, the 
right to data protection.96 Then, Chapter 2 of Title I will bring the focus on the 
employment relationship, by concentrating on employee control and monitoring. First, it 
will examine the rights and obligations arising from the employment relationship, and the 
rights granted to the employer that can justify control and monitoring. Then, it will discuss 
the already established legal framework for employee monitoring.  
Chapter 1: Legal protection of personal life 
26. When it comes to the protection of employees’ personal lives, traditionally 
two rights can gain significant importance: the right to privacy and the right to data 
protection. They are both acknowledged at the international97 and at the national level98 – 
as it will be discussed in Chapter 1 – confirming their utmost importance. Both the right to 
privacy and the right to data protection aims to protect the person99 and are fundamental 
rights.100 The respect of these rights is a necessary precondition of the enjoyment of other 
fundamental rights.101 The right to data protection is regarded as a guarantee to ensure the 
inviolability of the individual’s privacy, aiming to guarantee non-interference.102 
27. Both rights are closely connected to technological developments and largely 
influenced by them, giving rise to new challenges. Amongst these developments, the 
proliferation of social media and SNSs has a huge impact on employees’ right to privacy 
and data protection, as during the use of these services individuals often reveal events that 
 
96 As György Kiss noted, employees are entitled to the same fundamental rights just as any individual, 
however, their exact appearance is influenced by the specific characteristics of the employment context. 
Source: Kiss, Gy. (2010) Alapjogok kollíziója a munkajogban. Pécs: Justis Tanácsadó Betéti Társaság, p. 
226. 
97 The relevant international organizations that adopted international norms in the field of privacy and/or data 
protection are the UN, OECD, CoE and EU. The analysis of international norms relating to the specific field 
of workplace privacy/data protection will take place in Chapter 2. 
98 Both rights are explicitly present in the Hungarian constitution (Article VI) and gained constitutional 
recognition by the French Constitutional Council. 
99 Despite what its appellation might suggest, the right to data protection does not aim to protect personal 
data, but the individual to whom personal data relates. Source: Majtényi, L. (2002) ‘Az információs 
szabadságok és az adatvédelem határai’, Világosság, XLIII (2–3), pp. 57-58. 
100 Both rights are acknowledged in the CFREU (Article 7 and Article 8), are explicitly present in the 
Hungarian constitution (Article VI) and gained constitutional recognition by the French Constitutional 
Council. 
101 Rouvroy, A. and Poullet, Y. (2009) ‘The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-
Development: Reassessing the Importance of Privacy for Democracy’, in Gutwirth, S. et al. (eds) Reinventing 
Data Protection? Springer, p. 61. 
102 Vissy, B. (2015) ‘Az információs önrendelkezési jog’, in Pozsár-Szentmiklósy, Z. and Somody, B. 
(eds) Alkotmányos alapok. 2nd edn. Budapest: HVG-ORAC Lap- és Könyvkiadó, p. 206., pp. 200-201. 
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are traditionally considered private and share a vast amount of personal data – giving rise 
to several questions in relation to privacy and data protection.103 
28. Aim and structure of Chapter 1. The aim of Chapter 1 is to present the 
conceptual fundaments of one side of the collision of rights, namely the employees’ side. 
As two rights are addressed in detail in this Chapter, Section 1 will focus on the right to 
privacy, while Section 2 will discuss the right to data protection.104 
Section 1: Right to privacy 
29. One of the rights in the focus of the dissertation that must be balanced 
against the employer’s legitimate interests is the (employees’) right to privacy. However, 
when it comes to defining privacy, scholars usually face difficulties, as there exists no 
universal standpoint regarding its meaning.105 Due to its complexity, creating one single 
definition leads to a contended result.106 However, presenting the most prevailing ones 
throughout Section 1 is necessary for the purposes of the dissertation, as such an analysis 
can contribute to improving instincts on privacy107 – the understanding of which will be 
inevitable to address the question of privacy protection from a legal point of view. Then, it 
will be addressed what legal regulations aim to protect under the right to privacy (or right 
to respect for private life). 
30. Aim of Section 1. The aim of Section 1 is to provide a general conceptual 
basis regarding the scope and meaning of (the right to) privacy – which will be an essential 
precondition to addressing the specific challenges caused by the proliferation of SNSs and 
 
103 E.g. is publishing something on an SNS considered to be part of private life? Can the employer monitor 
how employees use these sites? Can the employer tell the employees how they can use these sites? These and 
other specific questions will be addressed under Title 2. 
104 Within both Chapters the different matters in relation to the right to privacy and right to data protection 
will be first approached from a general/universal angle, and then the discussion will be brought to France and 
to Hungary. 
105 As Avner Levin and Patricia Sánchez Abril phrased it: “[p]rivacy has always been difficult to define. It 
seems that everyone wants it, but there is no consensus as to its meaning or value.” Source: Levin, A. and 
Sánchez Abril, P. (2009) ‘Two Notions of Privacy Online’, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and 
Technology Law, 11(4), p. 1007. Or see as Daniel Solove aptly formulated: “[p]rivacy seems to be about 
everything, and therefore it appears to be nothing.” Source: Solove, D. J. (2006) ‘A Taxonomy of 
Privacy’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 154(3), p. 479. Cited in: Hughes, R. L. D. (2015) ‘Two 
concepts of privacy’, Computer Law and Security Review, 31(4), p. 528. 
106 Clarke, R. (2014) ‘Privacy and Social Media: An Analytical Framework’, Journal of Law, Information 
and Science, 23(1), p. 174. 
107 As Fabienne Kéfer and Sabine Cornélis cited J. Velu’s apt observation that “Privacy can be “felt” rather 
than defined.” Source: Kéfer, F. and Cornélis, S. (2009) ‘L’arrêt “Copland” ou l’espérance légitime du 
travailleur quant au caractère privé de ses communications’, Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme, 
(79), p. 781. 
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their effects on individuals’ and society’s expectations of privacy. Although references will 
be made to these matters, they will be addressed in detail under Title 2. Section 1 also aims 
to provide – after examining the different concepts, definitions, approaches and 
understandings in relation to privacy – a definition of privacy for the purposes of the 
dissertation. 
31. Structure of Section 1. §1 will address the history and scope of privacy and 
the way it is apprehended by scholars. Then, §2 will focus on how the different legal 
regulations regulate the right to privacy, with special regard to the most important 
international organisations, and to the two countries in the focal point of the dissertation: 
France and Hungary. 
§1. The challenges in defining (the right to) privacy: definitions and history 
32. Challenges in defining privacy. In spite of the numerous attempts108 that 
have been made to define privacy, privacy remains a complex and contested concept,109 
relating to which no universal definition could be formulated.110 Although the claim for 
privacy in universal, its concrete form differs according to the prevailing societal 
characteristics, the economic and cultural environment.111 It means that privacy must be 
reinterpreted in the light of the current era and be examined in the current context. 
Naturally, this ever-changing nature leads to challenges when it comes to defining what 
should be protected.112 
 
108 See more on the different definitions of privacy established by scholars in part (B). 
109 As Michael D. Birnhack stated: “[p]rivacy is a contested legal concept, with several understandings and 
more misunderstandings, covering distant areas of human activities. Privacy is under constant attacks from 
many different angles. Despite the criticism, its inherent vagueness, and instability, privacy is a fundamental 
human right and a hallmark of democracy.” Source: Birnhack, M. D. (2008) ‘The EU Data Protection 
Directive: An engine of a global regime.’, Computer Law & Security Review, 24(6), p. 508. 
110 As Serge Gutwirth formulated it: “[t]he notion of privacy remains out of the grasp of every academic 
chasing it.” Source: Gutwirth, S. (2002) Privacy and the Information Age. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers Inc. p. 31. 
Robert C. Post also expressed his doubts regarding whether a universal definition of privacy could be created 
by stating that “[p]rivacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so 
engorged with various and distinct meanings, that I sometimes despair whether it can be usefully addressed 
at all.” Source: Post, R. C. (2001) ‘Three Concepts of Privacy’, Georgetown Law Journal, 89(6), p. 2087.  
111 Majtényi, L. (2006) Az információs szabadságok: adatvédelem és a közérdekű adatok nyilvánossága. 
Budapest: Complex. p. 211.; Simon, É. (2005) ‘Egy XIX. századi tanulmány margójára’, Információs 
Társadalom, (2), pp. 33-34.; Szabó, M. D. (2005) ‘Kísérlet a privacy fogalmának meghatározására a magyar 
jogrendszer fogalmaival’, Információs Társadalom, (2), p. 45. 
112 With regard to these ever-changing circumstances, it is not only impossible but also without interest to 
establish a definition of privacy. Fatou Ba Sene citing François Rigaux in: Ba Sene, F. (2015) ‘La protection 
constitutionnelle de la vie privée et familiale sur les réseaux sociaux en France’, in Ndior, V. (ed.) Droit et 
réseaux sociaux. Issy-les-Moulineaux: Lextenso (Collection LEJEP), p. 93. 
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33. Privacy vs. the right to privacy. It must also be anticipated that what is 
considered to be private and what is legally protected as private can differ:113 the 
dissertation focuses on the legal aspects of privacy. Although privacy has been in existence 
for a long time, as certain needs for privacy have their early origins in ancient societies, it 
only became a generally accepted right in the 19th-20th century.114 
34. In the light of the challenges presented above, it is not the aim of the 
dissertation to establish an exhaustive or universal notion of privacy. However, a 
discussion on privacy is inevitable when addressing the question of workplace privacy 
protection and social media, in order to understand what privacy means in the context of 
SNSs and employment. Thus, the most important definitions and approaches to effectively 
addressing privacy will be presented, with the aim of creating a definition for the purpose 
of the dissertation. 
(A) History of (the right to) privacy 
35. Before addressing the exact content and scope of privacy, it is needed to 
define the main context in which (the right to) privacy appeared and continued to develop. 
Therefore, the main steps of its history will be addressed in the next paragraphs, followed 
by the presentation of how privacy gained legal recognition in French and Hungarian legal 
order, providing the framework of protection.115 
(a) Universal development 
36. Origins of privacy. Privacy can be traced back to a long history: in a broad 
sense, early origins of privacy can be observed even in ancient societies.116 The idea of 
 
113 For example, someone might find all kinds of physical connection – accidental physical contact in a bus 
during the rush hour or a friendly tap on the shoulder by a distant acquaintance – an intrusion into his/her 
private sphere, although in the legal sense it is not considered privacy infringement. 
114 Notably see the famous article entitled “The Right to Privacy” written by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. 
Brandeis [Warren, S. D. and Brandeis, L. D. (1890) ‘The Right to Privacy’, Harvard Law Review, 4(5), pp. 
193-220.] or the adoption of the different international human rights documents throughout the 20th century 
– to be presented in a later part of the dissertation. 
115 The substance of the international and national norms to be presented in this part will be examined in §2. 
116 For example, even the Bible has some passages where the violation of privacy appeared in its early form, 
where shame and anger followed the intrusion into someone’s private sphere. It is enough to think of Adam 
and Eve, who started to cover their bodies with leaves in order to preserve their privacy. (Source: Konvitz, 
M. R. (1966) ‘Privacy and the Law: a Philosophical Prelude.’, Law and Contemporary Problems, 31(2), p. 
272.) From a legal point of view, the Code of Hammurabi contained a paragraph against the intrusion into 
someone’s home, and the Roman law also regulated the same question. (Source: Solove, D. J. (2011) Nothing 
to hide: the false tradeoff between privacy and security. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, p. 4.) 
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privacy traditionally comes from the difference between “private” and “public”,117 which 
distinction comes from the natural need – as old as mankind – of the individual to make a 
distinction between himself/herself and the outer world.118 Of course, the limits between 
private and public differ according to the given era and society,119 which will cause the on-
going change throughout history of what people consider private.120, 121 Thus, 
contemporary conceptions of privacy and its protection will considerably differ from its 
early forms. 
37. Appearance of the right to privacy. It was the 19th century which brought a 
huge leap in the history of privacy as the new changes in the economy and in the society 
led to the transformation of the way people lived, and these new changes had consequences 
for privacy too, as physical and mental privacy were separated and started to evolve in two 
different ways. Due to urbanization, the population of cities started to grow, and it led to 
the physical loss of privacy as people in cities had to live in crowded places. On the other 
hand, citizens could experience a new “type” of privacy, as they ceased to live under the 
always watching eyes of their village neighbors and the constant moral control set up by 
them.122 
 
117 Szabó, M. D. (2005) ‘Kísérlet a privacy fogalmának meghatározására a magyar jogrendszer 
fogalmaival’, Információs Társadalom, (2), p. 45. 
118 Konvitz, M. R. (1966) ‘Privacy and the Law: a Philosophical Prelude.’, Law and Contemporary 
Problems, 31(2), p. 274. 
119 Szabó, M. D. (2005) ‘Kísérlet a privacy fogalmának meghatározására a magyar jogrendszer 
fogalmaival’, Információs Társadalom, (2), p. 45. 
120 In the ancient societies people had a relatively limited possibility for self-determination as their (private) 
lives were strongly influenced by the state. Plato illustrates this phenomenon in his dialogue the Laws, where 
the complete life of the individual was determined by the state and its aims, there was no place for individual 
freedom and autonomy. Thus, the book describes a very extreme state (which in its totality was never 
realised), some elements of it came true in ancient societies, and the life of the individual was strongly 
influenced by the public interests. In the Medieval Age there was no privacy as a societal value in today’s 
sense, the individual existed as a member of a community, so his/her private life was affected by the constant 
“monitoring” conducted by other members. A significant change in the history of privacy happened in the 
19th century, with the appearance of the industrial society. Source: Lukács, A. (2016) ‘What is Privacy? The 
History and Definition of Privacy’, in Gábor Keresztes (ed.): Tavaszi Szél 2016 Tanulmánykötet I. Budapest: 
Doktoranduszok Országos Szövetsége, p. 257. 
121 Daniel Solove made an illustrative example to present the on-going change regarding what people 
consider private: even the aspects of life that nowadays are commonly considered as private (the family, the 
body and the home, etc.) had been through considerable changes as initially they were far from being private. 
For example, marriage was initially considered to be a contract, while nowadays it is one of the most intimate 
decisions made by the individual. See more: Solove, D. J. (2002) ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’, California Law 
Review, 90(4), pp. 1132-1140. 
122 Simon, É. (2005) ‘Egy XIX. századi tanulmány margójára’, Információs Társadalom, (2), p. 36. 
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38. It was against this background that the need for the right to privacy 
appeared.123 Its first appearance dates back to 1890, when Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis first stated the need for the legal recognition of the right to privacy in their article 
titled “The Right to Privacy” (published in the Harvard Law Review).124 The reason behind 
was the dangers underlying the appearance and growth of (tabloid) newspapers, combined 
with the invention of the portable cameras, which were a fertile area for gossip and 
photojournalism.125 Their writing became a famous article among legal scholars; an 
“unquestioned ‘classic’”,126 the “most influential law review article of all”.127 In the above-
mentioned article Warren and Brandeis defined the right to privacy as “the right to be let 
alone”.128 The article also influenced jurisprudence as numerous endeavors to define 
privacy originated from Warren’s and Brandeis’ work.129 
39. International human rights agreements. Even before the drafting of the 
relevant international document(s), certain early forms of privacy protection (e.g. sanctity 
of the home and secrecy of correspondence) were to be found in the national legal systems, 
especially in France, England and Germany. However, it was only after the Second World 
War that the development of the right to privacy took a pace and has not slowed down ever 
since.130 The cruelties of the Second World War – during which the use of large databases 
facilitated the deportation of millions – led to the drafting of the first international human 
rights agreements,131, 132 both at the universal and at the regional level.133 The very first 
 
123 Early forms of protection existed as well, relating, for example, to the immunity of the home (“an 
Englishman's home is his castle”) or to the protection of correspondence. 
124 Warren, S. D. and Brandeis, L. D. (1890) ‘The Right to Privacy’, Harvard Law Review, 4(5), pp. 193–
220. 
125 On the background and the more detailed analysis of this high-impact article see more in: Bratman, B. E. 
(2002) ‘Brandeis and Warren’s The Right to Privacy and the Birth of the Right to Privacy’, Tennessee Law 
Review, 69(3), pp. 623–651.; Gormley, K. (1992) ‘One Hundred Years of Privacy’, Wisconsin Law Review, 
(5), pp. 1343-1357. 
126 Shapiro, F. R. (1985) ‘The Most-Cited Law Review Articles’, California Law Review, 73(5), p. 1545. 
127 Kalven, H. J. (1966) ‘Privacy in Tort Law – Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?’, Law and Contemporary 
Problems, 31(2), p. 327. 
128 Warren, S. D. and Brandeis, L. D. (1890) ‘The Right to Privacy’, Harvard Law Review, 4(5), p. 193. 
129 Simon, É. (2005) ‘Egy XIX. századi tanulmány margójára’, Információs Társadalom, (2), p. 32. 
The Right to Privacy influenced the law especially in the US, where this article is regarded as the origin of 
the four privacy torts (appropriation, publicity, false light, and intrusion) that emerged from the US case law. 
(See: Posner, R. A. (1978) ‘The Right of Privacy’, Georgia Law Review, 12(3), p. 409; Prosser, W. L. (1960) 
‘Privacy’, California Law Review, 48(3), p. 389.) Europe started to examine the right to privacy after the US 
and created a different kind of protection. On the differences between EU and US privacy protection see 
more: Whitman, J. Q. (2004) ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty’, The Yale Law 
Journal, 113(6), pp. 1151-1221. 
130 Rigaux, M. F. (1991) ‘La liberté de la vie privée’, Revue internationale de droit comparé, 43(3), p. 540, 
545. 
131 Buitelaar, J. C. (2012) ‘Privacy: Back to the Roots’, German Law Journal, 13(3), p. 174. 
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international document that acknowledged the right to privacy as a fundamental human 
right was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948, Article 12, 
hereinafter referred to as: UDHR).134, 135 At the regional level, the Council of Europe and 
the European Union must be mentioned. One of the most important documents regulating 
the right to privacy is the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe, 
1950, Article 8, hereinafter referred to as: ECHR), which served as a genesis for several 
pieces of privacy legislation throughout Europe,136 and marks the beginning of 
contemporary privacy protection in Europe.137 Last but not least, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (European Union, 2000, hereinafter referred to 
as: CFREU) must be mentioned. 
40. Technological development. Although the adoption of these norms 
constitutes a significant step in relation to privacy protection, the history of the right to 
privacy has not come to its end. Being an evolutive concept, privacy must be regularly 
reinterpreted according to the given era: when discussing the subject of privacy, the 
impacts of technological development pose inevitable questions as privacy has a close 
connection to technology, making it a very fertile area of research even after more than a 
century.138 
David Flaherty explains the relationship between technology and privacy, through 
pointing out how the latter is connected to technology and was challenged by the great 
 
132 Although Whitman demonstrates that in contrast to the popular opinion according to which dignity – and 
the fundamental right based on dignity, such as the right to privacy – became increasingly important in 
response to the cruelties of the world war, and especially the Nazi regime, it was already present and 
protected in (the French and German) legal systems. Source: Whitman, J. Q. (2004) ‘The Two Western 
Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty’, The Yale Law Journal, 113(6), p. 1165. 
133 See Annex I. on the summary table concerning the most important international documents in the field of 
privacy, data protection, data protection and employment, and data protection and social network sites. 
134 Mendel, T. et al. (2013) Étude mondiale sur le respect de la vie privée sur l’Internet et la liberté 
d’expression. Paris: Éditions Unesco (Collection Unesco sur la liberté de l’Internet), p. 12. 
135 Among the documents drafted by the United Nations, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (United Nations, 1966, hereinafter referred to as: ICCPR) shall also be mentioned, and its Article 17 
guaranteeing the respect of private life. 
136 Rustad, M. L. and Paulsson, S. R. (2005) ‘Monitoring Employee E-Mail and Internet Usage: Avoiding the 
Omniscient Electronic Sweatshop: Insights from Europe’, U. Pa. Journal of Labor and Employment Law, 
7(4), pp. 870-871. 
137 Otto, M. (2016) The Right to Privacy in Employment: a Comparative Analysis. Oxford, Portland: Hart 
Publishing, p. 69. 
138 As Robert Sprague noted, “[o]ne of the greatest impacts on one’s expectation of privacy—and, hence, 
one’s right to privacy—is technology.” [Source: Sprague, R. (2008) ‘Orwell Was an Optimist: The Evolution 
of Privacy in the United States and Its De-Evolution for American Employees’, The John Marshall Law 
Review, 42(1), p. 89.] 
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inventions ever since the Industrial Revolution.139 Compared to the big technological threat 
in the era of Warren and Brandeis, the instant camera, owned only by a few, the change is 
considerable: today individuals have far overstepped those challenges by carrying around 
in their pockets complex devices that are capable of tracking, locating and recording every 
move they make.140 Lawrence Lessig explains in one of his articles how monitoring – a 
natural societal phenomenon – was completely changed in its paradigm due to the 
technological development, by making it permanent, pervasive and recordable.141 Not only 
scholars, but several international documents have also acknowledged the importance of 
human rights and among them the right to privacy in this technologically changed 
environment.142 Title 2 will explore in detail the challenges brought by technology in the 
focus of the dissertation and its societal impacts: social media and SNSs. 
(b) Legal acknowledgement of the right to privacy: France and Hungary 
41. Privacy and constitutional law. In addition to the protection afforded by 
international norms, national systems as well guarantee the protection of the right to 
privacy. Both in France and in Hungary constitutional protection is accorded to the right to 
privacy. However, France is one of those countries which do not expressively state the 
protection of the right to respect for private life in its constitution.143  
42. In France, the Constitutional Council first recognized the right to respect for 
private life in its 1995 “vidéosurveillance” decision.144 Before this date, only the home 
received protection, but not the right to respect for private life in general.145 Although it 
does not refer expressly to the respect of private life as such, the “inspection of vehicles” 
 
139 Flaherty, D. H. (1999) ‘Some reflections on privacy and technology’, Manitoba Law Journal, 26(2), p. 
224. 
140 Hughes, R. L. D. (2015) ‘Two concepts of privacy’, Computer Law and Security Review, 31(4), p. 527. 
141 Lessig, L. (2005) ‘A privát szféra architektúrája’, Információs Társadalom, (2), pp. 55-74. 
142 See, for example, the UN’s document “The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the 
Internet.” (United Nations, 2012, A/HRC/20/L.13) or the “Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 
18 December 2013 - The right to privacy in the digital age” (United Nations, 2013, A/RES/68/167). These 
documents reaffirm that individuals shall enjoy the same fundamental human rights – and among them the 
right to privacy – also in the digital and Internet era. 
143 Though the Advisory Committee on the Revision of the Constitution proposed in 1993 to complement 
Article 66 with the provision “Everyone shall have the right to respect for his/her private life […] .” Comité 
consultatif pour une révision de la Constitution, présidé par le doyen Georges Vedel (1993) Propositions 
pour une révision de la Constitution. Rapport au Président de la République. p. 53. 
144 Conseil constitutionnel: décision n° 94-352 DC du 18 janvier 1995 
145 Burgorgue-Larson, L. (2005) ‘L’appréhension constitutionnelle de la vie privée en Europe : Analyse 
croisée des systèmes constitutionnels allemand, espagnol et français.’, in Sudre, F. (ed.) Le droit à la vie 
privée au sens de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Bruxelles: Bruylant, p. 98. 
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decision from 1977146 is considered to be the first step towards recognizing the 
constitutional value of the right to respect for private life.147 It was finally granted 
constitutional value in 1995, in the “vidéosurveillance” decision, when the Constitutional 
Council stated that “[…] the infringement of the right to respect for private life may pose a 
threat to the individual liberty.”148 By this, it attached the right to respect for private life to 
individual liberty, founded on Article 66 of the Constitution.149 Following this decision, in 
its universal health insurance decision in 1999,150 the Constitutional Council found a new 
legal base, detaching it from individual liberty and acknowledged that it is founded on 
Article 2 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen,151 therefore associated 
with personal liberty.152, 153 
43. Hungary’s constitution, the Fundamental Law (adopted in 2011) expressis 
verbis states the protection of the right to privacy, through stating in Subsection (1) of 
Article VI that “[e]veryone shall have the right to respect for his or her private and family 
life, home, communications and reputation.” The right to respect of private life as such did 
 
146 Conseil constitutionnel: décision n° 76-75 DC du 12 janvier 1977. See more on this decision in: Favoreu, 
L. (1979) ‘Le Conseil constitutionnel et la protection de la liberté individuelle et de la vie privée. A propos de 
la décision du 12 janvier 1977 relative à la fouille des véhicules’, in Études offertes à Pierre Kayser. Aix-en-
Provence: Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, pp. 411–425. 
147 Mazeaud, V. (2015) ‘La constitutionnalisation du droit au respect de la vie privée’, Les Nouveaux Cahiers 
du Conseil constitutionnel, (48) p. 10. 
148 Conseil constitutionnel: décision n° 94-352 DC du 18 janvier 1995, par 3. 
149 Burgorgue-Larson, L. (2005) ‘L’appréhension constitutionnelle de la vie privée en Europe : Analyse 
croisée des systèmes constitutionnels allemand, espagnol et français.’, in Sudre, F. (ed.) Le droit à la vie 
privée au sens de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Bruxelles: Bruylant, pp. 69-115. 
Available at: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01743616/document (Accessed: 16 August 2019) p. 17. 
150 Conseil constitutionnel: décision n° 99-416 DC du 23 juillet 1999. See more in this decision in: 
‘Commentaire de la décision n° 99-416 DC du 23 juillet 1999’ (Cahier 7). Les Cahiers du Conseil 
constitutionnel. Available at: http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/root/bank/download/99416DCccc_416dc.pdf (Accessed: 21 May 2018). 
151 Conseil constitutionnel: décision n° 99-416 DC du 23 juillet 1999, par. 45. “Considering that under 
Article 2 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen ‘the aim of all political associations is the 
preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of the Man. These rights are liberty, property, security 
and resistance to oppression.’ the freedom proclaimed by this article implies respect for privacy.” 
152 Crouzatier-Durand, F. (2013) Fiches de libertés publiques et droits fondamentaux. 2nd edn. Paris: 
Ellipses, p. 58.; Bioy, X. (2016) Droits fondamentaux et libertés publiques. 4e édition. Issy-les-Moulineaux: 
LGDJ-Lextenso éditions (Collection Cours). pp. 454-456. 
153 The notion of personal liberty (“liberté personnelle”) appeared in a 1988 decision of the Constitutional 
Council (Décision n° 88-244 DC du 20 juillet 1988. See more about it in: Dupré de Boulois, X. (ed.) 
(2017) Les grands arrêts du droit des libertés fondamentales. Paris: Dalloz. pp. 323-340.) and is considered 
to have utmost importance (“liberté mère”), serving as a single point of origin (“porte d’entrée unique”) for 
the manifestations of personal autonomy (Bioy, X. (2016) Droits fondamentaux et libertés publiques. 4e 
édition. Issy-les-Moulineaux: LGDJ-Lextenso éditions (Collection Cours). p. 452.). On the notions of 
individual liberty and personal liberty, and their role in the Constitutional Council’s decisions see more in: 
Vadillo, F. (2015) ‘Liberté individuelle vs liberté personnelle : l’article 66 de la Constitution dans la 
jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel ou la progressive reconnaissance d’un habeas corpus à la 
française’, Petites affiches, (80), p. 4–11.; Roussillon, H. and Bioy, X. (eds) (2006) La liberté personnelle : 
une autre conception de la liberté ? Toulouse: Presses de l’Université des Sciences sociales. 
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not appear explicitly till the adoption of the Fundamental Law,154 although it does not 
mean that before this period no legal protection was afforded: the previous constitution 
already ensured protection to certain aspects of privacy, such as private secrets and the 
home.155 
In June 2018, the seventh modification of the Fundamental Law156 introduced certain 
changes relevant to the right to respect for private life, with regard to the new challenges 
arising due to technological development, digitalization, and the growing media 
attention.157 As a result of the modification, Subsection (1) of Article VI was completed 
with the phrase “[t]he exercise of freedom of expression and the right of assembly cannot 
result in the violation of private and family life or home of others.” Subsection (2) was 
inserted into the same Article stating that the State legally protects the tranquility of the 
home. 
44. Civil law protection. Early forms of legal privacy protection appeared even 
before the right to respect of private life was explicitly declared by the Civil Codes – 1970 
in France and 1977 in Hungary. In France its early history is mostly connected to the 
freedom of press and to the insults relating to private life.158 Before 1970, when the right to 
respect for private life was inserted159 into the Civil Code,160 protection could be afforded 
on the basis of the previous Article 1382 on civil responsibility.161 
 
154 Although it appeared in the practice of the Constitutional Court – which will be addressed in §2. 
155 Act XX of 1949. The original text (Section 57) guaranteed protection to the individuals’ individual liberty 
and its inviolability, the respect of private secrets and the home. The amendment of 1972 ensured the same 
protection but to the citizens. The final text of the previous constitution was adopted in 1989, with Subsection 
(1) of Section 59 stating that “[i]n the Republic of Hungary everyone has the right to reputation, right to 
inviolability of the domicile, the right to the protection of private secrets and the right to the protection of 
personal data.” Source: Jóri, A. (2009) ‘A magánszférajogok’, in Jakab, A. (ed.) Az Alkotmány kommentárja 
II. Budapest: Századvég Kiadó, pp. 2171-2172. 
156 Article 4 of the seventh amendment of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, 28 June 2018  
157 T/332. számú javaslat Magyarország Alaptörvényének hetedik módosítása (2018). Előadó: Dr. Trócsányi 
László igazságügyi miniszter. Budapest, p. 5. 
158 See more on the early history of French privacy law in: Whitman, J. Q. (2004) ‘The Two Western 
Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty’, The Yale Law Journal, 113(6), pp. 1171-1180. 
159 Inserted by the Act No. 70-643 of 17 July 1970 on strengthening the guarantee of individual rights of 
citizens (“Loi n° 70-643 du 17 juillet 1970 tendant à renforcer la garantie des droits individuels des 
citoyens”). 
160 Article 9: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private life.” 
Without prejudice to the right to recover indemnification for injury suffered, judges may prescribe any 
measures, such as sequestration, seizure and others, suited to the prevention or the ending of an infringement 
of the intimate character of private life; in case of emergency those measures may be provided for by 
summary proceedings.” 
161 Rigaux, M. F. (1991) ‘La liberté de la vie privée’, Revue internationale de droit comparé, 43(3), p. 546. 
Article 1382 stated that “[t]he perpetrator of any act that causes damage to another person is obliged to make 
reparation.” 
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45. The previous Hungarian Civil Code (Act IV of 1959) did not ensure sui 
generis protection to privacy, it received protection on the ground of personality rights.162 
It is the primary objective of personality rights to ensure protection to rights which make 
humans human, which are parts of human personality, without examining the societal 
circumstances – excluding from their scope political, cultural and social rights.163 The 
essence of personality rights is to ensure the free expression of the personality and to 
prevent anyone from hindering them, within the limits that the community imposes.164 
Naturally, the exercise of these rights is not without limits, it is only in accordance with 
their social purpose, if it does not infringe other individuals’ rights or laws guaranteeing 
these rights.165, 166 It appeared in the Civil Code (Act V of 2013), which explicitly declares 
the protection of right to privacy.167 Another important step was the adoption of the act on 
the protection of private life168 in 2018. 
46. Criminal law protection. Besides constitutional and civil law protection, 
criminal law also guarantees the protection against infringements of the right to privacy. 
 
162 The general personality right was afforded protection even before the Second World War. Source: Jóri, A. 
(2009) ‘A magánszférajogok’, in Jakab, A. (ed.) Az Alkotmány kommentárja II. Budapest: Századvég Kiadó, 
p. 2170. 
163 Fézer, T. (2014) ‘Harmadik rész: személyiségi jogok’, in Osztovits, A. (ed.) A Polgári Törvénykönyvről 
szóló 2013. évi V. törvény és a kapcsolódó jogszabályok nagykommentárja. I. kötet. Budapest: Opten 
Informatikai Kft. p. 250. 
164 Petrik, F. (2014) ‘Személyiségi jogok’, in Wellmann, G. (ed.) Polgári jog: Bevezető és záró 
rendelkezések. Az ember mint jogalany. Öröklési jog. 2nd edn. Budapest: HVG-ORAC Lap- és Könyvkiadó, 
pp. 173-174. 
165 BH. 1992.387. 
166 See more on privacy and personality rights in: Görög, M. (2016) ‘A magánélethez való jog mint a 
személyiségi jog újabb, magánjogi kódexben nevesített vonatkozása’, in Balogh, E. (ed.) Számadás az 
Alaptörvényről: tanulmányok a Szegedi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar oktatóinak tollából. 
Budapest: Magyar Közlöny Lap- és Könyvkiadó, pp. 61-63. 
On the personality rights see more in: Nótári, T., Péterfalvy, A. and Sándor, I. (2006) A Polgári 
Törvénykönyv magyarázata. I. kötet: A személyek joga. Edited by G. Török. Budapest: Magyar Hivatalos 
Közlönykiadó. pp. 297-337.; Fézer, T. (2014) ‘Harmadik rész: személyiségi jogok’, in Osztovits, A. (ed.) A 
Polgári Törvénykönyvről szóló 2013. évi V. törvény és a kapcsolódó jogszabályok nagykommentárja. I. kötet. 
Budapest: Opten Informatikai Kft., pp. 249–355.; Zoltán, Ö. (2007) ‘A személyhez és a szellemi 
alkotásokhoz fűződő jogok’, in Gellért, G. (ed.) A Polgári Törvénykönyv magyarázata 1.7th edn. Budapest: 
Complex, pp. 256–326.; Petrik, F. (2014) ‘Személyiségi jogok’, in Wellmann, G. (ed.) Polgári jog: Bevezető 
és záró rendelkezések. Az ember mint jogalany. Öröklési jog. 2nd edn. Budapest: HVG-ORAC Lap- és 
Könyvkiadó, pp. 166–211.; Navratyil, Z. (2016) ‘Személyiségi jogok’, in Csehi, Z. (ed.) Az új Polgári 
Törvénykönyv magyarázata. Kommentár a 2013. évi V. törvényhez. 2nd edn. Budapest: Menedzser Praxis 
Szakkiadó és Gazdasági Tanácsadó Kft., pp. 105–124.; Kecskés, L. (2007) Polgári jog: A személyek joga. 
3rd edn. Budapest-Pécs: Dialóg Campus Kiadó. pp. 413-451. 
167 Subsection (1) of Section 2:42 of the Hungarian Civil Code: “[e]veryone is entitled to freely practice his 
or her personality rights, in particular the right to privacy and family life, home and communications with 
others in any way or form, and the right to protection against defamation of character, within the framework 
of the law and within the rights of others, and to not be impeded by others in exercising such rights.” 
168 Act LIII of 2018 on the protection of private life. To be presented in detail in a later section of the 
dissertation. 
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When introducing civil law protection in 1970, Act No. 70-643 of 17 July 1970 on 
strengthening the guarantee of individual rights of citizens also inserted provisions into the 
French Penal Code against different invasions of privacy, at present found in Articles 226-
1–226-7 of the French Penal Code. The Hungarian Penal Code (Act C of 2012) also 
contains certain provisions aiming to sanction the most serious actions infringing certain 
components of the right to respect for private life.169 
47. Conclusions of Part (A). Despite the fact that during the last decades the 
right to privacy gained legal recognition (both at the international and at the national level) 
and constitutes a dynamically evolving field of law due to its dependence on societal and 
technological circumstances, it does not mean that a universal definition, valid in all 
circumstances could be created. The next paragraphs will explore the different notions that 
were created attempting to define privacy.  
(B) Understanding privacy 
48. Enumerating exhaustively all existing (philosophical) and legal notions of 
privacy is an impossible task170 and would also go beyond the primary scope of the 
dissertation. Therefore, the dissertation had to limit itself to presenting only a certain 
number of approaches relevant for the main topic of the dissertation. The aim of the 
following paragraphs is to provide insight into the various facets of privacy through 
reviewing the (a) most common types of definitions, then their existing categorizations by 
several scholars. Then, part (b) will demonstrate the factors that can have a considerable 
influence on understanding privacy – making it an ever-changing concept. The knowledge 
of this background will be necessary to understand how the legal protection of privacy 
functions, and what aspects of privacy receive legal protection in the examined 
jurisdictions. 
(a) Definitions and classification of definitions 
 
169 Such as: Misuse of personal data – Section 219; Illegal Entry into Private Property – Section 221; 
Harassment – Section 222; Invasion of Privacy – Section 223; Mail Fraud –Section 224. 
170 I share the opinion of the ECtHR, which stated in Niemietz v. Germany that “[t]he Court does not 
consider it possible or necessary to attempt an exhaustive definition of the notion of ‘private life.’” ECtHR: 
Niemietz v. Germany, application no. 13710/88, 16 December 1992, par. 29. 
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49. Multiple definitions.171 Besides the ever-changing nature of privacy, 
numerous attempts to define privacy have been made during the last 120 years.172 
Traditionally, privacy can relate to concealment or secrecy, giving the individual the 
possibility to separate himself/herself from the outside world. As already presented, 
Warren and Brandeis defined privacy as “the right to be let alone”.173 Sidney M. Jourard 
links privacy to concealment and argues that privacy “is an outcome of a person's wish to 
withhold from others certain knowledge, past and present experience and action and his 
intentions for the future.”174 Privacy can also be understood as a quasi “aura” around the 
individual, which constitutes the boundary between him/her and the outside world.175 
László Sólyom puts interference into the center of privacy and argues that the common 
feature of perceptions of privacy is that it means the (physical and mental) area which is 
controlled by the individual, and which is thus free from external interference.176 
50. Accessibility can also play a part in these definitions: according to Ruth 
Gavison “our interest in privacy […] is related to our concern over our accessibility to 
others: the extent to which we are known to others, the extent to which others have 
physical access to us, and the extent to which we are the subject of others' attention.”177 
According to Hyman Gross “privacy is the condition of human life in which acquaintance 
with a person or with affairs of his life which are personal to him is limited.”178 Another 
definition captures privacy as an “interest that individuals have in sustaining a 'personal 
space', free from interference by other people and organisations.”179 Ernest Van Der Haag 
provides a similar definition through understanding privacy as “the exclusive access of a 
 
171 How privacy is comprehended in France and in Hungary will be addressed in detail under §2. 
172 On the existing definitions see more notably in: Solove, D. J. (2002) ‘Conceptualizing 
Privacy’, California Law Review, 90(4), pp. 1087–1156.; Davis, S. (2009) ‘Is There a Right to 
Privacy?’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 90(4), pp. 450–475. 
173 Warren, S. D. and Brandeis, L. D. (1890) ‘The Right to Privacy’, Harvard Law Review, 4(5), p. 193. 
174 Jourard, S. M. (1966) ‘Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy’, Law and Contemporary Problems, 
31(2), p. 307. 
175 Hajdú, J. (2005) A munkavállalók személyiségi jogainak védelme. Szeged: Pólay Elemér Alapítvány. p. 8. 
referring to Davis, S. (1996) Big Brother: Britain’s web of surveillance and the new technological order. 
London: Pan.  
176 Sólyom, L. (1983) A személyiségi jogok elmélete. Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó. p. 315. 
177 Gavison, R. (1980) ‘Privacy and the Limits of Law’, The Yale Law Journal, 89(3), p. 423. 
178 Gross, H. (1967) ‘The Concept of Privacy’, New York University Law Review, 42(1), pp. 35-36. 
179 Clarke, R. (2014) ‘Privacy and Social Media: An Analytical Framework’, Journal of Law, Information 
and Science, 23(1), p. 174. 
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person to a realm of his own. The right to privacy entitles an individual to exclude others 
from (a) watching, (b) utilizing, (c) invading his private [personal] realm.”180 
51. Privacy can be approached through control over information relating to the 
individual: Alan F. Westin defined privacy as “the claim of an individual to determine 
what information about himself or herself should be known to others”,181 while Charles 
Fried stated that “privacy […] is the control we have over information about 
ourselves.”182, 183 Richard A. Posner argued that “one aspect of privacy is the withholding 
or concealment of information.”184 Richard B. Parker goes beyond identifying privacy as 
control over information and argues that privacy “is control over when and by whom the 
various parts of us can be sensed by others.”185 According to Ferdinand D. Schoeman this 
control can relate not only to information and sensory access but also to the intimacies of 
personal identity.186 
52. Privacy can also be connected to human dignity and autonomy: Edward 
Bloustein argued that intrusion into privacy has a close connection with personhood, 
individuality and human dignity.187 Tom Gerety understands privacy as “the control over 
or the autonomy of the intimacies of personal identity”.188 Máté Dániel Szabó argued that 
“privacy is the right of the individual to decide about himself/herself”.189 According to the 
Supreme Court of Canada, privacy is closely connected to the concept of freedom, as it 
constitutes “an essential component of what it means to be free”.190 Privacy attached to 
dignity is connected to the free development of personality and inner self, enabling the 
 
180 Cited in: McCullagh, K. (2008) ‘Blogging: self presentation and privacy’, Information & Communications 
Technology Law, 17(1), p. 4. 
181 Westin, A. F. (2003) ‘Social and political dimensions of privacy’, Journal of Social Issues, 59(2), p. 431. 
182 Fried, C. (1968) ‘Privacy’, The Yale Law Journal, 77(3), p. 393. 
183 Erik Van Hove adopts the same opinion and complements this definition by adding the right to a private 
sphere. Cited in: McCullagh, K. (2008) ‘Blogging: self presentation and privacy’, Information & 
Communications Technology Law, 17(1), p. 4. 
184 Posner, R. A. (1978) ‘The Right of Privacy’, Georgia Law Review, 12(3), p. 393. 
185 Parker, R. B. (1974) ‘A Definition of Privacy’, Rutgers Law Review, 27(2), p. 281. 
186 Schoeman, F. D. (2007) ‘Privacy: philosophical dimensions of the literature’, in Schoeman, F. D. 
(ed.) Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 2. 
187 Bloustein, E. J. (1964) ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: an Answer to Dean Prosser’, New York 
University Law Review, 39(6), p. 973, p. 974. 
188 Gerety, T. (1977) ‘Redefining Privacy’, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 12(2), p. 281. 
189 Szabó, M. D. (2005) ‘Kísérlet a privacy fogalmának meghatározására a magyar jogrendszer 
fogalmaival’, Információs Társadalom, (2), p. 46. 
190 Flaherty, P. and Whitmore, S. (2013) ‘Privacy Protection in the Digital Workplace’, in Law Society of 
Upper Canada, Employment Law and the New Workplace in the Social Media Age. Toronto: Irwin Law, p. 9. 
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individual to create different public personas through being able to decide which areas of 
his/her life is the individual going to share with others.191 
53. Intimacy also appears in definitions: according to Julie Inness all these 
approaches – information, access or intimate decisions – are linked by the common 
denominator of intimacy, being in the center of privacy.192 According to Charles Fried, 
privacy serves as a basis for intimate relationships, such as friendship, love and trust; and 
constitutes a necessary pre-condition of establishing relationships with others and shaping 
one’s own identity.193, 194 
54. Having knowledge of these definitions is crucial for the main topic of the 
dissertation, as in relation to SNSs, several of these definitions gain importance – as it will 
be discussed in detail. Privacy interpreted as one’s right to decide about himself/herself can 
be understood as deciding whether to engage in SNSs and if yes, to what extent. 
Developing one’s personality can also take place on SNSs, as SNS profiles play an 
important role in self-expression and identity. Interpreting secrecy, withholding and the 
concealment of information in the SNS context is not without difficulties as the whole 
functioning of these sites is powered by the share of personal information. However, 
through the use of privacy settings, the individual can decide to withhold from one part of 
the community and only share information with a chosen audience. 
55. Classification of the definitions. Instead of providing a unique definition of 
privacy, it is worth examining what clusters of privacy or categorization of the definition 
of privacy exist, as they can provide important guidance in relation to the far-reaching 
nature of privacy and can improve instincts on privacy relating to which areas of life 
should receive legal protection. 
 
191 Levin, A. and Sánchez Abril, P. (2009) ‘Two Notions of Privacy Online’, Vanderbilt Journal of 
Entertainment and Technology Law, 11(4), p. 1013. 
192 Julie C. Inness, J. C. (1992) Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation. Cited in: Solove, D. J. (2002) 
‘Conceptualizing Privacy’, California Law Review, 90(4), p. 1121. 
193 Cited in: Levin, A. and Sánchez Abril, P. (2009) ‘Two Notions of Privacy Online’, Vanderbilt Journal of 
Entertainment and Technology Law, 11(4), p. 1013. 
194 As Daniel Solove analysed in his article entitled “Conceptualizing Privacy”, most of the existing 
definitions are either too narrow or too broad and presented his thorough criticism regarding these notions. 
He argued that definitions do not lack merit, as they might provide valuable insight into privacy, but none of 
them in itself succeed in perfectly capturing the essence of privacy. (Source: Solove, D. J. (2002) 
‘Conceptualizing Privacy’, California Law Review, 90(4), p. 1099.) Also, for the purpose of the dissertation 
not all “types” of privacy will be relevant – for example, the privacy of the home or physical privacy – 
instead, focus will be put on control over information and the autonomy or self-determination of the 
individual. 
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56. Certain scholars avoided providing a unique definition but defined different 
categories or clusters of privacy. Judith Wagner DeCew differentiated between three 
clusters of privacy claims: informational privacy, accessibility privacy and expressive 
privacy.195 Jerry Kang argued that privacy is composed of three overlapping clusters: 
spatial privacy (physical space), decisional privacy (choice) and information privacy (flow 
of information).196 The Supreme Court of Canada distinguished between three “zones of 
privacy”: territorial privacy, personal privacy and informational privacy.197 According to 
József Hajdú, privacy protection can take four forms: data protection, protection of the 
human body, protection of communication and protection of space.198 
57. Other scholars regrouped the existing definitions into different groups: 
according to Ken Gormley, the different privacy notions that appeared after Warren’s and 
Brandeis’s ground-breaking work can be grouped into four categories: (1) privacy as the 
expression of one’s personality, (2) privacy as autonomy, (3) privacy as the ability to 
regulate information and (4) privacy composed of different essential components.199 In 
addition to these four categories defined by Gormley, Éva Simon identified two more to be 
added to this list: (5) concepts according to which privacy is approached from societal 
interests, (6) while the sixth category is composed of theories according to which the right 
to privacy cannot and should not be reduced to one single definition.200 
Another study from 2013, entitled “Seven Types of Privacy”, written by Rachel L. 
Finn, David Wright and Michael Friedewald, made a huge contribution towards how to 
approach privacy. In this article the authors also opted for categorizing the types of privacy 
in a structured, logical way instead of creating a universal definition. They based their 
analysis on the four privacy subsets defined by Roger Clarke in 1997 and revised and 
expanded these categories while taking into account the technological developments that 
occurred during the past decades. They differentiated between seven types of privacy: (1) 
privacy of the person, (2) privacy of behaviour and action, (3) privacy of personal 
 
195 Solove, D. J. (2002) ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’, California Law Review, 90(4), p. 1125. See more on their 
analysis in: McCullagh, K. (2008) ‘Blogging: self presentation and privacy’, Information & Communications 
Technology Law, 17(1), pp. 4-6. 
196 Kang, J. (1998) ‘Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions’, Stanford Law Review, 50(4), pp. 1202-
1203. 
197 McKay-Panos, L. (2007) ‘Workplace Surveillance’, LawNow, 32(2), p. 45. 
198 Hajdú, J. (2005) A munkavállalók személyiségi jogainak védelme. Szeged: Pólay Elemér Alapítvány. p. 
10. 
199 Gormley, K. (1992) ‘One Hundred Years of Privacy’, Wisconsin Law Review, (5), pp.1137-1138. 
200 Simon, É. (2005) ‘Egy XIX. századi tanulmány margójára’, Információs Társadalom, (2), p. 33. 
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communication, (4) privacy of data and image, (5) privacy of thoughts and feelings, (6) 
privacy of location and space and (7) privacy of association.201 In order to be able to 
successfully assess the future challenges posed by new emerging technologies, the authors 
argued that “[…] privacy is an inherently heterogeneous, fluid and multidimensional 
concept, and […] suggest that this multidimensionality may be necessary to provide a 
platform from which the effects of new technologies can be evaluated.”202 
58. One important example of those who think that privacy should not be 
reduced to a single definition is Daniel Solove’s approach. In his article, “Conceptualizing 
Privacy” he argues that instead of creating an overarching concept, privacy should be 
better understood as “drawing from a common pool of similar characteristics”.203 In his 
article Solove differentiated between six categories of privacy and regrouped the existing 
definitions into these categories. According to him, privacy can be interpreted as (1) the 
right to be let alone, (2) limited access to the self, (3) secrecy, (4) control of personal 
information, (5) personhood and (6) intimacy.204 He pointed out that there is a problem 
with all these definitions: their scope is either too narrow or too broad. He emphasized that 
it does not mean that these concepts lack merit, the problem is that these authors use a 
traditional method of conceptualizing privacy, and as a result their definitions only 
highlight either some aspects of privacy, or they are too broad and do not give an exact 
view on the elements of privacy.205 
These headings defined by Solove can be understood as the main elements when it 
comes to the content of privacy, as knowing all these definitions, we can have a clue what 
areas of life privacy covers, and it can help to broaden and to improve instincts on privacy. 
Instead of applying these methods of conceptualizing privacy, Solove adopts a pragmatic 
approach by seeking to provide not one exhaustive definition but rather an approach to 
better understand privacy.206 He takes into account that privacy depends on several factors 
– such as societal norms, technology and context – and argues that a practical approach is 
 
201 Finn, R. L. et al. (2013) ‘Seven Types of Privacy’, in Gutwirth, S. (ed.) European Data Protection: 
Coming of Age. Dordrecht: Springer, p. 7. 
202 Finn, R. L. et al. (2013) ‘Seven Types of Privacy’, in Gutwirth, S. (ed.) European Data Protection: 
Coming of Age. Dordrecht: Springer, p. 26. 
203 Solove, D. J. (2002) ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’, California Law Review, 90(4), p. 1088. 
204 Solove, D. J. (2002) ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’, California Law Review, 90(4), p. 1094. 
205 Solove, D. J. (2002) ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’, California Law Review, 90(4), p. 1099. 
206 Solove, D. J. (2002) ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’, California Law Review, 90(4), pp. 1126-1128, p. 1129 
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needed to address privacy related issues, instead of creating one overarching definition of 
privacy.207 
59. The complexity of the subject was also highlighted by Koop et al. who have 
provided in their article, entitled “A Typology of Privacy” a typology of privacy “that is 
more systematic and comprehensive than any existing model.”208 In their typology they 
positioned the main types of privacy in a two-dimensional model, composed of the degree 
of privateness209 and the spectrum of positive to negative freedom.210 They identified eight 
types of privacy (bodily, intellectual, spatial, decisional, communicational, associational, 
proprietary, and behavioral privacy) and an extra “one”, informational privacy which – as 
it overlaps but does not coincide with each identified privacy type – constitutes an 
overarching concept instead of a separate type of privacy.211 
60. Again, these classifications are important as they can indicate that privacy in 
relation to SNSs cannot be reduced to one element, but several aspects of privacy gain 
significance in relation to SNSs (e.g. communication through using the messenger 
functions of these platforms, the ability to express one’s personality through posting a 
variety of content, deciding who can have access to the shared content through the 
application of privacy settings, etc.). 
(b) Factors influencing privacy 
61. Privacy should not and cannot be interpreted in a vacuum: what is 
considered to be private is highly dependent on the circumstances: there are huge 
differences between particular societies and cultures, or scientific development can also 
lead to a different, urging need for ensuring the protection of privacy.212 Different factors 
might influence privacy norms in a given society, such as, for example, the political, the 
socio-cultural and the personal level,213 the new generations of technology and new 
generation of users,214 or dimensions of time, place, economy and technology.215 All these 
 
207 On this approach see: Solove, D. J. (2002) ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’, California Law Review, 90(4), pp. 
1129-1154. 
208 Koops, B-J. et al. (2017) ‘A Typology of Privacy’, U. Pa. J. Int’l L., 38(2), p. 483 
209 Koops, B-J. et al. (2017) ‘A Typology of Privacy’, U. Pa. J. Int’l L., 38(2), p. 564 
210 Koops, B-J. et al. (2017) ‘A Typology of Privacy’, U. Pa. J. Int’l L., 38(2), p. 565. 
211 Koops, B-J. et al. (2017) ‘A Typology of Privacy’, U. Pa. J. Int’l L., 38(2), pp. 566-568. 
212 Fried, C. (1968) ‘Privacy’, The Yale Law Journal, 77(3), p. 486., p. 475. 
213 Westin, A. F. (2003) ‘Social and political dimensions of privacy’, Journal of Social Issues, 59(2), pp. 431-
434. 
214 Tene, O. (2011) ‘Privacy: The new generations’, International Data Privacy Law, 1(1), p. 15.  
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factors make it even more difficult to establish one single definition of privacy. Among the 
possible factors influencing the understating of privacy, attention will be drawn to 
technology, social norms and the individual and the context. 
62. Technology has always had a close connection with privacy as new 
innovations of technology change how privacy might be violated, as they gave rise to 
different kinds of privacy intrusions216 – which is also in the focus point of the dissertation. 
Technological innovations, such as profiling, location tracking, mobile devices, biometrics, 
RFID, cloud computing, etc. evoke new kinds of privacy challenges.217 Existing threats to 
privacy have become increasingly important due to the growth of Internet and online 
activities.218 As part of technological inventions, social media and SNSs will have their 
influence on privacy as well – but these questions will be discussed in detail in Title 2. As 
it will be demonstrated in relation to the possible existence of “social media law”, these 
technological innovations do not raise the question of the existence of a fundamentally new 
online privacy law, they rather challenge existing conceptions of privacy.219, 220 
63. As technology advances, it naturally influences individuals’ behaviour and 
social norms relating to privacy and expectations of privacy: social media and the 
 
215 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy (2016). A/HRC/31/64. United Nations, General 
Assembly. par. 21. 
216 For example, taking someone’s photograph has become considerably easier – an example also used by 
Warren and Brandeis back in 1890: while formerly, in order to capture one’s image, the individual had to 
pose for hours to get his/her portrait taken. The invention of cameras changed this landscape. Ever since, 
these devices have become smaller and cheaper, available to the general public. Today basically every 
smartphone has a built-in camera, making it possible to capture one’s image, without the individual’s 
knowledge. Development has not stopped here: Google glasses or Google contact lenses will raise different 
types of challenges. Or, eavesdropping also changed through time: the invention of printing, the invention of 
telephone, e-mails changed how the confidentiality of communications can be infringed. 
Though technology can indeed pose a threat to privacy, it must be seen that technological evolution is not an 
enemy of privacy, as in certain cases it can contribute to protecting privacy in more effective ways, enabling 
individuals to experience more privacy than their ancestors. Source: Schoeman, F. D. (2007) ‘Privacy: 
philosophical dimensions of the literature’, in Schoeman, F. D. (ed.) Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: 
An Anthology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 2. 
217 See more on how technology affects and challenges privacy in: Weber, R. H. (2015) ‘The digital future – 
A challenge for privacy?’, Computer Law and Security Review, 31(2), pp. 236-239.; Tene, O. (2011) 
‘Privacy: The new generations’, International Data Privacy Law, 1(1), pp. 16-21. and Türk, A. (2011) La vie 
privée en péril: des citoyens sous contrôle. Paris: OJacob. 
218 One example is identity theft, which is greatly facilitated in the online environment, compared to its 
offline counterpart. Source: Knight, A. and Saxby, S. (617) ‘Global challenges of identity protection in a 
networked world’, Computer Law and Security Review, 30(6), p. 619. 
219 See more on this matter in Title 2. 
220 The UN special rapporteur on privacy also calls attention to the re-examination of understandings of 
privacy, such as distinctions between “individual and collective privacy”, expectations of privacy in public 
and in private places, with special regard to the free development of one’s personality in the light of 
technological development. Source: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy (2016). 
A/HRC/31/64. United Nations, General Assembly. par. 27. 
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unprecedented extent of online self-exposure can be mentioned as one example.221 For 
example, while a few decades ago it was completely unimaginable to publicly share with 
an undetermined or a very high number of people what someone ate for breakfast, which 
itinerary this person used for his/her morning run, or who he/she is dating, today the share 
of such information is commonplace on SNSs. 
64. The individual also plays a central role, as expectations of privacy can vary 
from individual to individual.222 Anders J. Persson and Sven Ove Hansson also took into 
consideration the individual’s expectations and they divided privacy into two parts: a core 
part, which is protected “by default” – regardless of the individual’s acts – and a 
discretionary part, which is considered to be private depending on the individual’s 
attitudes.223 Privacy is highly dependent on the given context as well: Helen Nissenbaum 
emphasizes the importance of “contextual integrity” when it comes to privacy, pointing out 
that depending on the concrete situation, on the context in which the same information is 
shared might be considered private differently.224, 225 
65. Conclusions of Part (B). To conclude, all these factors, such as technology, 
ever-changing social norms, and perceptions of the individual, hinder the creation of a 
universal definition of privacy. Consequently, what is considered to be private (e.g. by a 
society or by an individual) is not always going to be subject to legal protection. Despite 
the lack of the ability to define privacy and despite its ever-changing nature, legal 
regulations must find an average standard that must receive legal protection. In §2 these 
international and national legislations will be discussed. 
66. In spite of the difficulties in creating a uniform definition, a definition must 
be adopted in order to determine what will be understood by privacy for the purpose of the 
dissertation. As it became apparent, privacy can comprise different aspects. In the context 
of SNSs, mostly two aspects of privacy, the informational aspect of privacy and decisional 
privacy will gain utmost importance. Although at the outset it can be concluded that the 
 
221 Tene, O. (2011) ‘Privacy: The new generations’, International Data Privacy Law, 1(1), p. 22. 
222 What one might consider as intrusion into private life – e.g. opening up about his/her relationship to a 
distant relative – another might consider as completely normal – e.g. sharing the same information 
documented in detail with photos, videos, etc. on social media with several hundreds of contacts. 
223 Persson, A. J. and Hansson, S. O. (2003) ‘Privacy at Work – Ethical Criteria’, Journal of Business Ethics, 
42(1), pp. 61-62. 
224 Nissenbaum, H. (1998) ‘Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: the Problem of Privacy in Public’, Law 
and Philosophy, 17(5–6), p. 581. 
225 For example, sharing information relating to one’s health might feel appropriate if the recipient is the 
individual’s doctor, but sharing exactly same information might feel inappropriate and as an intrusion into 
privacy if the employer asks for the same information. 
 58 
 
informational aspect of the question will also be directly regulated by the right to data 
protection. Therefore, when addressing privacy, particular attention should be paid to 
autonomy, meaning the individual’s right to decide on his/her own. On the basis of the 
above, for the purposes of the dissertation, privacy is understood broadly, as the control 
over the autonomy of the individual, meaning that the individual should be able to decide 
how to live his/her life. In the context of SNSs – as it will be addressed under Title 2 – it 
should primarily mean that the employee is free to decide whether to engage in SNSs, and 
how he/she can use these sites (what content to share, with whom, etc). 
§2. The legal regulation of the right to privacy 
67. As it was already referred to, several international human rights agreements 
guarantee the protection of privacy/respect for private life.226 In the following, the 
substance of the relevant (A) international (with the European legal order at the focus 
point) and (B) national norms will be addressed, with the aim of understanding what 
circumstances receive legal protection under the right to privacy. 
 (A) International human rights instruments 
68. United Nations. Among the UN’s international documents ensuring the 
right to respect for private life, the UDHR and the ICCPR must be mentioned. However, 
for lack of space, these provisions will not be addressed in detail,227 as focus will be rather 
put on the examination of the ECHR and the CFREU, as they are concentrated on the 
European legal order. Under the aegis of the UN, the UN special rapporteur on privacy 
 
226 So far, the expressions “privacy” and “right to privacy” were employed, but (European) legal regulations 
mostly refer to the expression “right to respect for private life”. It must be emphasized that privacy and 
private life are not synonyms, private life supposes a narrower scope, traditionally connected to secrecy or 
concealment, to protection against certain interferences – as it will be presented in the following paragraphs. 
However, there is a tendency indicating that the right to respect for private life is understood in a broader way 
(see, for example, the analysis on the ECtHR’s practice), incorporating also the autonomy of the individual – 
which matter is connected to privacy rather than to private life. 
227 Both documents guarantee the right for respect of private life by stating that it is a fundamental human 
right and no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his/her privacy, family, home and 
correspondence, or to attacks against his/her honour and reputation and they have the right to protect 
themselves against such unlawful interference (Article 12 of the UDHR and Article 17 of the ICCPR). 
Certain differences exist between the wording of these provisions: for example, compared to the ICCPR, the 
UDHR protects only against arbitrary interference and not unlawful interference. Also, regarding honour and 
reputation, the UDHR gives protection against any kind of attacks, while the ICCPR ensures protection 
against arbitrary attacks. Source: Mendel, T. et al. (2013) Étude mondiale sur le respect de la vie privée sur 
l’Internet et la liberté d’expression. Paris: Éditions Unesco (Collection Unesco sur la liberté de l’Internet). p. 
59. 
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must also be mentioned, who is an independent expert appointed by the Human Rights 
Council, whose task is to examine, report and raise awareness on the right to privacy.228 
69. Protection in Europe.229 In Europe, two regional organisations have to be 
mentioned, both of them having an elaborate system and regulation: the CoE and the 
European Union. It is the Council of Europe’s European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter referred to as: ECtHR) and the European Union’s European Court of Justice 
(hereinafter referred to as: CJEU) which created a detailed case law. 
(a) ECHR and ECtHR 
70. The centrepiece of the European protection of human rights,230 one of the 
most important documents regulating the right to privacy is the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Council of Europe, 1950, Article 8), which served as a genesis for several 
pieces of privacy legislation throughout Europe.231 Also, the European Court of Human 
Rights created very important case law regarding Article 8, characterized by rich legal 
development.232 
71. Article 8 of the ECHR: right to respect for private and family life. The 
ECHR guarantees in Article 8 the right to respect for private and family life through stating 
that: 
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
 
228 The right to privacy in the digital age (2015). A/HRC/28/L.27. United Nations, General Assembly.  
229 Even though the dissertation focuses mainly on the European legal order, it must be mentioned that it is 
not only Europe which ensures the right to privacy at a regional level. Article 11 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights (1969) also guarantees the right to privacy. The bodies responsible for ensuring compliance 
with the convention are the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. (Source: Mendel, T. et al. (2013) Étude mondiale sur le respect de la vie privée sur l’Internet 
et la liberté d’expression. Paris: Éditions Unesco (Collection Unesco sur la liberté de l’Internet). p. 61.) Also, 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) can be mentioned in relation to regional human 
rights protection, aiming to ensure fundamental civil and political and economic and social rights in the 
African region. (Source: Velu, R. and Ergec, J. (2014) Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. 
Bruxelles: Bruylant, pp. 24-25.)  
230 Moderne, F. (2012) La Convention européenne des Droits de l’Homme. 3rd edn. Paris: Dalloz, p. 2.  
231 Rustad, M. L. and Paulsson, S. R. (2005) ‘Monitoring Employee E-Mail and Internet Usage: Avoiding the 
Omniscient Electronic Sweatshop: Insights from Europe’, U. Pa. Journal of Labor and Employment Law, 
7(4), pp. 870-871. 
232 Schabas, W. A. (2015) The European Convention on Human Rights: a Commentary. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 366. 
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democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.” 
Article 8233 defines four categories receiving protection: in addition to private life it 
contains family life, home and correspondence – which can be understood as specific 
aspects of private life.234 In relation to the subject of the dissertation, mostly private life 
and auxiliary correspondence235 will have significant importance, amongst which, due to 
its ambiguous scope, the next paragraphs will focus on private life.236 
Although the ECHR guarantees the right to respect for private life through 
determining when an interference cannot be established, it makes it obvious that the right 
to privacy is not an absolute right.237 When the ECtHR examines whether there was a 
violation of Article 8, it examines two conditions in its decisions: first, whether there was 
an interference with the right to respect for private life under Paragraph 1 of Article 8 and 
second, whether the interference was legitimate according to the criteria set in Paragraph 
2.238 
 
233 Although it is not only Article 8 that can guarantee the respect of private life: other Articles of the ECHR 
as well might be of importance in this field. See more in: Guide sur l’article 8 de la Convention européenne 
des droits de l’homme. Droit au respect de la vie privée et familiale (2019). Conseil de l’Europe. Available 
at: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_8_FRA.pdf (Accessed: 5 November 2019), pp. 12-19. 
and Velu, R. and Ergec, J. (2014) Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Bruxelles: Bruylant, pp. 
649-650. 
234 Velu, R. and Ergec, J. (2014) Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Bruxelles: Bruylant, p. 659. 
235 The most important relevant decisions in relation to correspondence will be addressed in Part II. of the 
dissertation when examining SNS use during working hours. However, it must be emphasized that under 
correspondence protection is afforded not only to traditional letters, but rather to communication in general, 
regardless of the form it takes. As such it covers, for example, telephone conversations, telegraphs, electronic 
and radio electronic means of communication. (Source: Velu, R. and Ergec, J. (2014) Convention européenne 
des droits de l’homme. Bruxelles: Bruylant, p. 691.) See more on the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on 
communication in: Guide sur l’article 8 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Droit au 
respect de la vie privée et familiale (2019). Conseil de l’Europe. Available 
at: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_8_FRA.pdf (Accessed: 5 November 2019), pp. 91-111; 
Velu, R. and Ergec, J. (2014) Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Bruxelles: Bruylant, pp. 687-
691. 
236 Family life covers matters such as marriage, parenthood, relationship between parents and children, 
imprisonment of parents, etc. Home covers matters such as peaceful enjoyment of one’s home (protection 
against environmental nuisances), or expulsions, while correspondence covers matters such as telephone 
interception, traditional and electronic messages. See more on these rights in: Schabas, W. A. (2015) The 
European Convention on Human Rights: a Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 388-401. 
237 Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the ECHR; Kéfer, F. and Cornélis, S. (2009) ‘L’arrêt “Copland” ou 
l’espérance légitime du travailleur quant au caractère privé de ses communications’, Revue Trimestrielle des 
Droits de l’Homme, (79), p. 786. 
238 See more on the legitimate interference and Article 8 of the ECHR: Berger, V. (1998) Jurisprudence de la 
Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme. Paris: Éditions Dalloz, pp. 311-406.; Grád, A. and Weller, M. 
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72. Scope of Article 8: private life. Being a broad notion, private life 
encompasses numerous aspects, making it difficult, if not impossible, to provide an 
exhaustive definition.239 The ECtHR is on the position that it is not “possible or necessary 
to attempt an exhaustive definition of the notion of ‘private life’”240 and argued on several 
occasions that the concept of private life “is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive 
definition,”241 as Article 8 covers very broad areas of life, “encompassing the sphere of 
personal autonomy within which everyone can freely pursue the development and 
fulfilment of his or her personality and to establish and develop relationships with other 
persons and the outside world.”242 
73. Also, the technological and scientific developments that appeared after the 
adoption of the ECHR encouraged the ECtHR to create a flexible interpretation of private 
life under the current circumstances.243 The preamble of the ECHR itself declares that its 
aim is to guarantee and further develop human rights,244 suggesting the constant evolution 
of the rights guaranteed in the text of the ECHR, ensuring that the ECHR is interpreted in 
the light of the era.245 Societal changes,246 and the development of ICT technologies247 led 
to a broad interpretation of private life, responding to the occurring changes,248 and 
 
(2011) A strasbourgi emberi jogi bíráskodás kézikönyve. Budapest: HVG-ORAC Lap- és könyvkiadó, pp. 
448- 456, pp. 483-526; Pettiti, L.-E., Decaux, E. and Imbert, P.-H. (eds) (1995) La Convention Européenne 
des Droits de l’Homme, commentaire article par article. Paris: Economica, pp. 323-351.; Guide sur l’article 
8 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Droit au respect de la vie privée et familiale (2019). 
Conseil de l’Europe. Available at: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_8_FRA.pdf (Accessed: 5 
November 2019), pp. 10-12. 
239 Velu, R. and Ergec, J. (2014) Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Bruxelles: Bruylant, p. 659.; 
Sudre, F. (2015) La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. 10th edn. Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, p. 101. 
240 EctHR (1992): Niemietz v. Germany, application no. 13710/88, 16 December, par. 29. 
241 EctHR (2002): Pretty v. the United Kingdom, application no. 2346/02, 29 April, par. 61.; ECtHR (2003): 
Peck v. the United Kingdom, application no. 44647/98, 28 January, par. 57.; ECtHR (2008): S. and Marper v. 
the United Kingdom, application nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, 4 December, par. 66. 
242 ECtHR (2010): Jehovah's witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, application no. 302/02, 10 June, par. 
117. See also: ECtHR (2007): Evans v. the United Kingdom, application no. 6339/05, 10 April, par. 71. 
243 Grabarczyk, K. (2011) ‘Vie privée et nouvelles technologies’, Revue des droits et libertés fondamentaux, 
(7). 
244 Pettiti, L.-E., Decaux, E. and Imbert, P.-H. (eds) (1995) La Convention Européenne des Droits de 
l’Homme, commentaire article par article. Paris: Economica, p. 308. 
245 Velu, R. and Ergec, J. (2014) Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Bruxelles: Bruylant, p. 33., 
p. 49. 
246 Sudre, F. (2015) La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. 10th edn. Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, p. 101. 
247 Moderne, F. (2012) La Convention européenne des Droits de l’Homme. 3rd edn. Paris: Dalloz, p. 29. 
248 Guide sur l’article 8 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Droit au respect de la vie 
privée et familiale (2019). Conseil de l’Europe. Available 
at: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_8_FRA.pdf (Accessed: 5 November 2019), p. 20. 
 62 
 
implying that with the constantly changing societal-economic conditions, what falls under 
the scope of Article 8 also changes. 
74. As a result, the ECtHR goes beyond the “traditional” interpretation of 
private life connected mainly to intimacy/secrecy249 and also guarantees the respect of 
certain public aspects of the individual’s private life.250 Thus, protection is also afforded to 
the autonomy of the individual and to the development of personality, which can be 
manifested in establishing relationships with others, or can even cover professional 
activities. 
In relation to the matters belonging to the scope of private life,251 different authors 
created different categorisations. However, despite the exact appellations of these 
categories, a common feature is that the “traditional” protection of private life appears 
alongside with ensuring the protection of matters having a connection with the outside 
world. From the relevant case law Olivier Rijckaert and Noël Lambert identified three sub-
divisions of the right to respect for private life from the ECtHR’s jurisprudence: the right 
to intimacy, the right to maintain social relationships and the right to self-determination.252 
According to Rusen Velu and Jacques Ergec, two elements of private life exist: first, the 
 
249 Velu, R. and Ergec, J. (2014) Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Bruxelles: Bruylant, p. 659. 
This concept is closely connected to a so-called inner circle “in which the individual may live his own 
personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within that 
circle”. (Source: EctHR (1992): Niemietz v. Germany, application no. 13710/88, 16 December, par. 29.) 
250 Guide sur l’article 8 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Droit au respect de la vie 
privée et familiale (2019). Conseil de l’Europe. Available 
at: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_8_FRA.pdf (Accessed: 5 November 2019), p. 20. 
251 The ECtHR stated in its case law that interference in the following conditions of life fell under the scope 
of Article 8 (and further examined whether the interference was legitimate or not as it is not an absolute 
right): access to personal data (ECtHR: Leander v. Sweden, application no. 9248/81, 26 March 1987, par. 46, 
48; ECtHR: Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, application no. 10454/83, 7 July 1989, par. 36-37), telephone 
interception (ECtHR: Klass and Others v. Germany, application no. 5029/71, 6 September 1978, par. 41; 
ECtHR: Halford v. the United Kingdom, application no. 20605/92 , 25 June 1997, par. 41, 44, 46; ECtHR: 
Malone v. the United Kingdom, application no. 8691/79, 2 August 1984, par. 64; ECtHR: Huvig v. France, 
application no. 11105/84, 24 April 1990, par. 25; ECtHR: Kruslin v. France, application no. 11801/85, 24 
April 1990, par. 26.), physical and moral integrity (ECtHR: X and Y v. The Netherlands, application 
no. 8978/80, 26 March 1985, par 22.), protection of image (ECtHR: Reklos and Davourlis v. Greece, 
application no. 1234/05, 15 April 2009, par. 40.), choice or change of name (ECtHR: Guillot v. France, 
application no. 22500/93, 24 October 1993, par. 21-22; ECtHR: Burghartz v. Switzerland, application no. 
16213/90, 22 February 1994, par. 24.), sexual life (ECtHR: Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, application no. 
7525/76, 22 October 1981, par. 40-41.), profession or domicile (ECtHR: Niemietz v. Germany, application 
no. 13710/88, 16 December 1992, par. 28-33.), honour and reputation (ECtHR: Chauvy and Others v. 
France, application no. 64915/01, 29 September 2004, par. 70.), protection against environmental nuisances 
(ECtHR: López Ostra v. Spain, application no.16798/90, 9 December 1994, par. 51.), the right to establish 
and develop relationships with others (ECtHR: Niemietz v. Germany, application no. 13710/88, 16 December 
1992, par. 29.). 
252 Rijckaert, O. and Lambert, N. (2012) Le respect de la vie privée dans la relation de travail. Waterloo: 
Wolters Kluwer Belgium, pp. 6-7. 
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right to respect for private life, which aims to ensure the individual a sphere where third 
persons do not have access, connected to secrecy; and the second element is related to the 
relationships that the individual can make with others. Both of these aspects aim to ensure 
the protection of the personality of the individual.253 Frédéric Sudre differentiates between 
four areas:254 the first is the right to privacy (“le droit à la vie privée personnelle”), which 
is composed of the right to the intimacies of private life and of the right to the liberty of 
sexual life. The second area is the right to a social private life, covering the establishment 
of relationships with others, as well as professional activities. The third area is the right to 
personal developments, which involves areas such as knowing one’s origins, or choosing 
how to end one’s life. The fourth area guarantees the right to live in a healthy environment. 
A study published by the CoE differentiates between three categories: physical, 
psychological and moral integrity of the individual, private life and identity and 
autonomy.255 Martyn Bond takes a different approach and differentiates between rights 
requiring certain protection of the individual (“droit d’être à l'abri de”) and freedoms 
(“libertés de”). Amongst the rights, he notes that individuals have the right to be free from 
attacks against physical and psychological integrity, the right to be free from unwanted 
information gathering practices and the right to be free from serious environmental 
nuisances. The two freedoms relate to the right to develop relationship with others and the 
freedom in choosing one’s lifestyle.256 
75. Personality and autonomy of the individual. Although the ECHR and 
Article 8 do not contain a right to self-determination as such,257 the ECtHR found that it 
remains an important principle when it comes to interpreting Article 8 – altogether with the 
 
253 Velu, R. and Ergec, J. (2014) Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Bruxelles: Bruylant, p. 660. 
254 Sudre, F. (2015) La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. 10th edn. Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, pp. 101-104. 
255 Guide sur l’article 8 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Droit au respect de la vie 
privée et familiale (2019). Conseil de l’Europe. Available 
at: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_8_FRA.pdf (Accessed: 5 November 2019), p. 20. 
256 Bond, M. (2018) Une introduction à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Strasbourg: 
Conseil de l’Europe, p. 39. 
257 The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly interpreted the right to privacy as “[…] the right to live 
one's own life with a minimum of interference.” Then, it adds that “[i]t concerns private, family and home 
life, physical and moral integrity, honour and reputation, avoidance of being placed in a false light, non-
revelation of irrelevant and embarrassing facts, unauthorised publication of private photographs, protection 
against misuse of private communications, protection from disclosure of information given or received by the 
individual confidentially.” Source: Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly: Declaration on mass 
communication media and Human Rights, Resolution 428 (1970) 23 January 1970, Available at: 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=15842&lang=en Accessed: 2018. 02. 
28. 
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concept of quality of life.258 Physical and moral integrity is guaranteed through ensuring 
the development of the personality of the individual without outside interference.259 
Personal autonomy comprises the right to establish details of the individual’s identity as a 
human being.260 
76. Albeit the formulation of Article 8 suggests a negative right, the right to be 
left alone,261 the interpretation of the ECtHR acknowledges that private life can comprise a 
zone of interaction between individuals, even in the public context.262 Establishing and 
developing relationships is closely related to the development and fulfilment of one’s 
personality.263 Article 8 also protects a right to identity and personal development, and the 
right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside 
world.264 Dress and other “public” features – the desired appearance of the individual – 
might also concern private life, as it can constitute a way of expressing one’s 
personality.265 Article 8 is not limited to the protection of a mere inner circle rigidly 
delimiting the individual and the public, outside world; it rather ensures the right to 
establish and develop relationships with others.266 Such observations have high topicality 
and importance in the age when social media might be considered an important area of 
self-expression and establishing relationship with others.267 
77. Employees’ right to respect for private life. The ECtHR explicitly 
addressed the right to privacy in the employment context with regard to employee 
monitoring in several cases, such as Niemietz v. Germany (1992),268 Halford v. United 
Kingdom (1997),269 Copland v. the United Kingdom (2007),270 Bărbulescu v. Romania 
 
258 ECtHR: Pretty v. the United Kingdom, application no. 2346/02, 29 July 2002, par. 61. and par. 65. 
259 Schabas, W. A. (2015) The European Convention on Human Rights: a Commentary. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 370. 
260 ECtHR: Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, application no. 28957/95, 11 July 2002, par. 90. 
261 Schabas, W. A. (2015) The European Convention on Human Rights: a Commentary. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 366. 
262 ECtHR: Von Hannover v. Germany, applications nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, 7 February 2012, par. 95. 
Also see more on how Article 8 includes intimacy, social aspects and environmental well-being in: 
Bugorgue-Larsen, L. (2015) La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. 2nd edn. Issy-les-
Moulineaux: LGDJ. pp.133-142. 
263 Commission of the ECtHR: X v Iceland, application no. 6825/74, 8 May 1976 
264 ECtHR: Peck v. the United Kingdom, application no. 44647/98, 28 January 2003, par. 57. 
265 ECtHR: S.A.S. v. France, application no. 43835/11, 1 July 2014, par. 107. 
266 ECtHR: Niemietz v. Germany, Application no. 13710/88, 16 December 1992 
267 To be further addressed in Title 2 how privacy and private life should be understood in the social media 
age. 
268 ECtHR: Niemietz v. Germany, Application no. 13710/88, 16 December 1992 
269 ECtHR: Halford v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 20605/92, 25 June 1997 
270 ECtHR: Copland v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 62617/00, 3 April 2007 
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(2017),271 Libert v. France (2018).272 These cases, and the analysis of where the boundary 
of employee privacy lies will be addressed in detail in Chapter 2 focusing on workplace 
privacy. 
(b) EU and the CFREU 
78. Charter of Fundamental Rights. The EU’s main human’s rights document, 
the CFREU also guarantees in Article 7 the protection of private life.273 Article 7 reads as 
follows: 
“Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, 
home and communications.” 
Similarly to other international legal documents, the CFREU identifies the 
“traditional” interests that must be protected: private life, family life, home and 
communications.274, 275 In the EU as well, the right to respect for private life is not 
absolute, as Article 52 of the CFREU contains a provision in relation to the possible 
limitation of the rights recognized by the CFREU, making it possible to limit these rights if 
certain conditions are met.276, 277 
 
271 ECtHR: Bărbulescu v. Romania, Application no. 61496/08, 5 September 2017 
272 ECtHR: Libert v. France, Application no. 588/13, 22 February 2018 
273 However, even prior to the CFREU, the right to privacy was a recognized general principle of the EU law. 
See, for example: Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany (1992) Case C-
62/90, Court of Justice of the European Union, 8 April, par. 23.; Judgment of the Court of 26 June 1980. - 
National Panasonic (UK) Limited v Commission of the European Communities. - Competition: 
investigations by the Commission. - Case 136/79. (Source: Cariat, N. (2017) ‘Respect de la vie privée et 
familiale’, in Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne. Bruxelles: Bruylant, p. 162.) 
274 Nyman-Metcalf, K. (2014) ‘The Future of Universality of Rights’, in Kerikmäe, T. (ed.) Protecting 
Human Rights in the EU. Controversies and Challenges of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Heidelberg: 
Springer, p. 28. 
275 Incidentally, other articles can also aim at the protection of private life, such as Article 3 on the right to the 
integrity of the person, Article 8 on the right to data protection, Article 24 on the rights of the child and 
Article 37 on environmental protection. Source: Lock, T. (2019) ‘Article 7 CFR. Respect for private and 
family life’, in Kellerbauer, M., Klamert, M., and Tomkin, J. (eds) Commentary on the EU Treaties and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, p. 2115. 
276 Article 52 of the CFREU: Scope of guaranteed rights “1. Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and 
freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and 
freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others.” 
277 For example, limitations can take place as regards the use of names, abortions or freezing of assets if 
given conditions are met. See more in: Lock, T. (2019) ‘Article 7 CFR. Respect for private and family life’, 
in Kellerbauer, M., Klamert, M., and Tomkin, J. (eds) Commentary on the EU Treaties and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, pp. 2116-2117. 
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79. The CFREU has a close connection with the ECHR, as according to Article 
52(3) the rights which also appear in the ECHR have the same meaning and scope in the 
Charter, too.278 However, this implies a minimum requirement: the EU can grant a higher 
level of protection compared to the ECHR.279 Also, the CJEU refers many times 
intentionally to the practice of the ECtHR,280 as the content of privacy can be derived from 
the case law of the ECtHR.281Also, it is not uncommon for scholars to refer to the case law 
of the ECtHR when it comes to analysing the case law of the CJEU.282  
As such, Article 7 of the CFREU corresponds to Article 8 ECHR,283 as the wording 
of the CFREU reflects Article 8 of the ECHR, with one difference. The CFREU is 
deliberately broader in a way that it does not employ the expression “correspondence” but 
refers to “communications”, as it has taken into account the technological changes that 
occurred.284 However, from a substantial point of view it does not make a difference, as the 
ECtHR interpreted the expression “correspondence” broadly to all communications.285 
80. For the above reasons, as regards the meaning of “private life” it is identical 
to the interpretation of the ECtHR, meaning that none of the court interprets “private life” 
 
278 Naturally, the CFREU is not a simple repetition of the ECHR but introduces certain new rights – such as 
the right to data protection for example. Source: Gaïa, P. (2004) ‘La Charte des droits fondamentaux de 
l’Union européenne’, Revue française de droit constitutionnel, (2), p. 234. 
279 Cariat, N. (2017) ‘Respect de la vie privée et familiale’, in Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union 
européenne. Bruxelles: Bruylant, p. 163.  
280 See, for example: CJEU (2010): PPU. J. McB. v L. E., Case C-400/10, ECLI:EU:C:2010:582, 5 October, 
par. 53; “The wording of Article 8(1) of the ECHR is identical to that of the said Article 7, except that it uses 
the expression ‘correspondence’ instead of ‘communications’. That being so, it is clear that the said Article 7 
contains rights corresponding to those guaranteed by Article 8(1) of the ECHR. Article 7 of the Charter must 
therefore be given the same meaning and the same scope as Article 8(1) of the ECHR, as interpreted by the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights […].” CJEU (2008): Productores de Música de España 
(Promusicae) v Telefónica de España SAU, Case: C-275/06. ECLI:EU:C:2008:54, 29 January, par. 64. 
stating that “Article 7 substantially reproduces Article 8 of the [ECHR]”. 
281 Gellert, R. and Gutwirth, S. (2013) ‘The legal construction of privacy and data protection’, Computer Law 
and Security Review, 29(5), p. 524. 
282 See, for example: Lock, T. (2019) ‘Article 7 CFR. Respect for private and family life’, in Kellerbauer, M., 
Klamert, M., and Tomkin, J. (eds) Commentary on the EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, pp. 2115–2120.; Eriksson, M. (2006) ‘Article 7. Respect for 
private and family life’, in EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, pp. 78–89.; Nyman-Metcalf, K. (2014) ‘The Future 
of Universality of Rights’, in Kerikmäe, T. (ed.) Protecting Human Rights in the EU. Controversies and 
Challenges of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 21–36. 
283 Explanation on Article 7. Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007). 2007/C 
303/02. 
284 Explanation on Article 7. Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007). 2007/C 
303/02. 
285 Lock, T. (2019) ‘Article 7 CFR. Respect for private and family life’, in Kellerbauer, M., Klamert, M., and 
Tomkin, J. (eds) Commentary on the EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. United Kingdom: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 2119-2120. 
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restrictively.286 The preamble of the CFREU explicitly states that the strengthening of 
fundamental rights must take place in the light of the changes in society, social progress 
and scientific and technological developments, ensuring a dynamic interpretation of the 
right to respect for private life.287 As such the ECtHR can serve as example,288 private life 
covers certain aspects of professional and commercial activities, can relate to the health 
status of the individual, relationships with others, marital status, physical integrity, 
reputation, image of the individual, family name, sexual orientation.289 
(B) National legislations 
81. After addressing how privacy is understood in the most important 
international organisations, it is necessary to have a look at national legislations. First (a) 
common characteristics – such as affording constitutional and civil law protection will be 
addressed, then (b) the specific, unique features of each country will be examined in detail. 
(a) Protection of private life in France and in Hungary 
82. Protection of private life. Private life can be assessed as opposing to 
collective life: traditionally private life was conceived as “[...] the individual’s right to 
dispose a private space, distinct from the collective life of the community."290 In France, 
the Constitutional Council opted for a particular interpretation, adopting a restrictive 
approach: it links private life to the concept of secrecy – unlike national lower courts and 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.291 In this regard, the right to respect for private life is 
 
286 Kokott, J. and Sobotta, C. (2013) ‘The distinction between privacy and data protection in the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR’, International Data Privacy Law, 3(4), p. 223. 
By contrast, Christophe Vigneau notes that it is not precluded that certain public spheres of private life are 
excluded from the protection of private life. Vigneau, C. (2006) ‘Protection of personal data (Article 8)’, in 
Bercusson, B. (ed.) European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, p. 120. 
287 Lock, T. (2019) ‘Article 7 CFR. Respect for private and family life’, in Kellerbauer, M., Klamert, M., and 
Tomkin, J. (eds) Commentary on the EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. United Kingdom: 
Oxford University Press, 2115. 
288 Eriksson, M. (2006) ‘Article 7. Respect for private and family life’, in EU Network of Independent 
Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
p. 78. 
289 Cariat, N. (2017) ‘Respect de la vie privée et familiale’, in Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union 
européenne. Bruxelles: Bruylant, pp. 165-168. 
290 Détraigne, Y. and Escoffier, A.-M. (2009) La vie privée à l’heure des mémoires numériques. Pour une 
confiance renforcée entre citoyens et société de l’information. Rapport d’information 441. Sénat. p. 11. 
However, as it will be discussed in Title 2, SNSs considerably challenge the boundaries of private and public 
life, posing new challenges in defining the limits of private life. 
291 Source: Mazeaud, V. (2015) ‘La constitutionnalisation du droit au respect de la vie privée’, Les Nouveaux 
Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel, (48), pp. 16-17. 
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understood as protection against public or private intrusions into the intimate sphere of the 
individual,292, 293 but it does not include the freedom of private life.294 Vincent Mazeaud 
points it out that the Constitutional Council’s practice was initially centred around the 
concept of secrecy and mainly focuses on aspects such as domicile, correspondence or 
intimacies of private life, aspects where the concept of secrecy dominates.295 In its 
jurisprudence, the Constitutional Council examined matters in relation to intrusion and 
divulgation, such as intrusion into the home, search of vehicles, camera surveillance, GPS 
localisation, data protection or intercepting communication.296  
83. However, despite the prevailing concept of secrecy in the jurisprudence of 
the Constitutional Council, when examining the doctrine, several authors differentiate 
between two layers or “spheres” when it comes to private life: a hard core,297 closely 
connected to the concept of secrecy and another layer, moving beyond the narrow concept 
of secrecy. Vanessa Barbé distinguished between personal private life and social private 
life.298 Xavier Bioy interpreted the hard core as “to be let alone”, which refers to matters 
such as correspondence, inviolability of the home – and also data protection. To this hard 
core, the right to autonomy of private life is added, comprising fields such as the freedom 
to choose an occupation, identity or relations.299 Florence Crouzatier-Durand enumerated 
elements pertaining to the protection of private life and to the expression of private life.300 
For Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, the hard core is associated with intimacy and secret, 
 
292 Commentaire: Conseil constitutionnel: décision n° 2012-248 QPC du 16 mai 2012 
293 According to Hubert Alcatraz, the right’s original aim is to ensure a “bubble of secrecy around the 
individual”. Cited in: Favoreu, L. et al. (2015) Droit des libertés fondamentales. 7th edn. Paris: Dalloz. p. 
273. 
294 Favoreu, L. et al. (2015) Droit des libertés fondamentales. 7th edn. Paris: Dalloz, pp. 273-275. 
295 Mazeaud, V. (2015) ‘La constitutionnalisation du droit au respect de la vie privée’, Les Nouveaux Cahiers 
du Conseil constitutionnel, (48), p. 8. 
296 Mazeaud, V. (2015) ‘La constitutionnalisation du droit au respect de la vie privée’, Les Nouveaux Cahiers 
du Conseil constitutionnel, (48), p. 9.; Favoreu, L. et al. (2015) Droit des libertés fondamentales. 7th edn. 
Paris: Dalloz, p. 277. 
297 When assessing what constitutes the hard core of respect for private life, the Code on Internal Security 
and the Penal Code could serve as useful reference. Articles 226-1–226-7 of the Penal Code provide 
protection against different invasions of privacy, such as against the home, against image or words uttered, 
against identity theft, while Subsection 1 of Article L801-1 of the Code on Internal Security stipulates that 
“[t]he respect of private life and all of its components, notably the secrecy of correspondence, the protection 
of personal data and the inviolability of the home are guaranteed by law.” Source: Bioy, X. (2016) Droits 
fondamentaux et libertés publiques. 4e édition. Issy-les-Moulineaux: LGDJ-Lextenso éditions (Collection 
Cours), pp. 496-497. 
298 Barbé, V. (2018) Essentiel du Droit des libertés fondamentales. Issy-les-Moulineaux: Gualino, pp. 112-
121. 
299 Bioy, X. (2016) Droits fondamentaux et libertés publiques. 4e édition. Issy-les-Moulineaux: LGDJ-
Lextenso éditions (Collection Cours). pp. 496-497 
300 Crouzatier-Durand, F. (2013) Fiches de libertés publiques et droits fondamentaux. 2nd edn. Paris: 
Ellipses. pp. 58-72. 
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encompassing protection against intrusions and divulgations. It is completed by 
recognizing personality – not the right to personality – by attaching the right to respect for 
private life to the legal fundaments of personal liberty.301, 302 
84. Assessments of the Hungarian Constitutional Court. The Constitutional 
Court clarified the content of the right to privacy in several decisions, among which the 
most important ones will be addressed.303 In decision No. 8/1990 (IV. 23.), the 
Constitutional Court linked the right to privacy to the right to human dignity304 and 
considered the latter to be the formulation of the general right to personality and then 
identified the right to privacy as one aspect of it.305 In decision No. 56/1994 (XI. 10.), the 
Constitutional Court identified the “right to the freedom of privacy” (“magánélet 
szabadságához való jog”) as a fundamental right aiming to ensure the protection of the 
autonomy of the individual, originating from the inherent human dignity.306 In a decision 
relating to secret collection of information,307 the Constitutional Court extended the scope 
of protection ensured by the right to privacy to the intimate/private sphere, to 
communication, to the home and to the right to reputation.308, 309 
 
301 Burgorgue-Larson, L. (2005) ‘L’appréhension constitutionnelle de la vie privée en Europe : Analyse 
croisée des systèmes constitutionnels allemand, espagnol et français.’, in Sudre, F. (ed.) Le droit à la vie 
privée au sens de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Bruxelles: Bruylant, p. 72.  
302 See more on the constitutional aspects on the right to privacy in: Mazeaud, V. (2015) ‘La 
constitutionnalisation du droit au respect de la vie privée’, Les Nouveaux Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel, 
(48), pp. 7–20.; Ba Sene, F. (2015) ‘La protection constitutionnelle de la vie privée et familiale sur les 
réseaux sociaux en France’, in Ndior, V. (ed.) Droit et réseaux sociaux. Issy-les-Moulineaux: Lextenso 
(Collection LEJEP), pp. 91–100.; Burgorgue-Larson, L. (2005) ‘L’appréhension constitutionnelle de la vie 
privée en Europe : Analyse croisée des systèmes constitutionnels allemand, espagnol et français.’, in Sudre, 
F. (ed.) Le droit à la vie privée au sens de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Bruxelles: 
Bruylant, pp. 69–115. 
303 See more on the relevant decisions of the Constitutional Courts in: Majtényi, L. (2002) ‘Az információs 
szabadságok és az adatvédelem határai’, Világosság, XLIII (2–3), pp.72-78.; Szüts, K., Karsai, D. and 
Mándi, G. (2006) Az Alkotmánybíróság egyes határozatainak ismertetése. Budapest: Rejtjel Kiadó. pp. 222-
229. 
304 Sári, J. and Somody, B. (2008) Alapjogok. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, p. 127. 
305 Lábady, T. (1995) ‘A magánélet alkotmányos védelme (A házasság és a család védelme, a 
magánszférához való jog)’, Acta Humana: Emberi jogi közlemények, (18–19), p. 85.; Majtényi, L. (2008) ‘Az 
információs jogok’, in Halmai, G. and Tóth, G. A. (eds) Emberi jogok. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, p. 277. 
306 Decision No. 56/1994 (XI. 10.) Part II.; Fézer, T. (2014) ‘Harmadik rész: személyiségi jogok’, in 
Osztovits, A. (ed.) A Polgári Törvénykönyvről szóló 2013. évi V. törvény és a kapcsolódó jogszabályok 
nagykommentárja. I. kötet. Budapest: Opten Informatikai Kft., p. 263. 
307 Decision No. 32/2013. (XI. 22.) of the Constitutional Court 
308 Decision No. 32/2013. (XI. 22.) of the Constitutional Court, par. 84. 
309 However, Béla Pokol expressed his parallel reasoning regarding this reasoning and found that the 
Constitutional Court overstepped its competence and created a general right to privacy from the separate 
rights declared in the Fundamental Law. Par. 143. of Decision No. 32/2013. (XI. 22.) of the Constitutional 
Court 
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85. In relation to camera surveillance,310 László Kiss and István Kukorelli 
expressed in a dissenting opinion their view regarding surveillance as the exercise of 
informational power, drawing attention to the negative consequences of such a monitoring 
and its adverse effects on individuals’ behaviour. Although the decision relates to CCTV 
monitoring and dates back to 2002, one paragraph already referred to how this monitoring 
affects and changes the boundaries of private life311 – gaining particular importance in the 
social media era. In another decision relating to camera surveillance, the Constitutional 
Court stated that “the core element of privacy is that no intrusion or insight into the private 
sphere of the individual shall be conducted against his or her will”. In the case of an 
unwanted intrusion not only the right to privacy is infringed but also other aspects of the 
right to dignity (e.g. self-determination or physical and personal integrity of the person).312 
86. The French Civil Code. Traditionally, civil law aims to provide protection 
to this already mentioned “hard core”, governed by the concept of secrecy.313 Article 9 of 
the French Civil Code regulates the right to respect for private life.314 Although in 
paragraph 1 the expression right to respect for private life is used, paragraph 2 uses a 
confusing expression and refers to “the infringement of the intimate character of private 
life.” Historically, France has a narrow conception of privacy, based on the concept of 
secret (the right to the secrecy of private life) – and treated questions such as family, sex, 
identity and self-determination separately from privacy.315 Jean Carbonnier understood it 
 
310 Decision No. 35/2002. (VII. 19.) of the Constitutional Court 
311 “By the end of the 20th century, this form of control has become widespread in both the public sector and 
the business sector. The almost constant surveillance redefines the boundaries of private life. It becomes 
traceable how and with whom we spend our free time; with whom, when and about what we are talking; what 
kind of newspapers we read or what other habits we have. The risk relating to the misuse of technical 
achievements does not appear as a threat only on the part of the state, the private sector also uses camera 
surveillance as a means of increasing efficiency.” 
312 Decision No. 36/2005. (X. 5.) of the Constitutional Court  
313 Burgorgue-Larson, L. (2005) ‘L’appréhension constitutionnelle de la vie privée en Europe : Analyse 
croisée des systèmes constitutionnels allemand, espagnol et français.’, in Sudre, F. (ed.) Le droit à la vie 
privée au sens de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Bruxelles: Bruylant, p. 72.  
314 Article 9: “Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private life. 
Without prejudice to the right to recover indemnification for injury suffered, judges may prescribe any 
measures, such as sequestration, seizure and others, suited to the prevention or the ending of an infringement 
of the intimate character of private life; in case of emergency those measures may be provided for by 
summary proceedings.” 
315 Bioy, X. (2016) Droits fondamentaux et libertés publiques. 4e édition. Issy-les-Moulineaux: LGDJ-
Lextenso éditions (Collection Cours). p. 493. 
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as a secret sphere of life from which the individual can exclude third persons, where he/she 
could be left alone.316 
Elements of private life. The elements of private life cannot be exhaustively defined, 
“every arbitrary interference in one’s private life is unlawful”.317 The right to respect for 
private life318 is not an absolute right: it has to be balanced against other rights.319 Also, 
although “every person, regardless of their rank, wealth, current or future functions, has 
the right to respect for his/her private life”,320 the limits of that protection can vary 
according to the status of the given person.321 Private life can cover elements such as 
domicile, correspondence, the body, image, health, personal convictions, family life, 
marital life, sexual life, identity (name, sex, origins).322 Although recently a broader 
definition was provided by Jean-Christophe Saint-Pau (according to whom the right to 
respect for private life can be defined as the individual’s right to demand the State and 
other individuals to respect his/her freedom to act and as the secrecy of personal 
information),323 traditionally the Civil Code’s right to respect for private life was centred 
around the concept of secrecy – and originally, the Social Chamber of the Court of 
Cassation took over the secrecy concept of private life.324 
87. Hungarian Civil Code. The Hungarian Civil Code affords protection to the 
right to respect for private life (and to the right to data protection) on the ground of 
 
316 Carbonnier, J. (1971) Droit civil. 1, Introduction. Les Personnes. 9th edn. Paris: Presses universitaires de 
France. p. 254. 
317 Cour de cassation, chambre civile 1, 6 mars 1996, N° 94-11273 
318 Here again, various terminologies are used: secrecy of private life, freedom of private life, respect for 
private life (incorporating the former two notions). Kayser, P. (1995) La protection de la vie privée par le 
droit : protection du secret de la vie privée. 3rd edn. Aix-en-Provence; Paris: Presses universitaires d’Aix-
Marseille; Economica. p. 17. 
319 Alleaume, C. (2016) ‘La notion de droit à la vie privée’, in Batteur, A. (ed.) Les grandes décisions du 
droit des personnes et de la famille. 2nd edn. Issy-les-Moulineaux: LGDJ, p. 454. 
320 Cour de cassation, chambre civile 1, 23 octobre 1990, N° 89-13163  
321 On the duality of the right to respect for private life – conceived as secrecy and as liberty – in labour law 
see: Morgenroth, T. (2016) La vie privée en droit du travail. Doctoral dissertation. Université Lille 2 - Droit 
et Santé. See also on the right to respect for private life in employment in: Jacquelet, C. (2008) La vie privée 
du salarié à l’épreuve des relations de travail. Aix-en-Provence: Presses universitaires d’Aix-Marseille. 
322 See more on the content and regulation of (the right to respect for) private life: Alleaume, C. (2016) ‘La 
notion de droit à la vie privée’, in Batteur, A. (ed.) Les grandes décisions du droit des personnes et de la 
famille. 2nd edn. Issy-les-Moulineaux: LGDJ, pp. 453-464.; Terré, F. and Fenouillet, D. (2012) Droit civil : 
les personnes. Personnalité, incapacité, protection. 8th edn. Paris: Dalloz. pp. 114-136.; Saint-Pau, J.-C. 
(2013) ‘Le droit au respect de la vie privée’, in Saint-Pau, J.-C. (ed.) Droits de la personnalité. Paris: 
LexisNexis SA (Traités), pp. 673–943. On the notion of private life defined by courts in: Lepage, A. (2009) 
‘Droits de la personnalité’, Répertoire de droit civil. Dalloz. par. 67-95. 
323 Saint-Pau, J.-C. (2016) ‘Art. 9 - Fasc. 10 : Jouissance des droits civils. – Droit au respect de la vie privée. 
– Définition conceptuelle du droit subjectif’, JurisClasseur Civil Code. par. 26. 
324 Savatier, J. (1992) ‘La protection de la vie privée des salariés’, Droit social, (4), p. 330. 
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personality rights. It is the primary objective of personality rights to ensure protection to 
rights which make humans human, which are parts of human personality, without 
examining the societal circumstances – excluding from their scope political, cultural and 
social rights.325 The essence of personality rights is to ensure the free expression of the 
personality and to prevent anyone from hindering, within the limits that the community 
imposes.326 Naturally, the exercise of these rights is not without limits, it is in accordance 
with their social purpose only if it does not infringe other individuals’ rights or laws 
guaranteeing these rights.327 
The Civil Code states in general the protection of personality rights by declaring that 
“[e]veryone is entitled to freely practice his or her personality rights, in particular the 
right to privacy and family life, home and communications with others in any way or form, 
and the right to protection against defamation of character, within the framework of the 
law and within the rights of others, and to not be impeded by others in exercising such 
rights.”328 The Civil Code identifies a list of infringements of personality rights, although 
the legal protection is extended also to the personality rights not identified in the Civil 
Code. Among the specified infringements of personality rights, the infringement of private 
life and of the right to data protection is mentioned.329 
88. The right to respect for private life is one of the most private components 
and one of the manifestations of the single and indivisible personality.330 According to 
Hungarian jurisprudence, interference in the private life of the individual infringes 
personality rights if it is arbitrary, unjustified and unnecessary. An interference is 
considered to be arbitrary if it expressly contradicts the will and intention of the person 
concerned or he/she is not aware of it and if it is not justified based on the carefully 
 
325 Fézer, T. (2014) ‘Harmadik rész: személyiségi jogok’, in Osztovits, A. (ed.) A Polgári Törvénykönyvről 
szóló 2013. évi V. törvény és a kapcsolódó jogszabályok nagykommentárja. I. kötet. Budapest: Opten 
Informatikai Kft. p. 250. 
326 Petrik, F. (2014) ‘Személyiségi jogok’, in Wellmann, G. (ed.) Polgári jog: Bevezető és záró 
rendelkezések. Az ember mint jogalany. Öröklési jog. 2nd edn. Budapest: HVG-ORAC Lap- és Könyvkiadó, 
pp. 173-174. 
327 BH. 1992.387. 
328 Subsection (1) of Section 2:42 of the Hungarian Civil Code 
329 Items b) and e) of Section 2:43 of the Hungarian Civil Code 
330 Görög, M. (2016) ‘A magánélethez való jog mint a személyiségi jog újabb, magánjogi kódexben 
nevesített vonatkozása’, in Balogh, E. (ed.) Számadás az Alaptörvényről: tanulmányok a Szegedi 
Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar oktatóinak tollából. Budapest: Magyar Közlöny Lap- és 
Könyvkiadó, p. 61 
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assessed circumstances.331 In another decision, the High Court of Budapest (“Fővárosi 
Ítélőtábla”) interpreted the right to privacy as the individual’s right to decide about his/her 
faith, actions, body and information relating to him/her.332 The individual shall be able to 
decide whether to show himself/herself to the world or whether to hide from it.333 By this, 
the High Court basically identified this right with the right to informational self-
determination.334 
(b) Specificities of national legislations 
89. In addition to this general apprehension of the right to privacy, both France 
and Hungary have unique assets to address the question of privacy protection. This 
uniqueness is especially present in French law, where in the employment context the 
notion of personal life has substituted the notion of private life since 1997.335  
This solution is specific to France, in Hungarian labour law there is no distinction 
between the concepts of private life or personal life. The Hungarian language does not 
even have expressions to differentiate between these two concepts. Usually, the expression 
private life (“magánélet”) is used when referring to the protection of the individuals’ rights 
(right to respect for private life, act on the protection of private life). Mainly in the 
common language the expression personal sphere (“privát szféra”) is used to refer to the 
secret aspects, to the intimacies of a person. The expression private sector (which in 
Hungarian can also be translated as “magánszféra”, literally meaning private sphere) is 
used to describe employment relations as opposed to the public sector. 
90. In Hungary, the adoption of the Act on the protection of private life336 can 
be mentioned as a “national specificity”. Since the adoption of this act, the protection of 
 
331 LB Pfv. IV. 21 028/2000. – BH2001/61. See more on this case and the privacy and data protection 
questions it raised in: Szoboszlai, J. (2002) ‘A magánélet és a személyes adatok védelme a Dávodi ítéletek 
apropóján’, Fundamentum, 6(2), pp. 76–82. 
332 Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 2.Pf.20.429/2010/3 
333 Fézer, T. (2014) ‘Harmadik rész: személyiségi jogok’, in Osztovits, A. (ed.) A Polgári Törvénykönyvről 
szóló 2013. évi V. törvény és a kapcsolódó jogszabályok nagykommentárja. I. kötet. Budapest: Opten 
Informatikai Kft., p. 264. 
334 Sulyok, M. (2017) Magánszféravédelem a tisztességes eljárásban – Az alapjogsértő bizonyítás 
összehasonlító alkotmányjogi vizsgálata. Doctoral dissertation. Szegedi Tudományegyetem. p. 224. 
335 Waquet, P. (2002) ‘Retour sur l’arrêt Nikon’, Semaine sociale Lamy, (1065), p. 6. 
336 Act LIII of 2018 on the protection of private life 
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private life is not only ensured by the Fundamental Law and the Civil Code but also 
constitutes the subject of a separate act, hitherto inexistent.337 
(α) The concept of personal life in French labour law 
91. Protection of employees’ rights. Even though the right to respect for private 
life has been guaranteed in the French legal system since 1970, during the decades courts 
had to establish the boundaries of exercising employees’ rights in opposition to the 
employer’s legitimate interests and powers, as employees’ rights can only be exercised in 
consistently with these powers and with the legitimate interests of the undertaking. Balance 
should be found between these two sides, closely connected to the concepts of professional 
life and the personal life of the employee.338 
92. The complete separation of professional and private spheres is not possible: 
private life flows into professional life and vice versa. By concluding an employment 
contract, the employee partially resigns his/her liberties – but keeps an inalienable part of 
them, an inherent condition of being a human.339 Also, following from the rights and 
obligations of the parties of the employment relationship, as the employer must respect 
employees’ rights within the workplace, the employee must also accept certain limitations 
while acting outside of the workplace.340 
93. Attempts to separate these two spheres have come a long way.341 
Traditionally, the first distinction was made between professional life and extra-
professional life (“vie extraprofessionnelle”),342 making a distinction between the acts of 
the employee in the workplace and outside of it. Then the concept of extra-professional life 
 
337 Though in French law private life is not regulated by a specific act, the adoption of the Act for a Digital 
Republic in 2016 should be mentioned, which contains a chapter entitled “protection of private life online”. 
However, as the act mainly focuses on data protection and information society, its relevant provisions will be 
further addressed in Section 2. 
338 Pizzio-Delaporte, C. (2001) ‘Libertés fondamentales et droits du salarié le rôle du juge’, Droit Social, (4), 
p. 404. 
339 Rivero, J. (1982) ‘Les libertés publiques dans l’entreprise’, Droit social, (5), p. 422. 
340 Adam, P. (2013) ‘Vie personnelle/vie professionnelle : une distinction en voie de dissolution ?’, Le Droit 
Ouvrier, (780), p. 436. 
341 The first case regarding the opposition between personal life and professional life can be traced back to 
1955, when a worker was dismissed due to statements he made in his private space. The Court of Cassation 
declared that the dismissal violated the worker’s freedom of opinion, as with his acts he did not exceeded the 
limits of his individual powers. Source: Bello, A. (2012) ‘Le licenciement pour motif tiré de Facebook : un 
changement ... dans la continuité’, JCP S (édition sociale), (26) p. 13. 
342 This expression was first used by Michel Despax in 1963 in his article entitled “La vie extra-
professionnelle du salarié et son incidence sur le contrat de travail” [Juris-Classeur Périodique. La Semaine 
Juridique. éd. G., (1776)]. 
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was replaced by the respect for private life (“vie privée”), to finally settle with the concept 
personal life (“vie personnelle”). 
94. From extra-professional life to private life. Although the concepts of both 
extra-professional life and private life have their own merits, in themselves they were not 
suitable to ensure the protection required.343 The notion of extra-professional life covered 
the acts of employees conducted outside the workplace, opposing to professional life, 
conducted within the workplace; in principle firmly separating the extra-professional and 
the professional life of the employee.344 As it was contested, this notion did not take into 
consideration that within the workplace, too, employees have their rights to a certain 
degree.345 
95. Then, the notion of extra-professional life was replaced by the notion of 
private life. On the 20th November 1991, the Court of Cassation confirmed the first time 
the principle that “an employee cannot be dismissed for a reason originating from his/her 
private life”.346 In 1992 this principle was reinforced, and was completed with a direct 
reference to Article 9 of the Civil Code.347 Although private life can cover acts taken 
within the workplace, it did not protect the extra-professional life as such, instead was 
primarily centred on the concept of secret, covering only the intimacies of the person. 
Therefore, it did not cover acts relating to the public life of the employee, such as 
participating in a political reunion, practicing religion, etc.348 
96. Adopting the notion of personal life. For these reasons, adopting the notion 
of personal life was a logical and welcomed step.349 The notion of personal life therefore 
became the terminology used – specific to labour law350 – to describe the spheres of the 
 
343 Waquet, P., Struillou, Y. and Pécaut-Rivolier, L. (2014) Pouvoirs du chef d’entreprise et libertés du 
salarié: du salarié-citoyen au citoyen-salarié. Rueil-Malmaison: ÉdLiaisons (Droit vivant). p. 183. 
344 Despax, M. (1963) ‘La vie extra-professionnelle du salarié et son incidence sur le contrat de 
travail’, Juris-Classeur Périodique. La Semaine Juridique. éd. G., (1776). par. 2. 
345 Waquet, P., Struillou, Y. and Pécaut-Rivolier, L. (2014) Pouvoirs du chef d’entreprise et libertés du 
salarié: du salarié-citoyen au citoyen-salarié. Rueil-Malmaison: ÉdLiaisons, p. 183. 
346 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 20 novembre 1991, N° 89-4460 
347 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 22 janvier 1992, N° 90-42517  
348 Waquet, P. (2003) L’entreprise et les libertés du salarié. Paris: Editions Liaisons, pp. 116-117. 
349 Pizzio-Delaporte, C. (2001) ‘Libertés fondamentales et droits du salarié le rôle du juge’, Droit Social, (4), 
p. 406. 
350 Indeed, private life is a civil law concept – alien in labour law, while personal life and professional life are 
concepts unknown to civil law. Molfessis, N. (2004) ‘Vie professionnelle, vie personnelle et responsabilité 
des commettants du fait de leurs préposés’, Droit social, (1), p. 31. 
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employee’s life that are not subject to the subordination.351 This notion of personal life was 
elaborated by Philippe Waquet352 and was later adopted by the Court of Cassation. In 1997 
the Court of Cassation noted that “the acts of the employee pertaining to his/her personal 
life cannot constitute a reason for dismissal”,353 referring to personal life for the first time. 
Soon, it reinforced this principle in another decision stating that an element pertaining to 
the personal life of the employee cannot constitute a fault (“faute”).354, 355 
97. Personal life encompasses not only the private life, but also the public life of 
the employee, and not only outside the workplace, but also within the workplace, during 
working hours. Personal life is composed of private life (e.g. home, secrets, 
correspondence), the exercise of civil rights (e.g. marriage, divorce, properties) and the 
exercise of civil liberties (e.g. political life, participating in associations).356 
98. Private life is located at the core of personal life: it encompasses the 
“secret” part of the employee’s life – in accordance with the traditional conception of 
private life – such as sentimental relations, correspondence or domicile.357 But the concept 
of personal life does not stop here: it aims to provide protection to the “irreducible core of 
autonomy”358 of the employee. Acknowledging the impossibility to define the exact scope 
of the elements pertaining to personal life, Waquet notes that physical appearance, free 
time activities, consumer activity, militant and sport activity, religious activities all make 
part of personal life.359 These activities are not secret at all: they all take place in the light 
of the public, constituting the public life of the employee. 
 
351 Waquet, P. (2001) ‘La vie personnelle du salarié’, in Droit syndical et droits de l’homme à l’aube du XXIe 
siècle : mélanges en l’honneur de Jean-Maurice Verdier. Paris: Dalloz, p. 513. 
352 Waquet, P. (1994) ‘Vie professionnelle et vie personnelle du salarié’, Cahier Sociaux du Barreau de 
Paris, (64), p. 289. 
353 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 14 mai 1997, N° 94-45473  
354 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 16 décembre 1997, N° 95-41326 
355 However, as Agathe Lepage pointed out, the Court of Cassation was not always consistent with the use of 
the expressions of personal life and private life: that the latter was still used after the general acceptation of 
the expression personal life. Lepage, A. (2006) ‘La vie privée du salarié, une notion civiliste en droit du 
travail’, Droit social, (4), p. 373-374. See especially: “[A]n element pertaining to the private life cannot 
constitute a reason for dismissal[.]” (Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 9 juillet 2002, N° 00-45068); “[A] 
dismissal cannot take place based on a reason founded on the private life of the employee[.]” (Cour de 
cassation, chambre sociale, 30 novembre 2005, N° 04-41206) 
356 Waquet, P. (1994) ‘Vie professionnelle et vie personnelle du salarié’, Cahier Sociaux du Barreau de 
Paris, (64), p. 290. 
357 Waquet, P. (2003) L’entreprise et les libertés du salarié. Paris: Editions Liaisons, p. 122. 
358 Waquet, P. (2004) ‘La vie personnelle du salarié’, Droit social, (1), p. 25. 
359 Waquet, P. (2003) L’entreprise et les libertés du salarié. Paris: Editions Liaisons, pp. 123-124. 
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99. The primary principle of the concept of personal life (private life and public 
life) is to ensure that in his/her extra-professional life (beyond working hours), the 
employee is free to act as he/she wishes. However, personal life is also present in the 
professional life of the employee: at the workplace, during working hours. The Court of 
Cassation explicitly stated in its famous Nikon decision that “[…] the employee is entitled, 
even at the time and place of work, to respect for his/her private life […]”360 In principle, 
activities not having a secret character are also protected under the scope of personal life 
even within the workplace: e.g. talking with colleagues, choices relating to physical 
appearance, etc. 
100. The significance of the elaboration of the notion of personal life is that 
through its application the Social Chamber has broken with the civil law – secrecy based – 
concept of privacy. Instead, personal life incorporates not only private life, but also the 
public private lives of employees. In this regard this notion is similar to the ECtHR’s 
interpretation of privacy. As a result, when it comes to the protection of employees’ rights, 
a forward-thinking notion is applied. 
101. Despite the recognition of protecting employees’ personal life, it does not 
guarantee its inviolability without barriers: even in his/her personal life, the employee is 
bound by certain obligations (e.g. obligation of loyalty): both in his/her professional life 
and extra-professional life. As it was already stated, in such cases a balance must be found 
between the employer’s legitimate economic interests and the employees’ rights. 
Establishing the balance with regard to SNSs will constitute the main subject of Part II. of 
the dissertation. 
(β) Hungarian Act on the Protection of Private Life 
102. Aim and provisions of the act. In order to ensure the effective protection of 
private life in the light of the seventh amendment of the Fundamental Law, the Hungarian 
Parliament adopted Act LIII of 2018 on the Protection of Private Life (hereinafter referred 
 
360 Though this judgement employs the expression private life and not personal life. The Nikon case aimed to 
protect employees’ correspondence within the workplace, by stating that the right to respect for private life 
“[…] implies the secrecy of correspondence.” On the same day, in the Abram case (Cour de cassation, 
chambre sociale, 2 octobre 2001, N° 99-42727), the Court of Cassation also addressed the question of 
another inherent part of private life by limiting the expansion of professional life into the employee’s home 
(“the employee is not obliged either to accept to work from home, or to install there folders and work 
equipment”).  
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to as: Privacy Act).361 The Privacy Act lays down aims pervading the entire legal system in 
order to ensure a more comprehensive protection of private life and refers to the essential 
elements of this right, laid down in different acts,362 such as the Civil Code, Penal Code 
and Data Protection Act.363 In addition, the Privacy Act guarantees that the fundamental 
rules regulating the protection of private life shall only be stated in acts, and the laws 
governing the right to privacy shall be interpreted in accordance with the Fundamental 
Law and with the Privacy Act itself.364 
103. According to the Privacy Act, the right to private life is part of the right to 
the free development of personality and means that the individual has the freedom to 
responsibly and independently shape his/her life and to create and preserve human 
relationships.365 It is the essence of the right to private life that - with the exceptions 
specified in a separate Act - against the will of the individual others cannot breach it.366 
104. The aim of the right to respect for private life is to protect especially the 
right to bear a name, personal data, private secrets, image and voice recordings, honour and 
good reputation.367 Its infringement can occur especially through the abuse of personal 
data, secret, image and voice recording intended to be protected by the individual in 
relation to his/her private life and through the infringement of honour and good 
reputation.368  
105. Novelties brought by the act. Relating to the subject of the dissertation, the 
act contains one considerable novelty. The preamble of the Privacy Act acknowledges that 
the tools of ICT changed the way of communication, and that the protection of private life 
is extended to physical and to online harassment as well. Although it relates to harassment, 
after the preamble it states that the individual’s dignity and right to respect for private life 
shall be ensured in social media as well. For this reason, the legislator’s intention 
guarantees the security of the private sphere regarding content shared and published for 
private purposes. Subsection (3) of Article 8 of the Privacy Act stipulates that personal 
 
361 2018. évi LIII. törvény indokolása a magánélet védelméről 
362 2018. évi LIII. törvény indokolása a magánélet védelméről 
363 Section 6 of the Privacy Act 
364 2018. évi LIII. törvény indokolása a magánélet védelméről 
365 Subsection (1) of Section 2 of the Privacy Act 
366 Subsection (3) of Section 2 of the Privacy Act 
367 Subsection (1) of Section 8 of the Privacy Act 
368 Subsection (2) of Section 8 of the Privacy Act 
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data provided on the Internet for exclusively private purposes can be processed based on 
the unambiguous consent of the data subject, except for the cases of mandatory processing. 
The general reasoning of the Privacy Act gives no guidance regarding the exact 
meaning of these provisions: it only declares that in addition to the traditional forms of 
harassment, protection against every form of online harassment should be guaranteed.369 In 
the reasoning relating to Article 8, it is stated that the general principle according to which 
it is the essence of the right to respect for private life – unless otherwise prescribed by law 
– that it shall not not be infringed by others applies here, too. 
106. Shortcomings of the act. It is too early to assess the implications of the 
Privacy Act, due to the lack of doctrine and jurisprudence because of its recent adoption. 
Although at first sight it might be welcomed that an act assembles the existing regulations 
in relation to privacy present in different acts;370 substantially, except for a few 
provisions,371 the Privacy Act does not bring essential novelty. It is forward-thinking to 
declare that the online world merits protection just as the offline world, however, even 
without the declaration of that principle this was a rule deduced from the general rule of 
law. 
Also, the Privacy Act employs different terminology, sometimes in a confusing 
manner. For example, in the very first paragraph of its preamble, the act refers to two 
notions [right to respect for private life (“magánélet tiszteletben tartásához fűződő jog”) 
and right to privacy (“magánélethez való jog”)]; In the third paragraph the expression 
“private sphere” (“privátszféra”) is employed, without giving further explanation regarding 
the meaning or scope of this notion, raising the question whether it has an autonomous 
meaning or simply used as a synonym to privacy/private life.372 Also, the Privacy Act 
mainly uses the expression right to private life: it only refers to the right to respect for 
private life in Article 8. Neither the Fundamental Law, nor the Civil Code employs the 
expression “right to private life”. 
 
369 2018. évi LIII. törvény indokolása a magánélet védelméről 
370 As it was, for example, expressed by Mariann Arany-Tóth. Source: Arany-Tóth, M. (2019) ‘A magánélet 
védelméhez való jog újraszabályozásának hatása a munkaviszonyban a magánélet védelméről szóló törvény 
alapján (2. rész)’, Munkajog, (3), p. 34. 
371 See the provisions relating to social media. Besides, the rules relating to public figures was considerably 
changed, as now the protection of their private life is strengthened through the stricter separation of their 
public life and private life. [Preamble and Subsection (2) of Section 7] 
372 In addition, Subsection (2) of Section 2 employs the expression “private sphere” (“magánszféra”). 
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107. In addition, these provisions relating to social media and the Internet raise 
several questions, especially the expressions “content shared and published for private 
purposes” and “personal data provided on the Internet for exclusively private purposes” 
(“magáncéllal megosztott és közzétett tartalmak” and “magáncélból közölt személyes 
adat”). What does the security of private sphere in relation to this shared or published 
content enshrined in the preamble mean? Is protection afforded to a personal Facebook 
post available to ten Facebook friends? Or to several hundreds of Facebook friends? Is it 
only applicable to chat messages within these sites? 
The use of the expression “publish” suggest the sharing of a content with a larger 
audience, going beyond the scope of personal communication. Is the right to private life 
guaranteed when the user publicly shares a personal content relating to his/her private life, 
without using any privacy settings? In relation to Subsection (3) of Article 8, similar 
questions can be asked regarding personal data provided on the Internet for exclusively 
private purposes. Moreover, the phrasing of Subsection (3) of Article 8 is confusing, as it 
seems to implicate terminology referring to the outdated dual concept of legal grounds of 
the former Hungarian data protection act based on the dichotomy between consent and 
authorisation of the law.373 These questions are yet to be answered. 
108. Conclusions of Section 1. Despite the numerous attempts to define privacy, 
no universal definition could be created due to privacy’s embeddedness in the societal, 
technological and individual circumstances. In addition, what is considered to be private 
and what is legally protected as private might differ: the scope of privacy and the scope of 
the right to respect for private life are not always in overlap. The right to privacy covers a 
broader range of matters, while the right to respect for private life – terminology usually 
applied in the European legal order – is traditionally centred on the narrower concept of 
secrecy. However, even in these legal orders the concept of public privacy, or privacy as 
autonomy or self-determination appeared (first of all, see the ECtHR jurisprudence in 
relation to Article 8 of the ECHR), providing broader protection. 
109. In the French legal order especially the concept of personal life, specific to 
the employment context should be mentioned: personal life encompasses private life, as a 
hard core of protection; but it also includes some elements of (public) extra-professional 
 
373 Although the Privacy Act introduced changes in this regard. Balogh, Zs. Gy. et al. (2012) ‘Munkahelyi 
adatvédelem a gyakorlatban’, Infokommunikáció és Jog, 9(3), p. 97. 
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life. In the Hungarian legal order, this broader apprehension of right to respect for private 
life also appeared in the Constitutional Court’s practice, and in civil courts. 
110. In view of the foregoing, when the protection of employees’ privacy is 
discussed in the thesis, what will be understood by employees’ privacy is – in accordance 
with the definition previously proposed – ensuring the employees’ ability to act upon their 
wishes.  
Section 2: Right to data protection 
111. The right to privacy and the right to data protection are often mentioned 
together,374 and typically there is clearly a connection between these two rights.375 
However, formally they are regulated in separate documents, and when it comes to their 
substantial scope, there exist different theories describing the relations between these two 
rights, and the additional role fulfilled by the right to data protection.376 What is clear is 
that besides privacy, data protection can also play an important role in protecting 
employees’ private lives, in consequence its analysis must be included in the dissertation. 
112. The right to data protection does much more than simply protect personal 
data. Despite what its appellation might suggest, the right to data protection does not aim 
to protect personal data, but the individual to whom personal data relates.377 Pál Könyves 
Tóth emphasizes the connection between the right to data protection and human dignity, 
stating that it is an essential condition to human dignity that individuals be able to take 
decisions regarding the disclosure of personal data relating to them.378 Máté Dániel Szabó 
points out that personal data is more and more valued, as the individual’s personality can 
be increasingly expressed through personal data.379 To the outside world, the individual is 
more and more often perceived through (mainly) his/her personal data – instead of as a 
 
374 See, for example, Article 1 of the DPD, and Convention 108. 
375 Bygrave, L. A. (2001) The Place of Privacy in Data Protection Law. Available 
at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLJ/2001/6.html (Accessed: 28 February 2018). 
376 Orla Lynskey identified three models of understanding the relation between privacy and data protection: 
they can be understood as separate but complementary rights; data protection can be understood as a subset 
of privacy; or data protection can be perceived as a separate, independent right in service of different 
functions, but not limited to privacy. Source: Lynskey, O. (2015) The Foundations of EU Data Protection 
Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 90 and pp. 91-106. 
377 Majtényi, L. (2002) ‘Az információs szabadságok és az adatvédelem határai’, Világosság, XLIII (2–3), 
pp. 57-58. 
378 Könyves Tóth, P. (1990) ‘Adatvédelem és információszabadság’, Világosság, 31(8–9), p. 621. 
379 Szabó, M. D. (2005) ‘Kísérlet a privacy fogalmának meghatározására a magyar jogrendszer 
fogalmaival’, Információs Társadalom, (2), p. 47. 
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physical person.380 Because of such an enhanced role, if the processing (e.g. collection and 
use of such information) does not take place according to the established guarantees and 
rules, the individual might suffer serious consequences.381 
113. The Section will first address what additional role data protection can fulfill 
in comparison to privacy, aiming to clarify the relations between these two rights. Then, it 
will present how exactly the individuals’ rights must be respected, through examining the 
most important points of the relevant legislation. 
§1. Introduction to the right to data protection 
114. The first data protection regulation appeared a few decades after the right to 
respect for private life,382 followed by several other instruments both at the international 
and the national level. Although they will be addressed in detail in part §2, even at this 
point it must be noted that today data protection is subject to detailed regulations. For its 
importance, focus will be put on EU regulations: though ever since 1995 the question of 
data protection has been regulated,383 in 2016 the adoption of the GDPR brought 
considerable changes and became a central piece of legislation. 
In the following part, first, (A) it will be explored what the reasons for the emergence 
of data protection rules were. Then, (B) it will be examined why there was a need when the 
right to respect for privacy had already existed. To put it differently, it will be explored in 
what regards there are substantial differences (if there are) between the two rights, which 
would justify the existence of two rights. 
(A) The birth of the right to data protection 
115. Origins of data protection. The right to data protection is a relatively recent 
right: it appeared in the 1970s. Similarly to the right to privacy, the right to data protection 
 
380 Szabó, M. D. (2005) ‘Kísérlet a privacy fogalmának meghatározására a magyar jogrendszer 
fogalmaival’, Információs Társadalom, (2), p. 47. 
381 For example, as it will be addressed in a later part of the dissertation, if the employer does not process 
personal data according to the pertinent regulations, it not only infringes the employees’ or prospective 
employees’ rights but can also have serious consequences for his/her employment – e.g. termination of 
employment or unfavorable hiring decision. 
382 It was adopted in 1970 in Germany. Source: Simitis, S. (2010) ‘Privacy - An Endless Debate’, California 
Law Review, 98(6), p. 1995. 
383 See: Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data. Official Journal L 281, 23/11/1995 P. 0031 - 0050 
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also emerged as a reaction to technological development: owing to the appearance of 
computers, the collection, storage, transfer, etc. had never been easier, and the plan for 
establishing different state registers was evoked by the states. Under the shadow of how 
state registers had contributed to the horrible events of the Second World War,384 
combined with the growing fear of a surveillance state,385 the public feared the 
consequences of unregulated automated processing of personal data. Still, prior to the 
1960s and 1970s, technology did not make it possible to conduct automatic data 
processing; also, mass surveillance came at high costs, and thus the protection of the 
individual was naturally ensured.386 However, due to the technological development, the 
situation had changed, and as a response to the arising threats, data protection appeared,387 
as these innovations offered unprecedented opportunities for the state to keep records in 
order to fulfil its functions (e.g. in relation to taxation, etc.).388 At the same time, plans 
appeared throughout Europe aiming to unify or to connect national databases.389 It was 
against this background that the first documents regulating data protection appeared. The 
world’s first data protection act was adopted in 1970, in the German federal state of 
Hesse,390 and was soon followed by other countries (Sweden in 1973, Germany in 1977, 
France in 1978).391 After adopting these national data protection acts, it became also 
necessary to regulate the transborder flow of personal data, which led to the adoption of 
international data protection norms.392 
116. French and Hungarian origins. France adopted its data protection act, the 
“Loi informatique” in 1978 [Act No. 78-17 of 6 January 1978 on Information Technology, 
 
384 Galántai, Z. (2003) E-privacy olvasókönyv. Dialógusok a privacyről és az internetről – meg a 
cyberpornóról, a megfigyelésekről és egyebekről. Available at: https://mek.oszk.hu/04100/04134/html/ 
(Accessed: 18 November 2019). 
385 These fears are well illustrated in literature as well. Scholars usually refer to George Orwell’s “1984”, and 
Franz Kafka’s “The Trial”. In Hungary, scholars often cite a certain verse of a poem entitled “Air!” written 
by the famous Hungarian poet, Attila József in 1935: “They keep track of my phone calls,/ who I call and 
when and why./ They keep a transcript of my dreams/ and what they mean / and according to whom./ I don’t 
know what’s in my file of late/ but soon they’ll make a move/ and violate my rights.” Source: Hargitai, P. 
(tran.) (2005) Attila József Selected Poems. New York: iUniverse, pp. 35-36. 
386 Jóri, A. (2005) Adatvédelmi kézikönvy. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, p. 22. 
387 Szőke, G. L. (2015) Az európai adatvédelmi jog megújítása. Tendenciák és lehetőségek az önszabályozás 
területén. Budapest: HVG-ORAC, p. 27 
388 Sári, J. and Somody, B. (2008) Alapjogok. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, p. 133. 
389 Szőke, G. L. (2015) Az európai adatvédelmi jog megújítása. Tendenciák és lehetőségek az önszabályozás 
területén. Budapest: HVG-ORAC, p. 31. 
390 Simitis, S. (2010) ‘Privacy - An Endless Debate’, California Law Review, 98(6), p. 1995. 
391 On the history of data protection see more in: Szőke, G. L. (2015) Az európai adatvédelmi jog megújítása. 
Tendenciák és lehetőségek az önszabályozás területén. Budapest: HVG-ORAC, pp. 27-34.; Jóri, A. 
(2005) Adatvédelmi kézikönvy. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, pp. 21-66. 
392 Jóri, A. (2005) Adatvédelmi kézikönvy. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, p. 28. 
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Data Files and Civil Liberties (“loi relative à l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés”) 
hereinafter referred to as: FDPA – standing for French Data Protection Act],393 as a result 
of the SAFARI scandal concerning a project to interconnect certain files of the French 
administration – revealed to the public in an article in the newspaper Le Monde. 394 In 1978 
the FDPA also established the French national data protection authority, named French 
National Commission on Informatics and Freedoms (“Commission nationale de 
l'informatique et des libertés”) (hereinafter referred to as: CNIL). The FDPA was 
significantly amended in 2004395 in order to transpose the EU’s data protection directive,396 
and in 2016 by the Act for a Digital Republic aiming to address the new challenges of the 
information society.397 Although the GDPR is directly applicable, it did not repeal national 
data protection acts: in the case of conflicting provisions, the former will be applied.398 The 
amendment of the FDPA was realized in June 2018 by Act No. 2018-493 of 20 June 2018 
on the Protection of Personal Data (“Loi n° 2018-493 du 20 juin 2018 relative à la 
protection des données personnelles”).399 
117. While France was amongst the first countries in the world to adopt a data 
protection act in 1978, in Hungary this process was slower: Hungary adopted its first data 
protection act, Act LXIII of 1992 on the protection of personal data and access to data of 
public interest in 1992. The act also established the institution of the Hungarian data 
protection commissioner,400 who was first appointed in 1995. This act was amended due to 
 
393 See more on French data protection and on the FDPA in: Desgens-Pasanau, G. (2012) La protection des 
données à caractère personnel: la loi ‘Informatique et libertés’. Paris: LexisNexis (Carré droit); Féral-
Schuhl, C. (2018) Cyberdroit. Le droit à l’épreuve de l’Internet. 7th edn. Paris: Dalloz.; Forest, D. 
(2011) Droit des données personnelles. Paris: Gualino (Droit en action). 
394 Boucher, P. (1974) ‘« Safari » ou la chasse aux Français’, Le Monde, 21 March. p. 9. 
395 Loi n° 2004-801 du 6 août 2004 relative à la protection des personnes physiques à l'égard des traitements 
de données à caractère personnel et modifiant la loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l'informatique, aux 
fichiers et aux libertés 
396 On the history of French data protection and the adoption of the FDPA see more in: Braibant, G. 
(1998) Données personnelles et société de l’information: transposition en droit français de la directive n° 
95-46. Paris: la Documentation française (Collection des rapports officiels). pp. 31-36. and Rey, B. (2012) La 
vie privée à l’ère du numérique. Cachan: Lavoisier. pp. 66-82. 
397 See more on the Act for a Digital Republic in: Masnier-Boché, L. (2016) ‘Loi « pour une République 
numérique » : état des lieux en matière de protection des données personnelles’, Revue Lamy droit de 
l’immatériel ex Lamy droit de l’informatique, 131, pp. 50–55.; Richard, J. (2016). Le numérique et les 
données personnelles : quels risques, quelles potentialités ? Revue Du Droit Public (RDP), 1, 87–100. 
398 Bourgeois, M. (2017) Droit de la donnée : principes théoriques et approche pratique. Paris: LexisNexis. 
p. 13. 
399 See more on the GDPR’s effect on the FDPA in: Beaugrand, T. et al. (2017) Protection des données 
personnelles : se mettre en conformité d’ici le 25 mai 2018. Montrouge: Editions législatives. pp. 76-79. On 
the amendment of the FDPA see more in: CNIL (2018) Rapport d’activité 2017. La documentation française. 
pp. 34-37. 
400 Section 23 of Act LXIII of 1992 on the protection of personal data and access to data of public interest 
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Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2003401 and replaced in 2011 by Act CXII of 2011 on the 
Right to Informational Self-determination and Freedom of Information402 (hereinafter 
referred to as: HDPA – standing for the Hungarian Data Protection Act403).404 The HDPA 
also introduced significant changes to the national data protection authority: it replaced the 
institution of the data protection commissioner by establishing the Hungarian National 
Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (“Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és 
Információszabadság Hatóság ”, hereinafter referred to as: NAIH). After the entering into 
application of the GDPR, the Hungarian legislators adopted Act XXXIV of 2019 on 
legislative amendments required for the implementation of the European Union’s data 
protection reform (hereinafter referred to as: Enforcing Act) in April 2019, aiming to adapt 
the Hungarian legal system to the GDPR, by amending more than 80 acts.405, 406 
118. Generations of data protection regulations. Despite the recent birth of the 
right to data protection, scholars already distinguish between different generations of data 
protection regulations. However, these generations are not universal, different authors 
established different stages in the history of data protection regulations. According to 
Michael D. Birnhack, the first stage was the very appearance of these regulations, the 
second was the appearance of international regimes instead of solely national regulation 
and the third was the emphasis being put on the transfer of personal data instead of the 
collection.407 In 2005, law professor Yves Poullet differentiated between three generations 
 
401 By Act XLVIII of 2003 on the amendment of Act LXIII of 1992 on the protection of personal data and 
access to data of public interest. Source: Könyves Tóth, P. (2010) ‘Az adatvédelmi törvény 
metamorfózisai’, Fundamentum, (2), p. 55. 
402 On the history of Hungarian data protection regulation se more in: Péterfalvi, A. (ed.) (2012) Adatvédelem 
és információszabadság a mindennapokban. Budapest: HVG-ORAC, pp. 50-55.; Könyves Tóth, P. (2010) 
‘Az adatvédelmi törvény metamorfózisai’, Fundamentum, (2), pp. 53–61. 
403 Although the Hungarian data protection authority employed the expression “Privacy Act” when referring 
to the data protection act, the use of such an expression is unfortunate, with regard to the adoption of the 
Privacy Act (act on the protection of private life). For this reason, the acronym HDPA will be employed in 
the dissertation. 
404 In Hungary as well, the adoption of a landmark decision in the field of data protection is connected to a 
so-called universal identification number and its suppression by the Constitutional Court in Decision No. 
15/1991. (IV. 13.). 
405 On the most important changes occurring in 2019 see more in: Bölcskei, K. (2019) GDPR Kézikönyv 2.0. 
Budapest: Vezinfó Kiadó és Tanácsadó Kft. 
406 On Hungarian data protection see more in: Jóri, A. (2005) Adatvédelmi kézikönvy. Budapest: Osiris 
Kiadó.; Majtényi, L. (2006) Az információs szabadságok: adatvédelem és a közérdekű adatok nyilvánossága. 
Budapest: Complex.; Jóri, A., Hegedűs, B. and Kerekes, Z. (eds) (2010) Adatvédelem és 
információszabadság a gyakorlatban. Budapest: Complex.; Könyves Tóth, P. (2010) ‘Az adatvédelmi 
törvény metamorfózisai’, Fundamentum, (2), pp. 53–61.; Péterfalvi, A. (ed.) (2012) Adatvédelem és 
információszabadság a mindennapokban. Budapest: HVG-ORAC.; Jóri, A. and Soós, A. K. 
(2016) Adatvédelmi jog: magyar és európai szabályozás. Budapest: HVG-ORAC. 
407 Birnhack, M. D. (2008) ‘The EU Data Protection Directive: An engine of a global regime.’, Computer 
Law & Security Review, 24(6), pp. 511-512. 
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of data protection regulations, starting with Article 8 of the ECHR, continuing with the 
EU’s Data Protection Directive and the CoE’s Convention 108, and ending with the EU’s 
E-privacy Directive.408 Back in 1997, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger already distinguished 
four generations of data protection regulations. The first one dates back to the very 
appearance of data protection laws, when these acts aimed to regulate the technology, 
when processing was conducted only by a few controllers. Then, when processing became 
differentiated and available not only for states but for businesses too, data protection 
regulations shifted from regulating technology to guaranteeing individual liberty. The third 
generation is characterized by the right to informational self-determination, while the 
fourth (e.g. the EU Data Protection Directive) manifests an intention to strengthen the 
rights of the individual and to create a mandatory protection of certain data, and a shift and 
an opening towards sectoral regulation.409 
119. Gergely László Szőke differentiates between three generations: the first 
generation is characterized by the aim of regulating the automated processing of certain 
data controllers (mainly the state) who processed a huge amount of personal data. With the 
appearance and spread of the personal computer in the 1980s, this landscape changed, as 
the processing of personal data became available to a wider audience (to businesses or to 
private individuals): a second type of regulation was needed. These regulations are 
characterized by the aim of providing the individual the right to informational self-
determination in general, instead of regulating the processing of only a few data 
controllers. The European Data Protection Directive, the OECD Guidelines, the CoE’s 
Convention 108 are typical examples of the second generation of data protection 
regulations. However, since then, technology has not stopped evolving: the mass adoption 
of the Internet, social network sites, profiling, the use of mobile devices, etc. have evoked 
the necessity for a third generation of regulation. According to Szőke, the EU’s General 
Data Protection Regulation (then proposal) represents new tendencies in personal data 
protection, by taking into account the obligations of data controllers (instead of the 
individual’s right to self-determination), differentiating between certain types of 
 
408 Poullet, Y. (2005) ‘Pour une troisième génération de réglementations de protection des 
données’, Jusletter. Available at: http://www.crid.be/pdf/public/5188.pdf (Accessed: 24 February 2018). 
pp.4-8. 
409 Mayer-Schönberger, V. (1997) ‘Generational Development of Data Protection in Europe’, in Agre, P. E. 
and Rotenberg, M. (eds) Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 221-233. 
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controllers, aiming to regulate technology and strengthening the role of the internal 
regulations of controllers.410 
120. Either categorization we agree with, it is undisputed that the changes posed 
by the mass adoption of the Internet, social media, mobile devices and the shift in users’ 
behaviour represent a challenge both for the right to privacy and for the right to data 
protection. As the dissertation focuses on labour law, it is beyond the dissertation’s scope 
and aim to propose another classification of the generations of data protection regulations, 
for the purposes of the dissertation it is sufficient to identify the common characteristics of 
the development of data protection regulations. 
121. From the generations identified above, it can be observed that data 
protection went through different phases: since its appearance in the second half of the 20th 
century, the technological, societal and legal environment has been completely 
transformed. The conclusion that can be drawn from these generations is that data 
protection as well should be adequately adjusted to the given circumstances. While data 
protection at the beginning was regulated at the national level, it was soon recognized that 
the absence of an international legal framework would inhibit the international transfer of 
personal data411 –, resulting in the adoption and existence of a complex regulation. While 
at the beginning data protection regulations had to cope with a limited number of huge 
databases, nowadays data processings have multiplied due to the rapid advancement of 
technological development. These changes had an effect on the regulations as well, as at 
the beginning these regulations constituted mainly technical regulations, but later shifted 
towards guaranteeing the freedom of the individual.412 Existing rules are constantly 
challenged – for example by social media and SNSs, as it will be examined under Title 2. 
(B) Defining data protection: substantial delimitation from the right to privacy 
 
410 Szőke, G. L. (2013) ‘Az adatvédelem szabályozásának történeti áttekintése’, Infokommunikáció és jog, 
(3), pp. 108-111. In his article Szőke also refers to the different existing theories amongst Hungarian 
scholars. According to László Majtényi, the first generation consists of norms regulating data processing by 
computers, while the second generation is technology-neutral, and the third focuses on challenges arising in 
different sectors. (Majtényi, L. (2008) ‘Az információs jogok’, in Halmai, G. and Tóth, G. A. (eds) Emberi 
jogok. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, pp. 582-583.) According to András Jóri, the first generation of norms focuses 
on big data controllers and processing by computers, the second generation is centred around the right to 
informational self-determination, while the third one is concentrated on the new arising challenges. (Jóri, A. 
(2005) Adatvédelmi kézikönvy. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, pp. 23-66.) 
411 Jóri, A. (2005) Adatvédelmi kézikönvy. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, p. 28. 
412 Marta Otto referring to Mark Freedland in: Otto, M. (2016) The Right to Privacy in Employment: a 
Comparative Analysis. Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing, pp. 106-107. 
 88 
 
122. It was already established how privacy is understood in the dissertation. As 
a starting point, data protection can be comprehended as “the regulation and organisation 
of the conditions under which personal data can be lawfully processed.”413 However, it 
must also be established what is data protection and what is its relation to privacy? There is 
an uncontested connection between these two rights,414 however, just like regarding the 
exact meaning of privacy, there is no uniform standpoint in this question, as there is still no 
universal consensus with respect to the relationship between these two rights.415 Even at 
this point it must be noted that data protection and privacy are not considered to be 
synonymous concepts in the dissertation.416 
123. Data protection as a subset of privacy. Different interpretations suggest that 
data protection is a subset of privacy and not a separate right.417 On the one hand, different 
grammatical formulations support this view: data protection can be associated with 
privacy, as Patrik Hiselius’ formulation suggests: “[i]n the European Union, instead of 
using the term 'Privacy', in general the notion 'right to data protection' is used.”418 In the 
literature, the expressions informational privacy419 or data privacy420 are also used to 
describe data protection. 
 
413 Gellert, R. and Gutwirth, S. (2013) ‘The legal construction of privacy and data protection’, Computer Law 
and Security Review, 29(5), p. 525. 
414 According to László Sólyom, it is undisputed that the right to data protection originates from the right to 
privacy, although it has to be seen that both rights have grown beyond the concept of mere secrecy or 
intimacy. Source: Sólyom, L. (1988) ‘Adatvédelem és személyiségi jog’, Világosság, 29(1), p. 55. 
415 Purtova, N. (2010) ‘Private Law Solutions in European Data Protection: Relationship to Privacy, and 
Waiver of Data Protection Rights’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 28(2), p. 181. 
416 Kokott, J. and Sobotta, C. (2013) ‘The distinction between privacy and data protection in the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR’, International Data Privacy Law, 3(4), p. 223. According to Paul 
de Hert and Eric Schreuders, they are not synonymous concepts, but rather can be described as “twins but 
not identical”. Source: De Hert, P. and Schreuders, E. (2001) ‘The Relevance of Convention 
108’. Proceedings of the Council of Europe Conference on Data Protection, Warsaw, 19-20 November. 
Cited in: Kuner, C. (2009) ‘An international legal framework for data protection: Issues and 
prospects’, Computer Law and Security Review, 25(4), p. 308. 
417 For example, Endre Ferenczy argues that data protection is one component of privacy. Source: Ferenczy, 
E. (2010) ‘Az adatvédelem külföldi szabályozása’, Tudományos közlemények, (23), p. 48. 
418 Hiselius, P. (2010) ‘ICT/Internet and the Right to Privacy’, Scandinavian Studies in Law, 56, p. 203. 
419 See, for example: Mayer-Schönberger, V. (1997) ‘Generational Development of Data Protection in 
Europe’, in Agre, P. E. and Rotenberg, M. (eds) Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape. Cambridge: 
MIT Press, p. 226. 
420 Lee A. Bygrave argues that instead of the use of the expression “data protection”, the expression of “data 
privacy” is better suited as it can constitute a bridge between the US and the European concept of privacy and 
data protection, and it better reflects the values to be protected. Bygrave, L. A. (2004) ‘Privacy Protection in 
a Global Context – A Comparative Overview’, Scandinavian Studies in Law, 47, pp. 321-322.  
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On the other hand, Juliane Kokott and Christoph Sobotta also point out that both the 
ECtHR and the CJEU consider data protection as an expression of the right to privacy.421
 
Even in the EU, where the CFREU contains two separate articles for these two rights 
(Article 7 and Article 8), it is not excluded that data protection still forms a part of 
privacy.422 In the jurisprudence of the CJEU, though in certain decisions it acknowledged 
that the right to privacy and the right to data protection are two separate rights,423 the two 
rights are consistently conflated in most of its practice.424 In contrast to the CFREU, the 
ECHR does not contain a separate provision corresponding to the right to data protection, 
still, the ECtHR deducted certain data protection rules from Article 8,425 treating data 
protection as a privacy interest.426 Lee A. Bygrave refers to the existence of an “almost 
universal consensus” that data protection mostly aims to protect privacy.427 Indeed, privacy 
 
421 Kokott, J. and Sobotta, C. (2013) ‘The distinction between privacy and data protection in the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR’, International Data Privacy Law, 3(4), p. 222. 
422 Purtova, N. (2010) ‘Private Law Solutions in European Data Protection: Relationship to Privacy, and 
Waiver of Data Protection Rights’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 28(2), p. 185. 
423 In the Bavarian Lager case, the CJEU referred to the existence of a specific system of protection in 
relation to personal data protection [CJEU (2010): Commission v Bavarian Lager, Case C-28/08 P, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, 29 June, par. 60.]. In its opinion in the Volker case, it was stated that “[t]wo separate 
rights are evoked here: a classic right (protection of privacy under Article 8 ECHR) and a more modern right 
(the data protection provisions of Convention No 108)” acknowledging the existence of a separate right to 
data protection. (par. 71.) However, in the Volker judgement the CJEU employed the confusing expression of 
“the right to respect for private life with regard to the processing of personal data” (par. 52.) Source: CJEU 
(2010) Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, Joined cases C-92/09 and C-
93/09, Opinon, ECLI:EU:C:2010:353, 9 November 
424 For example, in the Rundfunk case he CJEU interpreted the DPD in the light of Article 8 of the ECHR. 
[CJEU (2003): Rechnungshof v. Österreichischer Rundfunk, Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:131, 20 May, par. 21.] In the case of Promusicae the CJEU employed the term “the right 
that guarantees protection of personal data and hence of private life” to refer to one fundamental right, 
treating privacy and data protection as one right. [CJEU (2008): Productores de Música de España 
(Promusicae) v Telefónica de España SAU, Case: C-275/06. ECLI:EU:C:2008:54, 29 January, par. 63.] See 
more on the conflating position of the CJEU in: Lynskey, O. (2014) ‘Deconstructing Data Protection: the 
“Added-Value” of a Right to Data Protection in the EU Legal Order’, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 63(3), pp. 569-597. 
425 Though Kokott and Sobotta argue that the ECtHR gave rise to a right to data protection, De Hert and 
Gutwirth are more cautious when it comes to this subject. They argue that though the ECtHR indeed went 
further than the narrow concept of privacy as intimacy and acknowledged several data protection aspects 
under Article 8 case law, basic data protection assumptions are not incorporated in its protection. (Kokott, J. 
and Sobotta, C. (2013) ‘The distinction between privacy and data protection in the jurisprudence of the CJEU 
and the ECtHR’, International Data Privacy Law, 3(4), p. 223. and De Hert, P. and Gutwirth, S. (2009) ‘Data 
Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: Constitutionalisation in Action’, in Gutwirth, S. et 
al. (eds) Reinventing Data Protection? Springer, p. 24. and p. 27. 
426 Purtova, N. (2010) ‘Private Law Solutions in European Data Protection: Relationship to Privacy, and 
Waiver of Data Protection Rights’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 28(2), p. 198. 
427 Bygrave, L. A. (2001) The Place of Privacy in Data Protection Law. Available 
at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLJ/2001/6.html (Accessed: 28 February 2018), par. 2. 
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occupies a central role in data protection, as supported by numerous legal documents and 
by scholars as well. According to these views, data protection aims to ensure privacy.428 
124. Scope of data protection. In contrast to interpreting data protection as a 
subset of privacy, different authors understand data protection as having a wider scope than 
privacy.429 For example, Orla Lynskey argues that the right to data protection – though 
overlapping with the right to privacy – offers an additional protection for individuals.430 
Several other authors draw attention to the fact that despite the connection between privacy 
and data protection, data protection cannot be limited to the protection of privacy, but aims 
to ensure the protection of other rights, being broader than privacy.431 Bygrave also 
 
428 For example, according to András Jóri, data protection is “a unique legal way to protect the private sphere 
of the individual” and “can be interpreted within the protection of private sphere, as the legal instrument 
protecting privacy in the current societal and technological environment.” Source: Jóri, A. and Soós, A. K. 
(2016) Adatvédelmi jog: magyar és európai szabályozás. Budapest: HVG-ORAC, p. 15 and p. 20. 
Nadezhda Purtova also interpreted existing doctrine as suggesting that the right to data protection and the 
right to privacy – though not completely synonymous – can be reduced to the same core, which is the 
protection of the private sphere of the individual. Source: Purtova, N. (2010) ‘Private Law Solutions in 
European Data Protection: Relationship to Privacy, and Waiver of Data Protection Rights’, Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights, 28(2), pp. 182-183. 
According to Article 1 of the DPD, its objective was to “[…] protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.” The 
CoE’s Convention 108 also contained a similar paragraph. However, the WP29 expresses the contrary by 
stating that this formulation suggests that the purpose of the right to data protection is wider than the mere 
protection of privacy. WP29 (2007) Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data. 01248/07/EN WP 136. 
p. 7. 
A “separation” of data protection from privacy might also be observed in the GDPR, as, with the data 
protection reform, the world privacy is gone from the GDPR: Article 1 aims to protect “[…] fundamental 
rights and freedoms of natural persons and in particular their right to the protection of personal data.” Also, 
a change in the terminology can be observed, adopting the concepts data protection by design and data 
protection impact assessment, replacing the “traditional” expressions privacy by design and privacy impact 
assessment. Source: Costa, L. and Poullet, Y. (2012) ‘Privacy and the regulation of 2012’, Computer Law 
and Security Review, 28(3), p. 255. 
According to Section 1 of the HDPA, the purpose of the act is to “[…] define rules in relation to data 
processing in order to make data controllers respect the private lives of individuals[.]” 
429 However, as it was also pointed out, data protection has a narrower scope compared to privacy, regarding 
the protection of moral persons: while data protection is solely offered to natural persons, the ECtHR 
expanded protection to moral persons. Source: ECtHR: Société Colas Est and others v. France, Application 
No. 37971/97, 16 April 2002, par. 40. and Kokott, J. and Sobotta, C. (2013) ‘The distinction between privacy 
and data protection in the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR’, International Data Privacy Law, 3(4), 
p. 225 
430 Lynskey, O. (2014) ‘Deconstructing Data Protection: the “Added-Value” of a Right to Data Protection in 
the EU Legal Order’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 63(3), p. 582. 
431 Bygrave, L. A. (2001) The Place of Privacy in Data Protection Law. Available 
at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLJ/2001/6.html (Accessed: 28 February 2018), par. 18. 
Similarly, according to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, in the age of the Internet the right to privacy no longer 
covers all aspects of the right to data protection – which is conceived to be a right at the intersection of 
property rights, the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Source: Falque-Pierrotin, I. (2012) 
‘La Constitution et l’Internet’, Les nouveaux cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel, 36, p. 36. 
Raphaël Gellert and Serge Gutwirth also argued that privacy protects not only privacy but other fundamental 
rights as well. Gellert, R. and Gutwirth, S. (2013) ‘The legal construction of privacy and data 
protection’, Computer Law and Security Review, 29(5), p. 530. Data protection regulation can cover other 
significant values besides privacy, such as requirement of fair processing, consent, legitimacy and non-
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expresses that while data protection aims to benefit society as a whole, privacy has a 
narrower aim, and concentrates on the individual.432, 433András Jóri et al. also noted that 
data protection can be wider as it covers personal data not necessarily falling under 
privacy.434 Usually such statement is supported by the fact that data protection rules apply 
regardless of the private or public nature of personal data, while traditionally privacy 
enjoys limited protection outside the private sphere.435 This question gains significant 
importance in the context of SNSs, as on SNSs users typically (publicly) share a vast 
amount of personal data, raising several questions in relation to whether they fall under the 
scope of privacy and/or data protection.436 
125. Instead of solely stating that the right to data protection is wider than the 
right to privacy, Raphaël Gellert and Serge Gutwirth found that it is wider and narrower at 
the same time. They argued that as regards the content of these two rights, there are 
overlaps, still data protection is wider and narrower than privacy and vice versa.437 Data 
protection is wider, as the data protection regulation applies to all kinds of personal data 
processing, even when the right to privacy is not infringed by the processing.438 It is also 
 
discrimination. Source: De Hert, P. and Gutwirth, S. (2009) ‘Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg 
and Luxemburg: Constitutionalisation in Action’, in Gutwirth, S. et al. (eds) Reinventing Data Protection? 
Springer, p. 9. 
432 Bygrave, L. A. (2001) The Place of Privacy in Data Protection Law. Available 
at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLJ/2001/6.html (Accessed: 28 February 2018), par. 20. 
433 In contrast to such an opinion Anoinette Rouvroy and Yves Poullet refer to other scholars who suggested 
that privacy aims to protect the society as a whole. Rouvroy, A. and Poullet, Y. (2009) ‘The Right to 
Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: Reassessing the Importance of 
Privacy for Democracy’, in Gutwirth, S. et al. (eds) Reinventing Data Protection? Springer, p. 60. 
434 Jóri, A., Hegedűs, B. and Kerekes, Z. (eds) (2010) Adatvédelem és információszabadság a gyakorlatban. 
Budapest: Complex. p. 34. In contrast, Attila Péterfalvi argued in an interview that the right to data protection 
is narrower than the right to privacy. Source: Szabó, M. D. (2004) ‘„Erős jogvédő szemlélettel, de a törvényi 
felhatalmazás keretein belül kell dolgoznunk.” Péterfalvi Attila adatvédelmi biztossal Szabó Máté Dániel 
beszélget’, Fundamentum, VIII(4), p. 40. 
435 Lynskey, O. (2014) ‘Deconstructing Data Protection: the “Added-Value” of a Right to Data Protection in 
the EU Legal Order’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 63(3), p. 583.; Gellert, R. and Gutwirth, 
S. (2013) ‘The legal construction of privacy and data protection’, Computer Law and Security Review, 
29(5), p. 526,; Kokott, J. and Sobotta, C. (2013) ‘The distinction between privacy and data protection in the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR’, International Data Privacy Law, 3(4), p. 225. 
436 These questions will be addressed in detail in Title 2. 
437 Gellert, R. and Gutwirth, S. (2013) ‘The legal construction of privacy and data protection’, Computer Law 
and Security Review, 29(5), p. 526. 
De Hert and Gutwirth also argued that data protection is both wider and more specific than the protection of 
privacy. De Hert, P. and Gutwirth, S. (2009) ‘Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: 
Constitutionalisation in Action’, in Gutwirth, S. et al. (eds) Reinventing Data Protection? Springer, p. 6. 
438 “[…] storing of data relating to the “private life” of an individual falls within the application of Article 8 § 
1 […]” [ECtHR (2000) Amann v. Switzerland, Application no. 27798/95,16 February, par. 65.] However, 
when the processing does not concern the private life of the individual – for example, in the case of public 
camera surveillance, more precisely in the case of the use of “photographic equipment which does not record 
the visual data” – the Commission held that there was no interference with the applicant’s private life. 
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more specific because it only deals with personal data, while the right to privacy covers 
more aspects. Privacy is also wider and more specific, as it could apply to cases concerning 
the processing of not personal data,439 but which nevertheless can have an effect on one’s 
privacy; but it will not apply to a processing which does not infringe privacy.440 
126. Tools of protection. While privacy remains a relatively vague concept, with 
a highly context-dependent nature, data protection is characterized by a more exact 
terminology. It is enough to look at basically any international or national piece of 
legislation: these documents usually contain the most important definitions, such as data 
protection, data processing, etc. having a more exact nature, leaving less place for 
interpretational questions. Naturally, it does not mean that data protection would not have 
to adapt to technological and societal changes441 (see, for example, the EU data protection 
reform), or that no interpretational questions would arise (see, for example, the pre-GDPR 
discourse on IP addresses). 
127. Another important difference is that while privacy aims to protect against 
intrusions (thus prohibiting intrusion), data protection regulations usually do not prohibit 
data processing but rather regulate how this processing can take place.442, 443 While the 
right to privacy is a “redress” right, which ensures the protection from interference by 
public powers, the right to data protection is a “control” right, which aims to give the right 
to control the processing of personal data relating to the individual.444 Another approach is 
to interpret the right to privacy as an opacity tool, ensuring the individual’s “invisibility” 
towards the state; while the right to data protection as a transparency tool, regulating the 
processing of personal data in order to achieve transparency.445, 446 Instead of providing 
 
European Commission on Human Rights (1998) Pierre Herbecq and the Association Ligue des droit de 
l’homme v. Belgium, Applications N° 32200/96 and 32201/96 (joined), 14 January. 
439 It is enough to think of physical privacy, or of the protection of home or family life. See, for example, 
Kuner, C. (2009) ‘An international legal framework for data protection: Issues and prospects’, Computer Law 
and Security Review, 25(4), p. 309. 
440 Gellert, R. and Gutwirth, S. (2013) ‘The legal construction of privacy and data protection’, Computer Law 
and Security Review, 29(5), p. 526. 
441 De Hert, P. and Gutwirth, S. (2009) ‘Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: 
Constitutionalisation in Action’, in Gutwirth, S. et al. (eds) Reinventing Data Protection? Springer, p. 4. 
442 De Hert, P. and Gutwirth, S. (2009) ‘Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: 
Constitutionalisation in Action’, in Gutwirth, S. et al. (eds) Reinventing Data Protection? Springer, p. 3. 
443 In contrast to this view, Gloria González Fuster and Serge Gutwirth point out that data protection can be 
interpreted as being of prohibitive nature. Source: González Fuster, G. and Gutwirth, S. (2013) ‘Opening up 
personal data protection: A conceptual controversy’, Computer Law and Security Review, 29(5), 
444 Knight, A. and Saxby, S. (617) ‘Global challenges of identity protection in a networked world’, Computer 
Law and Security Review, 30(6), p. 626. 
445 González Fuster, G. and Gutwirth, S. (2013) ‘Opening up personal data protection: A conceptual 
controversy’, Computer Law and Security Review, 29(5), p. 536. And De Hert, P. and Gutwirth, S. (2009) 
 93 
 
protection against data processing, the right to data protection protects individuals from 
unlawful processing and regulates under which conditions personal data can be 
processed.447 
128. In the light of the above, for the purposes of the dissertation, data protection 
will be considered as the set of rules governing the processing of personal data relating to 
the employee. Indeed, privacy is at the core values of data protection, as there are often 
overlaps between the two rights. However, the two rights have different sets of tools to 
ensure the protection of employees’ rights, therefore they cannot be treated as synonyms. 
While data protection channels the processing of personal data, privacy aims to ensure the 
employee to be able to decide about himself/herself. This can be interpreted as privacy 
enabling the employee to decide whether and how to use SNSs,448 as data protection 
aiming to regulate whether employers can process personal data obtained from SNSs and if 
they can, they perform it according to the guarantees laid down in pertinent regulations. 
§2. Legal regulation of the right to data protection 
129. Besides the substantial differences, the right to data protection also became 
a formally separate right, laid down in several international449 and national documents. Due 
to their utmost importance and the space limitations of the dissertation, amongst the 
international instruments the EU’s data protection framework will be focused on here, 
while other global and regional regulations will be addressed incidentally. Special attention 
will be paid to the GDPR, as it introduced considerable changes to EU data protection law. 
Its significance is mainly due to the form of the instrument chosen by the EU legislator: by 
regulating data protection in a regulation, EU law was unified in this field. 
Although – as it will be demonstrated – data protection is already subjected to 
detailed regulation, it does not mean that this right lacks paths to evolve. The development 
 
‘Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: Constitutionalisation in Action’, in 
Gutwirth, S. et al. (eds) Reinventing Data Protection? Springer, p. x. 
446 In contrast to this view, Marta Otto emphasizes the deficiency of this opacity-transparency approach, as 
according to her it does not take into consideration the established case law of the ECtHR interpreting 
privacy beyond a negative right. Source: Otto, M. (2016) The Right to Privacy in Employment: a 
Comparative Analysis. Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing, p. 112. 
447 De Hert, P. and Gutwirth, S. (2009) ‘Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: 
Constitutionalisation in Action’, in Gutwirth, S. et al. (eds) Reinventing Data Protection? Springer, pp. 3-4. 
448 Or reconnecting to the “traditional” concept of secrecy, it can be formulated as aiming to guarantee 
protection against the intrusions into the autonomy of private life. 
449 See Annex I. on the summary table concerning the most important international documents in the field of 
privacy, data protection, data protection and employment, and data protection and social network sites. 
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of informational communicational technology constantly challenges existing conceptions 
of data protection, giving rise to new questions or aspects to consider – for example, 
through the appearance of the right to informational self-determination. In some countries 
this right has been present for decades,450 in others it constitutes a new issue451 – but its 
existence and scope must be (re)examined in the light of technological and societal 
developments. 
(A) Formal distinction from the right to privacy: norms regulating the right to data 
protection 
130. Universal level. Although no binding regime of data protection exists452 at 
the global level, the United Nations’453 Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized 
Personal Data Files (hereinafter referred to as: UN Guidelines) should be mentioned.454 
The UN Guidelines contain recommendations to nations and also to governmental 
international organizations on what requirements and principles they should respect during 
the processing of personal data. The other document that must be mentioned is the 
OECD’s Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data 
(hereinafter referred to as: OECD Guidelines). These guidelines were revised in 2013. 
Despite the lack of binding effect, the OECD Guidelines have particular importance as the 
principles455 laid down in them are reflected worldwide in different privacy and data 
protection regulations.456 
 
450 See, for example, the German population census judgement from 1983. 
451 For example in France, where the Act for a Digital Republic introduced this right in 2016. 
452 On the possibilities of a global data protection regime see: Kuner, C. (2009) ‘An international legal 
framework for data protection: Issues and prospects’, Computer Law and Security Review, 25(4), pp. 307–
317. 
453 In 1968 at the United Nations International Conference on Human Rights the first serious international 
discussion on data protection took place. Source: Cate, F. H. (1995) ‘The EU Data Protection Directive, 
Information Privacy, and the Public Interest’, Iowa Law Review, 80(3), p. 431. 
454 United Nations: Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files. Adopted by General 
Assembly resolution 45/95 of 14 December 1990, 1990  
455 These principles are the following (OECD Guidelines, 1980, par. 7-14.): collection limitation principle, 
data quality principle, purpose specification principle, use limitation principle, security safeguards principle, 
openness principle, individual participation principle, accountability principle. See more on these principles 
at: Majtényi, L. (2008) ‘Az információs jogok’, in Halmai, G. and Tóth, G. A. (eds) Emberi jogok. Budapest: 
Osiris Kiadó, p. 586. 
456 Hendrickx, F. (2000) ‘Data protection and codes of conduct: self-regulation versus legislative 
intervention’, in Blanpain, R. (ed.) Multinational Enterprises and the Social Challenges of the XXIst 
Century: the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles at Work, Public and Private Corporate Codes of 
Conduct. (Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, 37), p. 254. 
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131. Regional regulation in Europe.457 The CoE’s Convention for the Protection 
of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data458 (hereinafter 
referred to as: Convention 108) was the first binding international document regulating the 
processing of personal data,459 serving as the foundation for several European countries’ 
data protection regulation.460 Throughout the years, the adoption of Convention 108 was 
followed by a series of sectoral recommendations and resolutions in various fields, 461 such 
as in the field of employment, and the Convention itself was modernized in 2018.462 
132. Even though the ECHR does not contain any article expressively stating the 
right to the protection of personal data, the ECtHR has found a way to ensure the 
protection of personal data, more precisely certain data protection principles (e.g. access to 
personal files, deletion and correction of personal data, purpose limitation principle) under 
its case law relating to Article 8.463 
133. National legislation: FDPA and HDPA. Although the GDPR leaves a 
certain margin of maneuver to the Member States, for example in the field of 
employment,464 it unified data protection in the EU. As neither the HDPA nor the FDPA 
contains employment specific provisions, their detailed general analysis will not be 
discussed.465 In accordance with Article 88 of the GDPR – which legitimizes Member 
 
457 Besides the European regulation, other regional regimes exist too, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation’s (hereinafter referred to as: APEC) Privacy Framework of 2005 (revised in 2015) the 
Economic Community of West African States’ (hereinafter referred to as: ECOWAS) Supplementary Act 
A/SA.1/01/10 on Personal Data Protection within ECOWAS or the Organisation of American States’ General 
Assembly Resolution 2661 on Access to Public Information and Protection of Personal Data. Source: 
Mendel, T. et al. (2013) Étude mondiale sur le respect de la vie privée sur l’Internet et la liberté 
d’expression. Paris: Éditions Unesco (Collection Unesco sur la liberté de l’Internet), p. 73. 
458 Council of Europe: Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data, ETS No.108, 28 January 1981. 
459 Which document was highly inspired by the French national data protection act. Source: Bioy, X. 
(2016) Droits fondamentaux et libertés publiques. 4e édition. Issy-les-Moulineaux: LGDJ-Lextenso éditions 
(Collection Cours). p. 524. 
460 Council of Europe: Explanatory Report to the Protocol amending the Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. Strasbourg, 10. October 2018, par. 1. 
461 See these documents at: Council of Europe (no date) Data protection. Legal instruments. Available 
at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/data-protection/legal-instruments(Accessed: 7 March 2018). 
462 Council of Europe: Modernised Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data. CM/Inf(2018)15-final, Elsinore, Denmark, 18 May 2018 
463 Gellert, R. and Gutwirth, S. (2013) ‘The legal construction of privacy and data protection’, Computer Law 
and Security Review, 29(5), p. 526. Also, see more in: Council of Europe (2017) Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights Concerning the Protection of Personal Data. T-PD(2017)23. Strasbourg. Available 
at: https://rm.coe.int/case-law-on-data-protection/1680766992(Accessed: 8 March 2018). Also, see what has 
been said in relation to the substantial differentiation between privacy and data protection. 
464 Article 88 of the GDPR – to be addressed later in the dissertation. 
465 For more information on the French data protection legislation see more in: Frayssinet, J. (1978) La Loi 
du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique aux fichiers et aux libertés et le décret du 17 juillet 1978. Paris: 
Libr. générale de droit et de jurisprudence, Desgens-Pasanau, G. (2012) La protection des données à 
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States to adopt specific provisions in the field of employment – both France and Hungary 
enacted employment specific data protection provisions, laid down not in the data 
protection acts but in the labour codes.466 Therefore, national specificities of the data 
protection acts will not be addressed, instead, emphasis will be put on the general 
provisions of the GDPR in part (b), while the employment specific privacy and data 
protection provisions in France and in Hungary will be addressed in Chapter 2.  
(a) EU framework of data protection 
134. Data protection as a fundamental right. The European Union also has its 
own data protection regime. The right to data protection is recognized at the EU 
constitutional level. Even though the right to data protection had existed before the 
adoption of the CFREU, the CFREU went further and – contrary to the ECHR – regulated 
the right to data protection as a fundamental right, separate from the right to respect for 
private life.467, 468 The Treaty of Lisbon (2007/2009) has a great significance as it provided 
 
caractère personnel: la loi ‘Informatique et libertés’. Paris: LexisNexis; Féral-Schuhl, C. (2010) Cyberdroit: 
le droit à l’épreuve de l’internet. 6e édition, à jour au 15 juillet 2010 [2011-2012]. Paris: Dalloz (Praxis 
Dalloz). pp. 31-109.; Grynbaum, L., Le Goffic, C. and Morlet-Haïdara, L. (2014) Droit des activités 
numériques. Paris: Dalloz. pp. 747-784, 803-851. On the joint examination of French data protection law and 
the GDPR see: Bourgeois, M. (2017) Droit de la donnée : principes théoriques et approche pratique. Paris: 
LexisNexis. pp. 5-274. 
On Hungarian data protection see more in: Jóri, A. and Soós, A. K. (2016) Adatvédelmi jog: magyar és 
európai szabályozás. Budapest: HVG-ORAC; Péterfalvi, A. (ed.) (2012) Adatvédelem és 
információszabadság a mindennapokban. Budapest: HVG-ORAC. On the 1992 data protection act see more 
in: Jóri, A., Hegedűs, B. and Kerekes, Z. (eds) (2010) Adatvédelem és információszabadság a gyakorlatban. 
Budapest: Complex; Jóri, A. (2005) Adatvédelmi kézikönvy. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó; Majtényi, L. (2006) Az 
információs szabadságok: adatvédelem és a közérdekű adatok nyilvánossága. Budapest: Complex. 
466 As they notified the European Commission: Notification à la Commission européenne de la législation 
française en vigueur en application des articles 49, 51, 84, 85, 88, 90 du règlement (UE) 2016/679 relatif à 
la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard du traitement des données à caractère personnel et à la libre 
circulation de ces données, et abrogeant la directive 95/46/CE – Note des autorités françaises (2018). Paris. 
Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/fr_notification_gdpr_articles_49_51_84_85_88_90_publish.pdf 
(Accessed: 19 April 2019) and A természetes személyeknek a személyes adatok kezelése tekintetében történő 
védelméről és az ilyen adatok szabad áramlásáról, valamint a 95/46/EK rendelet hatályon kívül helyezéséről 
szóló (EU) 2016/679 rendeletben (általános adatvédelmi rendelet) előírt tájékoztatási kötelezettségek 
teljesítéséhez szükséges informaciók (2018). XX-EUJMFO/ID/194/2/2018. Budapest. Available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/hu_notification_art_51.4_84.2_85.3_88.3_90.2_publish.pdf 
(Accessed: 19 April 2019). 
467 De Hert, P. and Gutwirth, S. (2009) ‘Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: 
Constitutionalisation in Action’, in Gutwirth, S. et al. (eds) Reinventing Data Protection? Springer, pp. 7-8. 
However, in contrast to this opinion, according to certain authors such as Marta Otto, the right to data 
protection should rather be considered as an emanation of the right to informational privacy, while Nadezhda 
Purtova concluded that data protection is considered to be a privacy interest in the EU legal order. Source: 
Otto, M. (2016) The Right to Privacy in Employment: a Comparative Analysis. Oxford, Portland: Hart 
Publishing. p. 113. and Purtova, N. (2010) ‘Private Law Solutions in European Data Protection: Relationship 
to Privacy, and Waiver of Data Protection Rights’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 28(2), p. 198. 
468 CFREU: Article 8, Protection of personal data: 
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the CFREU legally binding force and also incorporated the right to data protection into 
Article 16469 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter referred 
to as: TFEU).470 
135. The (previous) data protection directive. In 1995 the EU adopted Directive 
95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data,471 which was described as “the most 
comprehensive and successful international instrument of data protection laws”472, 473 and 
which was highly inspired by Convention 108.474 The DPD adopted a technology-neutral 
approach. The CJEU also dealt with data protection in several of its cases.475 
136. Data protection reform. For more than 20 years the DPD was the central 
document of data protection in the EU. In 2016 – though the process started back in 
2009476 – an important event happened in the history of data protection: in the frame of the 
 
“1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.  
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person 
concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which 
has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.” 
469 Article 16 of the TFEU (ex Article 286 TEC): 
“1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them. 
2. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, 
shall lay down the rules relating to the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data by Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and by the Member States when carrying out 
activities which fall within the scope of Union law, and the rules relating to the free movement of such data. 
Compliance with these rules shall be subject to the control of independent authorities.” 
470 González Fuster, G. and Gutwirth, S. (2013) ‘Opening up personal data protection: A conceptual 
controversy’, Computer Law and Security Review, 29(5), p. 531. 
471 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. Official 
Journal L 281, 23/11/1995 P. 31 - 50 
472 Michael D. Birnhack referring to Bennett, C. J. and Raab, C. D. (2006) The governance of privacy: policy 
instruments in global perspective. Cambridge: MIT Press and Swire, P. P. and Litan, R. E. (1998) None of 
your business: world data flows, electronic commerce and the European privacy directive. Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution Press in: Birnhack, M. D. (2008) ‘The EU Data Protection Directive: An engine of a 
global regime.’, Computer Law & Security Review, 24(6), p. 512. 
473 On the background of the adoption of the DPD see more in: Simitis, S. (1995) ‘From the Market to the 
Polis: The EU Directive on the Protection of Personal Data, Iowa Law Review, 80(3), pp. 445–470. 
474 Wong, R. (2012) ‘The Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC: Idealisms and realisms’, International Review 
of Law, Computers & Technology, 26(2–3), p. 229. 
475 For lack of space, these cases will not be addressed in detail. See more on the CJEU’s jurisprudence in the 
field of data protection in: Wong, R. (2012) ‘The Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC: Idealisms and 
realisms’, International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 26(2–3), pp. 229–244.; Laudati, L. 
(2016) Summaries of EU Court Decisions Relating to Data Protection 2000-2015. OLAF. Available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/sites/antifraud/files/caselaw_2001_2015_en.pdf (Accessed: 28 April 
2019).; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe (2018) Handbook on 
European data protection law: 2018 edition. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 
476 De Hert, P. and Papakonstantinou, V. (2012) ‘The proposed data protection Regulation replacing 
Directive 95/46/EC: A sound system for the protection of individuals’, Computer Law and Security Review, 
28(2), p. 131. 
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EU’s data protection reform, the DPD was replaced by the GDPR.477 Almost two decades 
after the adoption of the DPD, the revision of the EU data protection framework became 
necessary, as the developments in technology and globalization made the processing of 
personal data become more elaborated and less detectable.478 Also, the DPD did not result 
in the desired harmonisation effect.479 A reform was needed in order that the EU could 
ensure the effective protection of personal data in the 21st century, too.480 This reform was 
composed of two documents: the GDPR was one of them.481 It is important to state that the 
core principles and values laid down in the DPD remain valid, and the GDPR kept the 
technology-neutral approach of the regulation.482 The relevant provisions of the GDPR will 
be further detailed in part b.  
137. Sectoral data protection. Besides the general requirement set by the GDPR, 
sectoral rules must also be mentioned, as they react to the specific data protection 
questions raised in certain fields. The EU has also adopted sectoral data protection norms 
in the fields of the electronic communications sector,483 data processing by the Community 
Institutions and Bodies,484 data processing and criminal matters,485 data retention486 and on 
 
477 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 
1–88 
478 European Commission: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - A comprehensive approach on 
personal data protection in the European Union. COM(2010) 609 final. Brussels, 4 November 2010, p. 2. 
479 De Hert, P. and Papakonstantinou, V. (2012) ‘The proposed data protection Regulation replacing 
Directive 95/46/EC: A sound system for the protection of individuals’, Computer Law and Security Review, 
28(2), p.131. 
480 de Terwangne, C., Rosier, K. and Losdyck, B. (2016) ‘Lignes de force du nouveau Règlement relatif à la 
protection des données à caractère personnel’, Revue du droit des technologies de l’information, (62), p. 6. 
481 The other document was Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or 
the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89–131 
482 European Commission: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - A comprehensive approach on 
personal data protection in the European Union. COM(2010) 609 final. Brussels, 4 November 2010, p. 3. 
483 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector. OJ L 201, 
31.7.2002, p. 37–47 
484 Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and 
Decision No 1247/2002/EC 
485 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data 
processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. OJ L 350, 30.12.2008, p. 
60–71. replaced by Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities 
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the transfer of personal data.487 For the dissertation the specific rules laid down in the field 
of employment are of special importance – which will be presented in Chapter 2. 
Also, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (hereinafter referred to as: 
WP29) should be mentioned. The WP29 was an independent advisory board set up by 
Article 29 of the DPD, which addressed various sectoral questions of data protection – e.g. 
employee monitoring – in several of its documents. However, as a result of the data 
protection reform, the WP29 was replaced by the European Data Protection Board 
(hereinafter referred to as: EDPB), an independent body of the EU.488 The dissertation will 
focus on the documents issued by the WP29, as at the time of the submission of the 
dissertation the EDPB has not yet addressed any document relating to data protection in the 
context of employment. In these documents the WP29 basically translated the general 
provisions set in the DPD to the special context of employment.489 Even though they did 
not have legally binding force, – partly due to the WP29’s composition – they provide 
useful guidance for the Member States, and national data protection authorities take into 
consideration these opinions when it comes to the enforcement of national data protection 
rules.490 
(b) General Data Protection Regulation – rules of data processing 
138. The following paragraphs will address the most important rules set by the 
GDPR regarding data processing. Instead of giving an exhaustive presentation of the entire 
 
for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the 
execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework 
Decision 2008/977/JHA. OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89–131. 
486 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention 
of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic 
communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC. OJ L 
105, 13.4.2006, p. 54–63 
487 2000/520/EC: Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy 
principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce (notified under 
document number C(2000) 2441) (Text with EEA relevance.) OJ L 215, 25.8.2000, p. 7–47 replaced by 
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy 
Shield (notified under document C(2016) 4176. OJ L 207, 1.8.2016, p. 1–112  
488 Recital (139) of the GDPR 
489 These documents will be addressed in a later part of the dissertation. 
490 Otto, M. (2016) The Right to Privacy in Employment: a Comparative Analysis. Oxford, Portland: Hart 
Publishing p. 97. and Retzer, K. and Lopatowska, J. (2011) ‘How to Monitor Workplace E-Mail and Internet 
in Europe: The Polish Perspective’. Privacy & Security Law Report, Bureau of National Affairs. Available 
at: https://media2.mofo.com/documents/110718-privacy-and-security-law-report.pdf (Accessed: 2 May 
2018). p. 2. 
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data protection regime, or the most important changes compared to the DPD,491 the 
dissertation will only focus on the provisions which have higher relevancy in the context of 
employee monitoring and the protection of employees’ right to privacy and right to data 
protection492 and on the challenges raised by SNSs in relation to employment. Adequate 
knowledge of these provisions is necessary in order to be able to address the specific 
challenges raised by SNSs in the employment context.493 
139. Changes brought by the GDPR. The GDPR kept the technology-neutral 
nature and the core values494 of the DPD and applies to all kinds of processing, regardless 
of the technology used.495 One of the most striking differences between the instruments is 
that the EU legislators choose to regulate data protection by a regulation instead of the 
previous directive, unifying data protection law throughout Europe. 
140. Data processing in the employment context. Although having a regulation 
instead of a directive indeed leads to more uniformity, it does not mean that no differences 
will exist between Member State regulations, as in certain questions the GDPR empowers 
Member States to adopt specific rules. Particularly, Article 88 of the GDPR contains 
special provisions regarding processing in the employment context, stating that Member 
 
491 On the differences between the DPD and the GDPR with special regard to SNSs see more in: Lukács, A. 
(2017) ‘Adatvédelmi irányelv és rendelet, avagy hogyan változott a közösségi oldalakra vonatkozó 
szabályozás az Európai Unió adatvédelmi reformjával?’, in Homoki-Nagy, M. and Hajdú, J. (eds) Ünnepi 
kötet dr. Zakar András c. egyetemi tanár 70. születésnapjára. Szeged: Szegedi Tudományegyetem Állam- és 
Jogtudományi Kar, pp. 125–139. 
492 On the detailed and exhaustive analysis of the GDPR see: Jay, R. et al. (2017) Guide to the General Data 
Protection Regulation: a companion to data protection law and practice (4th edition). London: Sweet & 
Maxwell; Rücker, D. and Kugler, T. (eds) (2018) New European General Data Protection Regulation. A 
Practitioner’s Guide. München, Oxford, Baden-Baden: C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos; Bensoussan, A. (ed.) 
(2018) Règlement européen sur la protection des données: textes, commentaires et orientations pratiques. 
Bruxelles: Bruylant; Beaugrand, T. et al. (2017) Protection des données personnelles : se mettre en 
conformité d’ici le 25 mai 2018. Montrouge: Editions législatives; Prévost, S. and Royer, E. (eds) (2018) Le 
RGPD. Paris: Dalloz. Jóri, A. et al (2018) A GDPR magyarázata. Edited by A. Jóri. Budapest: HVG-ORAC; 
Péterfalvi, A., Révész, B. and Buzás, P. (eds) (2018) Magyarázat a GDPR-ról. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer 
Hungary; Bölcskei, K. (2019) GDPR Kézikönyv 2.0. Budapest: Vezinfó Kiadó és Tanácsadó Kft.; de 
Terwangne, C., Rosier, K. and Losdyck, B. (2016) ‘Lignes de force du nouveau Règlement relatif à la 
protection des données à caractère personnel’, Revue du droit des technologies de l’information, (62), pp. 5–
56. 
493 Throughout this part references will be made to the text of the GDPR and also to the different documents 
issued by the WP29 to clarify how these general provisions should be interpreted in the employment context. 
Though the WP29 existed under the auspices of the DPD, and not the GDPR, the inclusion of its documents 
is justified by the following: as it was already noted, despite the reform, the core values and principles of data 
protection remain valid, therefore the statements of the WP29 can keep providing guidance adequately and 
with caution. 
494 European Commission (2010) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - A comprehensive 
approach on personal data protection in the European Union. COM(2010) 609 final. Brussels, p. 3. 
495 Recital (15) of the GDPR 
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States can provide for more specific rules in order to ensure employees’ right to data 
protection.496 Such rules should include suitable and specific measures to safeguard the 
data subject’s human dignity, legitimate interests and fundamental rights, with particular 
regard to, amongst others, monitoring systems at the workplace.497 This means – as there is 
no unified “EU labour law” – that some differences between Member State regulations 
might still exist in the future in the field of employment monitoring, giving rise to certain 
national specificities. 
141. Definition of personal data according to the GDPR. On SNSs users 
(employees) share a myriad of personal data. According to Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the 
GDPR, personal data “means any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person (‘data subject’) […]”. The EU purposefully adopted such a wide 
definition,498 and the GDPR provides more guidance by adding a list of examples: “[…] in 
particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location 
data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, 
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person[.]” An 
employee’s name, phone number, e-mail address, image, the metadata regarding their 
communication, IP address, online identifiers,499 etc. all qualify as personal data.500 The 
GDPR requires to fulfil stricter conditions501 when it comes to the processing of “special 
categories of personal data”, such as personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the 
processing of genetic data502, biometric data503 for the purpose of uniquely identifying a 
 
496 Schultis, C. (2017) ‘Le traitement de données dans le cadre des relations de travail dans le règlement sur la 
protection des données personnelles’, Dalloz IP/IT, (5), p. 266. Article 88 of the GDPR: Processing in the 
context of employment: “1. Member States may, by law or by collective agreements, provide for more 
specific rules to ensure the protection of the rights and freedoms in respect of the processing of employees' 
personal data in the employment context, in particular for the purposes of the recruitment, the performance 
of the contract of employment, including discharge of obligations laid down by law or by collective 
agreements, management, planning and organisation of work, equality and diversity in the workplace, health 
and safety at work, protection of employer's or customer's property and for the purposes of the exercise and 
enjoyment, on an individual or collective basis, of rights and benefits related to employment, and for the 
purpose of the termination of the employment relationship.” 
497 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. p. 9. 
498 WP29 (2007) Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data. 01248/07/EN WP 136. p. 4. 
499 Recital (30) of the GDPR 
500 As concerns what is qualified as personal data see more in: WP29 (2007) Opinion 4/2007 on the concept 
of personal data. 01248/07/EN WP 136. 
501 As a main rule, Article 9 of the GDPR prohibits the processing of such data and then provides exception 
from this prohibition. 
502 Paragraph 13 of Article 4 of the GDPR: “‘genetic’ data means personal data relating to the inherited or 
acquired genetic characteristics of a natural person which give unique information about the physiology or 
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natural person, data concerning health504 or data concerning a natural person's sex life or 
sexual orientation, per se prohibiting their processing with certain exceptions (Article 9) 
and defines genetic data, biometric data and data concerning health. On SNSs, a user often 
shares information that is qualified as sensitive data. For example, through sharing 
relationship status and identifying with whom the employee is in relationship can reveal 
his/her sexual orientation. The liking of the pages of certain political parties or politicians, 
posts, or comments made under posts, confirming the attendance at certain political events 
can reveal one’s political opinions. The same goes for religious and philosophical beliefs. 
142. Definition of data processing according to the GDPR. Data processing is 
defined as “any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on 
sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, 
organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, 
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or 
combination, restriction, erasure or destruction[.]” (Paragraph 2 of Article 4) It is also a 
wide definition, basically any operation made on personal data falls under the notion of 
processing (e.g. consulting a Facebook profile, making a screenshot of it, etc.). Even 
though nowadays most processings are conducted by automatic means (e.g. with the help 
of a computer or a mobile device),505 the GDPR does not exclude manual processing, as 
these kinds of activities are also capable of posing a threat to the rights and interests of data 
subjects, protected by the GDPR.506 
143. Participants of the processing according to the GDPR. As concerns the 
parties participating in the processing: the data controller507 is the actor (natural or legal 
person, public authority, agency or other body) who, alone or jointly with others, 
determines the purpose and means of the processing of personal data; or the data 
 
the health of that natural person and which result, in particular, from an analysis of a biological sample 
from the natural person in question;” 
503 Paragraph 14 of Article 4 of the GDPR: “’biometric data’ means personal data resulting from specific 
technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural 
person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or 
dactyloscopic data;” 
504 Paragraph 15 of Article 4 of the GDPR: “‘data concerning health’ means personal data related to the 
physical or mental health of a natural person, including the provision of health care services, which reveal 
information about his or her health status;” 
505 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe (2018) Handbook on European 
data protection law: 2018 edition. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. p. 99. 
506 Rücker, D. and Kugler, T. (eds) (2018) New European General Data Protection Regulation. A 
Practitioner’s Guide. München, Oxford, Baden-Baden: C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos. p. 11. 
507 Paragraph 7 of Article 4 of the GDPR 
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processor,508 who processes personal data on behalf of the controller.509 The GDPR 
introduces the notion of joint controllers: if two or more controllers jointly determine the 
purposes and means of processing, they will qualify as joint controllers. They should adopt 
an arrangement detailing their respective responsibilities in order to comply with their 
obligations regarding the data processing.510 Depending on the circumstances of the 
processing, the employer can qualify either as controller/joint controller or processor. The 
employee/former employee/job candidate will qualify as the data subject:511 the identified 
or identifiable natural person to whom the personal data relates. 
144. Scope of the GDPR. Regarding the material scope of the GDPR: it applies 
to data processing conducted wholly or partly by automated means, and also to processing 
which is not conducted by automatic means but which forms or is intended to form part of 
a filing system.512, 513 The WP29 clearly stated that monitoring employees’ e-mail or 
Internet use, video surveillance or the processing of sound data clearly falls under the 
scope of the regulation and also stated that usually most manual records are also likely to 
fall under the scope of the regulation.514, 515 The WP29 also declared that the data 
protection requirements are to be applied to the case of processing prospective employees’ 
personal data obtained from SNSs during the recruitment process.516 By analogy, I suggest 
that it should also apply to the processing of employees’ personal data obtained from SNSs. 
145. According to its territorial scope, the GDPR applies to processing when the 
controller or the processor has an establishment in the EU (Paragraph 1 of Article 3) or 
when the controller or the processor does not have an establishment within the territory of 
 
508 Paragraph 9 of Article 4 of the GDPR 
509 On the notion of controller and processor see more in: WP29 (2010) Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of 
‘controller’ and ‘processor’. 00264/10/EN WP 169. 
510 Article 26 of the GDPR 
511 Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the GDPR 
512 Paragraph 6 of Article 4 of the GDPR: “‘filing system’ means any structured set of personal data which 
are accessible according to specific criteria, whether centralised, decentralised or dispersed on a functional 
or geographical basis[.]” 
513 Paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the GDPR 
514 WP29 (2001) Opinion 8/2001 on the processing of personal data in the employment context. 
5062/01/EN/Final WP 48. p. 13. 
515 Article 2 of the GDPR defines some exceptions from its scope, such as processing: 
- relating to activities falling outside the scope of EU law, 
- relating to the common foreign and security policy of the EU, 
- by a natural person for purely personal or household activity, 
- relating to criminal matters and public security, 
- conducted by EU bodies and institutions. 
However, these provisions do not affect the applicability of the GDPR to processing in the employment 
context. 
516 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. p. 11. 
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the EU but the processing relates either to the offering of goods or services to data subjects 
in the EU, or to the monitoring of data subjects’ behaviour within the EU. (Paragraph 2 of 
Article 3). Therefore, the GDPR applies if the employer is situated within the EU or the 
monitoring aims at employees’ behaviour on SNS within the EU. 
146. Data protection principles according to the GDPR. Principles of data 
processing are orienting principles517 and constitute the cornerstone of the GDPR.518 They 
apply to every data processing activity and play a huge part in interpreting the provisions 
of the GDPR, thus helping the data controller to establish a lawful processing519 and also 
courts to interpret the GDPR.520 These principles govern the processing of personal data 
and aim to ensure the protection of the individual. They are not new, the core of them is the 
same as those defined by previous data protection instruments.521 These principles are wide 
and general provisions, which have to be considered as a guideline and framework for the 
processing. Throughout the GDPR specific provisions complement these general 
principles.522 Every data processing has to comply with the following principles: 
lawfulness,523 purpose limitation,524 fairness,525 data minimization,526 accuracy,527 
transparency,528 storage limitation,529 integrity and confidentiality,530 accountability.531 
 
517 Péterfalvi, A., Révész, B. and Buzás, P. (eds) (2018) Magyarázat a GDPR-ról. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer 
Hungary, p. 95. 
518 Mali, P. (no date) GDPR Articles with Commentary & EU Case Laws, p. 14. 
519 Bölcskei, K. (2019) GDPR Kézikönyv 2.0. Budapest: Vezinfó Kiadó és Tanácsadó Kft, p. 74. 
520 Voigt, P. and von dem Bussche, A. (2017) The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). A 
Practical Guide. Springer, p. 84. 
521 de Terwangne, C., Rosier, K. and Losdyck, B. (2016) ‘Lignes de force du nouveau Règlement relatif à la 
protection des données à caractère personnel’, Revue du droit des technologies de l’information, (62), p. 18. 
522 Rücker, D. and Kugler, T. (eds) (2018) New European General Data Protection Regulation. A 
Practitioner’s Guide. München, Oxford, Baden-Baden: C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos. pp. 49-50. 
523 Item a) of Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the GDPR 
524 Item b) of Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the GDPR 
525 Item a) of Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the GDPR 
526 Item c) of Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the GDPR. This principle was previously called “Proportionality 
principle” in the documents of the WP29. 
527 Item d) of Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the GDPR 
528 Item a) of Paragraph 1 Article 5 of the GDPR  
529 According to this principle, personal data shall be “kept in a form which permits identification of data 
subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed” (Item e) 
of Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the GDPR) with certain exceptions. Recital (39) of the GDPR expressively 
states that the period of storing personal data is limited to a strict minimum. This principle can be understood 
as the temporal aspect of the necessity principle. Source: Rücker, D. and Kugler, T. (eds) (2018) New 
European General Data Protection Regulation. A Practitioner’s Guide. München, Oxford, Baden-Baden: 
C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos. p. 70. 
530 Integrity and confidentiality: personal data shall be processed “in a manner that ensures appropriate 
security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against 
accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures.” [Item f) of 
Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the GDPR] This provision aims to ensure the security of the personal data 
themselves, by obliging the employer to implement appropriate technical or organizational measures in order 
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Especially the principles of purpose limitation, accuracy, data minimization and 
transparency are considerably challenged by SNSs. These specific challenges will be dealt 
with in Part II. of the dissertation, here, the following paragraphs will focus on their 
general presentation. 
147. Lawfulness means that the data processing must have one of the six legal 
grounds defined in Article 6 of the GDPR.532 In the employment context some of them 
(namely consent, performance of a contract, legitimate interests)533 are more commonly 
applied than the others, therefore only these are going to be addressed in detail. 
One of the possible legal grounds is consent. However, the WP29 expressed on 
several occasions that the applicability of consent as a legal ground of processing in the 
employment context is highly questionable. According to the GDPR, consent is a “[…] 
freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by 
which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the 
processing of personal data relating to him or her[.]” (Paragraph 11 of Article 4) In 
 
to ensure that the personal data processed are secure and safe from outside intrusion. [WP29 (2002) Working 
document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 
18.] Further provisions on data security can be found in Articles 32-34 of the GDPR detailing the obligations 
of controllers and processors. 
531 Accountability: the employer, as data controller is responsible for compliance with these principles and 
also shall be able to demonstrate compliance. Article 24 further develops the responsibility of the controller 
by stating that depending on the circumstances of the processing, the controller shall adopt appropriate 
technical and organisational measures to ensure and to be able to demonstrate that processing is performed in 
accordance with the GDPR. The controller shall also review those measures. (Paragraph 1 of Article 24) 
Compliance might be demonstrated through the adherence to approved code of conducts or approved 
certification mechanisms. (Paragraph 3 of Article 24) The controller can demonstrate compliance – amongst 
others – through the adoption of internal policies, implementing the principles of data protection by design 
and by default, appointing a data protection officer implementing data minimisation and transparency or 
using pseudonymisation. [Recital (78) of the GDPR] The stakes are high: data subjects have the right to an 
effective judicial remedy against a controller or processor and can lodge a complaint with a supervisory 
authority if they consider that controllers or processors infringe or are in non-compliance with the regulation. 
(Article 79 of the GDPR) In the most severe cases, administrative fines up to 20 million euros, (or up to 4 % 
of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year in the case of an undertaking) can be 
imposed. (Paragraph 5 of Article 83 of the GDPR) 
532 Recital (40) of the GDPR 
These six possible legal grounds are: 
- consent, 
- performance of a contract or when processing is necessary in order to take steps at the request of the 
data subject prior to entering into a contract, 
- compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject, 
- vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person, 
- performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested 
in the controller, 
- legitimate interests. 
533 Kajtár, E. and Mestre, B. (2016) ‘Social networks and employees’ right to privacy in the pre-employment 
stage: some comparative remarks and interrogations’, Hungarian Labour Law E-journal, (1), p. 33 Note: the 
authors’ statement relates to pre-employment background checks.  
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Recital (43) the GDPR further states that consent shall not constitute a valid legal ground 
when its freely given nature is not ensured, such as in cases when there is a clear imbalance 
between the controller and the data subject. This provision is in harmony with the WP29’s 
previously manifested opinion, according to which the reliance on consent should be 
limited, as there is a hierarchal relationship between the parties, questioning the genuinely 
free nature of consent.534 If the employer asked the employees to consent to the installation 
of a monitoring or surveillance system (e.g. monitoring their use of SNSs or processing 
personal data obtained from SNSs), employees might not consent freely, as they fear the 
possible consequences of a refusal. Therefore, consent should not constitute the valid legal 
ground of employee monitoring.535, 536 
SNSs raise questions, as the employer might take advantage of his/her position 
to obtain access to certain content posted by the employees. For example, in the US case 
Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant the employer accessed a private chat room where 
employees had a discussion, by obtaining the login credentials of one of the employee, 
who gave them to the employer in the fear of getting in trouble in the case of not 
complying with the request.537 Also, there are no clear social conventions about social 
media use,538 which can have an effect on consent – for example, what should the 
employee do if the employer adds him/her as a “friend”? Can the employee ignore the 
friend request without consequences or is he/she “obliged” to accept it? However, 
Emmanuel Plasschaert points out that the formulation of Recital (155)539 implicitly implies 
that the EU legislator did not want to prohibit completely the use of consent as a legitimate 
 
534 WP29 (2001) Opinion 8/2001 on the processing of personal data in the employment context. 
5062/01/EN/Final WP 48. p. 23., WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. 
p. 23. 
535 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 21. 
536 This does not mean that consent as a valid legal ground is completely missing from the employment 
relationship. The WP29 provides an example of employees consenting to the upload of their photos into their 
intranet profiles. Source: WP29 (2011) Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent. 01197/11/EN WP187. 
p. 14. 
537Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group (2009), Civil Case No. 06–5754 (FSH). United States District 
Court, D. New Jersey, 25 September. 
538 Van Eecke, P. and Truyens, M. (2010) ‘Privacy and social networks’, Computer Law and Security 
Review, 26(5), p. 536. 
539 “Member State law or collective agreements, including ‘works agreements’, may provide for specific 
rules on the processing of employees' personal data in the employment context, in particular for the 
conditions under which personal data in the employment context may be processed on the basis of the 
consent of the employee […].” 
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ground in the employment context.540 In my opinion, because of the hierarchal relationship 
between the parties, employee’s consent should not constitute a legitimate legal ground for 
the processing of his/her personal data present on SNSs. 
148. Another possible legal ground – especially during recruitment – is 
performance of a contract or when processing is necessary in order to take steps at the 
request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract: when without the processing of 
personal data the contract between the parties could not be executed, the processing of 
these data will be considered lawful. For example, one of the main obligations of the 
employer – to pay the employee – necessarily comes with the processing of his/her bank 
account number.541 Or, in order to enter into contract with a prospective employee, the 
processing of certain personal data – such as name, date of birth, data relating to education 
and professional experience, etc. – is inevitable during the recruitment process. However, 
employee monitoring is likely to be considered as processing going beyond the 
performance of a contract,542 necessitating the application of another legal ground. Also, 
prior to entering into contract, a detailed background check following a candidate’s 
application should not be understood as necessary for entering into contract.543 
Data processing is lawful when it is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate 
interests pursued by the employer, except when these interests are overridden by the data 
subjects’ fundamental rights and freedoms.544 This provision requires a balancing, an 
assessment of whether the controller’s legitimate interests can override the data subject’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy and data protection.545 The WP29 pointed out that the 
legitimate interests of the employer can constitute a valid legal ground of employee 
monitoring.546 The WP29 emphasizes that this legal ground should not be treated as a last 
resort, which applies automatically when no other legal ground can be evoked, but has to 
 
540 Plasschaert, E. (2017) ‘La licéité du traitement de données personnelles du travailleur au regard du 
nouveau Règlement (UE) n° 2016/679 sur la protection des données’, in Ragheno, N. (ed.) Data protection & 
privacy: le GDPR dans la pratique. Limal: Anthemis, pp. 113-114. 
541 WP29 (2001) Opinion 8/2001 on the processing of personal data in the employment context. 
5062/01/EN/Final WP 48. p. 15. 
542 WP29 (2014) Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 
of Directive 95/46/EC. 844/14/EN WP 217. p. 17.  
543 WP29 (2014) Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 
of Directive 95/46/EC. 844/14/EN WP 217. p. 18. 
544 Item f) of Paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the GDPR 
545 Recital (47) of the GDPR 
546 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. pp. 16-17., WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 
249. pp. 7-8. 
 108 
 
fulfil severe conditions and involve a careful balancing of the two opposite sides in order 
to be considered lawful.547 The field of employee monitoring is considered to be a field 
where the balancing of legitimate interests can take place.548 Besides the employer’s 
legitimate interests, the employees’ rights also have to be taken into consideration: what 
impact would the processing have on these rights (e.g. what kind of data will be processed 
and how, what is the relation between the controller and the data subject)?549 Also, the 
implementation of additional safeguards is crucial when striking the balance.550 This means 
that although the legitimate interest can constitute a valid legal ground for employee 
monitoring, it does not apply automatically: the balancing test must be implemented,551 
carefully assessing the two sides. In my opinion, this is the legal ground that in most cases 
can be applied to the cases of SNS monitoring.552 
149. Purpose limitation is a principle bearing utmost importance553 and requires 
that every data processing shall have a specified, explicit and legitimate purpose and shall 
not be further processed in a manner incompatible with the original purpose.554 This means 
that – even when there is a valid legal ground justifying the processing – every processing 
shall have a specific purpose, the employer cannot process data “just in case” it is useful 
one day. This principle has huge importance, as determining the purpose is considered to 
be a precondition for the whole processing and application of the other principles. It also 
sets the boundaries of the processing.555 In the employment context different purposes 
 
547 WP29 (2014) Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 
of Directive 95/46/EC. 844/14/EN WP 217. p. 9. Then the WP29 provides further guidance in this Opinion 
regarding how the balancing test should be implemented. See also: Péterfalvi, A., Révész, B. and Buzás, P. 
(eds) (2018) Magyarázat a GDPR-ról. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer Hungary, p. 131. 
548 WP29 (2014) Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 
of Directive 95/46/EC. 844/14/EN WP 217. pp. 24-25.; Péterfalvi, A., Révész, B. and Buzás, P. (eds) 
(2018) Magyarázat a GDPR-ról. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer Hungary, p. 133. 
549 WP29 (2014) Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 
of Directive 95/46/EC. 844/14/EN WP 217.pp. 36-41. 
550 WP29 (2014) Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 
of Directive 95/46/EC. 844/14/EN WP 217.pp. 42-48. 
551 Bölcskei, K. (2019) GDPR Kézikönyv 2.0. Budapest: Vezinfó Kiadó és Tanácsadó Kft., pp. 62-63. 
552 However, as remarked by Edit Kajtár and Bruno Mestre, when it comes to pre-employment background 
checks, the application of the ‘balancing test’ is also dubious, as the employer’s legitimate interest to find the 
best candidate possible can be achieved through less intrusive methods. Kajtár, E. and Mestre, B. (2016) 
‘Social networks and employees’ right to privacy in the pre-employment stage: some comparative remarks 
and interrogations’, Hungarian Labour Law E-journal, (1), p. 33.  
553 Péterfalvi, A., Révész, B. and Buzás, P. (eds) (2018) Magyarázat a GDPR-ról. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer 
Hungary, p. 96. 
554 WP29 (2001) Opinion 8/2001 on the processing of personal data in the employment context. 
5062/01/EN/Final WP 48. p. 20; Jóri, A. et al. (2018) A GDPR magyarázata. Edited by A. Jóri. Budapest: 
HVG-ORAC, p. 195. 
555 Péterfalvi, A., Révész, B. and Buzás, P. (eds) (2018) Magyarázat a GDPR-ról. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer 
Hungary, p. 96.; WP29 (2013) Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation. 00569/13/EN WP 203. p. 4.  
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might have relevancy originating from the employer’s legitimate interests and rights (such 
as assessing whether a job candidate is adequate for the position, monitoring employees’ 
performance, monitoring the adequate use of the employer’s equipment, safety or 
monitoring the compliance with a non-compete clause).556 The purpose determines the 
whole processing activity: for example, if an employer started a processing for the purpose 
of ensuring safety, then this original purpose determines the rest of the processing: this 
data cannot be used to monitor, for example, employees’ behaviour.557 
In the case of SNS, the legitimate purpose might be, for example, to monitor whether 
employees truly spend working hours working (and not surfing on Facebook instead), 
whether they respect the possible restrictions imposed by the employer on the personal use 
of work computers, whether employees respect the employer’s reputation (and do not post 
defamatory content on SNSs or bring shame to the employer in other ways), whether the 
job candidate is the best who could be employed, etc. 
150. According to the WP29, in order for processing to be fair, personal data 
“must be processed in a way that does not bring about unfairness to the data subject.”558 
This imposes an additional test on controllers. However, the definition of fairness is not 
given, leaving room for the interpretation of this principle.559 It is closely connected to the 
principle of transparency – the Recitals of the GDPR560 mention fairness together with the 
principle of transparency (“fair and transparent processing”) 561 –, but they are not 
synonymous concepts. The principle of fairness goes beyond transparency and can be 
interpreted as the requirement to process personal data in an ethical way.562, 563 
151. According to data minimisation, personal data must be adequate, relevant 
and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed. It 
 
556 WP29 (2001) Opinion 8/2001 on the processing of personal data in the employment context. 
5062/01/EN/Final WP 48. pp. 6-7. 
557 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 14.  
558 WP29 (2001) Opinion 8/2001 on the processing of personal data in the employment context. 
5062/01/EN/Final WP 48. p. 18. 
559 See more examples in: Bölcskei, K. (2019) GDPR Kézikönyv 2.0. Budapest: Vezinfó Kiadó és Tanácsadó 
Kft, p. 80. 
560 Recitals (39), (60) and (71) of the GDPR 
561 Rücker, D. and Kugler, T. (eds) (2018) New European General Data Protection Regulation. A 
Practitioner’s Guide. München, Oxford, Baden-Baden: C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos. pp. 51-52. 
562 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe (2018) Handbook on European 
data protection law: 2018 edition. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. p. 119. 
563 An example is ensuring the presence of the employee when searching through his/her professional e-mail 
account. Source: NAIH/2019/51/11., p. 19. 
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places further limitations regarding what personal data the employer can process: the 
processing of personal data has to be necessary in order to achieve the purpose:564 the 
employer must consider whether the monitoring is truly needed, or the same result could 
be achieved through traditional forms of monitoring.565 Any monitoring shall be 
proportionate and the least intrusive possible566 compared to the purpose of the processing. 
For example, if the employer prohibits the use of social media at the workplace during 
working hours, then he/she should only monitor whether employees visit these sites, he/she 
must not monitor the content of these websites.567 The WP29 emphasizes that when it 
comes to electronic monitoring, prevention should be more important than detection.568 
Instead of monitoring the access to these “prohibited” sites, blocking of access or the use 
of pop-up warning windows should be considered.569 Monitoring should be tailored to the 
circumstances of the processing: continuous and automatic monitoring should be 
avoided.570 It is advisable that in accord with the purpose, the risks, etc., limitation in 
scope, time or place are applied. 
152. The principle of accuracy means that personal data shall be accurate and, 
where necessary, kept up-to-date. When personal data are inaccurate, every reasonable 
step, with regard to the purpose of the processing, shall be taken that these data are erased 
or rectified without delay.571 The GDPR does not provide a definition of ‘accurate’: data 
are considered to be inaccurate if they do not correspond with reality and also if they are 
not complete or are embedded into the wrong context.572 
153. Transparency requires that employees shall be aware of the characteristics 
of the processing (e.g. identity of the controller, what kind of personal data are processed, 
 
564 Péterfalvi, A., Révész, B. and Buzás, P. (eds) (2018) Magyarázat a GDPR-ról. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer 
Hungary, p. 101. 
565 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 13. 
566 Jóri, A. et al. (2018) A GDPR magyarázata. Edited by A. Jóri. Budapest: HVG-ORAC, p. 208.; WP29 
(2001) Opinion 8/2001 on the processing of personal data in the employment context. 5062/01/EN/Final WP 
48. p. 4, p. 21, p. 25.; WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. p. 7.  
567 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 24. 
568 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. p. 23. 
569 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 15, p. 18. 
570 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 17 
571 Jóri, A. et al. (2018) A GDPR magyarázata. Edited by A. Jóri. Budapest: HVG-ORAC, p. 215. 
572 Rücker, D. and Kugler, T. (eds) (2018) New European General Data Protection Regulation. A 
Practitioner’s Guide. München, Oxford, Baden-Baden: C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos. p. 68.  
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for what purpose, risks associated with the processing, what rights they have as data 
subjects and how they can exercise them), these pieces of information shall be easily 
accessible and easy to understand by using clear and pain language.573 This means that 
employers need to be open and clear about data processing, as a main rule covert 
monitoring is not permitted.574 Naturally, if employees are not aware of the 
processing/monitoring, they will not be able to exercise their rights,575 therefore 
transparency of processing is a precondition for being able to exercise data subjects’ rights. 
It relates also back to the population census judgement and to the core of the right to 
informational self-determination, as the German Federal Constitutional Court considered it 
crucial for the exercise of fundamental rights that the individual is aware of who processes, 
what data and why, etc.576 It is not enough to state that the use of the Internet or social 
network sites will be monitored, further details regarding the processing shall be provided. 
The principle of transparency is further strengthened by Articles 12-14 regulating the 
controller’s obligation to inform data subjects regarding the processing (the data subject’s 
right to information)577 and also by the data subject’s right to access (Article 15). 
154. Rights of the data subject according to the GDPR. Already existing rights 
were reinforced and new ones were introduced in order to ensure effective protection of the 
individuals.578 The employee has the right to information – which was already discussed in 
relation to the employer’s obligation to inform employees regarding the processing. 
However, employees have the right to obtain information not only at the time of the 
collection of personal data, but also during the processing. Therefore, in the frame of the 
right to access, the employee has the right to know whether the employer processes his/her 
personal data, and if there is processing taking place, the employee can obtain further 
information regarding it (e.g. what the purpose is, what personal data are processed, etc.) 
and also has the right to obtain a copy of the processed personal data.579 The right to 
 
573 Recital (39) of the GDPR 
574 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 14. 
575 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. p. 10. 
576 Simitis, S. (1995) ‘From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the Protection of Personal 
Data, Iowa Law Review, 80(3), pp. 447-448. 
577 Depending on the given country’s regulation – that is the case, for example, in Hungary and in France, 
further requirements, such as the information of works council might be necessary in order to make the 
processing lawful.  
578 Bounedjoum, A. (2016) ‘Réforme européenne des données personnelles : les nouveautés pour les droits 
des personnes’, JCP E Semaine Juridique, (22), p. 44. 
579 Article 15 of the GDPR 
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rectification guarantees that at the demand of the employee, inaccurate personal data shall 
be rectified, incomplete personal data completed.580 
155. The right to be forgotten is one of the novelties introduced by the GDPR, 
though not completely new as it already existed in the Directive.581 It means “the right of 
individuals to have their data no longer processed and deleted when they are no longer 
needed for legitimate purposes.”582 This right has two aspects.583 The first one is the 
“traditional” right to erasure, which means that “[t]he data subject shall have the right to 
obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without 
undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without 
undue delay […]” if other conditions are met. (Paragraph 1 of Article 17) It is completed 
by a second provision in order to strengthen the data subjects’ rights in the online world: 
with the obligation of the data controller to take all the reasonable steps to inform other 
controllers processing those data that the data subject wants these controllers to erase the 
data, any links to it, any copies or replication if the controller has made the data – subject 
to the right to erasure – public. [Recital (66), Paragraph 2 of Article 17] Of course, the 
right to be forgotten is not an absolute right; there exist some interests that justify that the 
right to be forgotten does not prevail in some cases: e.g. freedom of expression, or 
historical, scientific research. (Paragraph 3 of Article 17) 
The reason for the acceptance of the right to be forgotten is that, while the human 
mind has its limits in remembering, the Internet does not have any limits.584 However, the 
concrete way of the implementation of this right is still a question, as right now the Internet 
is not capable of forgetting, as it is not possible to permanently remove content.585 Still, 
this right is a great step in protecting personal data, however, it might be more accurate to 
interpret it as the right to not to be found, as complete erasure from the Internet is 
 
580 Article 16 of the GDPR 
581 See more on this subject: Bunn, A. (2015) ‘The curious case of the right to be forgotten’, Computer Law 
and Security Review, 31(3), pp. 336–350. 
582 European Commission (2010) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - A comprehensive 
approach on personal data protection in the European Union. COM(2010) 609 final. Brussels. p. 8. 
583 European Digital Rights (no date) ‘Key aspects of the proposed General Data Protection Regulation 
explained: What are they? Why are they important? What are common misconceptions? What can be 
improved?’ Available at: https://edri.org/files/GDPR-key-issues-explained.pdf(Accessed: 1 May 2018). p. 6. 
584 Kindt, E. (2015) ‘Privacy and Data Protection Law: An Introduction’. IC1206 Training School: De-
identification for privacy protection in multimedia content 07-11 October 2015, Limassol, Cyprus, 11 
October. 
585 Bolton, R. L. (2014) ‘The Right to Be Forgotten: Forced Amnesia in a Technological Age’, The John 
Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law, 31(2), p. 133. 
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technically not possible.586 Several users have possessed an SNS profile for years now: if 
these platforms are used actively, a considerable amount of personal data is accumulated – 
with a huge part of them being irrelevant to the purposes of the employment.587 
156. Novelties brought by the GDPR. The GDPR introduces new ways beyond 
the traditional legal protection, by regulating the technology itself, by making it more 
privacy-friendly. Three principles make this possible: data protection by design, data 
protection by default and data protection impact assessment.588 Data protection by 
design589 basically means – after the analogy of privacy by design – the use of built-in data 
protection-friendly solutions into the whole designing of the processing.590 Data protection 
by default591 means that controllers should ensure that personal data is processed with the 
highest privacy protection. Data protection impact assessment means the evaluation of the 
possible risks related to the protection of personal data, prior to the processing. In cases 
when data processing comes with higher risks for the rights of the individual, the controller 
should evaluate these risks in a data protection impact assessment, by taking into 
 
586 International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications (2013) Working Paper and 
Recommendations on the Publication of Personal Data on the Web, Website Contents Indexing and the 
Protection of Privacy. 675.46.32. pp. 1-2. 
587 The right to data portability, introduced by the GDPR, is another Internet specific right, it enables 
interoperability between different service providers. [Recital (68) of the GDPR] It consists of two parts: the 
first part is the right to obtain a copy of the personal data processed by the controller in a structured way, and 
the second one is the right to transmit this personal data to another service provider.  Source: Costa, L. and 
Poullet, Y. (2012) ‘Privacy and the regulation of 2012’, Computer Law and Security Review, 28(3), p. 257. 
According to the right to restriction of processing, the data subject has the right to obtain the restriction of 
processing from the controller when certain conditions are met. (Article 18 of the GDPR) Employees have 
the right to object when the processing is based on the legitimate interest ground (or on the performance of a 
task carried out in the public interest), on grounds related to their particular situations. In such a case the 
burden of proof is on the employer to demonstrate that his/her legitimate interest overrides the interests or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the employees (or the processing is for the establishment, exercise or 
defence of legal claims). [Article 21 and Recital (69) of the GDPR] Finally, the employees also have the right 
not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which would 
produce a legal effect concerning him/her or would similarly significantly affect the employee. (Paragraph 1 
of Article 22 of the GDPR) This means that employees have the right not to be subject to decisions made 
without human intervention. [Recital (71) of the GDPR] 
588 Costa, L. and Poullet, Y. (2012) ‘Privacy and the regulation of 2012’, Computer Law and Security 
Review, 28(3), p. 259. 
589 “[…] the controller shall, both at the time of the determination of the means for processing and at the time 
of the processing itself, implement appropriate technical and organisational measures, such as 
pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement data-protection principles, such as data minimisation, in 
an effective manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the 
requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects.” (Par. 1 of Article 25 of the GDPR) 
590 De Hert, P. and Papakonstantinou, V. (2012) ‘The proposed data protection Regulation replacing 
Directive 95/46/EC: A sound system for the protection of individuals’, Computer Law and Security Review, 
28(2), p. 260. 
591 “[t]he controller shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures for ensuring that, by 
default, only personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. 
That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of 
their storage and their accessibility.” (Paragraph 2 of Article 25) 
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consideration the characteristics of the processing. [Recital (83), Article 35] Employee 
monitoring will likely fall under the notion of “high risk” processing, placing an obligation 
on employers to conduct a data protection impact assessment.592, 593 
157. In conclusion, the GDPR is one of the most recent milestones in the history 
of data protection. Regulating the question of data protection in the form of a regulation 
strengthened and unified data protection law throughout the EU – even with the possibility 
of adopting more specific regulations in certain fields, for example, in the field of 
employment; leaving room for certain divergences between Member States. In spite of 
these divergences, the provisions presented above are cornerstones of the data protection 
framework. Their knowledge will be essential in assessing the processing of employees’ 
personal data obtained from SNSs, as these are the principles and rights that are going to 
be tested. 
(B) The right to informational self-determination in France and in Hungary 
158. Nowadays, the right to privacy and the right to data protection continue to 
be challenged by new innovations. Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, president of the French data 
protection authority drew attention to the changes regarding the relations between the right 
to privacy and the right to data protection caused by the appearance of a certain grey zone. 
This grey zone emerges when individuals want to share certain aspects of their personal 
life and to use their personal data to create a “public life”: who, instead of seeking 
protection, wish to be able to have control over their personal data.594 Therefore, besides 
the right to privacy and the right to data protection, another concept, the right to 
informational self-determination appeared as well in legal literature and order. Before 
addressing how the right to informational self-determination is regulated in France and in 
 
592 Employee monitoring update (2017) TaylorWessing. Available at: 
https://www.taylorwessing.com/globaldatahub/article-employee-monitoring-update.html (Accessed: 1 May 
2018). 
593 The aim of the assessment is to ensure the security and confidentiality of the processing. When there is a 
high risk which might cause difficulties to the controller in ensuring the appropriate measures, a consultation 
of the supervisory authority shall take place. [Recital (84) of the GDPR] It is considered to be easier to ensure 
the protection of privacy and personal data if the risks endangering them are taken into account in the early 
stages of the planning of the processing. Source: European Commission (2010) Comparative study on 
different approaches to new privacy challenges, in particular in the light of technological developments. 
JLS/2008/C4/011 – 30’CE’0219363/00’28. par. 131.  
594 Assemblé Nationale: Commission de réflexion et de propositions sur le droit et les libertés à l’âge du 
numérique, Mercredi 26 novembre 2014, Séance de 17 heures, Compte rendu n° 08, Available at: 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-comnum/14-15/c1415008.asp Accessed: 2017. 02. 26. 
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Hungary, it is necessary to clarify the conceptual foundations of the right and what the 
right to informational self-determination means in the international context. 
(a) Conceptual foundations 
159. Population census judgement. The right to informational self-determination 
first appeared in 1983 in the famous population census judgement of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court. In the background of this decision there is an act regulating a planned 
population census. This act resulted in a public outcry, as citizens feared the consequences 
of processing such a wide range of personal data, with a considerable amount of time for 
retention and used for several purposes. The Act was challenged before the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, which upheld the general aim of the population census, but 
required several obligations to safeguard the processing of personal data.595 
In its reasoning the Court argued that the provisions to be applied are the provisions 
of the Basic Law guaranteeing the general right to the free development of one’s 
personality [Article 2 (1)] and the right to dignity [Article 1 (1)]. These two provisions aim 
to protect the value and the dignity of the individual, who functions as a member of a free 
society in free self-determination. The Court emphasized that in the light of the rapid 
technological developments allowing more elaborate data processing, the individual’s 
decisional authority needs special protection.596 Protection shall be granted not only to the 
processing of personal data having a “special private or intimate character”, but also to 
“trivial data” as with modern data processing – through the combination of data – 
conclusions about the individual could be drawn even from these data.597 Even under these 
circumstances of modern data processing, the individual shall be granted the freedom to 
make decisions freely and without influence.598 The right to informational self-
determination means that individuals are free to decide whether, who, for what purposes, 
etc. can process personal data relating to them.599 
 
595 Hornung, G. and Schnabel, C. (2009) ‘Data protection in Germany I: The population census decision and 
the right to informational self-determination’, Computer Law & Security Review, 25(1), p. 85. 
596 Kommers, D. P. and Miller, R. A. (2012) The constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 3rd edn. Durham and London: Duke University Press. p. 409. 
597 Lauth, M. (2009) Thematic Legal Study on assessment of data protection measures and relevant 
institutions. Report on Germany. FRA. Available at: https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/role-data-
protection-authorities-2009-de.pdf. p. 8. 
598 Kommers, D. P. and Miller, R. A. (2012) The constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 3rd edn. Durham and London: Duke University Press. p. 410. 
599 Simitis, S. (2010) ‘Privacy - An Endless Debate’, California Law Review, 98(6), p. 1997. 
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The Court emphasized the interconnectedness of the ensuring of the right to 
informational self-determination and other fundamental rights, noting that if the individual 
is uncertain about whether, who, for what purposes etc. processes his/her personal data, –
instead of acting according to his/her will –, he/she will conform and adopt a behaviour 
that he/she thinks is considered to be in conformity with the data processors’ 
expectations.600 This could lead to the impairment of other fundamental rights (e.g. right to 
freedom of expression), damaging also the functioning of a free democratic society. 
Therefore, the protection against the unlimited processing of personal data must be 
guaranteed – based on the right to freely develop his/her personality and the right to 
dignity. The Court also notes that this right is not unlimited, and the individual shall accept 
certain limitations on the grounds of a compelling public interest.601 Instead of providing 
exclusive control to the individual, the State should process the personal data in a manner 
respecting the rights of the individuals, a legitimate aim, and compliance with certain 
principles – such as proportionality, data minimisation, obligations of the data controller, 
rights of the data subject – is required.602 Incidentally, although these data protection 
principles appeared in the population census judgement, up to now they constitute the key 
data protection principles.603 
160. Right to informational self-determination according to the legal literature. 
Since the appearance of the right to informational self-determination, scholars have also 
addressed this right. The right to informational self-determination can be connected both to 
privacy and to data protection: De Hert and Gutwirth point out that the right to 
informational self-determination can be interpreted as one of the values underlying the 
right to privacy and to data protection.604 
 
600 Simitis, S. (1995) ‘From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the Protection of Personal 
Data, Iowa Law Review, 80(3), pp. 447-448. 
601 Kommers, D. P. and Miller, R. A. (2012) The constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 3rd edn. Durham and London: Duke University Press. p. 410. 
602 Schwartz, P. (1989) ‘The Computer in German and American Constitutional Law: Towards an American 
Right of Informational Self-Determination’, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 37(4), p. 690, 
Kommers, D. P. and Miller, R. A. (2012) The constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 3rd edn. Durham and London: Duke University Press. p. 410., Hornung, G. and Schnabel, C. 
(2009) ‘Data protection in Germany I: The population census decision and the right to informational self-
determination’, Computer Law & Security Review, 25(1), p. 87. 
603 Hornung, G. and Schnabel, C. (2009) ‘Data protection in Germany I: The population census decision and 
the right to informational self-determination’, Computer Law & Security Review, 25(1), p. 87. 
604 De Hert, P. and Gutwirth, S. (2009) ‘Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: 
Constitutionalisation in Action’, in Gutwirth, S. et al. (eds) Reinventing Data Protection?Springer, p. 5. 
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161. Different scholars emphasize the connectedness of informational self-
determination’s to privacy: Eva Fialová associates it with informational privacy, and also 
remarks that informational self-determinations aims to ensure the control over personal 
data – similarly to informational privacy suggested by Westin.605 Jacky Richard goes even 
beyond privacy and data protection and interprets the right to data protection as a defensive 
concept, while self-determination implies a positive content. It goes beyond the protection 
of the right to privacy by ensuring – instead of guaranteeing protection from interference –
that the individual is able to freely decide how to exercise his/her rights.606 He also states 
that in this regard, the right to informational self-determination does not constitute a 
separate right, but rather a fundamental principle which gives meaning to the interpretation 
and guaranteeing of other fundamental rights.607 
162. In contrast, Antoinette Rouvroy and Yves Poullet limit the scope of 
informational self-determination and argue that it should not be interpreted as self-
determination, but rather as a precondition to exercising self-determination.608 Others 
emphasize its connection to data protection: the right to informational self-determination 
can be understood as a step in the evolution of data protection – for example, Viktor 
Mayer-Schönberger examined a shift towards self-determination as part of the third 
generation of data protection rules.609 Similarly, González Fuster and Gutwirth understood 
the appearance of the right to informational self-determination in German law as the 
redefinition of the main rules relating to data protection.610, 611 De Hert calls for the need of 
 
605 Fialová, E. (2014) ‘Data Portability and Informational Self-determination’, Masaryk University Journal of 
Law and Technology, 8(1), p. 47. 
606 However, it should not be forgotten that the individual is not completely free to decide regarding every 
processing: in many instances he/she cannot withdraw from the data processing. Therefore, the use of the 
expression informational co-determination might be more appropriate. Source: Bygrave, L. A. (2001) The 
Place of Privacy in Data Protection Law. Available 
at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLJ/2001/6.html(Accessed: 28 February 2018), par. [8] 
607 Richard, J. (2016) ‘Le numérique et les données personnelles : quels risques, quelles 
potentialités ?’, Revue du Droit public (RDP), 1, p. 91.  
608 Rouvroy, A. and Poullet, Y. (2009) ‘The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-
Development: Reassessing the Importance of Privacy for Democracy’, in Gutwirth, S. et al. (eds) Reinventing 
Data Protection? Springer, p. 51. 
609 Mayer-Schönberger, V. (1997) ‘Generational Development of Data Protection in Europe’, in Agre, P. E. 
and Rotenberg, M. (eds) Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape. Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 229. 
610 González Fuster, G. and Gutwirth, S. (2013) ‘Opening up personal data protection: A conceptual 
controversy’, Computer Law and Security Review, 29(5), p. 534. 
611 Nadezhda Purtova went even further and called the right to information self-determination the German 
equivalent of data protection. Purtova, N. (2010) ‘Private Law Solutions in European Data Protection: 
Relationship to Privacy, and Waiver of Data Protection Rights’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 
28(2), p. 186. 
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revising existing data protection regulation in order to decrease the traditionally protective 
aspect and the passive role of the individual by providing him/her a more active role.612 
(b) Right to informational self-determination in France and in Hungary 
163. Act for a Digital Republic. In France, data protection is traditionally 
considered as a defensive concept, but the developments of ICT challenged this concept.613 
Recognizing the changes brought by these developments, the legislator decided to step 
towards a more proactive protection. By adopting the Act for a Digital Republic in 2016, 
614 significant changes were introduced to the FDPA.615 Among these changes, the 
appearance of the concept of informational self-determination should be mentioned in the 
first place. 
Inspired by the German Federal Constitutional Court’s population census judgement, 
now the FDPA refers to the right to informational self-determination through stating that 
“[t]he individuals’ right to decide and to control the uses of personal data relating to 
him/her” must be ensured as provided by the GDPR and by the FDPA.616 Although the 
already existing data subject rights provided the possibility for the individual to participate 
in the processing, they did not ensure the true control over that data.617 According to the 
reasoning of the Act, this amendment was an answer to the loss of control over personal 
data and contributes to the interpretation of the already existing data protection rights.618 
164. Instead of considering it a separate right, Falque-Pierrotin understands the 
right to informational self-determination as “[...] a kind of ‘umbrella right’ which covers 
the specific rights on the protection of personal data.”619 The right to informational self-
 
612 De Hert, P. (2008) ‘Identity management of e-ID, privacy and security in Europe. A human rights 
view’, Information Security Technical Report, 13(2), p. 74. 
613 Falque-Pierrotin, I. (2012) ‘La Constitution et l’Internet’, Les nouveaux cahiers du Conseil 
constitutionnel, 36, pp. 36-37. 
614 Act No. 2016-1321 of 7 October 2016 for a Digital Republic (“Loi n° 2016-1321 du 7 octobre 2016 pour 
une République numérique) 
615 Such as the right to be forgotten for minors or provisions relating to post-mortem data protection. See 
more on the reforms introduced by the act in: Richard, J. (2016) ‘Le numérique et les données personnelles : 
quels risques, quelles potentialités ?’, Revue du Droit public (RDP), 1, pp. 87–100.; Masnier-Boché, L. 
(2016) ‘Loi « pour une République numérique » : état des lieux en matière de protection des données 
personnelles’, Revue Lamy droit de l’immatériel, 131, pp. 50–55. 
616 Article 1 of the FDPA 
617 CNIL (2017) Rapport d’activité 2016. Paris, La documentation française, p. 40. 
618 Exposé des motifs: Act No. 2016-1321 of 7 October 2016 for a Digital Republic 
619 « [...] une sorte de droit chapeau qui abriterait les droits spécifiques sur la protection des données 
personnelles. » Source: Assemblé Nationale: Commission de réflexion et de propositions sur le droit et les 
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determination should not be considered as a new right of the data subject,620 but a principle 
providing sense to all these rights, a guiding principle of the French data protection act, 
aiming to provide the data subject the control over his/her personal data.621 
165. Informational self-determination in the Hungarian legal order. The right 
to informational self-determination has been present in the Hungarian system since the 
Constitutional Court’s Decision No. 15/1991. (IV. 13.), in which the Constitutional Court 
defined the right to informational self-determination622 as “the right to decide about the 
disclosure and use of [the individual’s] personal data.”623 Since 1991 the Constitutional 
Court has interpreted the right to data protection as a right to informational self-
determination. One of the greatest and most disputed decisions in the field of data 
protection624 was decision No. 15/1991. (IV. 13.), in which the Constitutional Court stated 
as a general legal principle that the right to data protection shall be interpreted as a right to 
informational self-determination, interpreting it as an active right, rather than a defensive 
one.625, 626 The Constitutional Court provided a detailed analysis regarding the content of 
this right – requirement of purpose limitation, rights of the data subject, legal ground of 
processing, etc. – laying down the fundaments of Hungarian data protection regulation and 
the fundaments of the data protection act to be adopted.627, 628 
166. In Hungarian doctrine, instead of interpreting them as separate rights, the 
notions of data protection and informational self-determination are closely connected: 
András Jóri interpreted the right to data protection as a right conferring the right on the 
 
libertés à l’âge du numérique, Mercredi 26 novembre 2014, Compte rendu n° 08, Available at: 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-comnum/14-15/c1415008.asp Accessed: 2017. 02. 26. p. 9. 
620 Conseil d’Etat (2014) Le numérique et les droits fondamentaux. Les rapports du Conseil d’Etat, p. 26.  
621 Bruguière, J.-M. et al. (2017) ‘Actualité du droit de l’internet (février - octobre 2016)’, Revue Lamy Droit 
civil, (144). p. 32., Richard, J. (2016) ‘Le numérique et les données personnelles : quels risques, quelles 
potentialités ?’, Revue du Droit public (RDP), 1, p. 91., Geffray, E. (2014) ‘La protection des données 
personnelles, élément clé à l’ère numérique’, Légipresse, (320), p. 515. 
622 Szüts, K., Karsai, D. and Mándi, G. (2006) Az Alkotmánybíróság egyes határozatainak ismertetése. 
Budapest: Rejtjel Kiadó, p. 222. 
623 Constitutional Court’s Decision No. 15/1991. (IV. 13.), Part II. 
624 Majtényi, L. (2002) ‘Az információs szabadságok és az adatvédelem határai’, Világosság, XLIII (2–3), p. 
74. 
625 Decision No. 15/1991. (IV. 13.) of the Constitutional Court 
626 Even preceding this decision, the right to data protection was already conceived as a right to informational 
self-determination in László Sólyom’s dissenting opinion to decision No. 2/1990 (II. 18.). 
627 Majtényi, L. (2002) ‘Az információs szabadságok és az adatvédelem határai’, Világosság, XLIII (2–3) p. 
74. and Sólyom, L. (2001) Az alkotmánybíráskodás kezdetei Magyarországon. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó. p. 
466. 
628 Similar to the French precedents, this cornerstone decision concerned the adoption of a general and 
unified personal identification number – which the Constitutional Court found unconstitutional. 
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individuals to determine the processing of their personal data.629 Gergely László Szőke 
interprets the right to informational self-determination as a phenomenon affecting the 
development of the second generation of data protection rules.630 Similarly to data 
protection, the right to informational self-determination aims to ensure the protection of the 
private sphere.631 As it is interpreted as an active right, this primarily relates to privacy 
interpreted as the right to choose how to live one’s life,632 and not to privacy interpreted as 
secrecy. 
167. Despite the interpretation of the right to data protection as a right to 
informational self-determination, inconsistencies can be found in Hungarian legislation. 
Regarding the wording of the previous constitution (“protection of personal data”), former 
Hungarian data protection commissioner, László Majtényi, expressed his opinion according 
to which the wording as such is erroneous because it suggests that the right to data 
protection is a defensive right, while in reality it shall be conceived as the right to 
informational self-determination.633 It is interesting to note that the legislator did not 
correct this mistake when adopting the new constitution, despite the fact that the 
Constitutional Court interpreted the right to data protection as a right to informational self-
determination and that the new data protection act is also entitled as the act on the right to 
informational self-determination.634 The HDPA is entitled as the “Act on the Right to 
Informational Self-Determination and on Freedom of Information”, however, the 
expression “informational self-determination” is not present in the text of the HDPA. 
Naturally, through the regulation of the purpose limitation principle or the rights of the 
data subjects, the right to information self-determination prevails without being specified. 
168. In conclusion, though the appellation suggests that it constitutes a separate 
right, I understand the above-presented views as suggesting that instead of a separate right, 
 
629 Jóri, A. and Soós, A. K. (2016) Adatvédelmi jog: magyar és európai szabályozás. Budapest: HVG-ORAC, 
p. 15. 
630 Szőke, G. L. (2013) ‘Az adatvédelem szabályozásának történeti áttekintése’, Infokommunikáció és jog, 
(3), p. 110. 
631 Péterfalvi, A. (2014) ‘Személyiségi jogok - adatvédelem – információszabadság’, Magyar jog, 61(9), p. 
487. 
632 For example, Máté Dániel Szabó interprets this right in an extensive way, as according to him the right to 
informational self-determination implies that the individuals are entitled to decide to “show themselves to the 
world”. Source: Szabó, M. D. (2008) ‘Nyilvános magánszféra - Hol a határ?’, in Dezső, M. and Kukorelli, I. 
(eds) Ünnepi kötet Sári János egyetemi tanár 70. születésnapja tiszteletére. Budapest: Rejtjel Kiadó, p. 335. 
633 Majtényi, L. (1995) ‘Az adatvédelem és az információszabadság az alkotmányban’, Acta Humana: 
Emberi jogi közlemények, (18–19), p. 96. 
634 Béla Pokol expressed in his paralell reasoning that the Constitutional Court shall respect the decision of 
the legislator not to insert into the Fundamental Law the terminology suggested by the Constitutional Court. 
Source: par. 144 of Decision no. 32/2013 (XI. 22.) 
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the right to informational self-determination constitutes a guiding principle of privacy 
and/or data protection law, emphasizing the active aspect of these rights. This is also 
supported by the fact that the expression “right to informational self-determination” is not 
mentioned either in the DPD or in the GDPR.635 Neither in France, nor in Hungary does 
the right to informational self-determination constitute a right separate from data 
protection. The right to information self-determination appeared relatively late in French 
data protection law, but not as a separate right. Incorporated into the FDPA, it is conceived 
as a guiding principle of French data protection law, emphasizing the importance of 
ensuring that the individual exercises true control over his/her personal data. In Hungary, 
the right to data protection is interpreted as a right to informational self-determination, 
being an active right. According to the preamble of the HDPA, the Act was adopted in 
order to ensure the right to informational self-determination. Like in French law, instead of 
constituting a separate right, it rather remains a guiding principle. 
169. Conclusions of Chapter 1. When it comes to the protection of employees’ 
personal life while using SNSs, the examination of notably the right to privacy and the 
right to data protection (and the right to informational self-determination) is necessary. 
Knowing the scope of these rights is necessary to address the question from a narrower 
viewpoint: Chapter 2 will focus on their enforcement in the employment context. Although 
privacy seems to be an ever-changing, highly context-dependent concept and right, 
international and national legal regulations declare the protection of this right. Secrecy and 
concealment have traditionally played an important role, however, recently the protection 
of privacy in public has gained more recognition, moving it away from the original concept 
of secrecy. It appeared notably through the evolving practice of the ECtHR, and the 
creation of the concept “personal life”, specific to labour law, by the French Social 
Chamber. Therefore, privacy is interpreted in a broad way for the purposes of the 
dissertation, guaranteeing for the individual to be able to decide how to live his/her life. 
With regard to social media, it will mean that the employee should be free to decide 
whether and how to use these sites. 
Compared to the right to privacy, the right to data protection possesses a more exact 
set of tools with regard to ensuring the protection of employees’ rights, as in contrast to the 
quite general declaration of respect of private life, data protection is composed of detailed 
 
635 Even though Recital (7) of the GDPR declares that “[n]atural persons should have control of their own 
personal data.” 
 122 
 
provisions, regulating the whole data processing. In relation to SNSs, the importance of 
data protection will consist of providing the rules that must be respected when the 
employer processes personal data obtained through these sites, including the case of 
monitoring such use. 
The third right addressed in the Chapter was the right to informational self-
determination. However, it was concluded that instead of being a separate right, it rather 
fulfills the role of an overarching guiding principle of data protection, despite its 
ambiguous appellation. In relation to privacy, it has a narrower scope: as its appellation 
implies, informational self-determination is concentrated on information (and personal 
data), therefore focuses on the informational aspect of privacy. In this regard, for the 
purposes of the dissertation informational self-determination will be understood within the 
right to data protection, aiming to ensure the employee to be an active participant in data 
processing – and not as the right of the employee to decide whether to engage in using 
SNSs, or as a separate right. 
Chapter 2: Employee control and monitoring 
170. The employer is in control of the employment relationship: he/she can 
unilaterally determine the conditions of the employment relationship, resulting in the 
subordinate position636 of the employee.637, 638 It means that the employer is entitled to 
choose amongst applicants, to organize the work, and instruct employees, monitor 
compliance with instructions or even to sanction them. It is important to emphasize that 
controlling and monitoring employees is not an arbitrary decision of the employer: the 
employer is not only entitled to monitor employees, it is also his/her obligation at the same 
time.639 
171. Although these rights/powers are inherent to the employment relationship 
itself, they are not absolute, as employees’ rights – such as the right to privacy and the 
 
636 Under subordination the employee provides his/her workforce (and not his/her whole life or personality), 
according to his/her best knowledge, while following the employer’s instructions. 
637 Kiss, Gy. (2003) ‘A munkajog jogforrási rendszere és az alapjogok I.’, Jura, 9(1), p. 80. 
638 However, Jean-Emmanuel Ray raises the question whether technological development has weakend the 
employee’s subordination through providing more autonomy to the employee. Source: Ray, J.-E. (1992) 
‘Nouvelles technologies et nouvelles formes de subordination’, Droit social, (6), p. 1. [Page number referring 
to the online version of the article downloaded from: https://www-dalloz-fr.bcujas-ezp.univ-
paris1.fr/documentation/Document?id=DS/CHRON/1992/0081 (Accessed: 19 November 2019)] 
639 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2013) Munkajog. ELTE Eötvös Kiadó. Budapest. pp. 248-249. 
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right to data protection – impose limitations on the employer’s right to monitor.640 During 
enforcing these powers/rights, the employer limits employees’ rights, such as their right to 
privacy or right to data protection. Controlling and monitoring employees interfere with 
privacy and data protection, as posing limitations on the use of SNSs might concern the 
employees’ personal life, while consulting whether the employee complies with such a 
regulation implies data processing and as such concerns data protection. However, such a 
limitation must not be without limits or abusive: the employer’s rights must be balanced 
against the employees’ rights – such as the right to privacy and right to data protection. As 
the WP29 neatly formulated:“[w]orkers do not abandon their right to privacy and data 
protection every morning at the doors of the workplace.”641 However, these rights are not 
absolute either, as they are also limited by the employer’s right to monitor.642 Therefore a 
balance must be found between the two sides.643 
172. Aim and structure of Chapter 2. The aim of Chapter 2 is to present and 
prove the existence of the employer’s right to control and monitor, and then the present 
state of legal rules regulating employee monitoring, mostly using a descriptive method. 
The knowledge of these rules is crucial as they constitute the general framework of 
different emergences of employee monitoring – and amongst them social media. Chapter 2 
serves as a conceptual basis for the detailed analysis of monitoring and SNSs, discussed in 
Part II. of the dissertation. The aim of this Chapter is to prove the existence of the 
employer’s right to control and to monitor, but the question of how exactly this right is 
enforceable in the context of SNSs will be answered in Part II. 
Chapter 2 is composed of two Sections: Section 1 will present what is at stake on the 
other side against the right to privacy and right to data protection. It will deal with how the 
right to monitor is acknowledged in labour law. Then, Section 2 will deal with how exactly 
this collision appears in the context of employment, what the already established rules at 
the international and national level in the field of employee monitoring are. 
 
640 Hendrickx, F. (2002) ‘Protection of workers’ personal data in the European Union, Two studies’. EC, pp. 
23-24.  
641 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 4. 
642 Plasschaert, E. (2017) ‘La licéité du traitement de données personnelles du travailleur au regard du 
nouveau Règlement (UE) n° 2016/679 sur la protection des données’, in Ragheno, N. (ed.) Data protection & 
privacy: le GDPR dans la pratique. Limal: Anthemis, p. 106.  
643 Hajdú, J. (2005) A munkavállalók személyiségi jogainak védelme. Szeged: Pólay Elemér Alapítvány, p. 
20. 
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Section 1: The employer’s right to monitor 
173. Privacy and employment. Anders J. Persson and Sven Ove Hansson 
emphasized the significance and specificity of the employment relationship: according to 
them it is the rights and obligations ensuing from the employment contract which makes 
workplace privacy/monitoring issues such a specific subject, compared to other kinds of 
relations.644, 645 They argue that an intrusion into the privacy of employees must be justified 
by what the parties can require from each other based on the rights and obligations set forth 
in the employment contract.646 This supposes that the privacy issues are specific regarding 
the employment relationship (other kinds of legal relations such as self-employment, 
entrepreneurship or mandates give rise to different kinds of privacy challenges) and that 
the employer’s right to monitor can be derived from the obligations and rights imposed on 
the parties. 
174. Subordination and the employment relationship. Given the importance of 
the employment relationship, it must be examined what employment is and what its main 
characteristics are, making it special in the field of workplace privacy and data protection. 
It follows from the subordination between the employer and employee that the employer 
has power to exercise authority over employees.647 Frank Hendrickx identified monitoring 
as an element of authority and subordination, which is essential in the employment 
relationship.648 The Section will first explore the main characteristics of the employment 
relationship, and the rights and obligations ensuing from it, which also give rise to the 
employer’s right to monitor.  
175. Structure of the Section. These characteristics and the main observations 
drawn from them are common to industrialized societies, therefore the right to monitor will 
 
644 Persson, A. J. and Hansson, S. O. (2003) ‘Privacy at Work – Ethical Criteria’, Journal of Business Ethics, 
42(1), p. 63. 
645 The ILO highlighted the significance of processing in the employment context from a different aspect 
stating that “[i]n hardly any other case are so many personal data processed over such a long period of time 
as in connection with the employment relationship.” Source: ILO (1997) Protection of workers’ personal 
data. An ILO code of practice. Geneva: International Labour Office, p. 8. (Commentary) 
646 Persson, A. J. and Hansson, S. O. (2003) ‘Privacy at Work – Ethical Criteria’, Journal of Business Ethics, 
42(1), p. 64. 
647 Hendrickx, F. (2002) ‘Privacy and Employment Law: General Principles and Application to Electronic 
Monitoring’, in Blanpain, R. (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society. Use and 
Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. 49. 
648 Hendrickx, F. (2001) ‘Electronic Monitoring and Employment Privacy’, in Blanpain, R. (ed.) The 
Evolving Employment Relationship and the New Economy. The Hague/London/New York: Kluwer Law 
International, pp. 248.  
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first be approached from (§1) a more general angle, based on international standards and 
rules. The exact appearance of these general principles and rights can differ from state to 
state, therefore then (§2) it will be addressed how the right to monitor materializes in the 
French and in the Hungarian legal order. 
§1. Rights and obligations arising from the employment relationship 
176. ILO and the employment relationship. The ILO addressed the question of 
the employment relationship – which is a concept common in every legal system649 – on 
several occasions. In a document entitled “The employment relationship. Report V(1)”, the 
ILO demonstrated through several examples that when it comes to the employment 
relationship, the most commonly used factors to describe this relationship (in order to 
delimitate it from other concepts) are dependency, subordination, authority, direction, 
supervision, control.650 
177. A report and questionnaire were sent out to the Member States’ 
governments containing different questions regarding the possible content of an ILO 
document. Question eleven [Qu. 11 (1)-(3)] was related to the factors and indicators 
determining the existence of an employment relationship, and to the question what 
indicators should be used in order to achieve this [Qu. 11 (3)]. Dependency, subordination, 
supervision, control of work, direction, authority were often evoked by governments.651 
Finally, the adopted Recommendation included amongst the possible indicators that the 
work “[...] is carried out according to the instructions and under the control of another 
party […]”652 The annotated guide to the Recommendation, while referring to Paragraph 
 
649 ILO (2006) The employment relationship. Report V(1). International Labour Conference, 95th Session p. 
6. 
650 ILO (2006) The employment relationship. Report V(1). International Labour Conference, 95th Session p. 
20., p. 21. 
651 ILO (2006) The employment relationship. Report V(2A). International Labour Conference, 95th Session 
pp. 155-160 
652 ILO (2006) Recommendation concerning the employment relationship. No. 198. Geneva, 95th ILC 
session, par. 13 a) 
 126 
 
12 of the Recommendation,653 identifies control and dependence (or subordination) 
amongst the most important criteria.654 
178. Control is considered to be an important indicator of subordination.655 In 
every industrial country, the employment relationship is centred on subordination and is 
conceived as a relation where the employer can command and the employee shall obey.656 
Although the ILO is a universal organisation, the fundamental concepts laid down in these 
documents are relevant for European countries as well. A report prepared by members of 
the European Labour Law Network (hereinafter referred to as: ELLN) addressing the 
question of the characteristics of the employment relationship in the EU argued that “[i]n 
all countries, the main criterion for establishing an employment relationship or an 
employment contract is that one person is subordinated to or dependent on another 
person.”657 It basically refers to the organisational subordination,658 meaning that “the 
employee is subjected to supervisory power exercised by the employer.”659 The CJEU also 
confirmed that “[t]he essential characteristic of the employment relationship is that for a 
certain period of time a person performs services for and under the direction of another 
person in return for which he receives remuneration”.660 
This could be described by four characteristics. First, organisational subordination, 
which encompasses the employer’s power to give instructions regarding the work: both 
personal and functional instructions. Second, the control of work and the supervision of 
employees are also considered to be crucial in most Member States. Third, the integration 
 
653 “For the purposes of the national policy referred to in this Recommendation, Members may consider 
clearly defining the conditions applied for determining the existence of an employment relationship, for 
example, subordination or dependence.” 
654 ILO (2007) ‘The employment relationship: An annotated guide to ILO Recommendation No. 198’ p. 33. 
On dependence and subordination see more in: ILO (2007) ‘The employment relationship: An annotated 
guide to ILO Recommendation No. 198’ pp. 33-35. 
655 ILO (2007) ‘The employment relationship: An annotated guide to ILO Recommendation No. 198’ pp. 35-
36. 
656 Supiot, A. (2002) Critique du droit du travail. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. p. 109.  
657 European Network of Legal Experts in the field of Labour Law (2009) Characteristics of the Employment 
Relationship. Thematic Report 2009. Contract No. VC/2008/1211. p. 16. 
658 Economic dependency also exists, but its mere existence is not enough to establish the existence of an 
employment relationship. When it comes to economic dependency, the indicators of remuneration, bearing of 
financial risks and work performed solely or mainly for the benefit of the employer shall be examined. See 
more in: European Network of Legal Experts in the field of Labour Law (2009) Characteristics of the 
Employment Relationship. Thematic Report 2009. Contract No. VC/2008/1211. pp. 19-21. 
659 European Network of Legal Experts in the field of Labour Law (2009) Characteristics of the Employment 
Relationship. Thematic Report 2009. Contract No. VC/2008/1211. p. 16. 
660 CJEU (1991): Union de Recouvrement des Cotisations de Sécurité Sociale et d'Allocations Familiales de 
la Savoie (URSSAF) v Hostellerie Le Manoir SARL, Case C-27/91, ECLI:EU:C:1991:441, 21 November, 
par 7. 
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of the employee into the organisation is often a relevant indicator. Finally, amongst the 
‘other’ indicators, the provision of tools and materials by the employer and the fact that 
work is carried out within specific hours or at an agreed time can also be an indicator of 
organizational dependence.661 Another, more recent study in 2013 affirmed the importance 
of dependency and/or subordination when determining the existence of an employment 
relationship, which often involves control and the power to give instructions to employees, 
and provided several examples from EU Member States’ legal systems.662 
179. Employee monitoring. A study663 conducted back in 2001 under the 
supervision of Frank Hendrickx analysed the labour law regulations of EU Member States 
with regard to employee data protection and monitoring. This study also stated that the 
authority of the employer and the (legal) subordination of the employee are common 
factors in all Member States when it comes to the employment relationship.664 It refers to 
the general labour law principles and acknowledges that “these principles imply that 
employers have a contractually based right to control contract fulfilment and to monitor 
work performance and the proper use by employees of company equipment facilities.”665 
Ensuing from authority and from the right to manage the workplace, the employer – who is 
also the owner of the company equipment – is entitled to impose certain limitations on its 
use.666 For example, health and safety requirements, the protection and the correct use of 
the employer’s equipment, monitoring production processes and work performance and 
conducting quality control can justify employee monitoring.667, 668 Moreover, the employee 
 
661 European Network of Legal Experts in the field of Labour Law (2009) Characteristics of the Employment 
Relationship. Thematic Report 2009. Contract No. VC/2008/1211.pp. 16-19. 
662 International Labour Office, Governance and Tripartism Department and European Labour Law Network 
(2013) Regulating the employment relationship in Europe: A guide to Recommendation No. 198. Geneva: 
ILO. pp. 36-40. 
663 Hendrickx, F. (2002) ‘Protection of workers’ personal data in the European Union, Two studies’. EC. 
664 Hendrickx, F. (2002) ‘Protection of workers’ personal data in the European Union, Two studies’. EC. pp. 
12-13. 
665 Hendrickx, F. (2002) ‘Protection of workers’ personal data in the European Union, Two studies’. EC. p. 
114. 
666 Hendrickx, F. (2002) ‘Protection of workers’ personal data in the European Union, Two studies’. EC. p. 
101. 
667 Hendrickx, F. (2002) ‘Protection of workers’ personal data in the European Union, Two studies’. EC. p. 
119. More specifically, the monitoring of the use of the employer’s equipment (e.g. telephone, computer, 
Internet) may be justified by the following lawful purposes: monitoring work performance and quality 
control, monitoring compliance with different standards and procedures, investigating and detecting the 
security of the system, preventing crimes, collecting evidence of business transactions. 
668 Roger Blanpain also identified property rights, the right to manage and employer’s liability amongst the 
employer’s legitimate interest to monitor (the employees’ use of computer). Source: Blanpain, R. (2002) 
‘Employment and Labour Law Aspects. Setting the Scene. Asking the Right Questions?’, in Blanpain, R. 
(ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society. Use and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at 
Work. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. 43-44. 
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has not only rights, but also certain obligations such as carrying out work in person, respect 
and cooperate with his/her colleagues, loyalty towards the employer – where controlling 
the compliance with these obligations can justify monitoring. 
180. Employee monitoring and SNSs. Monitoring employees’ use of SNSs 
might contribute to the enforcement of several of these rights. In the hiring phase, it is 
notably the employer’s right to choose the most adequate applicant that might be enforced 
though conducting social media background checks. Monitoring SNS use during working 
hours at the expense of working hours might constitute a method for the employer to 
enforce his/her interests and rights in the field of productivity, work performance and the 
protection of the work equipment. Monitoring SNS use beyond working hours can serve 
the purposes of protecting against employee conducts detrimental to the employer’s 
reputation or the leaking of business interests. On the details and the possibility of 
monitoring employees’ use of SNSs in order to achieve these interests will be dealt with in 
detail in Part II. of the dissertation. 
§2. Appearance of the right to monitor in national legal orders 
181. It is worth noting that in the different languages used for the research 
different terminology is used. Hungarian literature mentions legitimate economic interests 
of the employer (“jogos gazdasági érdek”), as the main value is materialized in the form of 
the right of the employer to direct, to give orders and to control (“irányítási, utasítási és 
ellenőrzési jogkör”). In English literature the expression right to monitor is used, while in 
French literature the expression employer’s power (“pouvoir”) is employed, comprising the 
prerogative to control work. 
(A) France: the employer’s powers 
182. Employment and subordination. In both countries subordination has great 
importance when it comes to determining the existence of an employment relationship. In 
French law, subordination is a key element of the employment relationship. The Court of 
Cassation defined the employment contract in its jurisprudence as “a convention according 
to which a person engages in performing work for another person under its subordination 
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for remuneration.”669 The employment contract – originally based on the idea that the 
worker leases his workforce670 – supposes the leasing of the employees’ workforce. As the 
employer could not take possession of the employees’ workforce, this lack was 
compensated by the employees’ subordination to the employer.671 
183. In order to be qualified as an employment contract, three attributes must be 
present: the employee has to (1) perform work (2) under the legal subordination of the 
employer (3) in exchange for remuneration.672 These main elements also appear in the 
definition of labour law provided by Gérard Lyon-Caen, who argued that labour law is 
“all the legal rules applicable to individual and collective relations between private 
employers and employees who work under their authority for a remuneration called 
salary.”673 Subordination means that the employee is under the authority of the employer 
and is manifested in the employer’s power to give orders, and the employees’ correlative 
obligation to obey those orders.674 According to a landmark decision of the Court of 
Cassation, subordination is characterised by the “execution of work under the authority of 
an employer who has the power to give orders and directives, to control their execution, 
and to sanction the breaches of the subordinates.”675 Different indicators can help to 
determine the existence of subordination, such as the exercise of authority, the right to 
 
669 « Le contrat de travail est une convention par laquelle une personne s'engage à travailler pour le compte 
d'une autre et sous sa subordination moyennant une remuneration. » la Cour de cassation du 22 juillet 1954 
(Bull. civ. IV, no 576) referred to in : Le Lamy social (2019) 150. Définition du contrat de travail. Available 
at: shorturl.at/adoty (Accessed: 12 August 2019) 
670 The origins of employment contracts can be found in Roman law, which regulated it in the form of a 
locatio conductio operarum, which meant the “lease of a free person’s workforce for work in exchange for 
remuneration according to the time spent working” Although some forms of legal work existed in the age of 
feudalism, it was the changes caused by the industrial revolution that resulted in the transformation of work, 
leading to the appearance of “modern” labour law. Sources: Molnár, I. and Jakab, É. (2008) Római jog. 
Szeged: Leges. p. 299.; Kiss, Gy. (2005) Munkajog. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó. pp. 50-53.; Lehoczkyné 
Kollonay, Cs. (1997) A magyar munkajog I. Budapest: Kulturtrade Kiadó. p. 17. 
671 Supiot, A. (2000) ‘Les nouveaux visages de la subordination’, Droit social, (2), p. 132. 
672 Peskine, E. and Wolmark, C. (2016) Droit du travail. 11th edn. Paris: Dalloz (Hypercours Dalloz cours & 
travaux dirigés). p. 27. et pp. 27-34.; Bailleul, C. and Jourdan, D. (2011) Contrat de travail: du recrutement à 
la rupture. 8th edn. Paris: Delmas. p. 20. et pp. 20-22.; Mementos LMD – Droit du travail 2018 p. 25. ; Hess-
Fallon, B., Maillard, S. and Simon, A.-M. (2015) Droit du travail. 24th edn. Paris: Sirey-Dalloz (Aide-
mémoire). p. 88, et pp.88-90. Petit, F. (2011) Droits des contrats de travail. Paris: Gualino. p. 74. 
673 “L’ensemble des règles juridiques applicables aux relations individuelles et collectives qui naissent entre 
les employeur privés et les salariés qui travaillent sous leur autorité, moyennant une rémunération appelée 
salaire.” Source : Ray, J.-E. (2018) Droit du travail: droit vivant. Paris: Wolters Kluwer France, p. 14. 
674 Kéfer, F. and Cornélis, S. (2009) ‘L’arrêt “Copland” ou l’espérance légitime du travailleur quant au 
caractère privé de ses communications’, Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme, (79), p. 782. 
675 « [...] que le lien de subordination est caractérisé par l’exécution d’un travail sous l’autorité d’un 
employeur qui a le pouvoir de donner des ordres et des directives, d’en contrôler l’exécution et de 
sanctionner les manquements de son subordonné. » Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 13 novembre 1996, 
N° 94-13187  
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control whether employees comply, the right to impose sanctions (essential criteria),676 the 
employer bearing the risk of his/her activity, integration into the organisation,677 the 
equipment and raw material provided by the employer, work hours defined by the 
employer,678 the localisation of work.679 The subordinate relation originates from the 
submission to the employer’s regulatory, directive and disciplinary power in order to 
perform work on behalf of the employer.680, 681 
184. Rights and obligations arising from the employment contract. From the 
definition of the employment contract itself, the main obligations and rights of the parties 
(connected to the three central attributes: work, remuneration and subordination) can be 
identified. On the one hand, the employer shall provide work for the employee;682 while on 
the other hand, the employee is obliged not only to work but also to be at the disposal of 
the employer.683 One of the employer’s main obligations is to pay remuneration for the 
work, while the employee has the right to be remunerated. 
185. Following from the criteria of subordination, the employer has different 
powers in relation to ensuring the appropriate functioning of the workplace. The employer 
has the power to manage, to regulate and to discipline, while the employee must respect 
the instructions of the employer.684 The power to manage comprises several elements in 
order to organise work and is implemented through the right to give detailed orders. Giving 
instructions is not only a right: the employer is also obliged to do this, as it is his/her task 
to tell the employee how to perform the work. At the same time, it is also his/her right and 
 
676 Bailleul, C. and Jourdan, D. (2011) Contrat de travail: du recrutement à la rupture. 8th edn. Paris: 
Delmas. p. 22. 
677 Peskine, E. and Wolmark, C. (2016) Droit du travail. 11th edn. Paris: Dalloz (Hypercours Dalloz cours & 
travaux dirigés). p. 31-33. 
678 Hess-Fallon, B., Maillard, S. and Simon, A.-M. (2015) Droit du travail. 24th edn. Paris: Sirey-Dalloz 
(Aide-mémoire). p. 90. 
679 Petit, F. (2011) Droits des contrats de travail. Paris: Gualino. p. 75 
680 Mazeaud, A. (2016) Droit du travail. 10th edn. Issy-les-Moulineaux: LGDJ - Lextenso éditions. p. 339. 
681 Emmanuel Dockès draws attention to the fact that labour law was originally conceived based on the work 
performed by industrial workers. Therefore, attention should be paid when assessing the new forms of 
performing work. Jean-Emmanuel Ray has pointed out in one of his articles that technological changes may 
question the assessment of these indicators, and especially their effects on working hours and place of work 
might be “challenged”. Sources: Dockès, E. (2004) ‘Le pouvoir dans les rapports de travail: essor juridique 
d’une nuisance économique’, Droit social, (6), p. 1. [Page number referring to the online version of the 
article downloaded from: https://www-dalloz-fr.bcujas-ezp.univ-
paris1.fr/documentation/Document?id=DS/CHRON/2004/0122 (Accessed: 19 November 2019)] ; Ray, J.-E. 
(1992) ‘Nouvelles technologies et nouvelles formes de subordination’, Droit social, (6), pp. 1-4. [Page 
number referring to the online version of the article downloaded from: https://www-dalloz-fr.bcujas-
ezp.univ-paris1.fr/documentation/Document?id=DS/CHRON/1992/0081 (Accessed: 19 November 2019)] 
682 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 17 février 2010, N° 08-45298 
683 Article L3121-1 of the FLC 
684 Article L3121-1 of the FLC 
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obligation to control work and maintain work discipline.685 In accordance with these 
powers/rights, the employee shall perform work according to the instructions of the 
employer.686 
186. Common rules of conduct. Both the French Labour Code687 (hereinafter 
referred to as: FLC) and the Hungarian Labour Code688 (hereinafter referred to as: HLC) 
contain some general provisions, which are present in both jurisdictions. The FLC states 
that the contract has to be executed in good faith,689 specify the employee’s obligation of 
loyalty690 and contain provisions relating to the declarations of employees.691 French 
labour law declares that the employee has to perform work with diligence and obligation of 
discretion.692 The employer shall provide the necessary working conditions,693 which 
connects back to his/her authority: he/she shall adequately organise the work, shall 
manage, instruct and inform employees regarding work, shall provide the necessary 
knowledge for work, shall control work and shall discipline employees. In both countries – 
in accordance with EU regulation694 – the employer has important obligations in the field 
of workplace safety and health: he/she shall ensure the conditions of occupational health 
and safety,695 while the employee shall respect safety instructions.696 The FLC also 
expressively regulates the issue of psychological697 and sexual harassment,698 making it the 
employer’s obligation to prevent these issues. 
187. The employer’s powers. In French law, the employer, who is responsible for 
the organisation, management and the general functioning of the workplace,699 has certain 
 
685 Casaux-Labrunée, L. (2012) ‘Vie privée des salariés et vie de l’entreprise’, Droit social, (4), p. 335. 
686 Article L3121-1 of the FLC 
687 Code du travail 
688 Act I of 2012 on the Labour Code 
689 Article L1222-1 of the FLC and Subsection (2) of Section 6 of the HLC 
690 Subparagraph 3 of Article L1222-5 of the FLC and Section 8 of the HLC 
691 From Article L1222-2 to Article L1222-4 of the FLC 
692 Hess-Fallon, B., Maillard, S. and Simon, A.-M. (2015) Droit du travail. 24th edn. Paris: Sirey-Dalloz, pp. 
106-107. 
693 Hess-Fallon, B., Maillard, S. and Simon, A.-M. (2015) Droit du travail. 24th edn. Paris: Sirey-Dalloz, p. 
106. 
694 European Union: Council Directive of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of workers at work (89/391/EEC) 
695 Subparagraph 1 of Article L4121-1 of the FLC 
696 Subparagraph 1 of Article L4122-1 of the FLC 
697 From Article L1152-1 to Article L1152-6 of te FLC (Also from Article L1154-1 to L1154-2 and from 
Article L1155-1 to Article L1155-2) 
698 From Article L1153-1 to Article L1153-6 of the FLC (Also from Article L1154-1 to L1154-2 and Article 
L1155-1 to Article L1155-2) 
699 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 25 février 1988, N° 85-40821  
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powers to ensure its effective functioning.700 Originally, in the Brinon decision, the 
employer was perceived – as he/she is the one having responsibility – as the “only judge” 
to determine what decisions to make as regards the employees and the functioning of the 
workplace while complying with the legal regulations,701 which granted extensive powers 
to the employer. Later, these powers were limited, especially by the adoption of the Act 
Auroux in 1982, which regulated, and therefore imposed limitations on the internal 
regulations and sanctions.702 The next significant act in the subject was the act of 31st 
December 1992,703 which (inspired by the “Lyon-Caen report”704) inserted the famous 
article L120-2705 into the FLC, guaranteeing the general protection of the employee’s 
liberties and rights – at the same time imposing limitations on the employer’s powers. With 
this article, the legislator laid down the foundations of the protection of the employee’s 
rights and freedoms. Three different employer prerogatives are distinguished: power to 
manage (“pouvoir de direction”), power to regulate (“pouvoir législatif” or “pouvoir 
réglementaire”) and power to discipline (“pouvoir disciplinaire”).706 
188. The power to manage suggests two different elements: the management of 
the company and the management of the personnel. It follows from the principle of the 
entrepreneurial freedom that the employer has the prerogative to decide how to manage 
his/her business. As presented above, the Brinon decision acknowledged the employer’s 
power to freely – while complying with the legal regulations – take decisions regarding 
his/her business.707, 708 Resulting from the subordinate relationship between the parties, the 
 
700 Originally, two theories aimed to define the source of these powers. According to the “théorie 
contractuelle”, these powers originate from the employment contract itself, where the employee accepts the 
subordination by contracting, while according to “théorie institutionnelle” – notably represented by Paul 
Durand – these powers are born from the reality that the employee is part of the undertaking. Source: 
Peskine, E. and Wolmark, C. (2016) Droit du travail. 11th edn. Paris: Dalloz (Hypercours Dalloz cours & 
travaux dirigés), p. 161. 
701 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 31 mai 1956, N° 56-04323 
702 Act No. 82-689 of 4 August 1982 on the freedoms of employees in the workplace (“Loi n°82-689 du 4 
août 1982 relative aux libertés des travailleurs dans l'entreprise”) 
703 Act No. 92-1446 of 31 December 1992 on employment, the development of part-time work and 
unemployment insurance 
704 Lyon-Caen, G. (1992) Les libertés publiques et l’emploi. Paris: la Documentation française (Collection 
des rapports officiels) 
705 Article L120-2 of the FLC: “No one may limit the right of the individual or individual or collective 
liberties by any restriction which is not justified by the nature of the task to be performed and proportionate 
to the aim sought.” 
706 Durand, P. and Jaussaud, R. (1947) Traité de droit du travail. Tome I. Paris: Dalloz, p 423. 
707 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 31 mai 1956, N° 56-04323 
708 However, the legislator and the jurisprudence established certain limits and even obligations regarding 
entrepreneurial freedom. See more in: Waquet, P., Struillou, Y. and Pécaut-Rivolier, L. (2014) Pouvoirs du 
chef d’entreprise et libertés du salarié: du salarié-citoyen au citoyen-salarié. Rueil-Malmaison: ÉdLiaisons 
(Droit vivant), pp. 28-33. 
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employer has the power to manage not only the undertaking itself, but also the personnel: 
he/she can decide who to hire or who to dismiss, can give instructions, can determine the 
tasks, can organise workflow and (not only can, but is also obliged to) control, monitor the 
execution.709 
189. The employer’s power to regulate means that the employer is empowered to 
establish general and permanent rules, norms relating to the functioning of the workplace, 
notably through the adoption of an internal regulation.710 Strict limitations were imposed 
on the internal regulation by the act of 4 August 1982, detailing the requirements set 
towards an internal regulation. Especially Article L. 122-35 inserted into the FLC is 
significant for the subject of the dissertation. This article (inspired by the Corona decision 
of the State Council)711 stated that “[the internal regulation] may not limit the rights of the 
individual or individual or collective liberties by any restriction which is not justified by 
the nature of the task to be performed and proportionate to the aim sought.” The Act of 31 
December 1992 extended this protection by changing the expression internal regulation to 
“no one”. The prerogative to adopt an internal regulation has also become an obligation for 
employers who usually employ at least 20 employees.712 The internal regulation shall 
regulate the question of health and safety and work discipline (with special regard to the 
nature and scale of the possible sanctions).713 The FLC also addresses in detail the 
procedure of adopting an internal regulation714 and the rules relating to the administrative 
and judicial control over the internal regulation.715, 716 
190. The power to discipline is inherent to the employer717 and is a necessary 
complement to enforcing the other prerogatives.718 The employer has the power to apply 
 
709 Waquet, P., Struillou, Y. and Pécaut-Rivolier, L. (2014) Pouvoirs du chef d’entreprise et libertés du 
salarié: du salarié-citoyen au citoyen-salarié. Rueil-Malmaison: ÉdLiaisons, pp. 33-39. 
710 Petit, F. (2011) Droits des contrats de travail. Paris: Gualino, p. 275. 
711 In the Corona decision the State Council stated that the examined provisions of the internal regulation in 
question were not justified because when the employer exercises his/her powers to ensure workplace health 
and safety, he/she can only limit employees’ rights by a restriction necessary to achieve the aim sought. 
Conseil d'Etat (1980): N° 06361, Section, 1 février 
712 Subparagraph 1 of Article L1311-2 of the FLC 
713 Item 1° of Subparagraph 1 of Article L1321-1 of the FLC  
714 Submission for the opinion of the social and economic committee and communication to the labour 
inspector and to labour courts and making it available to every person who has access to the place where 
work or recruitment takes place. Article L1321-4 and Article R1321-2 of the FLC 
715 From Article L1322-1 to Article L1322-3 of the FLC; Article L1322-4 and Article R1322-1 of the FLC 
716 The Court of Cassation ruled that in the absence of the required consultation, the dismissal of an employee 
based on the infringement of the provisions of the internal regulation was considered to be void of real and 
serious cause. Source: Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 9 mai 2012, n° 11-13.687 
717 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 16 juin 1945 
718 Durand, P. and Jaussaud, R. (1947) Traité de droit du travail. Tome I. Paris: Dalloz. pp. 436-437. 
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sanctions for the wrongful acts of the employees.719 The act of 4 August 1982 also 
introduced several limitations, creating a legal framework for the employer’s power.720 
When exercising this power, the employer has to respect procedural rules.721 Also, it is 
forbidden to impose monetary sanctions on employees,722 or to impose a sanction which 
was not prescribed by the internal regulation.723 
191. The employer’s powers and SNSs. With regard to SNSs, following from the 
rights and obligations of the parties, the above means that employers do have the power to 
regulate how employees can use SNSs and control whether they have complied with such a 
regulation. The exact outlines of this power are to be addressed in detail in Part II. dealing 
with certain aspects of SNS use. 
(B) Hungary: the employer’s legitimate interests 
192. Subordination in Hungarian labour law. The HLC defines the 
employment contract as a contract where the employee is required to work as instructed by 
the employer, while the employer is required to provide work for the employee and to pay 
wages.724 As such, an employment relationship supposes the employee’s subordination and 
dependency.725 In order to determine the existence of an employment relationship, a joint 
administrative directive issued by the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Finance in 
2005 provides certain primary and secondary criteria. The primary criteria – which can be 
in themselves decisive when determining the existence of an employment relationship – 
contain subordination, the obligation to perform work personally, the obligation to provide 
work and the nature of the activity, the specification of the tasks to be performed in the job. 
193. In this context subordination supposes a hierarchal relation between the 
parties, where the employee performs work while being integrated into the business, 
resulting in the employer’s right to direct and to give orders. The secondary criteria – 
which, not in themselves but together with the presence of other criteria, can indicate the 
 
719 Article 1331-1 of the FLC 
720 As Waquet et al formulated: in the history of the employer’s disciplinary powers two eras can be found: 
one before the act of 4 August 1982 and one after the act of 4 August 1982. Source: Waquet, P., Struillou, Y. 
and Pécaut-Rivolier, L. (2014) Pouvoirs du chef d’entreprise et libertés du salarié: du salarié-citoyen au 
citoyen-salarié. Rueil-Malmaison: ÉdLiaisons, p. 49. 
721 They are contained in the FLC from Article 1332-1 to Article 1332-5 
722 Subparagraph 1 of Article L1331-2 of the FLC  
723 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 26 octobre 2010, N° 09-42740 
724 Subsection (2) of Section 42 of the HLC 
725 Hajdú, J. and Kun, A. (eds) (2012) Munkajog I. Budapest: Patrocinium, p. 108. 
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existence of an employment relationship – contain indicators such as the employer’s right 
to direct, to give orders and to control; the determination of the duration of work and the 
schedule of working time by the employer, the determination of the place of 
employment/work by the employer; remuneration for the work; use of the employer's 
assets, resources and raw materials; the employer’s obligation to ensure the conditions for 
occupational safety and health and contract in writing.726 György Kiss argues that legal 
subordination and the long-term nature of the employment relationship are the two crucial 
criteria.727 Tamás Gyulavári emphasizes as well that the most important characteristic of 
the employment relationship is dependency,728 which is manifested in the hierarchal 
relationship between the employer and the employee, resulting in the wide-ranging right of 
the employer to direct, to give orders and to control,729 meaning that the employer can give 
orders relating to any aspect of the employment: he/she can define the means, place and 
time of working.730 However, giving orders is not without limits, other provisions of the 
HLC must be respected.731 Employees perform work in a subordinate and dependent 
manner, according to the employer’s instructions: as the work is done on the behalf of the 
employer, the employer bears the risks and results of the work, the employee simply offers 
his/her workforce.732 
194. Rights and obligations of the parties. Similarly to French law, the rights 
and obligations of the parties are interconnected: what is a right on one side will be an 
obligation on the other side.733 The main obligations consist of providing work for the 
employee,734 who has to work735 and be at the employer’s disposal;736 and of providing 
 
726 7001/2005. (MK 170.) FMM-PM együttes irányelv a munkavégzés alapjául szolgáló szerződések 
minősítése során figyelembe veendő szempontokról. Although this directive has since been repealed, its main 
principles still remain valid. 
727 Kiss, Gy. (2015) Opportunities and limits of application principles and Civil Code rules in Hungarian 
labour law Crisis management with means of civil law. ELLN Working Paper No. 4. p. 5.; Kiss, Gy. (2017) 
‘A munkajog szabályozásának dilemmái’, Miskolci Jogi Szemle, XII(2), p. 273. 
728 Also stated in the explanations relating to Section 42 of the HLC in T/4786. számú törvényjavaslat a 
Munka Törvénykönyvéről (2011). Előadó: Dr. Matolcsy György nemzetgazdasági miniszter. Budapest 
729 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2017) Munkajog. ELTE Eötvös Kiadó. Budapest. p. 34. 
730 Kardkovács, K. (ed.) (2012) Az új Munka Törvénykönyvének magyarázata. Budapest: HVG-ORAC, p. 91. 
731 Radnay, J. (2003) Munkajog. 4th edn. Budapest: Szent István Társulat, p. 64. 
732 Lehoczkyné Kollonay, Cs. (ed.) (1997) A magyar munkajog I. Budapest: Kulturtrade Kiadó, pp. 8-9. 
733 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2017) Munkajog. ELTE Eötvös Kiadó. Budapest. p. 235.; Prugberger, T. (2011) ‘A 
munkaszerződés és a munkaviszonyból származó alapvető jogok és kötelezettségek a Munka 
Törvénykönyvének rekodifikációs tervezetében’, Gazdasági élet és társadalom, (1–2), p. 283. 
734 Subsection (1) of Section 51 of the HLC 
735 The HLC [Item c) of Subsection (1) of Section 52] defines it among the main obligations of the employee 
as the obligation to perform work in person with the level of professional expertise and workmanship that can 
be reasonably expected, in accordance with the relevant regulations, requirements, instructions and customs. 
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remuneration for the work – while the employee has the right to be remunerated.737 
Following from the criteria of subordination, the employer is entitled and at the same time 
obliged to create the conditions necessary for work, which includes organizing the work, 
managing employees, giving instructions and information, controlling work and 
maintaining work discipline.738 In accordance with these rights, the employee must 
perform work according to the instructions of the employer.739 
195. Common rules of conduct in the HLC. Similarly to the FLC, the HLC also 
stipulates that the contract has to be executed in good faith740 and the employee is 
subjected to an obligation of loyalty.741 In addition, the HLC regulates among the common 
rules of conduct the requirement of what can reasonably be expected in the given 
circumstances (“általában elvárhatóság”),742 the respect of the principles of fairness, 
mutual cooperation,743, 744 the requirement of taking into account the interests of the 
employees745 and the requirement of providing information.746 Moreover, the abuse of 
rights is prohibited.747, 748 
 
736 Item a) of Subsection (1) of Section 52 of the HLC (on the obligation to appear at the place and time 
specified by the employer, in a condition fit for work) and Item b) of Subsection (1) of Section 52 of the HLC 
(on the obligation to be at the employer’s disposal in a condition fit for work during their working time for 
the purpose of performing work) 
737 Item b) of Subsection (1) of Section 42 of the HLC 
738 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2013) Munkajog. 2nd edn. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, p. 247. 
739 Kajtár, E. (2014) ‘A munkáltatói utasítás helye a 21. század munkajogában’, Jura, 20(2), p. 215. and 
Subsection (2) of Section 42 of the HLC 
740 Subsection (2) of Section 6 of the HLC 
741 Section 8 of the HLC 
742 Subsection (1) of Section 6 of the HLC “Employment contracts shall be executed as it might normally be 
expected in the given circumstances, unless any legal provision exists to the contrary. A person may not rely, 
in support of his or her claim, on an unlawful act he or she has committed. A person who himself or herself 
engaged in an unlawful act may rely on the wrongful act committed by others.” 
743 Subsection (2) of Section 6 of the HLC “In exercising rights and discharging obligations, the parties 
involved shall act in the manner consistent with the principle of good faith and fair dealing, they shall be 
required to cooperate with one another, and they shall not engage in any conduct to breach the rights or 
legitimate interests of the other party. The requirements of good faith and fair dealing shall be considered 
breached where a party’s exercise of rights is contradictory to his or her previous actions which the other 
party had reason to rely on.” 
For example, adopting a workplace communication style according to the rules of civilized human behaviour 
or adopting a behaviour that takes into account mutual respect and human dignity fall under the obligation of 
cooperation. [Source: Kozma, A. (2013) ‘Mire köteles a munkavállaló?’, HR & Munkajog, 4(10) p. 8. and 
BH2006. 201.] 
744 In the employment relationship both the employer and the employee must actively contribute to the legal 
relationship: the employer organizes and directs the work, gives instructions, while the employee performs 
the work itself; which makes cooperation between the parties indispensable. Source: Miholics, T. (2015) 
‘Általános magatartási követelmények a munkaviszonyban’, Magyar jog, 62(4), p. 247. 
745 Subsection (3) of Section 6 of the HLC “Employers shall take into account the interests of workers under 
the principle of equitable assessment; where the mode of performance is defined by unilateral act, it shall be 
done so as not to cause unreasonable disadvantage to the worker affected.” 
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196. The HLC also adds that the employee has to behave in a way that 
demonstrates the trust vested in him/her for the job in question:749 when exercising his/her 
rights, the employee has to take into consideration the employer’s interests, not only during 
working hours but also beyond them.750 Also, he/she shall not jeopardize the legitimate 
economic interests of the employer.751 The employee shall also cooperate with co-
workers.752 The employer shall provide the necessary working conditions,753 which 
connects back to his/her authority: he/she shall adequately organise the work, shall 
manage, instruct and inform employees regarding work, shall provide the necessary 
knowledge for work, shall control work and shall discipline employees.754, 755 Also, he/she 
is obliged to ensure conditions of occupational health and safety,756 while the employee 
shall respect safety instructions.757 
197. The right to direct. The right to direct comprises several elements in order 
to organise work and is implemented through the right to give detailed orders. Giving 
instructions is not only a right: the employer is also obliged to this, as it is his/her task to 
tell the employee how to perform the work.758 The employer’s right to give instructions 
covers every aspect of working, during the whole lifetime of the employment relationship 
and he/she can exercise complete and detailed control over their implementation.759 At the 
same time, it is also his/her right and obligation to monitor work760, 761 and maintain work 
 
746 Subsection (4) of Section 6 of the HLC “The parties falling within the scope of this Act shall inform each 
other concerning all facts, information and circumstances, and any changes therein, which are considered 
essential from the point of view of employment relationships and exercising rights and discharging 
obligations as defined in this Act.” 
747 Subsection (1) of Section 7 of the HLC 
748 See more on these common rules of conduct in: Miholics, T. (2015) ‘Általános magatartási 
követelmények a munkaviszonyban’, Magyar jog, 62(4), pp. 245–249.  
749 Item d) of Subsection (1) of Section 52 of the HLC 
750 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2013) Munkajog. ELTE Eötvös Kiadó. Budapest, p. 262. 
751 Ember, A. (2015) ‘A munkáltató jogos gazdasági érdekének a védelme’, in Lajkó, D. and Varga, N. 
(eds) Alapelvek és alapjogok. Szeged: Szegedi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Doktori Iskola, 
p. 113.; Section 8 of the HLC. These provisions will be addressed in detail in Part II. 
752 Item e) of Subsection (1) of Section 52 of the HLC 
753 Subsection (1) of Section 51 of the HLC 
754 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2013) Munkajog. ELTE Eötvös Kiadó. Budapest, p. 247. 
755 On the rights and obligations of the parties see more in: Prugberger, T. and Nádas, Gy. (2014) Európai és 
magyar összehasonlító munka- és közszolgálati jog. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer, pp. 199-208. 
756 Subsection (4) of Section 51 of the HLC 
757 Section 1 of Article 60 of Act XCIII of 1993 on labour safety 
758 Kardkovács, K. (ed.) (2016) A Munka Törvénykönyvének magyarázata. 3rd edn. Budapest: HVG-ORAC 
Lap- és Könyvkiadó, p. 135.  
759 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2013) Munkajog. ELTE Eötvös Kiadó. Budapest. p. 38. 
760 Szűcs, P. (2013) A munka törvénykönyve, 2012-1992. Budapest: CompLex. p. 15. 
761 The HLC contains further provisions regarding the monitoring of work in Section 11 and 11/A.  
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discipline.762 As explained above, the employee shall perform work according to the 
instructions of the employer.763 
198. Internal policies764 can be understood as the employer’s instruction.765 The 
employer is entitled to regulate in internal policies matters covered by his/her right to 
instruct.766 Internal policies, the employer’s power to regulate originate from the right to 
give instructions, which can be traced back to the hierarchal relation present between the 
parties.767 In consequence, the matters regarding which an internal policy can be drafted 
are various, such as regulating conflict of interests, behaviour at work, norms relating to 
clothing or even behaviour outside the workplace – 768, 769 resulting in the employer being 
able to control, impose limitations on the behaviour of employees. 
199. Right to monitor. According to Hungarian labour law regulation, the 
employer shall provide the necessary working conditions,770 which means that he/she shall 
adequately organise the work, shall manage, instruct and inform employees regarding 
work, shall provide the necessary knowledge for work, shall control work and shall 
discipline employees.771 It follows from the employer’s obligation to ensure safe working 
environment and the obligation to organize work that he/she is also entitled to monitor 
whether employees comply with the given orders.772 As such, monitoring employees will 
not only be a right of the employer,773 but at the same time it is an obligation as well.774 
 
762 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2013) Munkajog. ELTE Eötvös Kiadó. Budapest. p. 249. 
763 Subsection (2) of Section 42 of the HLC 
764 Subsection (1) of Section 17 of the HLC: “(1) Employers shall be able to implement the legal acts referred 
to in Sections 15-16 [relating to Unilateral acts, statements and commitments] by means of internal rules 
established of its own accord or by way of a procedure formulated unilaterally (hereinafter referred to as: 
“employer’s internal policy”).” 
765 Kiss, Gy. (2005) Munkajog. 2nd edn. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, p. 80. 
766 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2017) Munkajog. 3rd edn. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó. p. 98. 
767 Gyulavári, T. and Kun, A. (2013) ‘A munkáltatói szabályzat az új Munka Törvénykönyvében’, Magyar 
jog, 60(9), p. 557. 
768 Berke, Gy. and Kiss, Gy. (eds) (2014) Kommentár a munka törvénykönyvéhez: kommentár a munka 
törvénykönyvéről szóló 2012. évi I. törvényhez. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer, p. 91. 
769 Additional provisions require that “[e]mployers shall consult the works council prior to passing a decision 
in respect of any plans for actions and adopting regulations affecting a large number of employees.” 
[Subsection (1) of Section 264 of the HLC] The processing and protection of personal data of employees and 
the implementation of technical means for the surveillance of workers are among the matters concerned by 
the obligation of consultation. [Items c) and d) of Subsection (2) of Section 264 of the HLC] 
770 Subsection (1) of Section 51 of the HLC 
771 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2013) Munkajog. ELTE Eötvös Kiadó. Budapest, pp. 238-239.; Kajtár, E. (2014) ‘A 
munkáltatói utasítás helye a 21. század munkajogában’, Jura, 20(2), p. 214. 
772 Horinka, É. (2018) ‘A munkavállaló és a munkáltató személyiségi jogainak védelme a munkaviszonyban’, 
in Mailáth György Tudományos Pályázat 2017. Díjazott dolgozatok. Budapest: Országos Bírósági Hivatal, p. 
627.; Ember, A. (2012) ‘Meddig terjedhet a munkáltató ellenőrzési joga: avagy a munkavállaló munkáltató 
általi kamerás megfigyelésének aggályai’, Humánpolitikai szemle, (9), p. 30. 
773 Hajdú, J. and Kun, A. (eds) (2014) Munkajog. Budapest: Patrocinium, p. 88. 
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However, such a monitoring cannot be unlimited: as it will be explored in a later part of the 
dissertation, employees’ rights, notably rights relating to the personality,775 limit the 
enforcement of the employer’s right to monitor to a certain extent. 
200. Right to discipline. The employer is entitled to issue a warning to an 
employee, in case he/she founds that the employee is committing a breach of duty.776 It 
follows from these rights and obligations that the employer is entitled to discipline 
employees through different sanctions in case of wrongful breach of obligations.777 
Detrimental legal consequences – proportionate to the breach of duty – may be applied if 
the employee infringed an obligation arising from the employment relationship, he/she was 
culpable and the detrimental legal consequence is prescribed by a collective agreement, or 
– if the employer or the employee is not covered by the collective agreement – by the 
employment contract.778 The employer can modify the sphere of duties or the salary of the 
employee, withdraw benefits or impose fines – while respecting the employee’s right to 
dignity and personality rights.779, 780 In the most serious cases the employer can terminate 
the employment by dismissal.781 
201. Conclusions of the Section. In conclusion, following from the specific 
rights and obligations imposed on the parties, the employer’s rights/powers in the field of 
control and monitoring enable him/her to control employees, to give them instructions, and 
to monitor compliance. In the context of the dissertation it means that on the one hand, the 
employer can determine certain rules in relation to the use of SNSs (e.g. maintaining work 
discipline, defending his/her reputation, etc.), and on the other hand, he/she can verify 
whether the employee complies with instructions and legal obligations imposed on 
 
774 Szűcs, P. (2013) A munka törvénykönyve, 2012-1992. Budapest: CompLex. p. 15. 
775 Horinka, É. (2018) ‘A munkavállaló és a munkáltató személyiségi jogainak védelme a munkaviszonyban’, 
in Mailáth György Tudományos Pályázat 2017. Díjazott dolgozatok. Budapest: Országos Bírósági Hivatal, p. 
627. 
776 Cséffán, J. (2018) A Munka Törvénykönyve és magyarázata. Szeged: Szegedi Rendezvényszervező Kft, p. 
206. 
777 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2013) Munkajog. ELTE Eötvös Kiadó. Budapest. p. 249. 
778 Subsection (1) of Section 56 of the HLC; See more on detrimental legal consequences in: Cséffán, J. 
(2018) A Munka Törvénykönyve és magyarázata. Szeged: Szegedi Rendezvényszervező Kft, p. 217-221. 
779 Kardkovács, K. (ed.) (2016) A Munka Törvénykönyvének magyarázata. 3rd edn. Budapest: HVG-ORAC 
Lap- és Könyvkiadó, pp. 144-145. 
780 Subsection (2) of Section 56 of the HLC adds: “The detrimental legal consequence aforementioned may 
be a sanction related to the employment relationship, altering its terms and conditions for a fixed period, 
which shall not violate the employee’s rights relating to personality and dignity. Where the sanction is of a 
financial nature, it may not - on the whole - exceed the employee’s monthly base wage in effect at the time 
when the sanction is imposed.” 
781 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2017) Munkajog. 3rd edn. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó. p. 240. 
 140 
 
him/her, such as obligation of loyalty, obligation of work, etc. (e.g. monitoring whether the 
employee surfs on Facebook instead of working during working hours, or inspecting SNS 
profiles to ascertain whether the employee damages the employer’s reputation through a 
post, etc.). 
Section 2: Legal rules relating to employee monitoring 
202. Besides the already presented general data protection framework, it also 
became necessary to adopt employment specific regulations in order to effectively ensure 
employees’ right to data protection. The data protection regulation recognizes the 
legitimacy of employee monitoring, by not prohibiting the processing of employees’ data 
in relation to monitoring, but by channeling it through requiring the respect of certain 
privacy and data protection measures. Although the right to privacy and the right to data 
protection are both concerned, it is mainly through the data protection approach that the 
different organizations and institutions, as well as national jurisdictions approached this 
question.782 
§1. Workplace privacy in the European legal order  
203. The Section will examine the international organizations – notably the EU 
and the CoE – which already addressed the question of processing employees’ data and 
adopted legal norms and documents in this field. These documents already addressed the 
traditional forms of monitoring – e.g. CCTV monitoring, monitoring of e-mail and Internet 
use, geo-localisation, etc. However, new innovations challenge the established rules, and 
 
782 As the ILO stated, technological development made it necessary to create data protection rules for the 
employment context “[…] in order to safeguard the dignity of workers, protect their privacy and guarantee 
their fundamental right to determine who may use which data for what purposes and under what conditions.” 
(ILO (1997) Protection of workers’ personal data. An ILO code of practice. Geneva: International Labour 
Office. p. 1.). The CoE in Recommendation No. (89) 2, - similarly to an almost identical phrasing in 
recommendation (2015)5 - stated that “[…] the use of automatic data processing methods by employers 
should be guided by principles which are designed to minimise any risks which such methods could possibly 
pose for the rights and fundamental freedoms of employees, in particular their right to privacy[.]” [Council 
of Europe (1989) Recommendation No. R (89) 2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the 
Protection of Personal Data Used for Employment Purposes.(Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 18 
January 1989 at the 423rd meeting of the Ministers' Deputies), Preamble] A similar formulation also 
appeared in the EU’s Second stage consultation of social partners on the protection of workers' personal 
data. The document noted that studies were prepared with the aim of assessing whether existing regulations 
“[…] provide appropriate protection of workers' fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the 
right to privacy or whether there is a need to further particularise and complement them, with regard to the 
particular context of the processing: the employment context.” (European Commission (2004) ‘Second stage 
consultation of social partners on the protection of workers’ personal data’, p. 4.) The exception might be the 
ECtHR’s case law, which approaches the question of employee monitoring from a more privacy related 
perspective, based on the right to respect for private life guaranteed by Article 8. 
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raise several questions. The most recent international documents already touched upon the 
question of SNSs, but they only devote brief provisions to the subject.783 An exhaustive 
regulation of data processing and SNSs in the employment context has not yet been 
elaborated, neither by the CoE nor by the EU. 
204. International Labour Organization. Although focus will be put on the 
European legal order, because of its significance, the International Labour Organization 
(hereinafter referred to as: ILO) must also be mentioned briefly. At the universal level, in 
1997, the ILO issued a code of practice regulating the processing of employees’ personal 
data.784 The code of practice is an instrument without binding force; however, it contains 
detailed regulation regarding the processing of employees’ personal data.785 Despite the 
lack of binding effect, given the ILO’s importance and the rapid adopting of such an 
instrument, it was by the adoption of a code of conduct that the ILO could quickly and 
effectively join the growing international conversation on data protection.786 The Code 
underlined the importance of the sectoral regulation of data processing in the employment 
context and regulated the most important rules, definitions and principles regarding the 
processing of personal data and employee monitoring.787 
 
783 Council of Europe (2015) Recommendation CM/Rec(2015)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
States on the processing of personal data in the context of employment. (Adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 1 April 2015, at the 1224th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies) and WP29 (2017) Opinion 
2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249.  
784 ILO (1997) Protection of workers’ personal data. An ILO code of practice. Geneva: International Labour 
Office. 
785 Spiros Simitis explained this by pointing out that by choosing the form of a code of practice, the ILO gave 
up on adopting a document with binding force, but in exchange it did not have to make compromises 
regarding the content. As a result, compared to other international documents in the field, this Code 
succeeded in regulating the question of employee monitoring in a more detailed way. Source: Simitis, S. 
(1998) ‘From the General Rules on Data Protection to a Specific Regulation of the Use of Employee Data: 
Policies and Constraints of the European Union’, Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 19(3), pp. 
362-363. 
786 Simitis, S. (1999) ‘Reconsidering the Premises of Labour Law: Prolegomena to an EU Regulation on the 
Protection of Employees’ Personal Data’, European Law Journal, 5(1), p. 50. 
787 For example: the Code applies to both the public and the private sector and both to manual and automated 
processing of employees’ (and job candidates’) personal data. (Article 4.) As concerns the purpose limitation 
principle, the Code clarifies with regard to employment that processing can only be conducted for reasons 
directly relevant to the employment of the worker. (Article 5. 1.) The Code expressly states that “[w]orkers 
may not waive their privacy rights[,]” (Article 5. 13.) meaning that consent cannot be considered as a legal 
ground for legitimate processing of personal data. The Code also states in Article 5.3. that when “personal 
data are to be processed for purposes other than those for which they were collected, the employer should 
ensure that they are not used in a manner incompatible with the original purpose, and should take the 
necessary measures to avoid any misinterpretations caused by a change of context[,]” taking into 
consideration that an employment relationship is often a long-term relationship. Source: De Hert, P. and 
Lammerant, H. (2013) Protection of Personal Data in Work-related Relations. Study PE 474.440. 
 142 
 
205. Since the adoption of the code of practice, the ILO did not adopt a document 
explicitly aiming employee privacy.788 What it did was contributing to the professional 
development of judges and staff, by organizing meetings in order to provide a platform for 
exchange relating to common challenges.789 Notably, the Meeting of European Labour 
Court Judges should be mentioned, which at its 17th meeting examined the question of 
privacy, where participating countries all noted in their national reports that, providing 
certain safeguards are respected, it is possible to interfere with employees’ privacy.790 The 
22nd meeting addressed the question of the impact of information communication 
technologies on the world of work. National reports by the 11 participating countries were 
issued, covering the fields of both individual and collective labour law, and addressing 
subjects such as the use of ICT in the hiring process, during employment, ICT activity and 
termination of employment, etc.791 
206. European legal order. As both France and Hungary are members of the 
CoE and the EU, emphasis will be put on these two international organizations. These 
organizations addressed the question of privacy and/or data protection with special regard 
to employment on several forums, making it a very important subject. In the following 
parts (A) the CoE’s and (B) the EU’s relevant regulation will be discussed in detail, 
presenting the European rules on employee monitoring and privacy. 
(A) Council of Europe 
207. Just like the ILO, the CoE has also recognized the importance of data 
processing in the employment context. For decades now, the ECHR’s Article 8 has had 
great significance: (a) the ECtHR developed a very important case law regarding the field 
of workplace privacy (data protection), also dealing explicitly with the question of 
 
Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs. 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. p. 20. See more in: Ibid. pp. 19-22. 
788 Fritsch, C. (2015) ‘Data Processing in Employment Relations; Impacts of the European General Data 
Protection Regulation Focusing on the Data Protection Officer at the Worksite’, in Gutwirth, S., Leenes, R., 
and de Hert, P. (eds) Reforming European Data Protection Law. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London: 
Springer, p. 156. 
789 ILO (no date) Meetings of the European Labour Court Judges. Available 
at: http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/departments-and-offices/governance/labour-
law/judges/lang--en/index.htm(Accessed: 1 May 2018) 
790 XVIIth Meeting of European Labour Court Judges (2009) General and national reports. Privacy in the 
workplace. ILO 
791 National reports. Topic 1. ”Impact on Information Technologies (IT) on industrial and employment 
relations” – review of national case law (2014). Dublin, Ireland: XXIInd Meeting of European Labour Court 
Judges 
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employee monitoring. The Committee of Ministers also adopted certain documents, 
explicitly addressing the question of employee data protection – which will be dealt with 
under section (b). This led to the adoption of sectoral regulation addressing explicitly the 
issue of the processing of personal data related to employees. Finally, although up to now 
they do not have a key role regarding employee privacy and data protection, (c) the 
(Revised) European Social Charter and the European Committee of Social Rights also have 
a moderate link to data protection, and as such they must be mentioned. 
(a) ECtHR case law related to workplace monitoring  
208. When it comes to employee privacy/data protection, the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence has paramount importance, as for decades now the ECtHR has regularly had 
to deal with the question of employee privacy. In its jurisprudence, the ECtHR adopts a 
privacy approach, instead of a more technical data protection analysis, and deals with the 
question whether the monitoring of certain aspects of the employees’ life fell under the 
notion of “private life” [Article 8 (1)] and whether the infringement was necessary in a 
democratic society [Article 8 (2)].792 This Section will present the key cases relating to 
employee monitoring, which are important to be discussed as they designate – to a certain 
extent – what the limits of employees’ private life are. 
209. Niemietz v. Germany. In the case Niemietz v. Germany (1992) the ECtHR 
applied the protection provided by Article 8 to the workplace, by stating that “[r]espect for 
private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings[,]”793 and pointing out that during the working life, 
the greatest opportunity to establish relationship with others happens at the workplace, 
blurring the boundaries of personal and professional life.794, 795 By this the ECtHR made 
clear that the right to respect for private life must not be interpreted narrowly, instead it 
 
792 I had the impression that the emphasis in these cases is mostly put on answering the question whether the 
private life of the employee was concerned, instead of how exactly monitoring shall take place. 
793 ECtHR (1992) Niemietz v. Germany, Application no. 13710/88, 16 December, par. 29. 
794 ECtHR (1992) Niemietz v. Germany, Application no. 13710/88, 16 December, par. 29. 
795 This is especially the case in liberal professions, where separating the two fields can be extremely 
challenging. Source: Lambert, P. and Rigaux, F. (1993) ‘Perquisition au cabinet d’un avocat et droit au 
respect de la vie privée, de la correspondance et du domicile’, Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme, 
(15), p. 478. 
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covers the social aspects of one’s life, even at the workplace: therefore the employer shall 
respect employees’ privacy even at the workplace.796 
210. Halford v. the United Kingdom. A few years after the Niemietz case, the 
ECtHR had to decide in another significant employee monitoring case. In the case Halford 
v. the United Kingdom (1997) the applicant, Miss Halford worked as a police officer and 
brought discrimination claims against her employer for being refused a promotion and 
alleged that her telephone calls were intercepted in order to obtain information against her 
for the proceedings.797 Miss Halford was provided two telephones: one for work purposes 
and one for private purposes; and received no restrictions on their use.798 Moreover, she 
was told that she could use her office telephone in her sex-discrimination case.799 As 
concerns the applicability of Article 8, the ECtHR stated that phone calls made from 
business premises (as well as from home) fall under the notion of “private life” and 
“correspondence” mentioned in Article 8.800 Naturally, it does not mean that the employer 
cannot monitor these calls, but when conducting such a monitoring, he/she shall respect the 
provisions laid down in Paragraph 2 of Article 8.801 
211. Copland v. the United Kingdom. In the case Copland v. the United 
Kingdom (2007) the applicant, Ms. Copland, worked at a college and alleged that her 
phone calls, e-mails and Internet use were monitored by her employer. The ECtHR found 
that from its precedent case law stating that phone calls made from business premises are 
covered by Article 8, “[i]t follows logically that e-mails sent from work should be 
similarly protected under Article 8, as should information derived from the monitoring of 
personal Internet usage.”802 With this statement the ECtHR interpreted Article 8 in the 
light of the technological development,803 and guaranteed protection against the new types 
 
796 Rijckaert, O. and Lambert, N. (2012) Le respect de la vie privée dans la relation de travail. Waterloo: 
Wolters Kluwer Belgium. p. 19. 
797 ECtHR (1997) Halford v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 20605/92, 25 June, par 9-12. 
798 ECtHR (1997) Halford v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 20605/92, 25 June, par. 16. 
799 Hendrickx, F. (2002) ‘Privacy and Employment Law: General Principles and Application to Electronic 
Monitoring’, in Blanpain, R. (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society. Use and 
Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. 54. 
800 ECtHR (1997) Halford v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 20605/92, 25 June, par. 44. 
801 In this case the ECtHR stated the violation of Article 8 as regards calls made from the office telephone, as 
domestic law did not guarantee adequate protection for the applicant. However, it did not state the violation 
of Article 8 in relation to the calls made from the home telephone. ECtHR (1997) Halford v. the United 
Kingdom, Application no. 20605/92, 25 June, par. 51. and par. 60. 
802 ECtHR (2007) Copland v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 62617/00, 3 April, par. 41. 
803 Kéfer, F. and Cornélis, S. (2009) ‘L’arrêt “Copland” ou l’espérance légitime du travailleur quant au 
caractère privé de ses communications’, Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme, (79), p. 785. 
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of interferences.804 The ECtHR held that the interference was not in accordance with the 
law, as there was no domestic law regulating the case of monitoring and stated the 
violation of Article 8.805 
212. Bărbulescu v. Romania. In the Bărbulescu v. Romania (2017) case, for the 
first time, the ECtHR had to decide in a case regarding the electronic monitoring by a 
private employer.806 The applicant, Mr. Bărbulescu was dismissed for using the Internet 
and a Yahoo account, created at the initiative of the employer, for private purposes against 
the prohibition of the employer. The employer found this out by monitoring the use of the 
equipment. Although Mr. Bărbulescu was informed that the personal use if IT equipment is 
prohibited, he was not informed as concerns the details of the implementation of the 
monitoring – which turned out to have registered all the content of his communication for a 
certain period. Reversing the fourth section’s decision from 2016,807 the ECtHR’s Grand 
Chamber ruled in 2017 that Article 8 was violated and the national authorities could not 
provide an effective protection of the applicant’s right to respect for private life.808 In 
accordance with the ECtHR’s previous case law, the ECtHR held that the applicant’s 
communications conducted from the workplace fell under the scope of Article 8.809 
213. In accordance with the ECtHR’s previous case law, the ECtHR held in the 
Bărbulescu case as well that the applicant’s communications conducted from the 
workplace fell under the scope of Article 8.810 In this case the ECtHR acknowledged the 
existence of “social private life” and ruled that “[…] an employer’s instructions cannot 
reduce private social life in the workplace to zero.”811, 812 However, it is important to 
emphasize that it does not mean that employers cannot monitor the activities of employees: 
 
804 Baugard, D. (2010) ‘L’utilité de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme en droit du 
travail’, Droit et Patrimoine, (195), p. 37. 
805 ECtHR (2007) Copland v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 62617/00, 3 April, par. 48-49. 
806 ECtHR, Press Unit (2017) ‘Q & A. Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Bărbulescu v. Romania 
(application no. 61496/08)’. Available 
at: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Press_Q_A_Barbulescu_ENG.PDF(Accessed: 1 May 2018). p. 2. 
807 ECtHR (2016) Bărbulescu v. Romania, Application no. 61496/08, 12 January 
808 On the details of the case see more in: Gheorghe, M. (2017) ‘Considerations on the conditions under 
which the employer may monitor their employees at the workplace’, Juridical Tribune, 7(2) pp. 62-69. and 
Rózsavölgyi, B. (2018) ‘Mikor lehet jogszerű a munkáltató ellenőrzése? – az Emberi Jogok Európai Bírósága 
Nagykamarája Bărbulescu kontra Románia ügyben hozott ítéletének iránymutatásai’, Munkajog, 2(1), pp. 
43–48. 
809 ECtHR (2017) Bărbulescu v. Romania, Application no. 61496/08, 5 September, par. 81. 
810 ECtHR (2017) Bărbulescu v. Romania, Application no. 61496/08, 5 September, par. 81. 
811 ECtHR (2017) Bărbulescu v. Romania, Application no. 61496/08, 5 September, par. 80. 
812 The ECtHR also had important remarks as regards the monitoring of itself, which will be further discussed 
in §2. 
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they can exercise discretion when it comes to determining the regulations relating to 
private communications at the workplace. However, they have to respect certain 
requirements arising from the already existing privacy and data protection regulation.813 
214. In this context private social life means the possibility for the individual to 
develop his/her social identity,814 and instant messaging services constitute one form of 
leading a private social life.815 The ECtHR also stated that restrictions on an individual’s 
professional life may fall within Article 8 in the case that they have “repercussions on the 
manner in which he or she constructs his or her social identity by developing relationships 
with others”.816 Even in the workplace, respect for private life and for the privacy of 
correspondence continues to exist, but they may be restricted to a necessary extent.817 
Therefore the complete ban of personal communication seems to restrict the private social 
life of employees to an unreasonable extent. 
215. The ECtHR elaborated in paragraph 121 of the Bărbulescu judgement what 
relevant factors should be taken into account when assessing whether the employee 
monitoring was lawful or not.818 These are: 
- whether the employee has been notified of the possibility of monitoring 
correspondence and other communications, and of how this monitoring is implemented, 
- the extent of the monitoring and the degree of intrusion into the employee’s privacy 
(e.g. whether only the flow of information was monitored or the content too, or whether the 
scope of monitoring was limited in time and space), 
- whether the employer has legitimate reasons to justify the monitoring and the 
access to their content, 
- whether the use of less intrusive methods would have been possible (e.g. instead of 
accessing the content of communication), 
- the consequences of the monitoring and how the result of the monitoring will be 
used by the employer, 
 
813 Kállai, P. (2017) ‘Bărbulescu Románia elleni ügye’, Fundamentum, 21(3–4), p. 101. 
814 ECtHR (2017) Bărbulescu v. Romania, Application no. 61496/08, 5 September, par. 70. 
815 ECtHR (2017) Bărbulescu v. Romania, Application no. 61496/08, 5 September, par. 74. 
816 ECtHR (2017) Bărbulescu v. Romania, Application no. 61496/08, 5 September, par 71. 
817 ECtHR (2017) Bărbulescu v. Romania, Application no. 61496/08, 5 September, par 80. 
818 Costes, L. (2017) ‘CEDH : surveillance des courriels d’un employé à son insu constitutive d’une violation 
du droit au respect de la vie privée et de la correspondance’, Revue Lamy droit de l’immatériel, (140), p. 35. 
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- whether the employee was provided adequate safeguards. 
216. This case is significant because it specified the rules in relation to employee 
monitoring and using the obtained information in disciplinary proceedings.819, 820 The 
decision did not only evoke the general principles to be considered during finding a 
balance between the two sides, but also found a reasonable balance between employees’ 
rights and the margin of discretion available to the Member States in relation to reasonably 
limiting the private use of the Internet in the workplace.821 The ECtHR laid down detailed 
criteria making monitoring legitimate822 – the detailed rules applying to employee 
monitoring will be reviewed in Part II. 
217. Case of Libert v. France. The Libert v. France (2018) case – relating to the 
storage of personal files on the employer’s computer – contains some important 
observations, in which the ECtHR did not question the established French rules.823, 824 The 
case related to the opening of personal files stored on a professional computer. The 
applicant, employee of the French national railway company (SNCF), was dismissed after 
the seizure of his work computer revealed that he stored a considerable number of 
pornographic files and forged documents. The applicant argued that the employer violated 
Article 8, by accessing those files in his absence. 
 
819 Costes, L. (2017) ‘CEDH : surveillance des courriels d’un employé à son insu constitutive d’une violation 
du droit au respect de la vie privée et de la correspondance’, Revue Lamy droit de l’immatériel, (140), p. 35. 
820 While recognizing the importance of establishing these “Bărbulescu criteria”, Jean-Pierre Marguénaud 
and Jean Mouly also draw attention to certain uncertanties regarding the application of these criteria. 
Notably, they question whether they are cumulative criteria or if not, what hierarchy is between them, how 
they should be taken into consideration when assessing whether Article 8 of the ECHR was breached. 
Source: Marguénaud, J.-P. and Mouly, J. (2017) ‘De l’accès des salariés à Internet à la rationalisation de 
l’influence de la Cour EDH sur les relations individuelles du travail’, La Semaine Juridique - Édition 
Générale, (44–45), p. 1996. 
821 Andriantsimbazovina, J. (2017) ‘L’encadrement stricte du contrôle par l’employeur de l’usage de la 
messagerie électronique du salarié ; Note sous Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, grande Chambre, 5 
septembre 2017, Barbulescu c/ Roumanie, numéro 61496/08’, La Gazette du Palais, (41), p. 2. [Page number 
referring to the online version of the article downloaded from: https://www.lextenso.fr/gazette-du-
palais/GPL307d0 (Accessed: 15 August 2019)] 
822 Colonna, J. and Renaux-Personnic, V. (2017) ‘Vie privée et surveillance des communications du salarié : 
la position de la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme ; Note sous Cour Européenne des Droits de 
l’Homme, grande Chambre, 5 septembre 2017, arrêt numéro 61496/08’, La Gazette du Palais, (43), p. 2. 
[Page number referring to the online version of the article downloaded from: https://www.gazette-du-
palais.fr/article/GPL309w2/ (Accessed: 15 August 2019)] 
823 Loiseau, G. (2018) ‘La CEDH valide la jurisprudence de la Chambre sociale’, La Semaine Juridique 
Social, (12), p. 11. [Page number referring to the online version of the article downloaded from: 
https://www.lexis360.fr/Document/vie_privee_du_salarie_la_cedh_valide_la_jurisprudence_de_la_chambre_
sociale_/zyiP_3vLY_y5rVWLGA3TgdU3HoxJt_utRta5bm5vCvQ1?data=c0luZGV4PTEmckNvdW50PTgw
MiY=&rndNum=1282688306&tsid=search6_ (Accessed: 15 August 2019)]; Nasom-Tissandier, H. (2018) 
‘L’importance de la charte informatique dans la justification de mesures de surveillance des 
salariés’, Jurisprudence sociale Lamy, (451), p. 14. 
824 See more on French regulation in Part II. 
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218. The ECtHR reminds that the employer has the right to ensure that 
employees use the equipment provided by him/her for executing their work in compliance 
with their contractual obligations and applicable regulation,825 confirming the existence of 
the employer’s right to monitor.826 The employee’s files identified as personal receive 
more protection, as according to French law they can only be opened if there is a risk or a 
particular event and in the presence of the employee, or if he/she has been properly notified 
of it – contrary to files presumed to be of professional nature.827 The ECtHR confirmed the 
principle that the employee is entitled to the right to respect for private life even within the 
workplace, and that files obviously identified as personal, stored on the computer provided 
by the employer for work purposes, might pertain to the private life of the employee,828 
and confirmed that the relevant part of French law is in accordance with the ECHR.829 
219. Conclusions drawn from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. From the case 
law of the ECtHR830 several conclusions can be drawn. First, the ECtHR made it clear that 
employees are entitled to the right to privacy, and they do not cease to have this right even 
within the workplace. Second, the ECtHR interpreted the right to privacy in a flexible way, 
taking into account the changes that had occurred in technology and society; through 
interpreting correspondence in a broad way and affording protection to a wide range of 
communication means. Third, in the field of employment as well, the ECtHR went beyond 
a narrow interpretation of privacy limited to secrecy: it recognized the importance of 
workplaces in establishing and developing relationships with other human beings. Fourth, 
the ECtHR made it clear that employees’ right to privacy is not an absolute right, and it can 
be limited if certain requirements are met. In its case law, in the Bărbulescu judgement the 
ECtHR provided detailed criteria in order to be able to trace a balance between employees’ 
 
825 ECtHR (2018) Libert v. France, Application no. 588/13, 22 February, par. 46. 
826 Sipka, P. and Zaccaria, M. L. (2018) ‘A munkáltató ellenőrzési joga a munkavállaló munkahelyi 
számítógépén tárolt magánadatai fölött’, Munkajog, 2(2), p. 47. 
827 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 17 mai 2005, N° 03-40017 
828 ECtHR (2018) Libert v. France, Application no. 588/13, 22 February, par 25. 
829 Porta, J. et al. (2018) ‘Libertés fondamentales, égalité de traitement et discrimination’, Bulletin 
d’information de la Cour de Cassation, (887), p. 17. 
830 The ECtHR has not only ruled in the cases of Internet or telephone monitoring at the workplace, but also 
regarding CCTV surveillance. These cases will not be discussed in the frame of the thesis, as they have a 
looser connection with the main subject of the dissertation, social network sites. On the most important cases 
see the following Factsheet: ECtHR, Press Unit (2018) ‘Factsheet - Surveillance at workplace’. Available 
at: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Workplace_surveillance_ENG.pdf(Accessed: 1 May 2018). 
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and employer’s rights and clarified the most important requirements in relation to 
employee monitoring.831 
(b) Recommendations of the CoE 
220. Recommendation 1989. Early in 1989 the CoE adopted a Recommendation 
on the Protection of Personal Data Used for Employment Purposes,832 [hereinafter referred 
to as: Recommendation No. (89) 2] representing a shift towards sectoral regulation. 
Recommendation No. (89) 2 covers data processing both in the private and in the public 
sector.833 Spiros Simitis identified five key principles of the document:834 (1) the data 
should be obtained directly from the employee,835 (2) the personal data should only be 
processed for the purposes of the employment relationship,836 (3) employees should be 
informed regarding the most important characteristics of the processing, (4) the employee 
should have a right to access, to rectification and to erasure and (5) the personal data 
should only be kept as long as they are needed for the purposes of the processing. In 
addition, the data stored should be accurate, kept up-to-date and “represent faithfully the 
situation of the employee”.837 Recommendation No. (89) 2 also contains provisions 
 
831 It is worth noting that in the 2018 case of Denisov v. Ukraine the ECtHR further specified and 
systematised case law relating to the private life of employees. (Source: Sudre, F. (2018) ‘La « vie privée » 
dans un contexte professionnel’, La Semaine Juridique Edition Générale, (41), p. 1054.) Despite holding that 
in the given case no breach of Article 8 of the CEHR was established, the ECtHR recalled the criteria which 
must be met. [ECtHR (2018) Denisov v. Ukraine, Application no. 76639/11, 25 September par. 92-134.) 
832 Council of Europe (1989) Recommendation No. R (89) 2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States 
on the Protection of Personal Data Used for Employment Purposes.(Adopted by the Committee of Ministers 
on 18 January 1989 at the 423rd meeting of the Ministers' Deputies) 
833 Article 1 (1) of Council of Europe (1989) Recommendation No. R (89) 2 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States on the Protection of Personal Data Used for Employment Purposes.(Adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 18 January 1989 at the 423rd meeting of the Ministers' Deputies)  
834 Simitis, S. (1998) ‘From the General Rules on Data Protection to a Specific Regulation of the Use of 
Employee Data: Policies and Constraints of the European Union’, Comparative Labor Law and Policy 
Journal, 19(3), pp. 361-362. 
835 In addition, the data processed should also be relevant and not excessive. This requirement should be 
enforced also during the recruitment process. Article 4 (1)-(3) of Council of Europe (1989) Recommendation 
No. R (89) 2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Protection of Personal Data Used for 
Employment Purposes.(Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 18 January 1989 at the 423rd meeting of 
the Ministers' Deputies) 
836 According to Article 1 (3) of Council of Europe (1989) Recommendation No. R (89) 2 of the Committee of 
Ministers to Member States on the Protection of Personal Data Used for Employment Purposes.(Adopted by 
the Committee of Ministers on 18 January 1989 at the 423rd meeting of the Ministers' Deputies) employment 
purposes relate to “[…]relations between employers and employees which relate to recruitment of 
employees, fulfilment of the contract of employment, management, including discharge of obligations laid 
down by law or laid down in collective agreements, as well as planning and organisation of work.” 
837 Article 5 (2) of Council of Europe (1989) Recommendation No. R (89) 2 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States on the Protection of Personal Data Used for Employment Purposes.(Adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 18 January 1989 at the 423rd meeting of the Ministers' Deputies) 
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regarding the communication of data (Articles 7-8), the transborder flow of personal data 
(Article 9) and special categories of data (Article 10).  
221. Updated Recommendation. Since then, the changes in technology, the 
employers’ tendency to collect personal data outside of the workplace and the appearance 
of processing carrying specific risks made it necessary to revise the existing framework on 
employee data protection.838 These were the main reasons underlying the adoption of 
Recommendation on the processing of personal data in the context of employment839 in 
2015. Despite the changed context, the core values of Recommendation (89) 2 still remain 
valid, however, the profound changes in technology and the world of work need to be 
taken into consideration.840 Similarly to the ILO’s Code of Practice, these 
Recommendations – as their denomination suggests – are also soft law instruments. It is 
important to state that in contrast to the previous documents, provisions related to SNSs 
appeared in this document.  
222. They are discussed in one paragraph stating “[e]mployers should refrain 
from requiring or asking an employee or a job applicant access to information that he or 
she shares with others online, notably through social networking.”841 It is clear that the 
provision covers both employees and prospective employees, and prohibits the employer 
from accessing information shared on these platforms – unless the user decides to share it. 
The explanatory memorandum highlights that the employer should not use intermediaries, 
another name or a pseudonym in order to obtain access to personal data without the 
knowledge of employees or job candidates.842 The explanatory memorandum also 
explicitly states that employers shall not ask for employees’ or job candidates’ password, 
 
838 Council of Europe (2015) Explanatory memorandum to Recommendation CM/Rec(2015)5 of the 
Committee of Ministers to member States on the processing of personal data in the context of employment. 
pp. 1-2. 
839 Council of Europe (2015) Recommendation CM/Rec(2015)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
States on the processing of personal data in the context of employment. (Adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 1 April 2015, at the 1224th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies) 
840 Buttarelli, G. (2010) Study on Recommendation No. R (89) 2 on the protection of personal data used for 
employment purposes and to suggest proposals for the revision of the above-mentioned Recommendation. T-
PD-BUR(2010)11. Strasbourg: The Bureau of the Consultative Committee of the Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. p. 5. 
841 CoE (2015) Recommendation CM/Rec(2015)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the 
processing of personal data in the context of employment. (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 1 
April 2015, at the 1224th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies) 5. 3.  
842 CoE (2015) Explanatory memorandum to Recommendation CM/Rec(2015)5 of the Committee of Ministers 
to member States on the processing of personal data in the context of employment. p. 7. 
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in order to access content on their profiles.843 According to my opinion, this article can be 
interpreted as follows: the employer cannot access in any way content on SNSs which are 
not accessible to him/her (e.g. because the employee uses privacy settings.) He/she cannot 
ask a co-worker, create a fake profile or ask for login credentials in order to obtain access. 
However, this would also imply that information publicly available on these sites can be 
processed by the employer – naturally respecting the existing data protection requirements, 
such as proportionality or purpose limitation, etc. 
(c) (Revised) European Social Charter and the European Committee of Social Rights 
223. European Social Charter and Revised European Social Charter. When it 
comes to the CoE and fundamental rights, the (Revised) European Social Charter 
(hereinafter referred to as: ESC),844 the “Social Constitution of Europe”845 must also be 
mentioned. This document guarantees the most important social and economic rights – just 
as the ECHR guarantees the fundamental civil and political rights. However, neither the 
European Social Charter, nor the Revised European Social Charter regulates expressively 
the right to privacy or the right to data protection. 
224. European Committee of Social Rights. Still, the European Committee of 
Social Rights (hereinafter referred to as: ECSR), an independent body responsible for 
monitoring compliance with the ESC, has already expressed itself in this field and 
identified legal fundaments of the right to privacy. The ECSR recognized that 
technological development has made it possible for employers to constantly supervise 
employees, blurring the boundaries of work and personal life. More severe intrusions – 
even after working hours and outside the workplace – have become possible.846 
The ECSR found that Article 1:2 § of the ECS, guaranteeing the right to undertake 
work freely,847 comprises the right to privacy and acknowledges the importance of 
 
843 CoE (2015) Explanatory memorandum to Recommendation CM/Rec(2015)5 of the Committee of Ministers 
to member States on the processing of personal data in the context of employment. p. 7. 
844 CoE (1961) European Social Charter, ETS No.035, 18 October and Council of Europe (1996) European 
Social Charter (revised), ETS No.163, 3 May 
845 CoE (no date) The European Social Charter. Available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/european-social-
charter (Accessed: 12 August 2019). 
846 European Committee of Social Rights (2013) Activity Report 2012. Council of Europe, p. 26. 
847 “Article 1 – The right to work 
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to work, the Parties undertake: […] 
2. to protect effectively the right of the worker to earn his living in an occupation freely entered upon[.]” 
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ensuring workers’ right to privacy.848 In its 2016 report, the ECSR states in a 
straightforward manner that Article 1:2 § concerns the right to privacy at work.849 In its 
observations relating to Article 1:2 § the ECSR recognized the relevancy of protecting 
employees’ private or personal lives against unlawful infringements. It linked the 
fundaments of the protection to the right to freely engage in occupation, meaning that 
employees remain free, which imposes a limit on employer’s powers. It also evoked the 
principle of dignity and its relation to the right to privacy and the possible cases of 
infringement (such as asking certain questions from prospective employees or employees 
and processing personal data).850, 851 Still, the ESC and the ECSR do not have a prominent 
role in ensuring employees’ right to privacy and data protection in spite of their importance 
in the protection of employees’ rights – compared to the ECtHR. 
(B) European Union 
225. Like other international organizations, the EU as well has developed certain 
employment specific data protection requirements in addition to the general EU data 
protection framework.852 Similarly to the CoE and the ECtHR, the EU’s court’s, (a) the 
CJEU’s relevant case law in relation to employee privacy/data protection will be 
addressed. Then, (b) the WP29’s and the European Data Protection Supervisor’s relevant 
documents will be examined as – in spite of not having binding force – they provide 
important guidance in specific fields as well.  
(a) CJEU 
From amongst the case law of the CJEU notably three cases must be mentioned, 
dealing with the applicability of data protection rules in the employment context: the 
Rechnungshof v. Österreichischer Rundfunk case, the V and European Data Protection 
Supervisor v. European Parliament case and the Bodil Lindquist case. 
 
848 European Committee of Social Rights (2013) Activity Report 2012. Council of Europe. p. 26. 
849 European Committee of Social Rights (no date) Activity Report 2016. Council of Europe. p. 32. 
850 European Committee of Social Rights (2006) Statements of interpretation - Article 1-2. 2006_Ob_1-
2/Ob/EN. Council of Europe 
851 On the possible protection provided by the ESC see more in: Perraki, P. (2013) La protection de la vie 
personnelle du salarié en droit comparé et européen [étude comparative des droits français, hellénique, 
britannique et européen]. Thèse en droit. Université de Strasbourg, pp. 75-79. 
852 In relation to the GDPR, the already examined Article 88 must be mentioned. 
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226. Rechnungshof v. Österreichischer Rundfunk. In the Rechnungshof v. 
Österreichischer Rundfunk case the CJEU had to take a stand on regarding the 
applicability of the DPD to the processing of information (salaries and pensions) related to 
civil servants.853 In the case, the Austrian regulation required certain public bodies to 
communicate the salaries and pensions of civil servants to the Court of Audit, who would 
create an annual report and transfer them to the Parliament and later make them available 
to the general public.854 The CJEU linked the applicability of the DPD to whether there 
was an interference with private life, and whether that interference was justified according 
to Article 8 of the ECHR.855 The CJEU states that while the mere recording of data relating 
to the salaries by the employer does not constitute in itself interference in the private life of 
the employees, the communication of that data to third parties infringes the right to privacy 
of the employees.856 
227. V and European Data Protection Supervisor v. European Parliament. In 
the case V and European Data Protection Supervisor v. European Parliament the applicant 
contested at the European Union Civil Service Tribunal the use of a previous medical 
opinion – declaring her unfit for a previous position at the European Commission – which 
resulted in her rejection at the European Parliament. She alleged that her right to respect 
for private life was violated.857 Referring to the Rechnungshof v. Österreichischer 
Rundfunk case, the CJEU ruled that the transfer of personal data constituted an interference 
with the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 8 of the ECHR.858 Although 
the processing of the sensitive medical data served a legitimate interest, it does not justify 
the transfer of medical data from one institution to another, without the consent of the data 
subject, and it would have been possible to achieve the legitimate objective by less 
interference.859 
 
853 Otto, M. (2016) The Right to Privacy in Employment: a Comparative Analysis. Oxford, Portland: Hart 
Publishing. p. 98. 
854 CJEU (2003): Rechnungshof v. Österreichischer Rundfunk, Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-
139/01, ECLI:EU:C:2017:131, 20 May, par 2. 
855 CJEU (2003): Rechnungshof v. Österreichischer Rundfunk, Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-
139/01, ECLI:EU:C:2017:131, 20 May, par. 72. 
856 CJEU (2003): Rechnungshof v. Österreichischer Rundfunk, Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-
139/01, ECLI:EU:C:2017:131, 20 May, par. 73-74. 
857 CJEU (2011): V v. European Parliament, Case F-46/09, ECLI:EU:F:2011:101, 5 July, par. 65. 
858 CJEU (2011): V v. European Parliament, Case F-46/09, ECLI:EU:F:2011:101, 5 July, par. 111-112. 
859 CJEU (2011): V v. European Parliament, Case F-46/09, ECLI:EU:F:2011:101, 5 July, par. 125. 
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228. Bodil Lindquist. In the case of Bodil Lindquist the applicant worked at a 
parish, and set up web pages at home – “in order to allow parishioners preparing for their 
confirmation to obtain information they might need”860 –, where she – without the 
knowledge or consent of her colleagues – uploaded personal data (such as hobbies, family 
members, phone numbers) related to them.861 Although the case primarily concerned the 
applicability of the DPD in the online environment,862 it has three potential implications for 
employment. First, it confirms that employment-related information falls under the 
category of personal data under the DPD.863 Second, it questions employers’ practices to 
publish personal data on company websites. Third, it provides no possibility to bypass the 
DPD by employers, as employees’ activities are also covered (for example, he/she cannot 
ask an intern to process employees’ personal data in order to be qualified non-
profitable).864 
229. The above cases show that several acts might constitute an interference in 
the employees’ private life and infringe his/her right to data protection. However, – in 
contrast to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence – these cases are more remote from employee 
monitoring, they rather concern whether there was an interference and are more 
concentrated on data processing. For this reason, it is necessary to further examine the 
specific matter of employee monitoring – which was explicitly addressed by the WP29.  
(b) The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party and the European Data Protection 
Supervisor 
230. Employee monitoring. In its documents the WP29 basically translated the 
general provisions set in the DPD to the special context of employment, offering concrete 
solutions in the field of data protection and employee monitoring.865 They did not have 
 
860 CJEU (2003): Bodil Lindqvist, Case C-101/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:596, 6 November, par. 12. 
861 CJEU (2003): Bodil Lindqvist, Case C-101/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:596, 6 November, par. 12-14. 
862 One of the questions referred to the CJEU for preliminary ruling was whether the exemptions provided in 
the DPD apply to the processing concerned. For the subject of the thesis, the household exception has 
relevancy. The CJEU ruled that this exception “[…]must therefore be interpreted as relating only to 
activities which are carried out in the course of private or family life of individuals, which is clearly not the 
case with the processing of personal data consisting in publication on the internet so that those data are 
made accessible to an indefinite number of people.” CJEU (2003): Bodil Lindqvist, Case C-101/01, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:596, 6 November, par. 47. 
863 CJEU (2003): Bodil Lindqvist, Case C-101/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:596, 6 November, par. 24. 
864 Otto, M. (2016) The Right to Privacy in Employment: a Comparative Analysis. Oxford, Portland: Hart 
Publishing. p. 101. 
865 Fritsch, C. (2015) ‘Data Processing in Employment Relations; Impacts of the European General Data 
Protection Regulation Focusing on the Data Protection Officer at the Worksite’, in Gutwirth, S., Leenes, R., 
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legally binding force, however, partly due to the WP29 being composed of representatives 
from each national data protection authority (hereinafter referred to as: DPA), they 
provided useful guidance for Member States, and national data protection authorities took 
these opinions into consideration when it came to the enforcement of the national data 
protection rules.866 As such, the findings made by the WP29 have importance for France 
and for Hungary as well, as national DPAs took them into account during the enforcement 
of national data protection regulation.867 
231. The most important documents issued by the WP 29 are Opinion 8/2001 on 
the processing of personal data in the employment context,868 Working document on the 
surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace (2002)869 and Opinion 2/2017 
on data processing at work,870 which provide guidance regarding the regulation and the 
monitoring of employees’ Internet use.871 In these documents the WP29 emphasized that 
the general data protection principles also apply to the case of processing employee data, 
and within this case, to employee monitoring, and provided guidance on how exactly these 
general provisions shall be translated into the employment context. Opinion 8/2001 
addresses the question of processing in the employment context in general, without 
detailing how the general rules should be applicable to specific cases of employee 
monitoring. The Working document focuses on the question of surveillance and monitoring 
of electronic communication, with special regard to e-mail monitoring and the monitoring 
of Internet access. Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work complements Opinion 
 
and de Hert, P. (eds) Reforming European Data Protection Law. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London: 
Springer, p. 155. 
866 Otto, M. (2016) The Right to Privacy in Employment: a Comparative Analysis. Oxford, Portland: Hart 
Publishing p. 97. and Retzer, K. and Lopatowska, J. (2011) ‘How to Monitor Workplace E-Mail and Internet 
in Europe: The Polish Perspective’. Privacy & Security Law Report, Bureau of National Affairs. Available 
at: https://media2.mofo.com/documents/110718-privacy-and-security-law-report.pdf (Accessed: 2 May 
2018). p. 2. 
867 It must not be forgotten that due to the EU’s data protection reform, the WP29 was replaced by the 
European Data Protection Board. However, at the time of submitting the dissertation, the EDPB has not yet 
addressed any document relating to data protection in the context of employment. 
868 WP29 (2001) Opinion 8/2001 on the processing of personal data in the employment context. 
5062/01/EN/Final WP 48 
869 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55 
870 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249 
871 Among the already regulated cases of monitoring, the monitoring of e-mail and Internet use are need to be 
discussed in detail, as they have the closest connection and relevancy when it comes to SNSs. Provisions 
relating to employee monitoring by means of CCTV and geo-localisation are to be found in WP29 
(2004) Opinion 4/2004 on the Processing of Personal Data by means of Video Surveillance. 11750/02/EN 
WP 89; WP29 (2005) Working Party 29 Opinion on the use of location data with a view to providing value-
added services. 2130/05/EN WP 115 and WP29 (2011) Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation services on smart 
mobile devices. 881/11/EN WP 185 
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8/2001 and the Working document and takes into consideration the societal-technological 
and legal changes that occurred since and provides guidance regarding several types of 
processing and monitoring. 
232. Already regulated cases of monitoring. In the light of these general rules, 
the rules to be applied to certain types of employee monitoring are already elaborated in 
the “practice” of the WP29. Such monitoring includes, for example, closed-circuit 
television or video surveillance,872 or the collection of location data.873 In this part the 
focus will be on the WP29’s documents relating to monitoring of e-mail and Internet use, 
followed by SNSs. 
233. Although the principles laid down in Opinion 8/2001 are valid in the case of 
e-mail and Internet monitoring, it was in the 2002 Working document that the WP29 
addressed in detail the question of monitoring of e-mail and Internet use at the workplace. 
The Working document also points out the importance of the general data protection 
requirements, and then addresses the question of e-mail and Internet monitoring. In its 
Opinion 2/2017 the WP29 takes into account the technological development that occurred 
since the adoption of its previous documents, while stating that the conclusions laid down 
in the Working Document still remain valid.874 The Working Party emphasizes the 
importance of proportionality, transparency (e.g. through the way of adopting policies).875 
Under the item “Processing operations resulting from monitoring ICT usage at the 
 
872 The legitimate purpose of the CCTV system can be to secure the workers’ health and safety. They cannot 
be used to monitor the employees’ productivity and work intensity. It is strictly forbidden to place video 
cameras in premises which employees use only for private purposes or which are not related to work, e.g. 
toilets, lockers, resting rooms, bathrooms. Also, appropriate information shall be given to employees 
regarding the processing. Source: WP29 (2004) Opinion 4/2004 on the Processing of Personal Data by 
means of Video Surveillance. 11750/02/EN WP 89. p. 25. 
873 The monitoring of employees’ location is possible through several ways, such as GPS, mobile telephone, 
Wi-Fi network or an RFID tag. The monitoring of location is acceptable when a specific purpose related to 
the work of the employee justifies it. Such a reason can be, for example, the transfer of people or valuable 
goods, or the improvement of the distribution of resources for services in scattered locations. The protection 
of persons or goods can also be acceptable if it is aimed at providing the security of the employee, the vehicle 
or other objects entrusted to him/her. The least intrusive means should be applied (continuous monitoring 
should be avoided) and the employee shall be able to turn off the monitoring device outside of working 
hours. The behaviour of the employees cannot be monitored this way. Sources: WP29 (2005) Working Party 
29 Opinion on the use of location data with a view to providing value-added services. 2130/05/EN WP 115. 
p. 10. and WP29 (2011) Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation services on smart mobile devices. 881/11/EN WP 
185. p. 14. 
874 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 12. 
875 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 14. 
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workplace” the Opinion expressively deals with e-mail and Internet monitoring at the 
workplace. 
234. Monitoring of employees’ e-mail. As concerns e-mail monitoring, it might 
pose a challenge that two persons’ personal data are processed: the recipient’s and the 
sender’s. As for the employee, information can be given easily, and as for the third parties, 
warnings should be included in the messages to inform them about the monitoring. 
Another solution might be to provide the employee with two e-mail accounts: one for 
professional and one for personal purposes.876 For the personal e-mail the monitoring of its 
content would be possible only in very rare circumstances (e.g. in relation to criminal 
activities),877 while for the monitoring of professional e-mail accounts the rules are less 
severe. 
Still, even in these cases, the general principles (necessity, proportionality, etc.) 
apply,878 and the monitoring of e-mail should first be limited to monitoring the traffic. 
Employees should not only be informed that a monitoring takes place, but also if there is a 
detected misuse, putting the emphasis on prevention, rather than detection.879 In several 
cases a misuse can be detected by accessing traffic data (e.g. the participants and time of 
the communication), without accessing the content of the mail.880 Access to the content of 
the messages should only be permitted when the legitimate purpose cannot be achieved 
through less intrusive means. 
235. Monitoring of employees’ Internet use at the workplace. Regarding the 
monitoring of Internet use, the starting point is that the employer is free to decide whether 
he/she allows workers to use the Internet for personal purposes, and if so, to what extent. 
Though the employer is entitled to monitor whether employees comply with the regulation, 
 
876 Otto, M. (2016) The Right to Privacy in Employment: a Comparative Analysis. Oxford, Portland: Hart 
Publishing, p. 105. 
877 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 21. 
878 Basically, the WP29 provides an explanation of the application of these general rules to the specific 
context of monitoring. Source: Kambellari, E. (2013) ‘Employee email monitoring and workplace privacy in 
the European perspective’, Iustinianus Primus Law Review, 8. Available at: https://cutt.ly/1rv83w7 
(Accessed: 19 January 2019), p. 4. 
879 Retzer, K. and Lopatowska, J. (2011) ‘How to Monitor Workplace E-Mail and Internet in Europe: The 
Polish Perspective’. Privacy & Security Law Report, Bureau of National Affairs. Available 
at: https://media2.mofo.com/documents/110718-privacy-and-security-law-report.pdf (Accessed: 2 May 
2018), p. 2. and WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the 
workplace. 5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. pp.4-5. 
880 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. pp. 17-18. 
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certain restrictions must be considered. The WP29 expressed its view that instead of 
monitoring, the emphasis should be placed on preventing the misuse of computers.881 This 
could be achieved by using programs that remind the employee of the misuse (e.g. warning 
windows, which pop up and alert the employee).882, 883 This can suffice to prevent the 
misuse and the employee’s visit to the website can be avoided. It would also be effective if 
the employer warned the worker of the misuse as the first step. According to the basic 
principles the least intrusion possible must be made, so it is advisable that the employer 
avoid automatic and constant monitoring.884 It follows from the requirement of subsidiarity 
that monitoring might not even be necessary, as the blocking of certain websites can 
prevent employees from the personal use of the Internet; accent should be put on 
prevention, rather than detention.885 However, already in 2002 the WP29 underlined that a 
complete ban on the personal use of the Internet does not seem reasonable, as it does not 
take into consideration how much employees use it in their everyday lives.886 The WP29 
even referred to employees’ “legitimate right to use work facilities for some private 
usage”.887 
236. Social network sites. Although the question of processing of employees’ 
personal data obtained from SNSs is not exhaustively regulated, in Opinion 2/2017, the 
WP29 addressed the question of SNSs in two regards: processing during the recruitment 
process and in-employment screenings. 
237. Under the title “Processing operations during the recruitment process” the 
WP29 expressively refers to personal data obtained from SNSs.888 The WP29 
 
881 Otto, M. (2016) The Right to Privacy in Employment: a Comparative Analysis. Oxford, Portland: Hart 
Publishing, p. 105. and WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in 
the workplace. 5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 24. 
882 Retzer, K. and Lopatowska, J. (2011) ‘How to Monitor Workplace E-Mail and Internet in Europe: The 
Polish Perspective’. Privacy & Security Law Report, Bureau of National Affairs. Available 
at: https://media2.mofo.com/documents/110718-privacy-and-security-law-report.pdf (Accessed: 2 May 
2018), p. 2. 
883 According to the EDPS, it is more useful to watch the indicators (for example, volume of data 
downloaded) than the visited websites themselves and to take further steps only when there is a strong 
suspicion of misuse. Source: Buttarelli, G. (2009) ‘Do you have a private life at your workplace? Privacy in 
the workplace in EC institutions and bodies’. 31st International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy, 
Madrid, 4-6 November 
884 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 17. 
885 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. p. 15. 
886 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 4. 
887 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. p. 14. 
888 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. p.11. 
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acknowledged the phenomenon of the growing use of SNSs, and the employer’s belief 
according to which during the recruitment he/she is free to use these – because of the lack 
of using the privacy settings – publicly available personal data. The WP29 stresses that just 
because these data might be publicly available, it does not mean that the employer can 
freely process this data for his/her own purposes. Just like in the case of processing other 
data, the existence of a valid legal ground (such as legitimate interest), the application of 
the necessity and relevancy principle is required. The employer should consider in advance 
whether it is a profile related to personal or business purposes. The inspection of these 
profiles is only permitted when it is necessary and relevant to the performance of the job 
that the candidate is applying for. The personal data should only be stored for a limited 
period (until it becomes clear that the candidate will not be employed) and it is crucial that 
candidates are informed of the processing. If the employee used the privacy settings, and 
therefore the employer cannot access the profile, he/she cannot ask the prospective 
employee to friend him/her or gain access to the profile through another way.889 
238. The WP29 also refers to the issue of in-employment screening (as from a 
technological point of view the employer is able to continuously screen and gain 
information relating to the personal lives, opinions, beliefs, etc. of employees by inspecting 
their social network profiles). The body states that such a screening should not take place 
on a generalized basis and should be limited in scope. Also, if an employee limits the 
access to his/her profile, the employer should not gain access to it. If in the limited cases 
when the employee is required to use a social network profile created by the employer (e.g. 
spokesperson), the employee should retain the possibility – specified in the terms and 
conditions of the employment contract – of having a non-work related profile that he/she 
can use.890 
239. Conclusions drawn from the WP29’s activity. The significance of the 
above documents is to be found in concretizing the abstract data protection rules to the 
context of modern-day employment and, despite the lack of their binding force, they 
provide useful guidance when it comes to employee monitoring and data protection. 
Therefore, they provide guidance not only to Member States and legislators, but also to 
employers who process employees’ personal data or conduct some kind of monitoring.  
 
889 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. p.11. 
890 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. p.12. 
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240. The European Data Protection Supervisor. The European Data Protection 
Supervisor (hereinafter referred to as: EDPS) was established by Regulation (EC) No 
45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community 
institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data.891 The EDPS is an 
independent supervisory authority,892 responsible for monitoring whether EU institutions 
and bodies respect rules regulating the processing of personal data, and give advice to them 
and to data subjects regarding data protection.893 
241. As concerns processing in the employment context, the EDPS’s guidelines 
should be mentioned. Even though these documents relate to processing conducted by EU 
institutions and bodies, the EDPS itself stated that it does not mean that these documents 
are only useful for them, as Regulation 45/2001894 is similar to the DPD and the GDPR in 
many regards.895 The EDPS adopted guidelines – amongst others – on the electronic 
communication,896 on the use of mobile devices,897 on camera surveillance,898 on the 
processing of health data899 and on processing related to recruitment.900 
 
891 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and 
bodies and on the free movement of such data, Article 41 (1) 
892 Paragraph 1 of Article 41 of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the 
Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data. Official Journal of the European 
Union (2001: L 008) Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2001:008:TOC 
(Accessed: 2 May 2018) 
893 Paragraph 2 of Article 41 of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 
894 Which was replaced by Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC 
895 EDPS (2016) Guidelines on the protection of personal data processed through web services provided by 
EU institutions. Available at: https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/16-11-
07_guidelines_web_services_en.pdf(Accessed: 12 August 2019), p. 3. 
EDPS (2015) Guidelines on personal data and electronic communications in the EU institutions. Available 
at: https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Supervision/Guidelines/
15-12-16_eCommunications_EN.pdf(Accessed: 12 August 2019), p. 1. 
896 EDPS (2015) Guidelines on personal data and electronic communications in the EU institutions. 
Available 
at: https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Supervision/Guidelines/
15-12-16_eCommunications_EN.pdf(Accessed: 12 August 2019) 
897 EDPS (2015) Guidelines on the protection of personal data in mobile devices used by European 
institutions. Available 
at: https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Supervision/Guidelines/
15-12-17_Mobile_devices_EN.pdf(Accessed: 12 August 2019) 
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242. Conclusions. The adoption of international regulations and the relevant 
cases in the field of employee data protection and monitoring demonstrates the importance 
of this specific subject. As it was seen, the question of employee monitoring and data 
protection is not new, as the first relevant documents date back to decades. In consequence, 
early documents did not address the challenges raised by SNSs. What is more precisely 
elaborated by them and also has a direct connection to the main subject of the thesis is the 
monitoring of e-mail and Internet use, in that respect that SNSs are also web-based 
services and also allow the user to communicate. As SNSs have a growing importance, the 
most recent documents already address them explicitly. However, they only deal with one 
aspect of the subject (notably pre-employment) – the exhaustive regulation of SNSs in the 
field of employment is yet to be elaborated. 
The rules established by the above-examined international institutions and bodies 
provide the Member States with an important guidance, which can therefore have an 
important impact on national legal systems. The following Paragraph will explore how 
France and Hungary have decided to regulate the question of employee privacy and data 
protection in their respective legislations. 
§2. Workplace privacy/data protection in France and in Hungary 
243. Similarly to the international regulations presented above, employment 
specific rules appeared in Member States’ legal orders as well. On the following pages it is 
going to be examined, as opposed to the already discussed employer’s rights/powers, how 
the protection of employees’ rights appears in national legal systems. These (labour law) 
rules constitute the conceptual fundaments of protecting employees’ rights. The exact rules 
of monitoring employing a given technology are deducted from these general rules. Both 
the FLC and the HLC contain a general clause declaring the protection of employees’ 
rights (which rights include, for example, the right to privacy and the right to data 
 
898 EDPS (2010) The EDPS video-surveillance guidelines. Available 
at: https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Supervision/Guidelines/
10-03-17_Video-surveillance_Guidelines_EN.pdf(Accessed: 12 December 2016) 
899 EDPS (2009) Guidelines concerning the processing of health data in the workplace by Community 
institutions and bodies. Available 
at: https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Supervision/Guidelines/
09-09-28_Guidelines_Healthdata_atwork_EN.pdf(Accessed: 12 December 2016) 
900 EDPS (2008) Guidelines concerning the processing operations in the field of staff recruitment. Available 
at: https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Supervision/Guidelines/
08-10-10_Guidelines_staff_recruitment_EN.pdf(Accessed: 12 December 2016) 
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protection). Also, both labour codes contain certain provisions providing more detailed 
principles for data processing. 
244. From this background it was already elaborated how these general 
requirements must be applied to existing forms of employee monitoring. In France, notably 
the courts and the CNIL, while in Hungary the doctrine and the NAIH (and the former 
Data Protection Commissioner) have already worked out how they should be applied to 
specific types of monitoring. Therefore, the rules relating to the areas of telephone 
monitoring, CCTV monitoring, geolocalisation, the use of electronic badges, etc. are 
already elaborated.901, 902 The monitoring of the use of work computers, Internet and e-mail 
 
901 See more in: Brégou, P. (2012) Le pouvoir disciplinaire de l’employeur : surveillance, fautes, sanctions, 
procédures, contentieux. Rueil-Malmaison: Éd. Liaisons; Féral-Schuhl, C. (2018) Cyberdroit. Le droit à 
l’épreuve de l’Internet. 7th edn. Paris: Dalloz; Waquet, P., Struillou, Y. and Pécaut-Rivolier, L. 
(2014) Pouvoirs du chef d’entreprise et libertés du salarié: du salarié-citoyen au citoyen-salarié. Rueil-
Malmaison: ÉdLiaisons 
See more on documents issued by the CNIL in: CNIL Fiches Travail et données personnelles (Édition 2018); 
La Rédaction D.O. (2013) ‘Diffusion des bonnes pratiques en matière de protection des données personnelles 
des salariés’, JCP S (édition sociale), (7), pp. 3–7.; see more on the CNIL’s good practices in: Griguer, M. 
(2013) ‘Protection des données personnelles : conformité et bonnes pratiques des entreprises’, Cahiers de 
droit de l’entreprise, (1), pp. 73–76, 2 guide, on the CNIL’s practice: Wolton, E. and Pompey, S. (2013) 
‘Données à caractère personnel et droit du travail’, Revue de Jurisprudence Sociale (RJS), (4), pp. 215–220. 
The CNIL also issued simplified standards (“norms simplifiées”), which they concern badges (CNIL 
(2002) Délibération concernant les traitements automatisés d’informations nominatives relatifs mis en 
oeuvre sur les lieux de travail pour la gestion des contrôles d’accès aux locaux, des horaires et de la 
restauration. Délibération n°02-001 du 08 janvier 2002.); telephone conversations (CNIL 
(2014) Délibération n° 2014-474 du 27 novembre 2014 portant adoption d’une norme simplifiée relative aux 
traitements automatisés de données à caractère personnel mis en oeuvre par les organismes publics et privés 
destinés à l’écoute et à l’enregistrement des conversations téléphoniques sur le lieu de travail (NS 057). 
Délibération n°2014-474 du 27 novembre 2014.; CNIL (2005) Délibération no 2005-19 du 3 février 2005 
portant création d’une norme simplifiée concernant les traitements automatisés de données à caractère 
personnel mis en oeuvre dans le cadre de l’utilisation de services de téléphonie fixe et mobile sur les lieux de 
travail (norme simplifiée no 47) et portant abrogation de la norme simplifiée no 40. Délibération no 2005-19 
du 3 février 2005.); geolocalisation (CNIL (2015) Délibération n° 2015-165 du 4 juin 2015 portant adoption 
d’une norme simplifiée concernant les traitements automatisés de données à caractère personnel mis en 
oeuvre par les organismes publics ou privés destinés à géolocaliser les véhicules utilisés par leurs employés 
(norme simplifiée n° 51). Délibération n°2015-165 du 4 juin 2015.) and on the management of the personnel 
(CNIL (2005) Norme simplifiée n° 46 : Délibération n°2005-002 du 13 janvier 2005 portant adoption d’une 
norme destinée à simplifier l’obligation de déclaration des traitements mis en oeuvre par les organismes 
publics et privés pour la gestion de leurs personnels. Délibération n°2005-002 du 13 janvier 2005.). Though 
after the application of the GDPR these standards do not have legal force, their examination is not without 
interest. 
902 In general, see more on employee monitoring in Hungary in: Arany-Tóth, M. (2008) A munkavállalók 
személyes adatainak védelme a magyar munkajogban. Szeged: Bába Kiadó.; Arany-Tóth, M. 
(2016) Személyes adatok kezelése a munkaviszonyban. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer; Hajdú, J. (2005) A 
munkavállalók személyiségi jogainak védelme. Szeged: Pólay Elemér Alapítvány., Szőke, G. L. (ed.) 
(2012) Privacy in the workplace. Data protection law and self-regulation in Germany and in Hungary. 
Budapest: HVG-ORAC Lap- és Könyvkiadó; Szőke, G. L. et al. (2012) Munkahelyi adatvédelem. Nemzeti 
jelentés – Magyarország. Available 
at: http://pawproject.eu/en/sites/default/files/page/web_national_report_hungary_hu.pdf (Accessed: 21 
October 2016) 
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will be further addressed in detail in Part II. as they have a closer connection to SNSs 
compared to the other forms of monitoring. The dissertation focuses on SNSs: it will be 
Part II. which will address in detail how these general rules are to be applied to the case of 
SNSs – the present sections will provide the conceptual background for that analysis. 
245. Besides these already regulated, “traditional” forms of employee 
monitoring, several other matters have also been regulated, which gain a new light in the 
SNS era. These matters are subjected to detailed existing regulation – which will be 
analysed in Part II. For example, in the field of dismissals, the protection of private life 
must be ensured: in French law the starting point is that dismissal cannot be based on an 
element pertaining to the personal life of the employee. The HLC ensures the same 
principle through stating that as a main rule, an employee may be dismissed only for 
reasons in connection with his/her behaviour in relation to the employment relationship, 
with his/her ability or in connection with the employer’s operations.903 Or in the field of 
employees’ freedom of expression – again, to be addressed in detail in Part II. – the already 
elaborated rules are considerably challenged by SNSs, giving rise to a multitude of 
questions to be answered. The following sections will focus on the more general rules, 
leaving the discussion of the more specific rules to Part II. 
(A) Protecting employees’ rights in the labour codes 
 
On the monitoring of computer and Internet use see more in: Hegedűs, B. (2006a) ‘A munkahelyi 
hagyományos és elektronikus levelezés ellenőrzése’, Munkaügyi szemle, 50(6), pp. 47–49.; Hegedűs, B. 
(2006b) ‘A munkahelyi számítógép és internet ellenőrzésével kapcsolatos gyakorlati kérdések’, Munkaügyi 
szemle, 50(7–8), pp. 81–83. 
On the monitoring of telephone use see more in: Hegedűs, B. (2007) ‘A munkavállaló rendelkezésére 
bocsátott telefon használatának ellenőrzéséről’, Munkaügyi szemle, 51(1), pp. 50–52. 
On CCTV surveillance see more in: Lukács, A. (2017) ‘Privacy at Work: the Regulation of Camera 
Surveillance in Hungarian Labour Law’, Acta Universitatis George Bacovia - Juridica, 6(1), pp. 77–118.; 
Lukács, A. (2013) ‘A munkavállalók személyiségi jogainak védelme, különös tekintettel a munkahelyi 
kamerákra’, De Iurisprudentia Et Iure Publico, 7(2).; Sum, S. (2007a) ‘A munkavállalók személyes 
adatainak védelméről, különös tekintettel a munkahelyi kamerák alkalmazására I.’, Munkajog: kérdések és 
válaszok, 3(2), pp. 28–35.; Sum, S. (2007b) ‘A munkavállalók személyes adatainak védelméről, különös 
tekintettel a munkahelyi kamerák alkalmazására II.’, Munkajog: kérdések és válaszok, 3(3), pp. 32–36.; 
Torma, G. (2016) ‘Munkáltatói ellenőrzés’, HR & Munkajog, 7(7–8), pp. 19–23. 
On the monitoring of alcohol and drug use: Rátkai, I. (2016) ‘Alkohol- és drogfogyasztás ellenőrzése a 
munkahelyen’, HR & Munkajog, 7(10), pp. 6–9. 
See more on documents issued by the NAIH in: NAIH (2013) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és 
Információszabadság Hatóság ajánlása a munkahelyen alkalmazott elektronikus megfigyelőrendszer alapvető 
követelményeiről. NAIH-4001-6/2012/V. Budapest and NAIH (2016) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és 
Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről. 
Budapest 
903 Subsection (2) of Section 66 of the HLC 
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246. Both the FLC and the HLC declare the protection of employees’ rights. The 
key provision enouncing this protection is Article L1121-1 of the FLC, regulating the 
limitation of the rights and individual liberties of the individual. The HLC contains a 
similar paragraph: Section 9 proclaims the protection of personality rights. These two 
provisions constitute the cornerstone of protecting employees’ rights. 
(a) Article L1121-1 of the French Labour Code 
247. Origins of regulation: the Corona case. Besides accepting the co-existence 
of the personal sphere and the professional sphere, employees’ rights in general have seen 
an important evolution. Before 1982 the employer had a quasi-unlimited power when it 
came to the drafting of internal regulations.904 It was the State Council’s Corona decision 
in 1980 that first declared the principle that provisions of the internal regulation can be 
annulled due to the threat they can pose to the rights of the person.905 This principle was 
legitimized by Article L.122-35 of the Act of 4 August 1982 (the “loi Auroux”),906 which 
stated that “[the internal regulation] may not limit the rights of the individual or individual 
or collective liberties by any restriction which is not justified by the nature of the task to be 
performed and proportionate to the aim sought.” This was a first, as hitherto the idea of 
civil liberties entering the workplace was unknown. Also, Article L. 122-45 stated that 
“[n]o employee may be punished or dismissed because of his or her origins, sex, morals, 
family situation, membership in an ethnic group, in nation or race, political opinions, 
trade union or mutual activities, religious convictions.” 
248. The 1990 Lyon-Caen report and its repercussions. In 1990, Gérard Lyon-
Caen was asked by the Ministry of Labour Law to prepare a report in order to find a 
balance between the employees’ and job candidates’ individual liberties and the 
employer’s powers, in the light of the development of new technologies.907 As a result, he 
drew up his famous report, entitled “Civil liberties and employment”,908 which is the origin 
 
904 For example, the internal regulation of Air France stipulated that if a flight attendant gets married, the 
marriage will automatically result in the cessation of the functions of the employee – which provision seems 
unimaginable nowadays. 
905 Collomp, E. (2010) ‘La vie personnelle au travail. Dernières évolutions jurisprudentielles’, Droit social, 
(1), p. 40. 
906 Loi n°82-689 du 4 août 1982 relative aux libertés des travailleurs dans l'entreprise 
907 Lyon-Caen, G. (1992) Les libertés publiques et l’emploi. Paris: la Documentation française (Collection 
des rapports officiels). p. 3. 
908 Lyon-Caen, G. (1992) Les libertés publiques et l’emploi. Paris: la Documentation française (Collection 
des rapports officiels). 
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of legitimizing the protection of employees’ rights.909 In his report he addressed two main 
subjects: hiring (what the limits of asking for information relating to job candidates are) 
and the evaluation of employees and the control of work (with regard to the subordination 
between the parties, to what extent the liberties and rights of the employee are restricted). 
He drew attention to the development of emerging technologies and its repercussions: the 
threat posed by their capacity to provide powerful means of knowledge, power and control 
to the employer.910 
249. Article L1121-1 of the FLC. Originating from his report, with Article L. 
120-2 of the Act of 31 December 1992911 the legislator laid down the foundations of the 
protection of the employee’s rights and freedoms. Its text (Article L1121-1 of the FLC in 
force) reads as follows: 
“No one may limit the rights of the individual or individual or collective 
liberties by any restriction which is not justified by the nature of the task to be 
performed and proportionate to the aim sought.”912 
By this provision, the extent of the employer’s powers – without denying their 
existence – was considerably narrowed. The legislator expanded the protection by 
replacing the previously used word “internal regulation” with the expression “no one”, 
which includes not only the internal regulation,913 but also the collective agreement, the 
employment contract, the unilateral acts of the employer, etc.,914 and besides the employer, 
social partners, too.915 
250. Scope of Article L1121-1 of the FLC. What rights and liberties does the 
text aim to protect? Without analysing the differences between these two concepts in 
 
909 Lyon-Caen, A. (2014) ‘Libertés et contrôle dans l’entreprise. 20 ans après’, Revue droit du travail Dalloz, 
(6), pp. 386–390. 
910 Lyon-Caen, G. (1992) Les libertés publiques et l’emploi. Paris: la Documentation française (Collection 
des rapports officiels). p. 10. It is interesting to remember that the report was published in 1992: years and 
decades before the mass adoption of the Internet and SNSs. 
911 Act No. 92-1446 of 31 December 1992 on employment, the development of part-time work and 
unemployment insurance 
912 “Nul ne peut apporter aux droits des personnes et aux libertés individuelles et collectives de restrictions 
qui ne seraient pas justifiées par la nature de la tâche à accomplir ni proportionnées au but recherché.” 
913 Although Subparagraph 2 of Article L1321-3 of the FLC repeats Article L1121-1 stating that the internal 
regulation may not contain “[p]rovisions limiting the rights of the individual or individual or collective 
liberties by any restriction which is not justified by the nature of the task to be performed and proportionate 
to the aim sought.” 
914 Waquet, P. (2003) L’entreprise et les libertés du salarié. Paris: Editions Liaisons, pp. 101-109. 
915 Waquet, P. (2003) L’entreprise et les libertés du salarié. Paris: Editions Liaisons, pp. 86-88. Although as 
Jean-Emmanuel Ray pointed out, originally this “no one” aimed to protect only job candidates. Source: Ray, 
J.-E. (2010) ‘D’un droit des travailleurs aux droits de la personne au travail’, Droit social, (1), p. 6. 
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detail, the dissertation will limit itself to presenting Philippe Waquet’s thoughts on this 
issue, according to whom it is not possible, nor desirable, to draft an exhaustive list. Under 
the rights of the individual, the right to dignity and the right to equality are protected, while 
under individual liberties, the right to respect for private life is included.916 The protection 
of the right to respect for private life also has a connection with regulations relating to non-
discrimination,917 a founding principle for the protection of the rights of the person.918 
251. Conditions of restricting rights and liberties. Also, the text speaks about 
restriction of rights and liberties – suggesting that it is not possible to place a complete 
limitation on them919 – based on two principles: the necessity principle and the principle of 
proportionality. The necessity principle means that conciliation between the employer’s 
interests and the employee’s rights must be made, and only the restriction which is 
indispensable for protecting the employer’s legitimate interests is justified. It means that 
the restriction must have a defined and legitimate purpose. The principle of proportionality 
limits excessive restrictions, by demanding to compare the employer’s advantage with the 
employee’s disadvantage. If there is an available method which restricts the rights and 
liberties of the employee less, this method shall be used. Also, the method chosen cannot 
be excessive.920 
252. Although today the respect of employees’ personal life is an important 
requirement of contemporary law,921 critical spirit should be adopted, as certain authors 
have raised the question of the necessity of re-examining the question from the employer’s 
point of view. Without questioning that the employee is entitled to protection of personal 
life, Lise Casaux-Labrunée asks whether the opposite question should be asked, namely 
how employees can respect “business life” in the workplace. By taking advantage of the 
protective legal framework and the possibilities offered by modern means of 
communication, aren’t employees bringing a bit too much of their personal life to the 
 
916 Waquet, P. (2003) L’entreprise et les libertés du salarié. Paris: Editions Liaisons (Collection Droit 
vivant). pp. 93-96. 
917 Article L1132-1 of the FLC 
918 Tissot, O. de (1995) ‘La protection de la vie privée du salarié’, Droit social, (3), p. 227. 
919 Waquet, P. (2003) L’entreprise et les libertés du salarié. Paris: Editions Liaisons, p. 90. 
920 Mouly, J. (2012) Droit du travail. 6e édition. Rosny-sous-Bois: Bréal (Lexifac Droit), p. 117. See also: 
Mazeaud, A. (2014) Droit du travail. 9e édition. Issy-les-Moulineaux: LGDJ-Lextenso éditions (Domat Droit 
privé), pp. 339-340.; Peskine, E. and Wolmark, C. (2016) Droit du travail. 11th edn. Paris: Dalloz, pp. 221-
224.; Waquet, P., Struillou, Y. and Pécaut-Rivolier, L. (2014) Pouvoirs du chef d’entreprise et libertés du 
salarié: du salarié-citoyen au citoyen-salarié. Rueil-Malmaison: ÉdLiaisons (Droit vivant), p. 235-236. 
921 Loiseau, G. (2011) ‘Vie personnelle et licenciement disciplinaire’, Recueil Dalloz Sirey, (23), p. 1568. 
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workplace?922 This question is particularly pertinent in the age when employees spend a 
daily 1 hour 15 minutes of working time by surfing on the Internet (and in a large part on 
social media).923 Also, social media introduced a new paradigm regarding extra-
professional life: employees often feel free to say anything on these sites – supplying a 
quite rich case law of “Facebook firings” –, seriously compromising the employer’s 
legitimate interests. These must be considered as well when determining the balance 
between the employer’s and employees’ rights. 
(b) Protection of rights relating to personality in the Hungarian Labour Code 
253. The HLC came into force in 2012 and it brought fundamental changes to 
workplace data protection.924 Declaring the protection of personality rights is also a 
novelty of the HLC in force: the previous Labour Code did not set the general protection of 
these rights.925, 926 After the entering into application of the GDPR, the Hungarian legislator 
adopted Act XXXIV of 2019 on legislative amendments required for the implementation 
of the European Union’s data protection reform (hereinafter referred to as: Enforcing Act) 
in April 2019, aiming to adapt the Hungarian legal system to the GDPR, by amending 
more than 80 acts. The Enforcing Act also concerned the HLC, as in accordance with 
Article 88 of the GDPR, specific rules were introduced. These novelties will be presented 
in the corresponding places. 
 
922 Casaux-Labrunée, L. (2012) ‘Vie privée des salariés et vie de l’entreprise’, Droit social, (4) p. 334.  
923 According to a study prepared by Olfeo regarding Internet use at the workplace in 2015. Olfeo 
(2016) Etude 2016 : La réalité de l’utilisation d’Internet au bureau. Available 
at: https://www.euromedia.fr/public/2016/12/etude-olfeo-2016-realite-utilisation-web-au-
bureau.pdf (Accessed: 20 January 2019) 
924 The previous HLC (Act XXII of 1992) contained only very brief provisions regarding workplace privacy 
and data protection. It stated in Subsection (1) Section 77 that “[a]n employee shall only be requested to 
make a statement, fill out a data sheet, or take an aptitude test which does not violate his or her personal 
rights and which essentially provides substantive information for the aspects of the establishment of an 
employment relationship[,]” and in Subsection (4) of Section 3 that “[e]mployers may only disclose facts, 
data and opinions concerning an employee to third persons in the cases specified by law or with the 
employee's consent”. Source: Balogh, Zs. Gy. et al. (2012) ‘Munkahelyi adatvédelem a 
gyakorlatban’, Infokommunikáció és Jog, 9(3), p. 99. 
925 Arany Tóth, M. (2008) ‘Gondolatok a munkavállalók személyiségi jogainak védelméről a magyar 
munkajogban’, Jogtudományi közlöny, 63(3), p. 131. The lack of the general declaration of protection did not 
mean that no protection at all was afforded to employees: the majority of the doctrine identified within this 
the protection of personality among the employer’s duty of care. Source: Arany Tóth, M. (2008) ‘Gondolatok 
a munkavállalók személyiségi jogainak védelméről a magyar munkajogban’, Jogtudományi közlöny, 63(3), p. 
129. 
926 A reference was made to them in Subsection 2 of Article 8 stating that “[a]n employee shall not waive 
his/her rights in protection of his/her wages and his/her person in advance, nor shall he/she conclude an 
advance agreement which may prejudice his/her rights to his/her detriment.” 
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254. Protection of rights relating to personality. Subsection (1) of Section 9 
declares the protection of personality rights, referring explicitly to the Hungarian Civil 
Code,927 resulting in the joint application of labour law and civil law provisions.928 As 
Items b) and e) of Section 2:43 of the Hungarian Civil Code expressly specify the right to 
respect for private life and the right to data protection, these provisions are to be applied to 
these rights as well. Although it is regulated under a separate title, the respect of 
personality rights is considered to be a general requirement and belongs to the common 
rules of conduct of labour law.929 Limiting employees’ personality rights to a certain extent 
is a natural characteristic of labour law: the exact content of personality rights protection in 
labour law can be determined in the light of labour rights and obligations.930 
255. Conditions of restricting personality rights. Although according to 
Subsection (3) an employee may not waive his/her rights relating to personality in advance, 
it does not mean that no limitation of these rights can take place: Subsection (2) lays down 
the conditions for restricting these rights – which are very similar to those established by 
the FLC. This restriction has three concurrent conditions: it shall be absolutely necessary, 
directly related to the purpose of the employment relationship, and proportional to its 
objective. 
256. A restriction is absolutely necessary if without it the employer would not be 
able to fulfil his/her obligations ensuing from the employment relationship.931 The 
requirements of necessity are met if the restriction is objectively necessary.932 The purpose 
of the employment relationship shall be interpreted narrowly, and the restriction shall relate 
exclusively and directly to this purpose.933 The purpose of the employment relationship 
 
927 Subsection (1) of Section 9 of the HLC: “Unless otherwise provided for in this Act, the provisions of 
Sections 2:42-2:54 of Act V of 2013 of the Civil Code shall apply to the protection of the personality rights 
of employees and employers, with the proviso that in the application of Subsections (2) and (3) of Section 
2:52 and Section 2:53 of the Civil Code the provisions of this Act relating to liability for damages shall be 
applicable.” 
928 Kardkovács, K. (ed.) (2016) A Munka Törvénykönyvének magyarázata. 3rd edn. Budapest: HVG-ORAC 
Lap- és Könyvkiadó. p. 53. 
929 Miholics, T. (2015) ‘Általános magatartási követelmények a munkaviszonyban’, Magyar jog, 62(4), p. 
245. 
930 Arany Tóth, M. (2008) ‘Gondolatok a munkavállalók személyiségi jogainak védelméről a magyar 
munkajogban’, Jogtudományi közlöny, 63(3), p. 134. 
931 Kardkovács, K. (ed.) (2016) A Munka Törvénykönyvének magyarázata. 3rd edn. Budapest: HVG-ORAC 
Lap- és Könyvkiadó. p. 52. 
932 T/4786. számú törvényjavaslat a Munka Törvénykönyvéről(2011). Előadó: Dr. Matolcsy György 
nemzetgazdasági miniszter. Budapest. p. 100. 
933 T/4786. számú törvényjavaslat a Munka Törvénykönyvéről(2011). Előadó: Dr. Matolcsy György 
nemzetgazdasági miniszter. Budapest. p. 100 
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shall be identified from the rights and obligations of the parties. In accordance with the 
main obligations of the parties (the employee shall work while the employer shall provide 
work and remuneration), the purpose of the employment relationship is employment in 
order to achieve the employer’s legitimate economic interest. This must be interpreted 
narrowly and is limited by the HLC and by the personality rights of the employee.934 
Regarding proportionality, the employer’s objective and the employee’s disadvantage must 
be balanced.935 
257. Informing employees. In addition, Subsection 2 of Section 9 regulates the 
question of informing employees on the limitation of their personality rights. The 
Enforcing Act made this provision more severe, as it broadened the scope of the 
employer’s obligation regarding his/her obligation to inform employees: the information 
should relate not only to the methods, conditions and length of limiting personality rights, 
but also to the circumstances justifying the necessity and proportionality of the 
limitation.936 
(B) Data protection and employee monitoring 
Besides the general declaration of the protection of rights and personality rights, both 
labour codes contain additional rules, expressively focusing on (certain aspects of) 
employee data protection. While the FLC regulates the most important rules in relation to 
the processing of personal information of employees and prospective employees, the HLC 
focuses on data protection rules, and then contains specific rules regarding employee 
monitoring. 
(a) Principles applicable to the processing of personal information937 in the French 
Labour Code 
 
934 Berke, Gy. and Kiss, Gy. (eds) (2014) Kommentár a munka törvénykönyvéhez: kommentár a munka 
törvénykönyvéről szóló 2012. évi I. törvényhez. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer, p. 58. 
935 Kardkovács, K. (ed.) (2016) A Munka Törvénykönyvének magyarázata. 3rd edn. Budapest: HVG-ORAC 
Lap- és Könyvkiadó. p. 52. 
936 Rátkai, I. (2019) ‘Új adatvédelmi szabályok a munkaviszonnyal összefüggésben’, Munkajog, (2), pp. 69–
75. Available at: https://munkajogilap.hu/uj-adatvedelmi-szabalyok-a-munkaviszonnyal-
osszefuggesben/ (Accessed: 12 August 2019). 
937 The FLC does not employ the expression personal data. Instead, it uses the expression “information 
relating personally to a candidate/employee” (“information concernant personnellement un candidat/un 
salarié”). 
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258. Besides the declaration of the general respect of rights and liberties, the FLC 
contains other rules relevant to the subject of the dissertation. Articles L1221-6 to L1221-9 
relate to recruitment, regulating what information can be asked, how it should be processed 
and what requirements apply to the methods of recruitment. Articles L1222-3 to L1222-4 
relate to the information asked from employees, and mirrors the former provisions relating 
to recruitment. The requirements set towards the processing of employees’ and prospective 
employees’ personal information echo those laid down in the FDPA, such as purpose 
limitation, proportionality or transparency.938 Through these principles, a more dominant 
data protection approach is reflected. This part will review the relevant principles: first 
their formulation in the FLC and then their appearance in the data protection framework. 
259. Principle of purpose limitation. The principle of purpose limitation939 also 
explicitly appears in labour law, limiting the scope of processing to matters relating to the 
professional life: Article L1222-2 states that information requested from an employee – 
regardless of its forms – shall only have the aim to assess the employee’s professional 
competence, while Article L1221-6 states that information requested from a job candidate– 
regardless of its forms – shall only have the aim to assess his/her fitness for the proposed 
employment or his/her professional competence. The purpose shall be determined prior to 
the processing.940 Although it is not expressly referred to, by stating that the aim of 
collecting shall relate to the professional capacities, the legislator indirectly refers to the 
protection of the (prospective) employees’ personal life. 
The purpose limitation principle is also enshrined in the data protection regulation.941 
If the employer decides to monitor employees, first, he/she has to define its purpose.942 
There are several legitimate aims that can justify monitoring: to determine whether an aim 
is legitimate the technological context also has to be taken into consideration. Often aims 
such as preventing damage to goods and persons, enhancing productivity, or ensuring the 
 
938 Bouchet, H. (2004) La cybersurveillance sur les lieux de travail. Paris, la Documentation française: 
Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés, p. 8. 
939 Also enshrined in Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the FDPA: “the data shall be obtained for specified, explicit 
and legitimate purposes, and shall not subsequently be processed in a manner that is incompatible with those 
purposes.”  
940 CNIL (2010) Guide pour les employeurs et les salariés. Les guides de la CNIL. p. 3. 
941 Item b) of Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the GDPR, Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the FDPA  
942 Wolton, E. and Pompey, S. (2013) ‘Données à caractère personnel et droit du travail’, Revue de 
Jurisprudence Sociale (RJS), (4), p. 218. 
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security of the network are referred to.943 Or, as a specific example, telephone monitoring 
might be mentioned, where listening to the phone calls of employees can be conducted for 
the purpose of training or evaluating employees, ameliorating the quality of the service or 
to provide proof in certain limited cases.944 
260. Principle of proportionality. Besides its general formulation in Article 
L1121-1, the principle of proportionality requires that the information requested from job 
candidates or from employees shall have a direct and necessary link with the aimed 
purpose, and candidates and employees shall reply in good faith.945 Article L1222-3 adds 
that means and techniques of evaluation shall be relevant in regards of the purpose. The 
CNIL stated that as a main rule, during recruitment it is not compatible with these 
provisions to collect personal data relating to nationality, social security number, housing 
conditions, information concerning family members, etc.946 
261. This principle requires that personal data shall be adequate, relevant and do 
not exceed the purpose for which they are processed.947 This principle provides that no 
intrusive monitoring shall take place, only the strict minimum of data shall be processed. 
When assessing the principle of proportionality, the given circumstances of the case shall 
be taken into consideration.948, 949 For example, the use of permanent videosurveillance950 
or the systematic search of employees’ bags951 was considered to be disproportionate. The 
same is true for the use of keylogger programs: the CNIL stated that as they can constantly 
and permanently record every keystroke, they pose an unproportionate threat to 
employees’ rights and their use is allowed only in very strict cases.952 
 
943 Wolton, E. and Pompey, S. (2013) ‘Données à caractère personnel et droit du travail’, Revue de 
Jurisprudence Sociale (RJS), (4), p. 218. 
944 CNIL (2018) L’écoute et l’enregistrement des appels. Fiches pratiques: Travail & données personnelles. 
945 Article L1222-2 and Article L1221-6 of the FLC 
946 CNIL (2002) Délibération portant adoption d’une recommandation relative à la collecte et au traitement 
d’informations nominatives lors d’opérations de recrutement. Délibération n°02-017 du 21 mars 2002 
947 Item c) of Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the GDPR, Paragraph 3 of Article 4 of the FDPA 
948 Wolton, E. and Pompey, S. (2013) ‘Données à caractère personnel et droit du travail’, Revue de 
Jurisprudence Sociale (RJS), (4), p. 219. 
949 For example, while asking for the height of a job applicant for a secretary post does not seem to be 
proportionate, asking the same information from a stewardess can be considered proportionate, as they have 
to be able to easily reach the higher shelves in the plane. Or, asking for a driving licence is not proportionate 
when the job does not need driving, naturally in the case of a truck driver, asking for the driving licence is a 
proportionate measure. 
950 CNIL Délibération n°2012-475 du 3 janvier 2013 
951 CA Rennes 6 février 2003 n°02-2859 
952 Keylogger : des dispositifs de cybersurveillance particulièrement intrusifs(2013) CNRS. Available 
at: http://www.cil.cnrs.fr/CIL/spip.php?article1954 (Accessed: 1 October 2018) 
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262. Transparency. The general principle of transparency (and the employer’s 
obligation to inform employees of the processing of personal data) appears in the FLC, 
both in regards of employees and candidates. It holds that no information relating 
personally to an employee/candidate can be collected through a measure that has not been 
brought to his/her attention (Article L1222-4 and Article L1221-9) and 
employees/candidates shall be explicitly informed of methods and techniques used for 
professional evaluation/recruitment, prior to their application (Article L1222-3 and Article 
L1221-8). 
This is closely related to the principle of fairness (“principe de loyauté” enshrined 
also in Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the FDPA), prohibiting the collection of personal data 
by all fraudulent, unfair or unlawful means.953 The Court of Cassation ruled already in 
1991 that although the employer has the right to control and monitor the activity of 
employees during working hours, any recording of their image or words, for any reason, 
without their knowledge, will constitute illegal proof.954 It means that no secret monitoring 
is allowed,955 which was also confirmed by the Court of Cassation, who stated in a case 
relating to the monitoring of telephone calls that “the employer has the right to control and 
to monitor employees’ activities during working hours, only the use of covert monitoring is 
unlawful.”956, 957 
263. Besides informing the employees individually, collective transparency is 
also required: the social and economic committee shall be informed prior to the application 
(and all modifications) of methods or techniques used for recruitment and of automated 
 
953 Benalcázar, I. de (2003) Droit du travail et nouvelles technologies : collecte des données, Internet, 
cybersurveillance, télétravail. Paris: Montchrestien : Gualino. p. 35 
954 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 20 novembre 1991, N° 88-43120  
955 For example, hiring a private detective (Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 22 mai 1995, N° 93-44078) 
or the use of letter bombs at the post in response to the high number of letters opened by the employees 
without their knowledge (Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 4 juillet 2012, N° 11-30266) is considered to 
be an unlawful means of collecting evidence.  
956 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 14 mars 2000, N° 98-42090  
957 Naturally, even without prior information of employees, their simple surveillance by their supervisors 
(Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 26 avr. 2006, n° 04-43.582) and, even in the absence of prior 
consultation, the simple surveillance by the employer or in-house service entrusted with this task (Cour de 
cassation chambre sociale 4 juillet 2012 N° de pourvoi: 11-14241) will not be considered unlawful. 
However, in a case relating to the personal use of telephone, the Court of Cassation ruled that the simple 
verification of the length, cost or the phone numbers of the calls made from work phones is not considered to 
be illegal monitoring just because it was not previously brought to the attention of the employer. (Source: 
Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 29 janvier 2008, N° 06-45279). Grynbaum et al. are of the opinion that 
this decision was due to the circumstances of the case, and this principle should not be extended to other 
types of employee monitoring (e.g.: Internet). Source: Grynbaum, L., Le Goffic, C. and Morlet-Haïdara, L. 
(2014) Droit des activités numériques. 1st edn. Paris: Dalloz. p. 895. 
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processing in the field of HR management and they shall be informed and consulted before 
deciding of the adoption of means or techniques allowing to monitor employees’ 
activities.958 Regulating questions relating to the work discipline in the internal 
regulation959 are also subject to certain conditions such as submission for the opinion of the 
social and economic committee, communication to the labour inspector, labour courts and 
persons accessing the workplace, or administrative and judicial control.960 
264. Whistleblowing. In order to ensure the enforcement of the rights of the 
individuals, the FLC also contains a provision on whistleblowing (Article L2313-2): if staff 
representatives notice that there exists a threat to the rights of individuals, to physical and 
mental health or to individual liberties, which is not justified by the nature of the task to be 
performed and is not proportionate to the aim sought, they have to contact the employer 
immediately. The employer has to investigate the case and remedy the situation by taking 
the necessary measures. If the employer does not act, or there are different opinions 
regarding the veracity of the threat and there is no solution found, the matter is taken to the 
labour court. 
(b) Data processing and employee monitoring in the Hungarian Labour Code 
265. Amendment of the HLC. In 2019 the Enforcing Act introduced some 
important changes in the field of data protection, considerably increasing the number of 
provisions dealing with this matter. Now these matters are regulated under a separate title 
(“Title 5/A: Data processing”) containing three Sections: Section 10 regulating employee 
statements, disclosure of information and aptitude tests, Section 11 on the processing of 
sensitive data (biometric and criminal personal data) and Section 11/A relating to employee 
monitoring. 
Section 10 and Section 11/A existed before the amendment as well, although the 
Enforcing Act modified them and enlarged them with additional rules. Section 11 on 
sensitive data is completely new. Also, its analysis will not be part of the dissertation as it 
 
958 Article L2312-38 of the FLC 
959 Or in-service notes or in any other document containing general and permanent obligations. (Article 
L1321-5 of the FLC)  
960 Article L1321-1 of the FLC; Article L1321-4 of the FLC; from Article L1322-1 to Article L1322-3 of the 
FLC; Article L1322-4 of the FLC, Article R1321-2 of the FLC; Article R1322-1 of the FLC. 
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does not relate to the main subject of it, since there are no biometric data or criminal 
personal data on SNSs. 961 
266. Employee statements and disclosure of information. Section 10 regulates 
the question of data protection, through regulating disclosure of information and aptitude 
tests. As regards employee statements and disclosure of information, it declares that “[a] 
worker may be requested to make a statement or to disclose certain information only if 
deemed necessary for the conclusion, fulfilment or termination of the employment 
relationship or for the enforcement of the need ensuing from this act.”962 In data protection 
terminology, the latter condition is asserted by the purpose limitation principle, by 
requiring that personal data can only be processed if without processing the conclusion, 
fulfilment or termination of employment would not be possible,963 only to the extent that is 
essential to achieve those purposes.964 In the employment context processing can have 
numerous purposes, such as the administration of working time, ensuring workplace safety 
requirements or exercising the employer’s right to monitor, choosing the best job 
candidate, etc.965 
267. Aptitude tests. Regarding aptitude tests, the HLC contains two restrictions: 
it states that only an employment regulation can prescribe an aptitude test, or the test shall 
be necessary in order to exercise rights and to fulfil obligations in accordance with 
employment regulations.966 Employers often use different tests in order to assess 
employees’ or prospective employees’ competences or personality traits. Such tests might 
reveal sensitive traits of the individual; therefore, it is crucial that the individual’s rights 
are ensured during their application.967 
268. As a new provision, Subsection 2 of Section 10 of the HLC also states that 
the employer, trade unions and works councils can demand the employee to give a 
statement or disclose information in order to exercise their rights or comply with their 
 
961 See more on them in: Lukács, A. (forthcoming) ‘A GDPR által okozott kihívások a munkajogban’, in 
Strihó, K. and Szegedi, L. (eds.) Európai szabályozáspolitikai kihívások. Budapest: Nemzeti Közszolgálati 
Egyetem 
962 Subsection (1) of Section 10 of the HLC 
963 Péterfalvi, A. (ed.) (2012) Adatvédelem és információszabadság a mindennapokban. Budapest: HVG-
ORAC. p. 292. 
964 Péterfalvi, A. (ed.) (2012) Adatvédelem és információszabadság a mindennapokban. Budapest: HVG-
ORAC. p. 293. 
965 Arany-Tóth, M. (2016) Személyes adatok kezelése a munkaviszonyban. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer. p. 29. 
966 Subsection (1) of Section 10 of the HLC 
967 Berke, Gy. and Kiss, Gy. (eds) (2014) Kommentár a munka törvénykönyvéhez: kommentár a munka 
törvénykönyvéről szóló 2012. évi I. törvényhez. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer, p. 61. 
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duties in the field of labour relations.968 Subsection 3 regulates the presentation of 
documents – however, this matter does not have direct relevance to the subject of the 
thesis. As it was already mentioned, the same is valid for Section 11 regulating the 
processing of certain sensitive data. 
269. Employee monitoring. Section 11/A regulates data processing resulting 
from the employer’s right to monitoring and contains rules regulating the monitoring of 
electronic devices used by the employee. Subsection 1 declares employees’ behaviour can 
be monitored to the extent pertaining to the employment relationship and the employer can 
employ technical means to conduct such a monitoring.  
It follows from the employer’s right to monitor that he/she has the right (it is even an 
obligation) to monitor whether employees are following the orders as the employer has not 
only a right, but also an obligation to ensure the order and discipline within the 
workplace.969 Prior to the Enforcing Act, the HLC contained three restrictions as regards 
employee monitoring: the monitoring could not go beyond the extent pertaining to the 
employment relationship, it could not infringe human dignity and the private life of 
employees could not be monitored.970 The latter two conditions were removed from the 
HLC. The legislator justified this removal by reminding that both the respect of human 
dignity and the prohibition of monitoring private life can be deduced from general rules, 
therefore repeating these requirements is not necessary.971 
270. The employer’s right to monitor the employees’ behaviour in relation to the 
employment relationship is quite extensive: it can relate both to behaviour within the 
workplace and beyond the workplace972 – with respect to the requirements set in the HLC. 
It is important that the employee does not have the right to private life only outside the 
workplace: they are entitled to it inside the workplace as well.973 The behaviour is in 
 
968 Rátkai, I. (2019) ‘Új adatvédelmi szabályok a munkaviszonnyal összefüggésben’, Munkajog, (2), pp. 69–
75. Available at: https://munkajogilap.hu/uj-adatvedelmi-szabalyok-a-munkaviszonnyal-
osszefuggesben/ (Accessed: 12 August 2019) 
969 Kardkovács, K. (ed.) (2016) A Munka Törvénykönyvének magyarázata. 3rd edn. Budapest: HVG-ORAC 
Lap- és Könyvkiadó. p. 136. 
970 Subsection (1) of Section 11 of the HLC 
971 T/4479. számú törvényjavaslat az Európai Unió adatvédelmi reformjának végrehajtása érdekében 
szükséges törvénymódosításokról (2019). Előadó: Dr. Trócsányi László igazságügyi miniszter. Budapest, p. 
102. 
972 Cséffán, J. (2018) A Munka Törvénykönyve és magyarázata. Szeged: Szegedi Rendezvényszervező Kft. p. 
44. 
973 A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi adatkezelések 
alapvető követelményeiről, p. 6. 
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relation to the employment if it is connected to the fulfilment of his/her obligations or to 
the exercise of his/her rights originating from the employment relationship.974 Defining the 
scope of behaviour related to employment or the limits of the employee’s private life is 
increasingly challenging in the social media context, for reasons already presented in the 
thesis. 
271. The employer is also entitled to define the aim of monitoring, the time, the 
methods used, etc.975 However, he/she has to respect certain requirements. The methods 
applied should be suitable to achieve the purpose, namely the legitimate interests and rights 
that the employer aims to enforce.976 Necessity and proportionality should apply not only 
to the scope of the data processed, but also to the time period of processing and to the 
persons having access to that data.977 The monitoring must in every case respect 
employees’ dignity.978 The right to monitor shall not be exercised abusively, it shall not 
intend to restrict the enforcement of employees’ rights, or to constitute harassment or the 
suppression of employees’ opinion.979 
272. Use of electronic devices. As a completely new provision, the Enforcing 
Act enacted a Section to the HLC (Subsection 2 of Section 11/A) stipulating that electronic 
devices provided by the employer can be used exclusively for professional purposes – 
unless the parties agree otherwise. It is also regulated how the employer can verify such a 
use, through stating that when monitoring compliance, the employer can only monitor data 
in connection with the employment – aiming to grant protection to the private life of the 
employee. The latter rule is also to be applied when the employee uses his/her own device 
for work. These rules will be examined in detail in Part II. 
273. Obligation of information. The HLC specifies the employer’s obligation of 
information. In consequence, the employer shall inform employees regarding the 
processing of employees’ personal data980 and the technical means used for their 
 
974 Arany-Tóth, M. (2016) Személyes adatok kezelése a munkaviszonyban. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer. p. 74. 
975 Arany-Tóth, M. (2016) Személyes adatok kezelése a munkaviszonyban. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer. p. 74. 
976 A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi adatkezelések 
alapvető követelményeiről p. 6. 
977 A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi adatkezelések 
alapvető követelményeiről p. 6. 
978 A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi adatkezelések 
alapvető követelményeiről p. 6. 
979 Subsection (1) of Section 7 of the HLC 
980 Subsection (2) of Section 10 of the HLC 
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surveillance.981 The explanatory memorandum of the HLC emphasizes the importance of 
the obligation of information and its increased importance in a world where personal life 
flows into professional life and vice versa.982 
274. Additional provisions require that “[e]mployers shall consult the works 
council prior to passing a decision in respect of any plans for actions and adopting 
regulations affecting a large number of employees.”983 The processing and protection of 
personal data of employees and the implementation of technical means for the surveillance 
of workers are among the matters concerned by the obligation of consultation.984 
275. Conclusions. Section 2 examined the provisions that constitute the core of 
employee privacy and data protection in French and Hungarian law. They have to be 
applied to the processing of personal data and to the monitoring of employees – which will 
be addressed in detail in Part II, dealing with analysing what kind of challenges SNSs raise 
in the light of these general requirements. 
276. As a result of the above analysis, it can be concluded that the similarities 
between the two labour codes are that they both contain a general declaration of protecting 
employees’ rights, followed by the enunciation of certain data protection rules. The 
difference between the two regulations is that while the HLC contains these rules in a 
unique title, the relevant provisions are to be found in a more fragmented way in the FLC. 
Also, while the HLC contains data processing provisions relevant in the field of employee 
monitoring, the FLC regulates the question in a more general way. Also, the FLC explicitly 
deals with job applicants’ rights, while such a provision is not to found explicitly in the 
HLC. 
277. In both of them these rules are quite general and do not explicitly address 
concrete methods of monitoring. An exception is the recently introduced provision in the 
HLC on the use of computer devices, declaring that unless agreed otherwise, these devices 
must be used exclusively for professional purposes. In any case, these constitute the rules 
that must be reinterpreted in the light of SNSs, which raises several questions to be 
addressed in detail in Part II. 
 
981 Subsection (2) of Section 11 of the HLC 
982 T/4786. számú törvényjavaslat a Munka Törvénykönyvéről (2011). Előadó: Dr. Matolcsy György 
nemzetgazdasági miniszter. Budapest. pp. 102-103. 
983 Subsection (1) of Section 264 of the HLC 
984 Items c) and d) of Subsection (2) of Section 264 of the HLC 
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278. Conclusions of Chapter 2. Every individual – and amongst them employees 
as well – is entitled to the right to privacy and to the right to data protection. However, 
these rights are not absolute: employers are entitled to – in accordance with labour law 
regulations – control employees’ behaviour and monitor them; purely by being an 
employee, the individual’s freedom is partially abandoned.985 
279. The importance of this subject is illustrated by a number of instruments 
regulating this issue – both at the international (e.g. ILO, CoE, EU) and at the national 
level. These instruments have drawn attention to the importance of workplace privacy and 
data protection and laid down the most important principles to be respected. While doing 
so they also addressed the, back at the time of their adoption, most common forms of 
employee monitoring (e.g. CCTV surveillance, e-mail and Internet monitoring, GPS 
localistaion, etc.) and provided detailed guidance during their application. 
280. However, since the adoption of these documents new developments of ICT, 
such as SNSs, have appeared, giving rise to new types of privacy and data protection 
questions that are yet to be answered. Although the most recent documents already address 
the question of SNSs,986 which also confirms the need for determining their exact rules of 
application in the field of privacy and data protection, they do not provide exhaustive 
regulation, they only concentrate on certain aspects of the subject. Therefore, the balance 
between employees’ and employer’s rights is still to be determined in the field of SNSs. 
Conclusions of Title 1 
281. In conclusion, the collision between the employer’s and the employees’ 
rights is not new. The employee’s subordination is present in the employment relationship, 
regardless of the current technological status. Rights and obligations arising from this 
subordination are the same (e.g. right to give orders, to control, to monitor), but can take 
different shapes according to the given circumstances. These circumstances can be highly 
influenced by technology: physical surveillance manifested through the watching eyes of a 
 
985 Hendrickx, F. (2002) ‘Privacy and Employment Law: General Principles and Application to Electronic 
Monitoring’, in Blanpain, R. (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society. Use and 
Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. 49. 
986 E.g. WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249, Council of Europe 
(2015) Recommendation CM/Rec(2015)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the processing 
of personal data in the context of employment 
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supervisor raises different questions compared to digital surveillance monitoring every step 
employees make in the online world. 
282. When establishing the boundaries of the employer’s right to control and to 
monitor, a balance must be found between the employer’s side and the employees’ side. 
On the employees’ side several rights, notably the right to privacy, the right to data 
protection and the right to informational self-determination can be at stake during the 
different types of employee control and monitoring. Chapter 1 examined the scope and 
essence of these rights, and established that employees are entitled to them, as well as any 
individual. Although these rights must be ensured within the workplace,987 they are not 
limitless: it follows from the individual’s status as an employee that they must be subjected 
to certain limitations.988 
283. On the employer’s side, originating from the subordination between the 
employer and employee, the employer is entitled to exercise authority over employees,989 
including the right to control and to monitor: they are manifested in Hungarian law through 
the employer’s legitimate economic interests, and in France through the employer’s 
powers. However, just as employees’ rights are not limitless, neither is the employer’s 
right to control and monitor: during their enforcement, a balance should be found between 
the employees’ rights and the employer’s rights. 
284. As it was already mentioned, these rights and their collision are not new, 
and they are addressed both by the FLC and by the HLC. However, these codes can only 
address the issue from a general point of view and cannot consider all technologies 
specifically. In relation to Hypothesis 1 of the dissertation – according to which in the case 
of SNSs, the collision between the employees’ rights and the employer’s rights appears in 
a more intense form compared to the “traditional” methods of employee monitoring – it 
was necessary to examine the two sides of this collision, in order to be able to answer 
whether it is intensified by SNSs. Thus, it still must be examined what novelties brought to 
 
987 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 4 
988 Hendrickx, F. (2002) ‘Privacy and Employment Law: General Principles and Application to Electronic 
Monitoring’, in Blanpain, R. (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society. Use and 
Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. 49. 
989 Hendrickx, F. (2002) ‘Privacy and Employment Law: General Principles and Application to Electronic 
Monitoring’, in Blanpain, R. (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society. Use and 
Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. 49. 
 180 
 
this collision by SNSs are added to the intensity of this collision – which will be addressed 
in detail in Title 2.  
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Title 2: Blurred boundaries of work and personal life in the digital 
age 
In Title 1 the collision between the employees’ and the employer’s rights was 
addressed, examining in detail the different rights that must be balanced against each other. 
However, the development of ICT exerts a fundamental effect on this collision by making 
the boundaries of professional and personal life increasingly blurred; new information and 
communications technologies had a great impact – amongst others – on the notions of 
working time and working place.990, 991 Technological change is one of the several factors 
that can have an effect on work-life balance.992 Determining the boundaries between 
personal and professional spheres is crucial, as the enforcement of the parties’ rights and 
interests is mainly concentrated within the professional life for the employer and within the 
personal life for the employee.  
285. Hitherto the separation of these two spheres did not pose fundamental 
challenges: a key observation is that formerly work and personal life could be separated 
(and the applicability of labour law could be determined) more easily through the 
assessment of place and time: the concepts of “outside” and “inside” of the workplace, as 
well as “before” and “after” work still existed. However, the appearance of the Internet 
fundamentally altered such separation.993 The blurring of this boundary is two-way: not 
only work is omnipresent, but personal life is everywhere as well.994 
286. The aim of Title 2 is to prove the existence of (mutually) blurred boundaries 
due to ICT and SNSs, and to show that the issue of the enforcement of rights and interests 
is more pronounced. As a result, on the one hand, the employer can gain “access” to the 
employee’s personal life to a deeper extent. On the other hand, personal life has also 
gained ground to an unprecedented extent within the professional sphere, making both 
parties increasingly interested in enforcing their rights. 
 
990 Ray, J.-E. (2001) Le droit du travail à l’épreuve des NTIC. Rueil-Malmaison: Liaisons, p. 83. 
991 In addition to physical and temporal boundaries, Wafa El Wafi also mentions psychological boundaries as 
an important factor in the separation of work and private life. Source: El Wafi, W. (2016) Perméabilité des 
frontières vies « personnelle et professionnelle » et usage des TIC : modèles d’articulation. Université de 
Lorraine, p. 13. 
992 Wilkens, M. et al. (2018) Striking a balance: Reconciling work and life in the EU. Publications Office of 
the European Union, Luxembourg: Eurofound. 
993 Verkindt, P.-Y. (2010) ‘Les “amis” de nos “amis”..’, JCP S (édition sociale), (48), p. 4. 
994 Ray, J.-E. (2010) ‘D’un droit des travailleurs aux droits de la personne au travail’, Droit social, (1), p. 4. 
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287. Main questions to be considered. Title 2 aims to answer questions such as: 
in what regards have ICT and especially SNSs blurred the boundaries of personal and 
professional life? As the dissertation primarily examines the subject from the viewpoint of 
the employees’ right to privacy and right to data protection, the question of what privacy 
means in the context of SNSs also has to be addressed. 
288. Structure of Title 2. First, Chapter 1 will focus on ICT in general and will 
address how new technologies have blurred the boundaries of personal and professional 
life. Then, Chapter 2 will focus on SNSs: first, by adopting a mainly descriptive approach, 
the basic functioning of these sites will be presented in order to be able to then 
appropriately assess the legal implications of such platforms and the questions in relation 
to the separation of these two spheres. 
Chapter 1: Information and communication technology and blurred 
boundaries of work and personal life 
289. The expansion of digital tools has fundamental effects on individuals’ 
lives.995 Today, due to the development of ICT, the boundaries of work and personal life 
are increasingly blurred: personal life flows into professional life and vice versa.996 As 
SNSs are products of the information communication technologies, it is worth examining 
first in general how ICT affects the separation of work and personal life, before addressing 
the specific questions raised by SNSs. 
290. Technology has not only blurred the lines of the physical workplace: it also 
blurred the lines of employment. The concept of employment itself is more and more 
blurred, as the employment contract is not the only way to perform work. Due to gig 
economy, platform economy, new forms of work have appeared (e.g. gig work, 
crowdworking, etc.). 
 
995 Ray, J.-E. and Bouchet, J.-P. (2010) ‘Vie professionnelle, vie personnelle et technologies d’information et 
de communication’, Droit social, (1), p. 46. 
On the possible future influence of technology (notably digitalisation) on labour law, see more in György 
Lőricz’s article on the imaginary Act I of 2032 on the Labour Code (of the future). The article contains a 
commentary on the most important features of the code, such as employee monitoring and data protection, 
establishing an employment contract, e-contracts, algorithyms giving orders, working time, etc. Source: 
Lőrincz, G. (2018) ‘Kommentár a munka törvénykönyvéről szóló 2032. évi I. törvényhez - Munkajogi sci-
fi’, Pécsi Munkajogi Közlemények, 11(1), pp. 7–34. 
996 Kajtár, E. (2015) ‘Till Facebook Do Us Part? Social Networking Sites and the Employment 
Relationship’, Acta Juridica Hungarica, 56(4), p. 269. 
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Section 1: New forms of employment 
291. New forms of employment. In its Digital Single Market Strategy for 
Europe, the European Commission recognized that ICT, and amongst them Internet and 
digital technologies have a fundamental effect on the lives of individuals – including the 
world of work as well.997 As a response to the changes occurring due to societal and 
economic factors, Eurofound published a report998 in 2015 adressing new forms 
employment,999 which have increased importance nowadays. The expression “new forms 
of employment” refers to cases when the number of employer and employee differs from 
the usual (the usual is considered to be 1:1), when the work is not performed on a regular 
basis, when it implies increased networking and cooperation between self-employed, when 
it is not performed from the employer’s premises or when the use of ICT is strong and 
widespread.1000 Among these new forms of employment ICT-based mobile work1001 and 
crowdworking1002 have high relevance to the subject of the thesis, as they are characterised 
by the use of ICT technology – being conducted anywhere and anytime, regardless of time 
and place.1003 
292. The report acknowledged the advantages of these forms of employment and 
identified the main challenges that they represent. With regard to privacy, in relation to the 
use of ICT, on the one hand it was recognized that they provide more flexibility and 
improve the work-life balance of employees, through enabling them to perform work when 
 
997 European Commission (2015) Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe. Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions COM(2015) 192 final. Brussels, p. 3. 
998 Mandl, I. et al. (2015) New forms of employment. Publications Office of the European Union, 
Luxembourg: Eurofound. 
999 In the report Eurofound identified and examined nine types of “new forms of work”. These are: employee 
sharing, job sharing, interim management, casual work, ICT-based mobile work, voucher-based work, 
portfolio work, crowd employment and collaborative employment. 
1000 Mandl, I. et al. (2015) New forms of employment. Publications Office of the European Union, 
Luxembourg: Eurofound, pp. 4-5. 
1001 The report identifies ICT-based mobile work as referring to “[…] work patterns characterised by the 
worker (whether employee or self-employed) operating from various possible locations outside the premises 
of their employer (for example, at home, at a client’s premises or ‘on the road’), supported by modern 
technologies such as laptop and tablet computers. This is different from traditional teleworking in the sense 
of being even less ‘place-bound’.” Source: Mandl, I. et al. (2015) New forms of employment. Publications 
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg: Eurofound, p. 7. 
1002 The report refers to crowdworking as a not place-bound form of employment, where “[v]irtual platforms 
match a large number of buyers and sellers of services or products, often with larger tasks being broken 
down into small jobs.” Source: Mandl, I. et al. (2015) New forms of employment. Publications Office of the 
European Union, Luxembourg: Eurofound, p. 7. 
1003 Mandl, I. et al. (2015) New forms of employment. Publications Office of the European Union, 
Luxembourg: Eurofound, p. 72. 
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it is the most suitable for them.1004 However, on the other hand, it was also recognized that 
implications on the boundaries of work and private life can occur as well, manifested for 
example in the requirement of being always available.1005, 1006 
293. These issues were also addressed by the European Commission’s European 
agenda for the collaborative economy,1007 which notably raised the question of what 
effects collaborative economy1008 has on the boundaries of employment and in accordance 
with what criteria the existence of an employment relationship can be established.1009 The 
report entitled Working anytime, anywhere: the effects on the world of work, published 
jointly by the ILO and Eurofound,1010 examined the effects that the use of ICT for work 
purposes exercises on the world of work outside the workplace.1011 It emphasized that such 
work can represent advantages both for employers and employees, for example, regarding 
work-life balance, creating new jobs, contributing to economic growth, etc.1012 With regard 
to the main subject of the dissertation, one of the main driving forces of ICT-based work is 
 
1004 Mandl, I. et al. (2015) New forms of employment. Publications Office of the European Union, 
Luxembourg: Eurofound, pp. 76-77. 
1005 Mandl, I. et al. (2015) New forms of employment. Publications Office of the European Union, 
Luxembourg: Eurofound, p. 79. 
1006 Since then, the report was updated in 2018. In this document problems relating to supplementary working 
time (e.g. working during nights or weekends) was identified as one of the most challenging aspects of ICT-
based mobile work.) Source: Mandl, I. and Biletta, I. (2018) Overview of new forms of employment – 2018 
update. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg: Eurofound, p. 11.  
1007 European Commission (2016) A European agenda for the collaborative economy. Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions COM(2016) 356 final. Brussels. 
1008 In the agenda collaborative economy is defined as “business models where activities are facilitated by 
collaborative platforms that create an open marketplace for the temporary usage of goods or services often 
provided by private individuals.” Source: European Commission (2016) A European agenda for the 
collaborative economy. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM(2016) 356 final. 
Brussels, p. 3. 
1009 European Commission (2016) A European agenda for the collaborative economy. Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions COM(2016) 356 final. Brussels, pp. 11-13. 
1010 Eurofound and International Labour Office (2017) Working anytime, anywhere: The effects on the world 
of work. Joint ILO–Eurofound report. Luxembourg, Geneva: Publications Office of the European Union, 
International Labour Office 
1011 Eurofound and International Labour Office (2017) Working anytime, anywhere: The effects on the world 
of work. Joint ILO–Eurofound report. Luxembourg, Geneva: Publications Office of the European Union, 
International Labour Office, p. 1. 
1012 Eurofound and International Labour Office (2017) Working anytime, anywhere: The effects on the world 
of work. Joint ILO–Eurofound report. Luxembourg, Geneva: Publications Office of the European Union, 
International Labour Office, p. 9. Moreover, the report addresses several areas where the use of ICT might 
have a considerable impact on working conditions. These include working time, individual and 
organisational performance, work–life balance and occupational health and well-being. 
 185 
 
flexibility and the better work-life balance that can be constructed through it.1013 However, 
while ensuring flexibility, ICT can also contribute to the expansion of working hours,1014 
which can have detrimental effects on the separation of work and private life, as well as on 
availability and on the consequences associated with it.1015 In relation to work-life 
balance,1016, 1017 the report found that controversial results were observed in countries 
participating in the report: while certain ones stated that their work-life balance improved 
due to ICT, others (or even the same individuals) also reported negative effects due to the 
blurring of the boundaries.1018  
294. Occupational health. Working with ICT can have consequences for 
occupational safety and health.1019 The health of the employees can be detrimentally 
influenced not only by physical risks: working conditions, such as work intensity or work 
duration, also play an important role with respect to the employees’ health. While having 
the possibility to work beyond working hours can have positive effects through increasing 
employees’ autonomy, it can also cause detrimental health issues to employees.1020 ICT 
also exercise important effect on workplace safety and health, particularly by resulting in 
 
1013 Eurofound and International Labour Office (2017) Working anytime, anywhere: The effects on the world 
of work. Joint ILO–Eurofound report. Luxembourg, Geneva: Publications Office of the European Union, 
International Labour Office, p. 9.  
1014 Eurofound and International Labour Office (2017) Working anytime, anywhere: The effects on the world 
of work. Joint ILO–Eurofound report. Luxembourg, Geneva: Publications Office of the European Union, 
International Labour Office, p. 21. 
1015 Eurofound and International Labour Office (2017) Working anytime, anywhere: The effects on the world 
of work. Joint ILO–Eurofound report. Luxembourg, Geneva: Publications Office of the European Union, 
International Labour Office, p. 23. 
1016 In its Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-
life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU the EU recognized the 
importance of work life balance manifested in the reconciliation of work and family life. Although it 
constitutes an important step, the directive focuses on gender equality of those who are parents or carers and 
does not address the question of how the reconciliation should be done with regard to ICT in general. 
1017 The European Pillar of Social Rights (European Pillar on Social Rights (2017). Publications Office: 
Luxembourg.) also determines the principle of work-life balance through declaring that “[p]arents and 
people with caring responsibilities have the right to suitable leave, flexible working arrangements and access 
to care services. Women and men shall have equal access to special leaves of absence in order to fulfil their 
caring responsibilities and be encouraged to use them in a balanced way.” 
1018 Eurofound and International Labour Office (2017) Working anytime, anywhere: The effects on the world 
of work. Joint ILO–Eurofound report. Luxembourg, Geneva: Publications Office of the European Union, 
International Labour Office, p. 29. 
1019 In addition to its effects on employees’ health, it was also observed that a better work-life balance can 
increase mental well-being and engagement in the job (resulting in a better workforce) and thus has 
advantages both for the employer and for employees. Source: Wilkens, M. et al. (2018) Striking a balance: 
Reconciling work and life in the EU. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg: Eurofound, p. 
2. 
1020 Kubicek, B. et al. (2019) Working conditions and workers’ health. Publications Office of the European 
Union, Luxembourg: Eurofound, pp. 15-16. 
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stress due to the blurred boundaries and constant availability for work.1021 According to the 
European Working Conditions Survey, performing work beyond the regular working hours 
can increase employees’ autonomy, but at the same time makes employees more exposed 
to work-related health issues.1022  
The importance of ensuring adequate rest period is guaranteed by different 
international documents, such as the CFREU,1023 the CoE’s Revised European Social 
Charter1024 or the EU’s European Pillar on Social Rights.1025 Also, within the EU, notably 
the Working Time Directive1026 must be mentioned, which has the aim of laying down 
minimum safety and health requirements for the organisation of working time.1027 
However, this aim might be compromised due to the constant availability of employees 
and its effects on the boundaries of work and personal life, raising important questions 
with regard to occupational safety and health. Although the significance of this issue is 
recognized, the dissertation will not deal with it in detail for reasons of space limitations, 
as this subject is indirectly connected to the main focus of it. 
295. Technology has not only blurred the lines between professional life and 
personal life, but also made the boundaries of the employment relationship itself porous, 
challenging the concepts of wage earners, subordination, occupational safety and health 
etc.1028 Standard employment seems not to be the norm anymore.1029 Platform work,1030 
 
1021 Eurofound and International Labour Office (2017) Working anytime, anywhere: The effects on the world 
of work. Joint ILO–Eurofound report. Luxembourg, Geneva: Publications Office of the European Union, 
International Labour Office, p. 36. 
1022 Kubicek, B. et al. (2019) Working conditions and workers’ health. Publications Office of the European 
Union, Luxembourg: Eurofound, p. 16. 
1023 Article 31 on fair and just working conditions stipulates that: “1. Every worker has the right to working 
conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity. 2. Every worker has the right to limitation of 
maximum working hours, to daily and weekly rest periods and to an annual period of paid leave.” 
1024 See Article 3 on the right to safe and healthy working conditions 
1025 Declaring workers’ right to healthy, safe and well-adapted work environment. 
1026 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning 
certain aspects of the organisation of working time. Article 3 stipulates that “Member States shall take the 
measures necessary to ensure that every worker is entitled to a minimum daily rest period of 11 consecutive 
hours per 24-hour period.” 
Article 5 stipulates that “Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that, per each seven-day 
period, every worker is entitled to a minimum uninterrupted rest period of 24 hours plus the 11 hours' daily 
rest referred to in Article 3.” 
1027 Article 1 of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 
concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time 
1028 Bidet, A. and Porta, J. (2016) ‘Le travail à l’épreuve du numérique’, Revue droit du travail Dalloz, (5) p. 
328. 
1029 International Labour Office (2015) World employment and social outlook 2015: The changing nature of 
jobs. Geneva: ILO. p. 13. and ILO (no date) The Future of Work We Want: A global dialogue. Available 
at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
cabinet/documents/publication/wcms_570282.pdf (Accessed: 16 May 2018) p. 8 
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clickworking1031 and crowdworking1032 challenge the existing concepts, and at first sight 
they might seem to escape from the scope of the employment relationship.1033, 1034 As the 
existence of an employment relationship does not depend on the will expressed by the 
parties or on the designation the parties gave to their agreement but on the conditions in 
which the activity is performed,1035 it must be carefully analysed whether the conditions in 
order to qualify as an employment relationship are met.1036 
296. Although analysing whether these new forms of work qualify as 
employment or not raises several interesting questions, its analysis would be beyond the 
scope of the dissertation. The dissertation focuses on how the boundaries of personal life 
and professional life are blurred, and not on the blurred boundaries of employment. For the 
main subject of the thesis the emphasis is put on how (prospective) employees’ right to 
 
1030 “Platform work is an employment form in which organisations or individuals use an online platform to 
access other organisations or individuals to solve specific problems or to provide specific services in 
exchange for payment. Source: Platform work (2018) Eurofound. Available 
at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/industrial-relations-dictionary/platform-
work (Accessed: 13 August 2019)  
1031 They are “digital laborers who perform micro tasks via the platforms with the unique, main or secondary 
aim to receive an income or additional income.” Julien, M. and Mazuyer, E. (2018) ‘Le droit du travail à 
l’épreuve des plateformes numériques’, Revue droit du travail Dalloz, (3) pp. 195-196. 
1032 “[Crowdworking] refers to a form of work done by a “crowd” via a digital intermediary based on the 
outsourcing of activities, with piece rate payments. It is about calling a multitude of persons to do a task, the 
crowdworkers offering their labour force.” Julien, M. and Mazuyer, E. (2018) ‘Le droit du travail à l’épreuve 
des plateformes numériques’, Revue droit du travail Dalloz, (3) p. 190. 
1033 Julien, M. and Mazuyer, E. (2018) ‘Le droit du travail à l’épreuve des plateformes numériques’, Revue 
droit du travail Dalloz, (3), p. 191. 
1034 For example, in the case of platform work, at first sight it is the client who gives orders, evaluates and 
controls the service, fixes the price, etc. while the platform “only” ensures a place to make the deal between 
the parties. The worker is free to accept or decline work. However, Mathilde Julien and Emmanuelle 
Mazuyer argue that these are just appearances and further analysis of the real conditions of the execution of 
the relationship is needed in order to apprehend the true role of platforms. Source: Julien, M. and Mazuyer, 
E. (2018) ‘Le droit du travail à l’épreuve des plateformes numériques’, Revue droit du travail Dalloz, (3), p. 
191. 
1035 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, du 17 avril 1991, 88-40.121 (See more on this case in: Champaud, C. 
and Danet, D. (1992) ‘Société en participation. Eléments constitutifs. Distinction du contrat de travail’, RTD 
Com., (1), pp. 196–196.); Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, du 19 décembre 2000, 98-40.572 (See more on 
this case and on the qualification of the employment contract in: Jeammaud, A. (2001) ‘L’avenir sauvegardé 
de la qualification de contrat de travail: à propos de l’arrêt Labbane’, Droit social, (3), pp. 227–238.); 
BH2005. 102; 7001/2005. (MK 170.) FMM-PM együttes irányelv a munkavégzés alapjául szolgáló 
szerződések minősítése során figyelembe veendő szempontokról 
1036 For example, in November 2018 the Court of Cassation pronounced that a subordinate relationship was 
present between the delivery person and the “Take Eat Easy” society, and characterised the delivery person’s 
contract as employment contract. (Cour de cassation, civile, chambre sociale, 28 novembre 2018, 17-20.079) 
In January 2019 the Court of Appeal of Paris ruled that there is an employment contract between an 
independent driver and between the platform Uber. (CA, Paris, Pôle 6, chambre 2, 10 Janvier 2019, n° 
18/08357) Also, in California, an Uber driver was qualified as an employee instead of being qualified as an 
independent contractor. (Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco, Uber Technologies, Inc., A 
Delaware Corporation vs. Barbara Berwick, CGC-15-54378, 2015)  
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privacy and to data protection can be protected on SNSs, and not on who is considered to 
be an employee.1037 
Section 2: “ATAWAD”: AnyTime, AnyWhere, AnyDevice – eroding physical 
boundaries of the workplace 
297.  ATAWAD. The blurring of the boundaries between professional and 
personal life can be effectively described by the acronym of ATAWAD (also a registered 
trademark by Xavier Dalloz since 2002) referring to a connection possible from AnyTime, 
AnyWhere, AnyDevice.1038 In accordance with the three aspects included in this 
expression, the blurring of boundaries will be presented through these three interconnected 
aspects, which were all shaken by technological advances: place of work, working hours 
and equipment used for work. However, as a preliminary point it must be emphasized that 
this phenomenon is mainly relevant for employees performing office work, and especially 
knowledge work.1039, 1040 
§1. “Any time”: working hours 
298. To put it simply, earlier, working time was easy do determine by the place 
of the employee: when the employee was in the workplace, he/she had to work, but when 
he/she was at home (or outside the workplace) he/she was not working. However, 
 
1037 On this subject see more in: Desbarats, I. (2017) ‘Quel statut social pour les travailleurs des plateformes 
numériques ? La RSE en renfort de la loi’, Droit social, (11), pp. 971–983; Gomes, B. (2016) ‘Le 
crowdworking : essai sur la qualification du travail par intermédiation numérique’, Revue droit du travail 
Dalloz, (7), pp. 464–471.; Fabre, A. and Escande-Varniol, M.-C. (2017) ‘Le droit du travail peut-il répondre 
aux défis de l’ubérisation ?’, Revue droit du travail Dalloz, (3), pp. 166–174.; Prassi, J. (2017) ‘Uber devant 
les tribunaux. Le futur travail ou juste un autre employeur’, Revue droit du travail Dalloz, (6), pp. 439–445..; 
Kun, A. (2018) ‘A digitalizáció kihívásai a munkajogban’, in Homicskó, Á. O. (ed.) Egyes modern 
technológiák etikai, jogi és szabályozási kihívásai. Budapest: Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem Állam- és 
Jogtudományi Kar (Acta Caroliensia Conventorum Scientiarum Iuridico-Politicarum, XXII), pp. 119–138.; 
Rácz, I. (2017) ‘A sharing economy munkajogi kihívásai, különös tekintettel az uberizált munkaerőre’, in 
Keserű, B. A. (ed.) Doktori Műhelytanulmányok 2017. Győr: Széchenyi István Egyetem Állam- és 
Jogtudományi Doktori Iskola, pp. 273–284. 
1038 Bathelot, B. (2015) Définition : ATAWAD, Définitions marketing. Available at: https://www.definitions-
marketing.com/definition/atawad/ (Accessed: 15 May 2018); ATAWAD (no date) emarketing.fr. Available 
at: http://www.e-marketing.fr/Definitions-Glossaire/ATAWAD-240581.htm ; (Accessed: 11 May 2018); 
Griguer, M. and Schwartz, J. (2017) ‘Les risques liés à l’implémentation du droit à la déconnexion dans 
l’entreprise’, Cahiers de droit de l’entreprise, (2), p. 51. 
1039 Eurofound and International Labour Office (2017) Working anytime, anywhere: The effects on the world 
of work. Joint ILO–Eurofound report. Luxembourg, Geneva: Publications Office of the European Union, 
International Labour Office. p. 3. The report acknowledges that certain kinds of occupations require the 
physical presence at the workplace or simply do not involve the use of ICT. Source: Ibid. pp. 17-18. 
1040 The detailed rules regarding the matters arising in relation to the place and time of work, and the 
equipment used will be further adressed in Part II. of the dissertation. 
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technological developments have shaken up the world of work in this regard, too. Personal 
life flows into professional life, as employees do not spend their working time exclusively 
working. The personal use of the employer’s (or their own) equipment at the expense of 
working time is a growing issue: it is a growing phenomenon that employees often surf the 
Internet or are connected to their SNS at work, at the expense of working hours.1041 
299.  On the other hand, professional life also flows into the personal life of the 
employee, as in the hectic 21st century it is often an expectation towards employees to 
instantly answer a work e-mail, phone call, instant message – even after working hours. 
Today it is not uncommon that work is not finished when working hours are over: work e-
mails, calls, messages can be received and sent literally any time.1042 This 24 hour 
connectivity poses challenges not only to the separation of work and personal life, but also 
to the health of employees,1043 as it can lead to permanent stress by putting the expectation 
on employees to be available and react rapidly, at any time.1044 With the advent of the 
“Homo connectus” and the widespread use of technology, the rethinking of work-life 
balance must be considered.1045, 1046 
300. Right to disconnect. Although the question of the boundaries of work and 
personal life was already addressed by courts,1047 the development and widespread use of 
 
1041 The time spent on social media during working hours can represent a considerable amount of time. 
According to a report prepared by Bambu by Sprout Social (US), 18 % of the surveyed spend less than 15 
minutes per day on these sites, however, 20 % spend more than an hour on these sites (and 10 % amongst 
them spend more than 2 hours.) According to a study prepared by Olfeo, French employees surf the Internet 
for private purposes for 2 hours 10 minutes daily, and connecting to Facebook is one of the most popular 
activity. According to the results of the PAW (Privacy in the workplace) project in 2012, 39 % of the 
Hungarian employees participating in the survey check social networks at the workplace. Sources: Bambu by 
Sprout Social (no date) Putting Downtime to Work: A Marketing Data Report. Available 
at: https://getbambu.com/blog/data/downtime-to-work-marketing-report/(Accessed: 20 January 2019).; Olfeo 
(2016) Etude 2016 : La réalité de l’utilisation d’Internet au bureau. Available 
at: https://www.euromedia.fr/public/2016/12/etude-olfeo-2016-realite-utilisation-web-au-
bureau.pdf (Accessed: 20 January 2019); Szőke, G. L. (ed.) (2012) Privacy in the workplace. Data protection 
law and self-regulation in Germany and in Hungary. Budapest: HVG-ORAC Lap- és Könyvkiadó, p. 173. 
1042 Ray, J.-E. and Bouchet, J.-P. (2010) ‘Vie professionnelle, vie personnelle et technologies d’information 
et de communication’, Droit social, (1), p. 45. 
1043 INFOREG (2017) ‘De la difficulté d’appliquer le droit à la déconnexion à tous les salariés’, Cahiers de 
droit de l’entreprise, (3), p. 71. 
1044 Mettling, B. (2015) Transformation numérique et vie au travail. p. 35. 
1045 Coelho Moreira, T. (2016) ‘The Electronic Control of the Employer in Portugal’, Labour & Law Issues, 
2(1), pp. 6-7. 
1046 However, ICT can have beneficial effects as well, as these activities might equilibrate themselves through 
transitioning into an implicit give-and-take: it is true that today an employee might spend a part of his/her 
working time buying, for example, a train ticket for the weekend, but the same employee might respond to 
urgent work messages on a Saturday morning. Source: Combrexelle, J.-D. (2010) ‘Vie professionnelle et vie 
personnelle’, Droit social, (1), p. 12. 
1047 The Court of Cassation stated in 2001 that “the employee is obliged neither to accept to work from home, 
nor to install there folders and work equipment”. In 2004 the Court of Cassation confirmed this principle by 
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ICT raises this question with new intensity. France addressed this challenge by 
introducing1048 to its legislation the right to disconnect (“le droit à la déconnexion”),1049 
which means “the employees’ right to not to be connected to a professional digital tool 
during periods of rest and leaves”.1050 
301. According to the FLC, the annual negotiation on professional equality 
between men and women and on quality of worklife has to address the terms of exercising 
the employees’ right to disconnect and the measures that employers adopt regarding the 
use of digital tools in order to ensure the respect of working time and periods of rest and 
leaves and the respect of personal and family life. In the lack of an agreement, the 
employer shall adopt a charter addressing the question of the right to disconnect.1051 
However, when it comes to implementation, the regulation is deficient: although the 
employer faces sanctions if he/she does not negotiate on this question as prescribed by the 
law, there is no sanction if these negotiations do not finish with the adoption of a 
charter.1052 Still, protection can arise from the employer’s obligation regarding the health 
of employees – connected to the overwork and stress caused.1053 
The realisation of this right might take several forms, starting from the blocking of 
professional messaging services, through pop-up windows, to sending the messages with 
delay.1054 The Mettling report in 20151055 drew attention to the fact that the right to 
 
stating that “the fact that the employee could not be reached on his personal phone outside working hours is 
devoid of wrongfulness” therefore could not constitute a legitimate reason for disciplinary dismissal. (Cour 
de cassation, chambre sociale, du 2 octobre 2001, 99-42.727 and Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, du 17 
février 2004, 01-45.889) 
1048 However, Clément Cailleteau further nuanced this statement through referring to already existing 
appearances of this right, such as the right to rest, and was also the subject of certain initiatives of social 
partners. Source : Cailleteau, C. (2018) ‘Temps de travail et droit à la déconnexion’, Lexbase Hebdo - Edition 
Sociale, (750), p. 2. [Page number referring to the online version of the article downloaded 
fromhttp://www.lexbase-academie.fr.bcujas-ezp.univ-paris1.fr/revues-juridiques/46785641-document-
elastique (Accessed: 4 October 2019)] 
1049 This right was inserted into the Labour Code by the Act No. 2016-1088 of 8 August 2016 on labour, the 
modernization of social dialogue and securing professional pathways (loi n° 2016-1088 du 8 août 
2016 relative au travail, à la modernisation du dialogue social et à la sécurisation des parcours 
professionnels). In entered into force on the 1st January 2017. 
1050 Definition provided by Jean-Emmanuel Ray cited in: Griguer, M. (2017) ‘3 questions: Le droit à la 
déconnexion’, La Semaine Juridique Entreprise et Affaires, (30–34), p. 5. 
1051 Subparagraph 7 of Article L2242-17 of the FLC 
1052 Bourgeois, M.-B., Touranchet, L. and Alas-Luquetas, X. (2017) ‘Le droit à la déconnexion’, JCP S 
(Édition sociale), (24), p. 17. Griguer, M. and Schwartz, J. (2017) ‘Les risques liés à l’implémentation du 
droit à la déconnexion dans l’entreprise’, Cahiers de droit de l’entreprise, (2), p. 52. 
1053 Bourgeois, M.-B., Touranchet, L. and Alas-Luquetas, X. (2017) ‘Le droit à la déconnexion’, JCP S 
(Édition sociale), (24), p. 17.  
1054 See more about the realization of the right to disconnect in: Bourgeois, M.-B., Touranchet, L. and Alas-
Luquetas, X. (2017) ‘Le droit à la déconnexion’, JCP S (Édition sociale), (24), p. 17.; Ayache-Revah, I. and 
 191 
 
disconnect is not only a right but also an obligation, and emphasised the co-responsibility 
of employers and employees in this regard.1056 However, it shall not be forgotten that 
although the right to disconnect aims to ensure the respect of working hours, it also 
contributes to more flexibility and certain employees choose it on purpose to work outside 
working hours.1057, 1058 
§2. “Anywhere”: place of work 
302. Traditionally, the place of work and time of work were mutually connected: 
while the place of work implied working hours, non-working hours were automatically 
associated with outside of the physical workplace.1059 Especially the latter is questioned by 
the development of ICT and through the increase of certain atypical forms of employment, 
such as homework or telework. These atypical forms of employment are more affected as 
they have (completely) demolished the physical separation of work and personal life. 
Personal life also flows into professional life, as the use of SNSs is – from a technical point 
of view – not limited to outside of the workplace. As their use is not dependent on the 
 
Galvan, A. (2017) ‘Garantir l’efficacité du droit à la déconnexion, entre obligation et utopie...’, Les cahiers 
du DRH, (245) pp. 5-6. 
1055 The Mettling report addressed the question of the impacts of digital technology on the world of work and 
recognized that the digital revolution caused a change of paradigm in the world of work, affecting a wide 
range of its fields. (p. 5.) The report (1) identified the main impacts of digital technology and (2) the 
consequences that can be drawn from them and (3) proposed solutions to these new challenges. Amongst 
others, the report proposed the acknowledgment of the right and obligation of disconnect, but also addressed 
the questions of management, new forms of performing work, etc. For a summary of the report see: 
Reymann, A. (2015) ‘Transformation numérique et vie au travail’, Les cahiers du DRH, (225), pp. 61–65. 
and Pontif, V. (2016) ‘“Transformation numérique et vie au travail” : les pistes du rapport Mettling’, Revue 
droit du travail Dalloz, (3), pp. 185–187. 
1056 Mettling, B. (2015) Transformation numérique et vie au travail. pp. 20-21.  
1057 For example, it is the case when an employee deliberately chooses to work on a Sunday night in order to 
be able to have a calmer Monday morning at work. Loiseau, G. (2017) ‘La déconnexion-Observations sur la 
régulation du travail dans le nouvel espace-temps des entreprises connectées’, Droit social, (5), p. 464. 
1058 See more on the right to disconnect in: Bourgeois, M.-B., Touranchet, L. and Alas-Luquetas, X. (2017) 
‘Le droit à la déconnexion’, JCP S (Édition sociale), (24), pp. 15–18.; Ayache-Revah, I. and Galvan, A. 
(2017) ‘Garantir l’efficacité du droit à la déconnexion, entre obligation et utopie...’, Les cahiers du DRH, 
(245), pp. 2–7.; Griguer, M. and Schwartz, J. (2017) ‘Les risques liés à l’implémentation du droit à la 
déconnexion dans l’entreprise’, Cahiers de droit de l’entreprise, (2), pp. 50–52.; INFOREG (2017) ‘De la 
difficulté d’appliquer le droit à la déconnexion à tous les salariés’, Cahiers de droit de l’entreprise, (3), pp. 
71–73.; Loiseau, G. (2017) ‘La déconnexion-Observations sur la régulation du travail dans le nouvel espace-
temps des entreprises connectées’, Droit social, (5), pp. 463–470.; Disant, M. et al. (2017) ‘Droit et risque n° 
9 (Suite et fin)’, Les Petites Affiches, (237), pp. 4–23. 
1059 Morgenroth, T. (2016) La vie privée en droit du travail. Doctoral dissertation. Université Lille 2 - Droit 
et Santé. p. 29. 
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exact geographical position of the employee1060 (but on an Internet connection and a 
device), they can be accessed from anywhere, even from the workplace. 
303. The traditional methods of employee monitoring were only capable of 
“keeping an eye on” employees while they were at the workplace, during working hours, 
whereas now, due to technological innovations, monitoring is not limited anymore to the 
physical workplace, it is now possible to watch employees’ every step not only within the 
workplace, but to “follow them home” and monitor their activities outside the 
workplace.1061 It is enough to think of the portable devices that the employee takes outside 
the workplace (work computers, work cell phones, GPS systems) or of the use of SNSs, 
during which the employee provides insight into his/her personal life, conducted beyond 
the boundaries of the workplace. 
§3. “Any device”: equipment used for work 
304. Before, most of the necessary work equipment was in the factory/office/etc. 
and no or very few employees possessed at home the equipment necessary for work. 
Today, a change can be observed regarding the use and spread of these technologies: for 
the first time since the industrial revolution, ICT impacts the personal lives of employees 
as individuals, just as much as their professional lives as employees. Moreover, employees 
often start to use these tools in the course of their personal lives, before entering the 
professional sphere.1062 Employees can bring their devices used for personal purposes (e.g. 
smartphone) or they can bring their devices to the workplace for the purpose of working, 
instead of the employer providing equipment. An example of the latter is the bring your 
own device (hereinafter referred to as: BYOD) phenomenon.1063 Professional devices also 
enter the personal sphere of the employee: employees often take home with them the 
devices provided by the employer (e.g. company phone, company laptop). Also, outside 
 
1060 Except for limited exceptions, such as China, where the biggest social network sites – such as Facebook – 
cannot be accessed unless the user installs a VPN (Virtual Private Network). 
1061 Bibby, A. (2016) You’re being followed Electronic Monitoring and surveillance in the workplace. 
UNI/GS/06-2006/0035/EN. UNI Global Union. Available 
at: http://www.andrewbibby.com/pdf/Surveillance-en.pdf (Accessed: 11 May 2018). p. 2. 
1062 Mettling, B. (2015) Transformation numérique et vie au travail, p. 5. 
1063 See more on data protection requirement during the implementation of BYOD practices in the CNIL’s 
information notice on BYOD (BYOD: what are the good practices?) or the WP29’s Opinion on data 
processing at work. (CNIL (2015) ‘BYOD: quelles sont les bonnes pratiques?’ Available at: 
https://www.cnil.fr/fr/byod-quelles-sont-les-bonnes-pratiques (Accessed: 15 May 2018); WP29 (2017) 
Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. pp. 16-17.); Kun, A. and Rácz, I. (2017) ‘A 
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)-policy jelensége – munkajogi nézőpontból’, Munkajog, 1(1), pp. 40–44. 
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the workplace employees might use their personal devices for professional purposes (e.g. 
sending an e-mail, receiving a phone call). 
305. Such uses might result in a complete blurring of professional and private 
use: employees might use their own devices for work purposes, while those possessing a 
company owned equipment potentially use it for private purposes (e.g. checking Facebook 
from the company’s computer). It raises data protection questions of separating personal 
and professional use of the device when the employer intends to exercise his/her right to 
monitor. One of the most important questions arising in relation to privacy and data 
protection is whether/how the employer can access and control these personal devices that 
are also used for work or control the use of equipment provided by him/her while 
respecting employees’ right to privacy and data protection?1064 
306. Conclusions of Chapter 1. The proliferation of ICT has fundamentally 
altered the way individuals live their lives – including their professional lives as well. 
Amongst the different advantages and disadvantages in relation to ICT and the world of 
work, Chapter 1 focused on how ICT has contributed to the blurred boundaries of work 
and private life, how it challenges and blurs the previously established boundaries through 
breaking down physical, temporal and material separation of work and personal life – as 
the analysis of ATAWAD illustrated. Such a phenomenon raises important questions in 
relation to the monitoring or the control of employees’ work, to defining working hours, to 
the health of employees, etc.1065 
307. As regards ICT use for work, the dichotomy between France and Hungary is 
not considered to be significant for the subject of the dissertation, as its proliferation is 
present in both countries. Naturally, differences in the exact appearance and use of ICT 
might occur between these two countries, but the phenomenon in itself is present in both of 
them – and for the thesis the latter has particular importance, as the possible differences in 
their use do not change the basic characteristic of ICT in relation to blurring the boundaries 
of work and personal life. 
 
1064 These questions will be addressed in detail in Part II. when examining the monitoring of whether the 
employee respects working hours. 
1065 However, besides the difficulties in separating professional and personal life, ICT can provide 
possibilities and facilitate performing working as well. For example, they provide more freedom to the 
employee and can allow performing work in a way which is more convenient to him/her: the employee can 
work from home, sparing hours of public transportation, or can choose his/her working hours in accordance 
with his/her most productive period. Employees in difficult situation (e.g. individuals with disability) might 
also benefit from these innovations.  
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308. Through stating that due to ICT the boundaries of professional and personal 
life have become increasingly blurred, the analysis in Chapter 1 set the general context 
necessary for the further examination of SNSs. As SNSs belong to ICT as well, the 
statements of Chapter 1 are adequately applicable to them as well – however, their 
specificities must be addressed in detail in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 2: The rise of social network sites and its effects on employment 
309. SNSs are worldwide phenomena: in 2017, 71 percent of Internet users were 
social network users.1066 Given their extreme popularity and their embeddedness in 
individuals’ lives, they naturally affect employment as well. With the collision between 
privacy and data protection and the employer’s legitimate interests at the focal point of Part 
I, Chapter 2 aims to examine how employees’ right to privacy and data protection are 
affected by SNSs. 
The primary objective of Chapter 2 is to examine what privacy means in the context 
of SNSs, and in what regards SNSs increase the blur between the boundaries of 
professional and private life. It was demonstrated that the right to privacy protects against 
interference in the private life of the individuals. Jean-Emmanuel Ray recalls the 
phenomenon of the individualisation of private life (“l’individualisation de la vie privée”) 
evoking the thoughts of the sociologist Daniel Cardon, who holds that although the right to 
privacy is traditionally conceived as a protective right, today it is more and more conceived 
as an (individual) liberty, which gains incredible importance in the age of social media 
self-exposure.1067 Regarding privacy protection in our age, the traditional “protective” 
nature of the right to privacy (e.g. the right to be let alone) remains valid, but it has to be 
reconsidered and co-exist with people’s interests in living in a networked society.1068 
In order to provide answers to these questions, first the conceptual foundations of 
SNSs should be clarified. Therefore, first, the main attributes of SNSs will be examined, 
such as their definition and functioning. Second, the legal implications of SNSs will be 
 
1066 Number of social media users worldwide from 2010 to 2021 (in billions) (no date) Statista. Available 
at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/278414/number-of-worldwide-social-network-users/ (Accessed: 20 
January 2019) 
1067 Ray, J.-E. (2015) ‘Actualité des TIC. Tous connectés, partout, tout le temps ?’, Droit social, (6), p. 521. 
1068 Bylund, M. et al. (no date) PRIMA — Privacy Research through the Perspective of a Multidisciplinary 
Mash up. Available at: http://soda.swedish-ict.se/4046/1/PRIMA_final_DOC_17.pdf (Accessed: 12 March 
2018). p. 142. 
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addressed, with the focus being on the right to data protection. Third, privacy issues will be 
treated, through determining, in addition to ICT in general, how SNSs affect the 
boundaries of privacy and the boundaries of personal and professional life.  
Section 1: Conceptual foundations 
In order to be able to assess the legal implications of SNSs, it is necessary to 
understand what SNSs are and how they function. After presenting the history and 
providing a definition of SNSs, their functioning will be described in detail. Naturally, the 
aim of Section 1 is not to provide guidance merely on how these sites work, it rather serves 
as a preparatory Section for addressing privacy and data protection questions: it aims to 
regroup the mainly descriptive presentation of the characteristics of these sites that can 
possibly gain importance when it comes to employees’ rights. It will also contribute to 
better understanding the facts of the relevant cases, analysed in Part II. 
§1. The rise of social network sites 
The following Paragraphs will focus on (A) the history of SNSs, starting with the 
brief presentation of two basic concepts inseparable from the functioning of SNSs: Internet 
and Web 2.0. The topicality and significance of the subject will be illustrated through 
presenting how popular these services have become. After placing SNSs in this context, 
(B) it will be defined what exactly SNSs are. 
(A) History of social network sites 
310. Internet and Web 2.0. According to the statement of András Szekfü, 
Internet is where computer communication on a global and universal network occurs, in a 
packet switched system – by the use of TCP-IP protocol – and from the beginning of the 
1990s, in a graphic user interface: in the system of World Wide Web.1069 The appearance 
and the proliferation of the Internet have completely transformed the way people can 
access information. The Internet as we know today was preceded by various military 
researches from the 1960s. The World Wide Web was created in 1989 by Tim Berners-Lee 
in the Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire (CERN). From 1991 the access to the 
network was available to basically any user in education and research and from 1993 
 
1069 Szekfü, A. (2007) Kommunikáció, nyilvánosság, esélyegyenlőség Magyarországon: a távírótól a Web 
2.0-ig. Budapest: Gondolat, MTA-ELTE Kommunikációelméleti Kutatócsoport. p. 124.  
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anyone could develop the network.1070 Since then, the Internet has conquered the world: 
while in 1995 it had 16 million users worldwide, this number increased up to 3,675 million 
by September 2016.1071, 1072 
311. In addition to the proliferation of the Internet, the appearance and 
widespread use of Web 2.0 technologies is important for the subject of the dissertation. 
Compared to its predecessor, Web 1.0, Web 2.0 enables users to create and share content 
as opposed to the structure of the static Web 1.0.1073 Social media and SNSs are connected 
to Web 2.0 as users themselves fill them up with content within the limits ensured by the 
server host.1074, 1075 Like technological innovations in general, the Internet and Web 2.0 
affect privacy and data protection, by placing the sharing of information data to their 
centre. As Spiros Simitis noted, Internet has redefined how personal data is processed; such 
processing is shifted to the Internet, as more and more areas of life are taking place 
online.1076 Robert Sprague also points out how the use of technology changed; today, 
instead of being merely a source of accessing information, the information sharing nature 
of the Internet is thriving.1077 The Internet goes beyond being merely a technological 
innovation and influences everyday life: it revolutionized the way individuals live, share, 
communicate and consume.1078 
 
1070 Meixner, Z. (2004) Az Internet Rövid Története, HVG. Available 
at: http://hvg.hu/tudomany/20041203interhist (Accessed: 22 September 2017), Szűts, Z. (2015) ‘A Munka 
Világának Online Kommunikációs Kérdései’, Opus et Educatio, 2(2), p. 28. 
1071 Internet Growth Statistics (no date) Internet World Stats. Available 
at: http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm (Accessed: 16 December 2016) 
Regarding users in Europe, Viviane Reading vice president of the EU’s Commission stated that in 1995 at the 
time of the adoption of the DPD, less than 1% of Europeans used the Internet. [European Commission 
(2012) Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of data protection rules to increase users’ control of 
their data and to cut costs for businesses. Press release. Brussels. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-12-46_en.htm(Accessed: 18 January 2019)] 
1072 On the history of the Internet see more in: Leiner, B. M. et al. (1997) Brief History of the 
Internet, Internet Society. Available at: https://www.internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ISOC-
History-of-the-Internet_1997.pdf (Accessed: 22 September 2017) 
1073 The next step of development is the appearance of Web 3.0 (also the so-called semantic web), which is 
based on the semantic tagging of content, integrated and integrable data. Source: Bányai, E. (2016) Közösségi 
média. Közösség vagy média? Pécs: Pécsi Tudományegyetem Közgazdaságtudományi Kar. p. 11. 
1074 Bozarth, J. (2010) Social media for trainers: techniques for enhancing and extending learning. San 
Francisco: Pfeiffer, p. 11. 
1075 On the main characteristics of Web 1.0, Web 2.0, Web 3.0 and social media see more in: Bányai, E. 
(2016) Közösségi média. Közösség vagy média? Pécs: Pécsi Tudományegyetem Közgazdaságtudományi Kar. 
pp. 9-36. 
1076 Simitis, S. (2010) ‘Privacy - An Endless Debate’, California Law Review, 98(6), p. 2003. 
1077 Sprague, R. (2008) ‘Rethinking Information Privacy in an Age of Online Transparency’, Hofstra Labor 
& Employment Law Journal, 25(2), p. 396. 
1078 Falque-Pierrotin, I. (2012) ‘La Constitution et l’Internet’, Les nouveaux cahiers du Conseil 
constitutionnel, (36), p. 31. 
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Table 2.: Comparison of Web 1.0 to Web 2.0 
WEB 1.0 WEB 2.0 
Programmer created web pages, graphics, 
Flash 
User-created Web pages, pictures, user 
reviews, blogs, wikis, YouTube, social 
networks 
Experts create content Everyone creates content 
Individuals visit web pages, read content People construct shared information 
Tightly controlled “sites” Loosely controlled communities 
One-way (one-to-many) Many-to-many (and peer-to-peer) 
Britannica Online Wikipedia 
Publish Participate 
Firewalls, hierarchies Dynamic, non-hierarchal 
Static, stable content, few changes Constantly updated content (Twitter, 
Wikipedia) 
Source: Bozarth, J. (2010) Social media for trainers: techniques for enhancing and extending learning. San 
Francisco: Pfeiffer, p. 12. 
 
312. Appearance and rise of SNSs. Although the first SNS, SixDegrees 
appeared back in 1997,1079 SNSs only became truly widespread in the first decade of the 
21st century. Today’s most known SNSs were launched during the 2000s (for example, 
MySpace and LinkedIn were launched in 2003, Facebook in 2004, YouTube in 2005, 
Twitter in 2006, Instagram in 2010 and Snapchat in 2011), and by the 2010s they 
“conquered the world”, the most popular of them having several millions of users 
worldwide (LinkedIn 303 million, Facebook 2.2 billion, YouTube 1.9 billion, Instagram 1 
billion, Snapchat 291 million active users).1080 Even though there exists no legal obligation 
to create a profile on an SNS, the importance of being present on these platforms suggests 
that it is questioned whether the individual has a true choice regarding engaging in such an 
activity – especially in certain communities, such as in schools.1081 
313. (Future) employees as users. Employees do not make an exception from 
the “SNS fever”: employees and prospective employees use these sites just like any other 
individual. Today not only students are present on these sites (who will grow up and 
become young employees one day), but also people of all generations are users of these 
 
1079 boyd, danah m. and Ellison, N. B. (2008) ‘Social Network Sites: Definition, History and 
Scholarship’, Journal of Computer Mediated Communication, 13(1), p. 214. 
1080 Most famous social network sites worldwide as of October 2018, ranked by number of active users (in 
millions) (2018) Statista. Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-
ranked-by-number-of-users/ (Accessed: 4 January 2018) 
1081 Síthigh, D. M. (2008) ‘The mass age of internet law’, Information & Communications Technology Law, 
17(2), p. 83. 
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sites.1082 It must also be mentioned that SNS use constitutes a “supraglobal” phenomenon: 
the most popular SNS platforms are available in most countries worldwide – with very few 
exceptions.1083 Although labour law regulations are mainly established at the national 
level, the behaviour in which employees engage is “supraglobal”: everywhere where 
employees engage in SNSs, they behave in a similar way – although differences might 
arise in the legal response according to the given country’s labour law regulations.1084 
314. Younger users and the decline of SNSs? In contrast to the popularity of 
SNSs, certain interesting observations were made in relation to the migration of users 
towards other platforms, and also in relation to quitting social media completely. 
According to a social media use forecast of eMarketer, teenagers and young adults will 
start to leave Facebook in favour of other social media sites, such as Instagram, or 
Snapchat.1085 Dailymail has also released an interesting article, describing how teenagers 
have got tired of social media, wishing it had never been invented and what steps they 
made towards decreasing their dependence on these platforms.1086 Although with the 
amount of users they have today it seems unlikely that SNSs will suddenly disappear from 
one day to another, it should be kept in mind that changes in their use (e.g. migration from 
one certain SNS to another one) might occur. 
 
1082 On the distribution of Facebook users of different ages see these statistics of 2014: Distribution of active 
Facebook users worldwide as of 4th quarter 2014, by age (no date) Statista. Available at: 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/376128/facebook-global-user-age-distribution/(Accessed: 17 January 
2017) 
1083 These countries include, for example, China, North-Korea and Iran. Source: List of countries that have 
banned Social Media for its citizens (no date) The Windows Club. Available 
at: https://www.thewindowsclub.com/list-of-countries-that-have-banned-social-media-for-its-
citizens (Accessed: 21 October 2019) 
1084 However, it is interesting to bring attention to certain possible differences in SNS use between different 
generations. Usually, younger people have less concern regarding their privacy, and all the content published 
in these years will be available when they enter the labour market. (Source: Crane, C. (2012) ‘Social 
Networking v. The Employment- at-Will Doctrine: A Potential Defense for Employees Fired for 
Facebooking, Terminated for Twittering, Booted for Blogging, and Sacked for Social 
Networking’, Washington University Law Review, 89(3), pp. 639-640.) William Smith and Deborah Kidder 
pointed out the significance of the generational difference between the young generations and the older ones 
and how these differences can influence the labour market situation of young people. (Source: Smith, W. P. 
and Kidder, D. L. (2010) ‘You’ve been tagged! (Then again, maybe not): Employers and 
Facebook’, Business Horizons, 53(5), p. 497.) The generation of those who have grown up with the Internet 
has a different attitude towards it, expecting that their privacy would be protected in the online world.  
(Source: Newell, B. C. (2011) ‘Rethinking Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Online Social 
Networks’, Richmond Journal of Law and Technology, 17(4), pp. 18-19.) 
1085 Instagram, Snapchat Adoption Still Surging in US and UK - Facebook’s appeal fading further among 
teens and young adults (2017) eMarketer. Available at: https://www.emarketer.com/Article/Instagram-
Snapchat-Adoption-Still-Surging-US-UK/1016369 (Accessed: 10 November 2017) 
1086 Harding, E. (2017) Even teenagers are growing tired of social media: Two thirds say they would not 
mind if it had never been invented, Daily Mail. Available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
4950268/Even-teenagers-growing-tired-social-media.html (Accessed: 10 November 2017) 
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(B) Delimitation of social media and social network sites 
Social media and social network sites are similar, but not synonymous concepts. 
Both of them are based on Web 2.0 and are centred around user-created content.1087 
However, their exact delimitation might differ based on the opinion of different authors, 
but usually SNSs are considered to be one form of social media.1088 
315. Definition of social network sites. When attempting to find a universal 
definition describing SNSs, one comes across numerous definitions as well.1089 The 
situation is exacerbated given that different sites can serve different purposes. Establishing 
one unique definition is also made more difficult by the myriad of the existing SNSs. The 
thematics of these sites can vary: for example, while Facebook, YouTube, Instagram and 
Twitter are “general” social network sites (they are destined for everyone, without bearing 
special thematics), LinkedIn and Viadeo are business centered social network sites, 
Academia and ResearchGate are for researchers, CouchSurfing is for travellers, etc. 
 
1087 According to the OECD, user-created content is “i) content made publicly available over the Internet, ii) 
which reflects a certain amount of creative effort, and iii) which is created outside of professional routines 
and practices.” Vickery, G. and Wunsch-Vincent, S. (2007) Participative Web and User-Created Content. 
Web 2.0, Wikis and Social Networking. OECD Publishing. p. 9. See more in Idem. p. 18. 
1088 Jue, A. L., Marr, J. A. and Kassotakis, M. E. (2010) Social Media at Work. How Networking Tools 
Propel Organizational Performance. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. p. 50.; Klausz, M. (2016) A közösségi 
média nagykönyve: hogyan vidd sikerre céged és önmagad. Budapest: Athenaeum. p. 71.; Flynn, N. 
(2012) The Social Media Handbook. Policies and Best Practices to Effectively Manage Your Organization’s 
Social Media Presence, Posts, and Potential Risks. San Francisco: Pfeiffer. p. 332.; Kaplan, A. M. and 
Haenlein, M. (2010) ‘Users of the world, unite! The challenges and opportunities of Social Media’, Business 
Horizons, 53(1), p. 62. 
1089 According to the OECD, social network sites “enable users to connect to friends and colleagues, to send 
mails and instant messages, to blog, to meet new people and to post personal information profiles.” Vickery, 
G. and Wunsch-Vincent, S. (2007) Participative Web and User-Created Content. Web 2.0, Wikis and Social 
Networking. OECD Publishing. p. 38. 
Nancy Flynn defines social networks as “online platforms where users create profiles, post content, share 
information, and socialize with others.” Source: Flynn, N. (2012) The Social Media Handbook. Policies and 
Best Practices to Effectively Manage Your Organization’s Social Media Presence, Posts, and Potential 
Risks. San Francisco: Pfeiffer. p. 332.  
According to Nathalie Dreyfus, social network sites “[…] are online communication platforms, which allow 
the user to join or to create a network of users who share a common interest. They stand as a website which, 
after a registration which is usually free and requires providing information (name, birthday, e-mail 
address), allows to access a platform of exchange and dialogue.” Cited in: Costes, L. (2011) ‘Réseaux 
sociaux : nouveaux enjeux et nouveaux défis pour les entreprises’, Revue Lamy droit de l’immatériel ex Lamy 
droit de l’informatique, (74), p. 132. 
After analysing the arising legal challenges and the given answers in relation to law and social network sites, 
Valère Ndior proposes the following legal definition, according to which “the common essential criteria of 
social networks would be to constitute a web hosting platform, which act as technical intermediate in order to 
provide to the public, for personal or for professional reasons, means and spaces of communication or 
interaction with other users. The owner of the social network account act as content publisher on a profile 
presumed to constitute a public space, except if the owner demonstrates that the contacts who he/she 
approved constitute a community of interest within which the data published remains under his/her control.” 
Source: Ndior, V. (2015) ‘Le réseau social : essai d’identification et de qualification’, in Ndior, V. (ed.) Droit 
et réseaux sociaux. Issy-les-Moulineaux: Lextenso (Collection LEJEP) p. 35. 
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National SNSs also exist, destined for people living in a given region or country, such as 
the late iwiw in Hungary, Copains d’avant in France, Weibo in China or Mixi in Japan.1090 
316. Ludovic Pailler identified two reference definitions: for US scholars it is the 
one defined by danah m. boyd1091 and Nicole B. Ellison, while European scholars mostly 
refer to the definition established by the WP29.1092 According to danah m. boyd and Nicole 
B. Ellison, social network sites are “[…] web-based services that allow individuals to (1) 
construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of 
other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of 
connections and those made by others within the system.”1093, 1094 Based on the definitions 
established in the article of boyd and Ellison, Dick Stroud proposes to create a “checklist” 
with the main elements of these sites. These elements are: a) possibility to create private or 
public profiles b) identifying a network of contacts c) messaging, communicating with the 
contacts d) content sharing such as photos or videos e) add-value content.1095 
According to the WP29, social network services are “[…] online communication 
platforms which enable individuals to join or create networks of like-minded users.”1096 
The WP29 complements this definition by identifying three common characteristics of 
social network sites: (1) users share their data in order to create profiles or a description of 
themselves, (2) possibility of posting user-generated content, such as videos, photos, etc. 
(3) providing a list of contacts and possibility to interact with these contacts.1097 Lamia El 
Badawi also proposes to identify the common characteristics of SNSs, which are – in my 
 
1090 See more on the different types of social network sites in: Ndior, V. (2015) ‘Le réseau social : essai 
d’identification et de qualification’, in Ndior, V. (ed.) Droit et réseaux sociaux. Issy-les-Moulineaux: 
Lextenso (Collection LEJEP), pp. 17-19. and Clarke, R. (2014) ‘Privacy and Social Media: An Analytical 
Framework’, Journal of Law, Information and Science, 23(1), p. 172. 
1091 danah m. boyd writes her name in lower case on purpose. See: boyd, danah m. (2017) ‘what’s in a 
name?’, https://www.danah.org/name.html. 
1092 Pailler, L. (2012) Les réseaux sociaux sur internet et le droit au respect de la vie privée. Bruxelles: 
Larcier. pp. 16-17. 
1093 boyd, danah m. and Ellison, N. B. (2008) ‘Social Network Sites: Definition, History and 
Scholarship’, Journal of Computer Mediated Communication, 13(1), p. 211. 
1094 Based on this definition, the Council of Europe states that “[a] social networking service is a platform 
which enables the building of social relations among people who share interests, activities, backgrounds or 
real-life connections. It is a web-based service that allows individuals to create a profile, to establish a list of 
users with whom to share views and to develop contacts within the system.” Source: Council of Europe, 
Committee of Ministers (2015) Explanatory memorandum to Recommendation CM/Rec(2015)5 of the 
Committee of Ministers to member States on the processing of personal data in the context of employment. 
par. 45. 
1095 Stroud, D. (2008) ‘Social networking: An age-neutral commodity — Social networking becomes a 
mature web application’, Journal of Direct, Data and Digital Marketing Practice, 9(3), p. 279. 
1096 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. p. 4. 
1097 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. p. 5. 
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opinion – consistent with the above-presented definitions: the creation of a profile, the 
public exposure of contacts and the publishing of content.1098 The three characteristics – 
profile, content, and contacts – are common to all SNSs, although it can differ which one 
of them is more emphatic.1099 
However, despite the establishment of these common characteristics, the evolutive 
nature of SNSs should be taken into consideration. Without questioning the validity of the 
presented “reference definitions”, Valère Ndior suggests adding other attributes, such as its 
extent of openness, the ways of connecting to it and its private or institutional nature, in 
order to better take into consideration the evolutive and hybrid nature of these sites.1100 
317. Definition of social media. SocialMediaToday evokes the definitions 
provided by the Merriam-Webster dictionary.1101 The dictionary defines social media as 
“forms of electronic communication (such as websites for social networking and 
microblogging) through which users create online communities to share information, 
ideas, personal messages, and other content (such as videos)”,1102 while social networking 
as “the creation and maintenance of personal and business relationships especially 
online”.1103 According to Andreas M. Kaplan and Michael Haenlein, social media are 
“[…] a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and 
technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User 
Generated Content[,]”1104 while social network sites are “[…] applications that enable 
users to connect by creating personal information profiles, inviting friends and colleagues 
to have access to those profiles, and sending e-mails and instant messages between each 
other.”1105 
 
1098 El Badawi, L. (2014) ‘La place des réseaux sociaux dans l’entreprise’, Revue Lamy droit de l’immatériel, 
(103), pp. 108-109. 
1099 Pailler, L. (2012) Les réseaux sociaux sur internet et le droit au respect de la vie privée. Bruxelles: 
Larcier. p. 17. 
1100 Ndior, V. (2015) ‘Le réseau social : essai d’identification et de qualification’, in Ndior, V. (ed.) Droit et 
réseaux sociaux. Issy-les-Moulineaux: Lextenso (Collection LEJEP), p. 15. 
1101 Schauer, P. (2015) 5 Biggest Differences between Social Media and Social Networking, 
SocialMediaToday. Available at: http://www.socialmediatoday.com/social-business/peteschauer/2015-06-
28/5-biggest-differences-between-social-media-and-social (Accessed: 22 September 2017) 
1102 Definition of social media (no date) Merriam Webster. Available at: https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/social%20media (Accessed: 22 September 2017) 
1103 Definition of social networking (no date) Merriam Webster. Available at: https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/social%20networking (Accessed: 22 September 2017) 
1104 Kaplan, A. M. and Haenlein, M. (2010) ‘Users of the world, unite! The challenges and opportunities of 
Social Media’, Business Horizons, 53(1), p. 61. 
1105 Kaplan, A. M. and Haenlein, M. (2010) ‘Users of the world, unite! The challenges and opportunities of 
Social Media’, Business Horizons, 53(1), p. 63. 
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318. According to Nancy Flynn, social media refers to “[a] category of Internet-
based resources that facilitate user participation and user-generated content. Social media 
include but are not limited to social networking sites […], microblogging sites […], photo- 
and video-sharing sites […], wikis […], blogs […] and social bookmarking or news 
aggregation sites […].”1106 
319. According to Clara Shih – in consistency with the above-presented 
definitions – the main difference between the two concepts is that while social media are 
content-oriented (they concentrate on the content – photos, videos, comments, etc. – the 
user is just a mere contributor), social network sites focus on human relationships (on 
profiles and relations). Of course, many social network sites also enable users to share 
content (e.g. likes, comments, photos or videos on Facebook), but their role is secondary, 
compared to relationships.1107 In contrast to social media, social network sites enable the 
individual to create his/her own profile, establish and develop relationship with others and 
to “live in the community” through the different services provided by these sites.1108 In 
sum, while content sharing is in the centre of social media, social network sites, as a form 
of social media, have a more personal character and focus on establishing and maintaining 
relationship between users. 
 
Table 3: Most important distinctive criteria between social media and social network sites 
SOCIAL MEDIA SOCIAL NETWORK SITES 
content-oriented user-oriented 
sharing content creation and maintenance of relationships 
one-to-many communication engagement with other users 
Source: the author’s own summary 
 
320. Matters discussed in the dissertation. Social media and SNSs are closely 
related: they are both web-based platforms, based on Web 2.0 technologies, where user-
generated content plays a crucial role in their functioning. SNSs are often considered as a 
 
1106 Flynn, N. (2012) The Social Media Handbook. Policies and Best Practices to Effectively Manage Your 
Organization’s Social Media Presence, Posts, and Potential Risks. San Francisco: Pfeiffer. p. 332. 
1107 Shih, C. (2011) A Facebook kora. Budapest: Kiskapu Kiadó, p. 38. 
1108 Bányai, E. (2016) Közösségi média. Közösség vagy média? Pécs: Pécsi Tudományegyetem 
Közgazdaságtudományi Kar. p. 70. 
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type of social media, and even overlaps can be observed.1109 For the purpose of the thesis, 
their greatest difference is the emphasis regarding their main purpose: while on social 
media the focus is on publishing content, social network sites have more personal 
characteristics and are centred around establishing and maintaining relationships.  
321. Activities both on social media and on social network sites can conflict with 
the interests of the employer, for example, the employee can jeopardize the employer’s 
reputation in a blog entry (social media) or in a post on his/her Facebook account (social 
network site). However, the dissertation will primarily focus on the employee use of social 
network sites for the reason that, since they are centred around relationships, they are more 
closely connected to their personal lives than social media. As the presented definitions 
highlighted, in contrast to social media, SNSs are even more user-oriented and self-
centred, therefore the employee’s personal life is more fundamentally influenced by them. 
Still, social media will not be excluded from the discussion in cases when the publication 
of certain facts on social media belongs to the personal sphere of the individual. 
§2. Functioning of social network sites 
322. It is necessary to present the technical functioning of these sites in order to 
be able to understand what legal challenges their use can lead to in the employment 
relationship. In the following paragraphs, the analysis will be conducted through 
examining different attributes of SNSs, such as what kind of information is available, who 
can publish content and who can access it. 
(A) What can be published? 
The first matter that must be examined is the type of content that can be published on 
SNSs. As a preliminary point it must be noted that content shared on SNSs can either relate 
directly to the employment (e.g. posting an opinion about someone’s supervisor) or can 
relate to a topic not directly relevant to the employment relationship (e.g. expressing one’s 
political opinion).1110 
 
1109 Certain platforms can be considered social media and social network at the same time (e.g. Facebook). 
Source: Burke, F. (2013) Social Media vs. Social Networking, Huffingtonpost. Available at: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/fauzia-burke/social-media-vs-social-
ne_b_4017305.html%202017%2002%2027(Accessed: 22 September 2017) 
1110 Part II. will further adress the topic and will examine in detail what implications these two types of 
content might have on the employment relationship. 
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323. Form. The whole idea of SNS is based on the active participation of the 
user, generating content. The form of the content can vary according to the given SNS, as 
they are structured differently, putting the emphasis on certain forms of sharing content. 
For example, Facebook makes it possible to share different kinds of content, starting with 
status updates, comments, likes, photos, videos, events, etc. YouTube is a video sharing 
platform, while Twitter provides micro-blogging service. On Instagram, users can share 
pictures (and short videos). 
324. Subject. The subject of the content can also vary: even though it is up to the 
user to decide what to share, if the SNS has a specific purpose, it is likely that the content 
will follow that purpose (e.g. LinkedIn focuses on sharing information relating to the 
professional life of the user, while on Instagram or Facebook the user generally shares 
more personal information). Typically, on these sites (usually in their profile) users share 
personal details, such as their name, birthday, e-mail address, workplace, university they 
attended, relationship status, profile pictures, etc. Besides these descriptive personal data, 
users can share a wide range of other type of information, such as pictures, status updates, 
personal entries or videos – it completely depends on them what they are willing to 
share.1111 Users can also interact with others and express themselves through comments, 
posts or likes. 
325. However, personal information about the users can be revealed not only by 
being actively engaged in SNS and explicitly sharing details of their personal lives. 
Besides actively publishing content, other “indirect” information created in the course of 
the normal use of SNSs, such as likes, contact list, events confirmed, membership in 
groups, etc. can reveal a lot about the individual. In sum, these sites can be extremely 
revealing as these data offer insight into the life of the individual, into his/her personality, 
beliefs, relationships, past, interests, current location or mood, etc.1112 
(B) Content relating to whom can be published? 
Naturally, a central role is occupied by the users of SNSs, as they constitute the 
primary actors behind the functioning of SNSs. However, it must also be examined 
 
1111 Except certain strict content that the site’s algorithms try to ban, such as violence, nudity, etc. 
1112 Users tend to act on these sites as if they were celebrities or public figures. Vallet, C. (2012) ‘Le 
dévoilement de la vie privée sur les sites de réseau social. Des changements significatifs’, Droit et société, 
(1), p. 171. 
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whether information relating to other users or even non-users of these sites can appear on 
SNSs. 
326. The user. As SNSs are based on the Web 2.0 technology and are centred 
around the individual, naturally the user himself/herself plays a central role in publishing 
personal information by filling out the profile, using the services or actively posting 
content. 
327. Other users and non-users. In general, it is the user who decides to publish 
his/her personal data. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that it is also possible to 
publish data relating to third parties (e.g. posting a group photo, or posting a video of 
someone, checking-in indicating the current location, etc.). Users can tag each other, which 
means that they can identify someone else in their posts. In these cases, this third party to 
whom the information relates is usually aware of the publication through tagging. 
However, it is also possible to post something without (or against) the consent of another 
user or even without his/her knowledge,1113 or to upload data relating not only to other 
users, but also to non-users of SNSs. Therefore, it is not necessarily due to the individual’s 
carelessness if (compromising) information is shared, as information can be uploaded by a 
third party. In such cases the individual loses control over his/her personal data.1114 
(C) Who can access the content? 
After examining what can be published and by whom/relating to whom, it is 
necessary to examine who can have access to the shared content. The significance of the 
accessibility of the given content will gain utmost importance when it comes to assessing 
the private of public nature of these sites in Part II. 
328. Privacy settings. The visibility of the content depends highly on the use of 
privacy settings, which enable users to decide to whom they disclose their personal data. 
These settings can differ from site to site. The settings can either be customized, enabling 
the user to fine-tune them, or follow the all or nothing approach, when the user can choose 
 
1113 See, for example, the story of Graham Mallaghan, working at the library of University of Kent, who 
found out from an acquaintance that without his knowledge a Facebook group was created, named “For 
Those Who Hate The Little Fat Library Man” in order to insult him. The group had more than 300 hundred 
members. Source: Hammond, E. (2007) No place to hide, Financial Times. Available 
at: https://www.ft.com/content/f6182bc8-85e4-11dc-b00e-0000779fd2ac(Accessed: 9 November 2017) 
1114 Although it is possible to report a content uploaded by another user, it does not provide perfect control, as 
the individual might not be instantly aware of the post or examining the report might take time. 
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between public settings and accessibility only to contacts/friends.1115 Evan North 
differentiated between public (available to the general public), semi-private (available to a 
certain group, such as friends or friends of friends) and private information.1116 For 
example, Facebook makes it possible to carefully tailor the privacy settings: from making 
every content public, to sharing them only with some chosen contacts or even with no one. 
It is also possible to fully customize these settings: theoretically it is possible to define 
different settings for every contact. Twitter and Instagram do not offer such detailed 
settings: either everything is public or everything is available only to friends. 
329. However, challenges rise regarding the effective use of privacy settings. In 
practice, these settings can be difficult for a user to be understood and they are not always 
aware of the real audience of the content published. Also, service providers often change 
these settings. Content can even “escape” from the chosen settings, as users can control the 
visibility of their activity only on certain parts of the site. The privacy settings chosen by 
the user do not always apply, as usually it is possible to publish data outside of the user’s 
profile. For example, generally it is possible to publish content on another user’s profile – 
e.g. to post a picture or make a comment – and in these cases the privacy settings chosen 
by this user will apply. 
330. The elusive concept of “friend”. In relation to the setting “available to 
friends”, attention must be drawn to the fact that the concept of “friend” is elusive as in 
general, a user can have several hundreds of contacts (the average number of friends is 
338).1117 Providing access “only” to friends can mean several hundreds of persons, while 
“friends of friends” can mean several thousands of users, making the given content 
accessible to an extremely large audience. The expression friend used in the offline world 
does not necessarily mean the same thing on SNSs: compared to their offline counterparts, 
online social networks are both vaster and present weaker ties between the individuals, as 
“the threshold to qualify as friend on somebody’s network is low”.1118 
 
1115 Krishnamurthy, B. and Wills, C. E. (2008) ‘Characterizing Privacy in Online Social 
Networks’, Proceedings of the first workshop on Online social networks, Seattle, WA, USA, p. 38. 
1116 North, E. E. (2010) ‘Facebook Isn’t Your Space Anymore: Discovery of Social Networking 
Websites’, Kansas Law Review, 58(5), p. 1288. 
1117 According to Brandwatch.com, in 2016, the average (mean) number of friends was 338, while the median 
(midpoint) number of friends was 200. Source: 47 Facebook Statistics for 2016 (2016) Brandwatch. 
Available at: https://www.brandwatch.com/blog/47-facebook-statistics-2016/(Accessed: 7 January 2017) 
1118 Gross, R. and Acquisti, A. (2005) ‘Information Revelation and Privacy in Online Social 
Networks’, Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society, p. 73. 
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331. These “friends” are added to the contact list during years of social media 
use: (former) classmates from primary school, from high school or from university, 
colleagues from work, family members, etc. who – in the absence of the use of privacy 
settings – can all access the user’s profile. The matter is further complicated by the fact 
that as SNSs are a relatively new phenomenon, clear social conventions regarding their use 
have not yet been established (e.g. when is it impolite to reject a friend request?).1119 Users 
accept friend requests even from strangers, as it was demonstrated by an experiment 
conducted by Sophos. In this experiment, 41% of the participating users accepted a friend 
request received from Freddy Staur, who was a profile created for a green frog.1120 
However, other researches report increased consciousness from users, who are becoming 
more active in pruning and managing their accounts.1121 
332. Visibility not determined by the individual. In the case of Facebook, users 
can post content to another user’s so called “wall” or leave comments under content on 
his/her wall. In this case the visibility will be defined by the privacy settings chosen by the 
other user. It is also possible to post content in events or groups. The privacy settings of 
these events and groups will depend on the choice of their creator (or the administrators, if 
the creator has appointed one).1122 Naturally, if the user creates these platforms, it is the 
user who decides what privacy settings to apply; otherwise he/she will have to accept the 
fact that he/she cannot control to whom the content might become available.1123 
333. One-to-one communication on SNSs. Usually, it is also possible to engage 
in one-to-one communication through sending a message to another user’s or users’ 
messaging inbox (e.g. Facebook Messenger or Instagram Direct). In such a case, the 
discussion will be available only to the participants, and non-participants cannot access it 
(unless they receive an invitation). Such messaging systems are very similar to e-mails. 
 
1119 Van Eecke, P. and Truyens, M. (2010) ‘Privacy and social networks’, Computer Law and Security 
Review, 26(5), p. 536. 
1120 See more on this experiment in: Sophos Facebook ID probe shows 41% of users happy to reveal all to 
potential identity thieves (2007) Sophos. Available at: https://www.sophos.com/en-us/press-office/press-
releases/2007/08/facebook.aspx(Accessed: 7 January 2017) 
1121 Madden, M. (2012) Privacy management on social media sites. Pew Research Center. Available 
at: http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Privacy_management_on_social_media_sit
es_022412.pdf (Accessed: 21 May 2018) 
1122 On Facebook an event can be public (everyone sees it) or private (only invited guests see it), while a 
group can be public (everyone can see the members of the group and the posts in it), closed (the members are 
visible by everyone, but the posts are not) or secret (only people who have been granted access can see the 
members and the content). 
1123 On the functioning and challenges related to social network sites – such as the content published, the 
elusive concept of “friends” or the use of privacy settings – see also: Vallet, C. (2012) ‘Le dévoilement de la 
vie privée sur les sites de réseau social. Des changements significatifs’, Droit et société, (1), pp. 163–188. 
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Table 4: Functioning of social network sites: what, whose personal data can be published and to 
whom they are available 
TYPE OF PERSONAL 
DATA 
Descriptive 
personal data 
(e.g. name, e-mail address, phone 
number, birthday, etc.) 
Other personal data (e.g. photos, videos, likes, status updates, 
etc.) 
PERSONS TO WHOM 
PERSONAL DATA CAN 
RELATE 
User  
Third party another user 
not user 
VISIBILITY OF 
PERSONAL DATA 
(PRIVACY SETTINGS) 
All or nothing public 
(everyone on the Internet) 
private 
(“only” contacts of the user) 
Customized (e.g. Facebook) 
“LOCATION” OF 
PERSONAL DATA 
User’s own profile privacy settings chosen by the user apply 
Other (other user’s 
profile, events, 
groups) 
privacy settings chosen by another party 
apply 
Source: the author’s own summary  
 
334. In sum, users can share all kinds of personal data, typically relating to their 
private or personal life. It is also possible that third parties publish data relating to the user 
– excluding such content from the control of the employee. Although privacy settings can 
be applied in order to define which audience can have access to the content, there are two 
problems with these settings. First, if they follow the all-or-nothing approach, in the best-
case scenario they will allow access to contacts or friends, which was proved to be an 
elusive concept. Second, although customizable privacy settings theoretically enable the 
user to share the given content with a chosen audience, in practice the mastering of such 
settings is difficult. In practice, users are often mistaken regarding the audience that can 
have access to the given content.1124 Understanding the functioning of SNSs is inevitable in 
order to address the arising legal challenges associated with its use. On the one hand, – as 
it will be discussed in Section 2 – such a use raises several questions in terms of privacy 
and data protection law in general. On the other hand, besides these “general” data 
protection issues, challenges specific to the employment relationship arise as well: as 
employees are among users as well, their activities on SNSs might raise specific privacy 
and data protection questions in relation to their employment relationship. 
 
1124 Sprague, R. (2011) ‘Invasion of the Social Networks: Blurring the Line Between Personal Life and the 
Employment Relationship’, University of Louisville Law Review, 50(1), p. 15.; Kajtár, E. and Mestre, B. 
(2016) ‘Social networks and employees’ right to privacy in the pre-employment stage: some comparative 
remarks and interrogations’, Hungarian Labour Law E-journal, (1), pp. 24-25. 
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Section 2: Legal implications and social network sites 
335. Existence of a “social media law”? Even though SNSs are relatively recent, 
it does not mean that they exist in a juridical vacuum. Discussions regarding the existence 
of a separate social media law have emerged. Daniel Solove aptly phrased it: “[n]ew 
technologies rarely give rise to questions we have never addressed before. More often they 
make the old questions more complex.”1125, 1126 Indeed, applying existing rules – that were 
adopted in a different context – to these new phenomena can entail difficulties.1127 
However, in the Anglo-Saxon community there is tendency to treat these problems as 
separate,1128 specific to social media, resulting in the creation of a “social media law”.1129 
In contrast to this approach, Valère Ndior suggests that SNSs should be attached to the 
already existing legal categories.1130 George Weir, Fergus Toolan and Duncan Smeed also 
argue that SNSs do not raise fundamentally new challenges but alter already existing 
threats.1131 
336. SNSs did not bring into existence the collision of rights in the employment 
relationship, it had already existed before SNSs; but they altered it. Therefore, based on the 
above, I hold the view that there is no need to create a new social media law for employee 
privacy; instead, it should be examined whether and with what alterations already existing 
provisions can regulate the question. 
 
1125 Solove, D. J. (2007) The Future of Reputation. Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet. New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press. p. 105. 
1126 Bill Thompson expresses a similar opinion stating that these new innovations of the online world do not 
raise fundamentally new questions compared to the physical world. Thompson, B. (2007) ‘The Breaking 
Wave: New Law for a Wired World?’, International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 21(3), pp. 
222-223. 
1127 Costes, L. (2011) ‘Réseaux sociaux : nouveaux enjeux et nouveaux défis pour les entreprises’, Revue 
Lamy droit de l’immatériel ex Lamy droit de l’informatique, (74), p. 137. 
1128 Eric Goldman describes what phases Internet (and SNS) regulation went through and what exceptions 
were applied to it, treating it as a new emerging field of law. Goldman, E. (2009) The Third Wave of Internet 
Exceptionalism. Available at: https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/03/the_third_wave.htm(Accessed: 
20 January 2019). 
1129 Ndior, V. (2015) ‘Le réseau social : essai d’identification et de qualification’, in Ndior, V. (ed.) Droit et 
réseaux sociaux. Issy-les-Moulineaux: Lextenso (Collection LEJEP), p. 11.  
1130 Ndior, V. (2015) ‘Le réseau social : essai d’identification et de qualification’, in Ndior, V. (ed.) Droit et 
réseaux sociaux. Issy-les-Moulineaux: Lextenso (Collection LEJEP), 11-12. 
1131 Weir, G. R. S., Toolan, F. and Smeed, D. (2011) ‘The threats of social networking: Old wine in new 
bottles?’, Information Security Technical Report, 16(2), p. 38. 
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337. SNSs raise a multitude of legal questions in fields such as cyber bullying, 
providing proof in legal proceedings, defamation and libel, etc.1132 However, addressing all 
these legal questions in detail would go beyond the scope of the dissertation. 
Consequently, Section 2 – in relation with the main subject of the dissertation – will focus 
on the right to respect for private life and on the right to data protection. 
§1. Documents addressing social network sites and privacy/data protection 
338. Despite the existence of the general data protection framework (such as the 
DPD or the GDPR), it is welcomed that different organs and institutions have recognized 
their importance and the need to address them specifically. As a result, they adopted 
various documents targeting especially social media and data protection law.1133 These 
documents usually emphasize the topicality and the importance of the subject and raise 
awareness to the privacy/data protection risks they can cause. However, they do not 
provide an exhaustive guidance, neither are they legally binding. 
339. European Union. Among these documents, the first was the European 
Union Agency for Network and Information Security’s (hereinafter referred to as: ENISA) 
position paper, entitled Security Issues and Recommendations for Online Social Networks 
(October 2007).1134 In this document, the ENISA recognizes the expansion of SNSs and 
analyses the different risks posed by them (such as for example data aggregation, 
secondary collection, identity theft or stalking), and the recommendations given in 
response to these risks, emphasizing the importance of raising awareness, reviewing the 
existing regulations or suggesting technical solutions. 
340. In 2009, the WP29 adopted Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking.1135 
The Opinion adopts a more practical point of view through the analysis of how the main 
points of the DPD could be applied to SNSs (such as who the data controller is, data 
security measures, how data subjects could exercise their rights, what information shall be 
provided to them, etc.). In 2018, the WP29 expressed its full support for the investigations 
conducted by national DPAs, taking place to examine recent data protection scandals (e.g. 
 
1132 For more on law and social media and/or SNSs see in: Stewart, D. R. (ed.) (2013) Social media and the 
law: a guidebook for communication students and professionals. New York and London: Routledge; 
Lambert, P. (2014) International Handbook of Social Media Laws. Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury 
1133 See Annex I. on the summary table concerning the most important international documents in the field of 
privacy, data protection, data protection and employment, and data protection and social network sites. 
1134 Security Issues and Recommendations for Online Social Networks (2007). Position Paper. ENISA. 
1135 WP29 (2009) Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking. 01189/09/EN WP 163.  
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Cambridge Analytica) and announced the establishment of a Social Media Working Group 
to develop a long-term strategy on the issue.1136  
341. In the same year, different major SNS providers signed an agreement, 
entitled Safer Social Networking Principles for the EU, in consultation with the European 
Commission.1137 This agreement especially targeted the protection of young users and 
minors, and aims to give guidance regarding how to minimize potential harm to them by 
outlining different best practices.1138 The document outlines the principles by which SNS 
providers should be guided as they seek to help minimize potential harm to children and 
young people, and recommends a range of good practice approaches which can help 
achieve those principles. 
342. International Working Group on Data Protection in 
Telecommunications.1139 Another very important document is the “Rome Memorandum”, 
issued by the International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications 
(hereinafter referred to as: IWGDPT) in March 2008.1140 In this document, the IWGDPT 
enumerates the change of paradigm in the sharing of personal data, both regarding its 
unprecedented scale and the novelty that they are published at the initiative of the user 
himself/herself. The Memorandum details the risks related to social network sites (such as 
the not forgetting nature of the Internet, the deceptive notion of “friends” and community, 
the possible vetting of these sites by the employer, just to mention a few examples that can 
have relevance in the employment context, too) and then provides guidance to regulators 
and to the providers of these services on how these risks could be reduced. 
 
1136 “Sorry is not enough”: WP29 establishes a Social Media Working Group (2018). Available 
at: https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-04-11_wp29_press_release_en.pdf (Accessed: 20 
January 2019) 
1137 Safer Social Networking Principles for the EU (2009). Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/sites/digital-agenda/files/sn_principles.pdf (Accessed: 20 January 2019) 
1138 Safer Social Networking Principles for the EU (2009). Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/sites/digital-agenda/files/sn_principles.pdf (Accessed: 20 January 2019) p. 1. 
1139 The International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications (also called Berlin group as 
the secretariat is provided by the data protection authority of Berlin) was established in 1983 at the initiative 
of national data protection authorities in the world. It has among its members national data protection 
authorities, as well as representatives from the private and NGO sectors. Source: European Data Protection 
Supervisor (no date) Glossary. Available at: https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/data-
protection/glossary/b_en(Accessed: 20 January 2019). Although the IWGDPT adopts proposals and 
recommendations that are legally not binding, due to its composition, these documents can serve as important 
guideline to countries as well. 
1140 International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications (2008) Report and Guidance on 
Privacy in Social Network Services - ”Rome Memorandum” -. 675.36.5. Rome 
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343. International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy 
Commissioners.1141 In October 2008, the 30th International Conference of Data Protection 
and Privacy Commissioners adopted the Resolution on Privacy Protection in Social 
Network Services.1142 The Resolution briefly describes the new challenges posed by social 
network sites and provides recommendations not only to service providers but also to 
users. These recommendations destined for users include a call for increased consciousness 
from users (notably regarding the use of pseudonyms and considering that they might be 
later confronted with the shared information, for example, during a job interview) and 
draw attention to the importance of respecting other individuals’ privacy.1143 
344. Council of Europe. In 2011, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary 
Assembly adopted a resolution on The protection of privacy and personal data on the 
Internet and online media,1144 in which the CoE emphasized the importance of privacy and 
data protection in the age of ICT developments. In 2012, the CoE adopted its 
Recommendation on the Protection of Human Rights with Regard to Social Networking 
Services.1145 The Committee of Ministers emphasized the growing role of SNSs in 
promoting (or hindering) the exercise or enjoyment of human rights. In the Appendixes of 
the Recommendation attention is drawn to the importance of what measures should be 
taken in order to make users capable of dealing with these platforms, how children and 
young people can be protected and how these platforms could operate. 
345. The merits and shortcomings of these international legal documents. 
These documents are significant in acknowledging the importance of SNSs in modern 
societies and recognize the need to provide legal regulation. They identify the possible 
risks and suggest different solutions to cope with them, contributing to enhancing privacy 
and data protection, and also to raising awareness to the issue. 
Still, since these documents do not have obligatory force, their enforcement in 
practice might face certain difficulties. As regards the subject of the dissertation, another 
 
1141 The International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners is a global forum of data 
protection authorities, established in 1979, seeking to provide leadership in reaction to privacy and data 
protection on an international scale. The Conference is held at least once a year. 
1142 30th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners (2008) Resolution on 
Privacy Protection in Social Network Services. Strasbourg 
1143 30th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners (2008) Resolution on 
Privacy Protection in Social Network Services. Strasbourg, p. 2. 
1144 Council of Europe (2011) The protection of privacy and personal data on the Internet and online media. 
Resolution 1843 (2011) 
1145 Council of Europe (2012) ‘Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
States on the protection of human rights with regard to social networking services’  
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significant lack is that these documents dealt with the question of SNSs from a general 
point of view and did not focus specifically on employment. During the research I have not 
found any legal document that would exhaustively co-regulate the specific question of 
privacy/data protection and social network sites in the employment context.  
Despite the lack of a document exhaustively addressing employment and SNSs, it is 
a great achievement that the latest documents on privacy and data protection at work at 
least mention social network sites. Still, these documents usually contain only few 
provisions; they do not regulate the question exhaustively. Among these documents, the 
CoE’s recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the processing 
of personal data in the context of employment (2015)1146 and the Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party’s opinion on data processing at work (2017)1147 should be 
mentioned. These provisions will be addressed in detail in Part II. of the dissertation. 
§2. Social network sites and data protection 
346. Despite the fact that the general data protection regime – such as earlier the 
DPD and now the GDPR – is applicable to social network sites, in practice it is not always 
obvious how the general data protection rules laid down in different documents should be 
applied in the context of SNSs. In the following paragraphs, “general” data protection 
challenges will be presented, such as how the SNS’s operator should comply with 
regulations in order to ensure individuals’ right to data protection. The exhaustive 
examination of such questions extends beyond the scope of the dissertation, as the main 
focus of the thesis is concentrated on the joint examination of labour law and data 
protection law – addressed in detail in Part II. Therefore, in the following paragraphs only 
the questions worth further researching will be discussed in order to provide insight into 
this other field related to data protection. 
347. Controllership and scope. In relation to the EU data protection framework, 
an important question is who can qualify as data controller. This question is of high 
significance as controllers are bound by several obligations laid down in the GDPR. It is 
uncontested that SNS providers qualify as data controllers1148, 1149 and are subject to the 
 
1146 “5.3. Employers should refrain from requiring or asking an employee or a job applicant access to 
information that he or she shares with others online, notably through social networking.” 
1147 See the section “5.1 Processing operations during the recruitment process”. 
1148 Kosta, E. et al. (2010) ‘Data protection issues pertaining to social networking under EU 
law’, Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy, 4(2), p. 196. and Garrie, D. B. et al. (2010) 
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responsibilities of the data controller. However, the question arises whether an individual 
user who decides to upload personal data relating to another person qualifies as a 
controller. 
348. A strict reading of the GDPR would result in qualifying the user as 
controller, as the user can determine the purposes (e.g. self-expression) and the means (e.g. 
choosing a video, a photo or a written post, etc.) of processing.1150 However, imposing 
controller’s responsibilities on users is not without questions, as according to the 
household exception, the regulation should not be applied to processing “by a natural 
person in the course of a purely personal or household activity.”1151, 1152 
Under the DPD it was debated whether the household exemption applies (should 
apply) to SNS users or not;1153 as it was drafted before the Web 2.0 era, in the premature 
 
‘Data Protection: The Challenges Facing Social Networking’, Brigham Young University International Law 
& Management Review, 6(2), p. 131.; WP29 (2009) Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking. 
01189/09/EN WP 163, p. 5. 
Recital (18) of the GDPR clearly states that it applies to SNS operators (and to other actors who make it 
possible for users to use these services). The CoE adopts the same view when stating in par 45. of the 
explanatory memorandum of Recommendation CM/Rec(2015)5 on the processing of personal data in the 
context of employment that “[c]ontrollers of social networking services are themselves bound to the 
principles of data protection and to the correspondent obligations, especially in terms of information, 
violations of terms of service and proportionality.” 
1149 Besides determining who the controller is, it might also raise difficulties to differentiate between the 
controller and the processor when it comes to different actors providing services in relation to SNSs (e.g. 
SNS operator, user or application provider). They can simultaneously be qualified, as controllers and 
processors, depending on who is defining the purpose and means of the processing. On these questions see 
more in: Van Alsenoy, B. et al. (2009) ‘Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data protection 
regulations?’, Identity in the Information Society, 2(1), pp. 68-69.; Van Eecke, P. and Truyens, M. (2010) 
‘Privacy and social networks’, Computer Law and Security Review, 26(5), pp. 537-539. 
1150 Garrie, D. B. et al. (2010) ‘Data Protection: The Challenges Facing Social Networking’, Brigham Young 
University International Law & Management Review, 6(2) p. 131.; Van Alsenoy, B. et al. (2009) ‘Social 
networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data protection regulations?’, Identity in the Information 
Society, 2(1), p. 70. 
1151 Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the DPD; Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the GDPR 
1152 However, in a 2018 CJEU case, the CJEU held that the operator of a Facebook fan page is considered to 
be a controller. Source: CJEU (2018): Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein, Case C-210/16, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:388, 5 June 
1153 The starting point is the CJEU’s Lindqvist decision, in which the court held that the household exception 
does not apply to cases when the individual publishes personal data on the Internet in a way that the data is 
accessible to an indefinite number of people. [CJEU (2003): Bodil Lindqvist, Case C-101/01, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:596, 6 November, par. 47.] In conformity with this decision, according to the WP29, the 
household exemption applies to most SNS users, but it does not apply to those who use SNSs for professional 
purposes (e.g. acting on behalf of a company or association, or promoting commercial, political or charitable 
goals). Also, when access is granted to a high number of users or extends beyond self-selected contacts (e.g. 
access to profile is not restricted through privacy settings or the data is indexable by search engines), the use 
extends beyond the personal sphere. WP29 (2009) Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking. 
01189/09/EN WP 163, pp. 5-6. In contrast, Patrick Van Eecke and Maarten Truyens argue that most users 
cannot rely on the exception and argue in favour of its strict application. (Van Eecke, P. and Truyens, M. 
(2010) ‘Privacy and social networks’, Computer Law and Security Review, 26(5), p. 540.) According to 
Rebecca Wong and Joseph Savirimuthu, it is unlikely that the (narrow interpretation of the) household 
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stages of the Internet, it did not contain any provisions specifically aimed at SNSs.1154 
However, the GDPR put an end to this discussion – contrarily to what had been previously 
stated in the Lindquist case –1155, as amongst the examples falling under the exception, it 
explicitly mentions the use of SNSs by individuals. Despite the GDPR regulating this 
issue, it is not without merit to recall different arguments from the previous discussions 
when the DPD was in force in order to nuance the picture. While it is true that subjecting 
SNS users to the same obligations as organisational data controllers, such as SNS 
operators, is not advisable,1156 nor is it realistic or enforceable;1157 at the same time it 
should be kept in mind that the formulation of the household exception took place before 
Web 2.0 technologies gaining ground, with the aim to cover innocuous processing. 
However, in the light of today’s SNSs, storage capacity, network connectivity, the ease 
with which an individual can possibly publish detailed information relating to third parties, 
SNSs do not weigh the same as personal phone registers from the time of the adoption of 
the DPD.1158 So while the GDPR correctly acknowledged that users should not be subject 
to the same obligations as organisational controllers, the possible processing conducted by 
them could potentially do serious harm to third persons’ rights, making it desirable to re-
evaluate the existing black and white situation.1159, 1160 
 
exception applies to users of SNSs (Wong, R. and Savirimuthu, J. (2008) ‘All or Nothing: This is the 
Question? The Application of Art. 3(2) Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC to the Internet’, John Marshall 
Journal of Computer & Information Law, 25(2), p. 265.; while Brendan Van Alsenoy et al. argues that users 
definitely fall under the DPD if their profile is set to public, but it is disputable whether private profiles are 
covered by the exception. (Van Alsenoy, B. et al. (2009) ‘Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound 
by data protection regulations?’, Identity in the Information Society, 2(1), p. 75.) 
1154 Wong, R. (2008) ‘Social Networking: Anybody is a Data Controller’. Available 
at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1271668 (Accessed: 20 January 2019). p. 2.; Garrie, 
D. B. et al. (2010) ‘Data Protection: The Challenges Facing Social Networking’, Brigham Young University 
International Law & Management Review, 6(2) p. 142. 
1155 Klein, T. and Tóth, A. (eds) (2018) Technológia jog - Robotjog - Cyberjog. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer 
Hungary, p. 45. 
1156 Garrie, D. B. et al. (2010) ‘Data Protection: The Challenges Facing Social Networking’, Brigham Young 
University International Law & Management Review, 6(2) p. 133. 
1157 Wong, R. (2008) ‘Social Networking: Anybody is a Data Controller’. Available 
at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1271668 (Accessed: 20 January 2019). p. 13. 
1158 Van Eecke, P. and Truyens, M. (2010) ‘Privacy and social networks’, Computer Law and Security 
Review, 26(5), p. 539. 
1159 Among the proposed solutions to this problem, drafting a new category for individual controllers 
(including, for example, SNS users) (Garrie, D. B. et al. (2010) ‘Data Protection: The Challenges Facing 
Social Networking’, Brigham Young University International Law & Management Review, 6(2) p. 134.), or 
assessing the qualitative and quantitative change in sharing personal data (e.g. publishing a vast amount of 
videos possibly containing sensitive information) was raised. (Van Eecke, P. and Truyens, M. (2010) 
‘Privacy and social networks’, Computer Law and Security Review, 26(5), p. 540.)  
1160 On the detailed analysis of the notion of controller and the scope of the household exception under the 
DPD see more in: Garrie, D. B. et al. (2010) ‘Data Protection: The Challenges Facing Social 
Networking’, Brigham Young University International Law & Management Review, 6(2) pp. 127-152.; Van 
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349. Determining the scope of the household exemption can raise very similar 
questions to those arising during the assessment of the private or public nature of SNSs 
during expressing oneself (to be further presented in Part II.); to which analysis the 
observation considering the material scope might serve as useful guidance. With regard to 
the household exception, the Lindqvist decision of the CJEU linked the exemption’s 
applicability to two criteria: the processing must be carried out “in the course of private 
and family life” and personal data published on the Internet should not be available to an 
indefinite number of users on the Internet.1161 This raises the questions of access (private or 
public) and the scope of persons (“in the course of private and family life”) having access 
to the content. 
First, the decision created a separation between private and public access on the 
Internet.1162 However, in the context of SNSs this solution is criticised as being arbitrary, 
as even when privacy settings are used, the data might be available to a high number of 
contacts,1163 allowing access to an audience beyond the legislator’s original intent.1164 
Rebecca Wong and Joseph Savirimuthu also qualifies this narrow dichotomy as 
undesirable, as it can inhibit the proper use of SNSs.1165 Second, in relation to the 
individuals who can have access to the content doubts arise, as a narrow interpretation 
might limit this to access only to family members, while a broad interpretation would 
allow access to other persons as well.1166, 1167 
 
Alsenoy, B. et al. (2009) ‘Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data protection 
regulations?’, Identity in the Information Society, 2(1), pp. 65-79.; Wong, R. (2008) ‘Social Networking: 
Anybody is a Data Controller’. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1271668 
(Accessed: 20 January 2019); Wong, R. and Savirimuthu, J. (2008) ‘All or Nothing: This is the Question? 
The Application of Art. 3(2) Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC to the Internet’, John Marshall Journal of 
Computer & Information Law, 25(2), pp. 241–266.; de Terwangne, C. (2015) ‘L’exception concernant les 
traitements de données à des fins personnelles et domestiques de la directive 95/46 relative à la protection des 
données’, Revue du Droit des Technologies de l’Information, (58), pp. 45–51. 
1161 Van Alsenoy, B. et al. (2009) ‘Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data protection 
regulations?’, Identity in the Information Society, 2(1), p. 73. 
1162 Wong, R. and Savirimuthu, J. (2008) ‘All or Nothing: This is the Question? The Application of Art. 3(2) 
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC to the Internet’, John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law, 
25(2), p. 247. 
1163 Van Alsenoy, B. et al. (2009) ‘Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data protection 
regulations?’, Identity in the Information Society, 2(1), p. 75. 
1164 Though with regard to SNSs, it would have been useful to specify the limits of the “indefinite number of 
users”. 
1165 Wong, R. and Savirimuthu, J. (2008) ‘All or Nothing: This is the Question? The Application of Art. 3(2) 
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC to the Internet’, John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law, 
25(2), p. 256. 
1166 Wong, R. and Savirimuthu, J. (2008) ‘All or Nothing: This is the Question? The Application of Art. 3(2) 
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC to the Internet’, John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law, 
25(2), p. 256. 
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350. Lawful ground for processing. An SNS provider (or an application 
provider) might process personal data based on the grounds of consent, necessity for 
performance of a contract or the balancing of rights and interests.1168 Here, it is especially 
interesting to present a few thoughts on the question of consent as a lawful ground of 
processing. 
Although the GDPR made it clear that pre-ticked boxes should not constitute 
consent,1169 questions still arise, such as whether privacy policies make it possible to make 
an informed consent,1170 or whether the consent is truly voluntary. Users do not have the 
power to negotiate with the SNS provider, either they accept the privacy policy imposed on 
them as such, or they must refrain from using such services. Also, most sites do not have 
alternatives, which means that everyone is member of a specific site, then in order to be 
able to communicate with his/her friends, the user must choose this site, and not a similar 
one, with better data conditions of data processing. Today, given the importance of SNSs 
in everyday life and the fact that users do not have a true choice, the question arises 
whether the consent was truly voluntary or not. 
351. Data protection principles. From a general data protection aspect different 
questions need to be answered regarding data protection principles. As data controllers, 
organizational data controllers must comply with the data protection principles. Different 
questions arise in relation to the principle of proportionality and necessity. First, when a 
user decides to register on an SNS, the question is whether the personal data that the user is 
obliged to provide in order to create an account are indeed necessary to use the service 
(e.g. being obliged to use his/her real name, or having the possibility to choose a 
pseudonym).1171 As regards the storage of personal data, questions might also arise in 
 
1167 For example, the Belgian Privacy Commission interpreted personal use in the context of sharing pictures 
as processing for the sole purpose of distribution among a selected (‘definable’) group of friends, family 
members or acquaintances, for example, sending them as an e-mail attachment or uploading them to a 
secured website, which is only available to the relevant family members and is not indexable by search 
engines. The Dutch Data Protection Authority also adopted a very similar approach. (Van Alsenoy, B. et 
al. (2009) ‘Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data protection regulations?’, Identity in the 
Information Society, 2(1), p. 74.) However, in the light of the customizable privacy settings that certain SNSs 
provide to users, even SNSs can provide this level of privacy if the contacts are indeed limited in number and 
carefully chosen and authorized by the user, and no other persons can access the content. 
1168 Van Eecke, P. and Truyens, M. (2010) ‘Privacy and social networks’, Computer Law and Security 
Review, 26(5), pp. 542-543. 
1169 Recital (32) of the GDPR 
1170 On certain issues regarding Facebook’s privacy policies see more in: Jaeger, E. (2015) ‘Facebook 
Messenger: Eroding User Privacy in Order to Collect, Analyze and Sell Your Personal Information’, The 
John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law, 31(3), pp. 393–421. 
1171 WP29 (2009) Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking. 01189/09/EN WP 163, p. 11. 
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relation to necessity and proportionality as infringements are possible. An extreme 
example is pointed out by Evelyne Sørensen, who described how Facebook users could not 
practice self-censorship because even if they started to type something, then decided not to 
post but to delete it, Facebook store that information.1172 Up-to-dateness might also be 
questioned, as on these sites personal data back to several years can be aggregated. A 
solution might be to set the default settings to delete personal data published by users after 
a determined period (for example, 3 years), and those users who wish should take active 
steps and change the default settings. 
352. Transparency is a crucial question as well. SNS operators lay down the 
rules and the conditions of using their services in their privacy policy in a unilateral 
document, the terms of which are solely defined by the site operator. The user does not 
have the possibility to negotiate those terms and conditions and has to accept them when 
registering to the service. Theoretically, users can learn more about data processing 
operations from these policies, in practice various difficulties arise: because of the lengthy 
wording, users usually do not read such policies, and even if they read them, they do not 
understand its provisions, and even if they understand them, they do not have the necessary 
background knowledge in order to make an adequate, informed decision.1173 
353. SNS operators and the employment context. Although in the above data 
protection principles were examined from a general angle, these issues might have 
relevancy in the employment context as well. Having the possibility to use these sites 
under a pseudonym might “break” the connection between the employee and the employer, 
as it would make the identification of the user more difficult to a third party (compared to 
cases when the employee uses his/her real name and may even identify the employer on 
his/her profile).1174 Or, the aggregation of less data by default would result in employers 
being able to trace a limited past of the prospective employee or the employee. Privacy 
policies in their present form do not enable an average user to truly exercise control over 
his/her personal data. Informing users and raising awareness amongst them through a more 
appropriate, user-friendly way might enable more users to exercise their rights in a more 
 
1172 See more in: Sørensen, E. J. B. (2016) ‘The post that wasn’t: Facebook monitors everything users type 
and not publish’, Computer Law and Security Review 32 (2016) pp., 32(1), pp. 146–151. 
1173 Solove, D. J. (2013) ‘Introduction: Privacy-Self Management and the Consent Dilemma’, Harward Law 
Review, 126(7), p. 1888. (See more: Idem pp. 1888-1893.) 
1174 Although it does not mean in any case that hiding under a pseudonym would enable employees to escape 
from all responsibility. 
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conscious way and might contribute to their better understanding of the functioning of 
SNSs and the stakes relating to the processing of their personal data.1175, 1176 
Section 3: Social network sites and blurred boundaries 
354. In connection with the main subject of the dissertation, SNSs can blur two 
boundaries: the boundaries of privacy and the boundaries of professional and personal life. 
On the one hand, (§1) it has to be assessed whether and if yes, how SNSs can alter 
reasonable expectations of privacy, and whether they can influence what is considered to 
be covered by privacy nowadays. On the other hand, it is necessary to examine (§2) that in 
the light of how ICT contributed to blurring the boundaries between professional and 
personal life, what specific problems, inherent to SNSs arise in this regard. 
§1. Changed expectations of privacy 
Before addressing the questions of (B) how SNSs altered the boundaries of privacy, 
what privacy means in the context of SNSs, it is necessary to consider (A) what are the 
 
1175 Technological and societal changes that occurred since the adoption of the DPD raises additional data 
protection questions as well. Luckily, the GDPR has addressed challenges through the modernization of the 
previous data protection rules: examples such as the right to data portability, the right to be forgotten, data 
protection by design, data protection by default or data protection impact assessment can be cited. On the 
novelties introduced by the (proposed) GDPR see more in: De Hert, P. and Papakonstantinou, V. (2012) ‘The 
proposed data protection Regulation replacing Directive 95/46/EC: A sound system for the protection of 
individuals’, Computer Law and Security Review, 28(2), pp. 130-142.; Costa, L. and Poullet, Y. (2012) 
‘Privacy and the regulation of 2012’, Computer Law and Security Review, 28(3), pp. 254–262. 
In relation to the recent privacy scandals, such as the Snowden revelations or the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal, the transfer of personal data is also a significant field. Especially with regard to the changes in the 
juridical landscape: such as the Schrems decision, invalidating the Safe Harbor agreement and the adoption of 
the Privacy Shield, in the field of data transfers between the EU and the US. See more on these scandals and 
data transfers in: Black, I. (2013) NSA spying scandal: what we have learned, The Guardian. Available 
at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/10/nsa-spying-scandal-what-we-have-learned (Accessed: 
20 January 2019); Pintér, R. (2013) ‘Yes, we (s)can!’, Információs Társadalom, (3–4), pp. 28–42.; European 
Commission (2016) European Commission launches EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: stronger protection for 
transatlantic data flows. Press release. Brussels. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-
2461_en.htm(Accessed: 20 January 2019).; Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 
2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the 
protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (notified under document C(2016) 4176) (Text with EEA 
relevance) 
See more on data protection and SNSs in: Kosta, E. et al. (2010) ‘Data protection issues pertaining to social 
networking under EU law’, Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy, 4(2), pp. 193-201.; 
Lukács, A. (2017) ‘Adatvédelmi irányelv és rendelet, avagy hogyan változott a közösségi oldalakra 
vonatkozó szabályozás az Európai Unió adatvédelmi reformjával?’, in Homoki-Nagy, M. and Hajdú, J. 
(eds) Ünnepi kötet dr. Zakar András c. egyetemi tanár 70. születésnapjára. Szeged: Szegedi 
Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar, pp. 125–139., Van Eecke, P. and Truyens, M. (2010) 
‘Privacy and social networks’, Computer Law and Security Review, 26(5), pp. 535-546. 
1176 The employment specific aspect of these principles will be addressed in more detail in Part II. 
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significance and the underlying reasons behind the use of SNSs and what role(s) do they 
play in individuals’ lives? 
(A) Importance of social network sites 
355. As it was already mentioned, the popularity of SNSs is given by their 
capacity to fulfill three basic human needs: according to James Grimmelmann these needs 
are self-expression (identity), communication (relationships) and being part of a 
community. These needs constitute the basic elements of social interaction. First, through 
shaping their online profiles users can express their identity. Second, on SNSs users can 
communicate and maintain relations with others in several ways. Third, they can feel that 
they are part of a community and they can establish their social position within the 
community.1177 
356. Creating identity. Desiring to express one’s identity and to manage one’s 
perceptions taken of the individual by third parties is not a novelty.1178 On SNSs users can 
present an image of themselves in various forms, where each feature provided by the SNS 
serves as a means for self-expression, be it a (profile) picture, a caption, filters, hashtags, 
likes, membership in a group, etc.1179 SNSs allow users to create a carefully shaped 
identity, where posts might be carefully planned, aiming to reflect the precise image that 
the user aims to diffuse towards his/her contacts.1180 SNSs are centred around the 
individual, creating personal, or “egocentric” networks.1181 
357. Communication. Leigh A. Clark and Sherry J. Roberts note that technology 
has always had a significant impact on how people communicate (e.g.: telegraph, 
telephone, Internet, etc.) and SNSs should be considered as a next step of human 
interaction, therefore they shall receive adequate protection.1182 Ways of communication 
naturally change over time and since the creation of the Internet, it has changed how users 
 
1177 Grimmelmann, J. (2009) ‘Saving Facebook’, Iowa Law Review, 94(4), pp. 1151-1159. 
1178 Notably see Erving Goffman’s “impression management” describing how individuals aim to control the 
impressions that others might have of him/her. Goffman, E. (1956) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. 
Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, Social Sciences Research Centre.  
1179 Grimmelmann, J. (2009) ‘Saving Facebook’, Iowa Law Review, 94(4), pp. 1152-1153. Creating a perfect 
post has become an increasingly complex, well-planned act. 
1180 Williams, A. (2009) Here I Am Taking My Own Picture, The New York Times. Available 
at: https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/fashion/sundaystyles/here-i-am-taking-my-own-
picture.html (Accessed: 20 January 2019) 
1181 boyd, danah m. and Ellison, N. B. (2008) ‘Social Network Sites: Definition, History and 
Scholarship’, Journal of Computer Mediated Communication, 13(1), p. 219. 
1182 Clark, L. A. and Roberts, S. J. (2010) ‘Employer’s Use of Social Networking Sites. A Socially 
Irresponsible Practice’, Journal of Business Ethics, 95(4), p. 508, p, 509, p. 518. 
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use it. At the beginning of the 21st century, its information-sharing nature started to 
thrive,1183 and has not stopped since,1184 leading to the phenomenon that it has become an 
integral part of everyday life: users share bits of their personal lives, be it pictures of a 
party, a holiday, Christmas celebration, a meal in a restaurant or drinks in a fancy bar. 
Today, being (actively) present on SNSs is even a societal expectation, reflected in the 
mantra of SNSs that if it is not posted to SNS, it did not happen.1185 
358. Being part of a community. SNSs can let users establish their social 
position and enable them to be recognized members of the community,1186 which can 
manifest in several forms – either in the number of contacts, or in the number of likes 
received. When it comes to the reasons for using SNSs, the (informational) societal 
pressure is also an important factor. If everyone is present on these sites, staying out of 
them – in the age of information, when information is in the centre of life – can represent a 
serious disadvantage, as the user would not be able to use certain services and have the 
same possibilities as the other users.1187 Users are bound to these services because they can 
only leave these sites with difficulties, because if they do so, they would leave all their 
friends, too.1188 Also, being present on these platforms and keeping in touch with different 
contacts is crucial, as today “[c]onnectedness is social currency”.1189 
359. SNSs as means of exercising human rights. Besides satisfying basic human 
needs, the Internet and SNSs can also play an important role in promoting the exercise of 
human rights.1190 The use of SNSs can also constitute a way of exercising fundamental 
rights. From a legal perspective, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers 
emphasized the importance of the Internet and SNSs in promoting the exercise and 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, stating that they can also enhance 
 
1183 Sprague, R. (2008) ‘Rethinking Information Privacy in an Age of Online Transparency’, Hofstra Labor 
& Employment Law Journal, 25(2), pp. 395-396. 
1184 According to the site Brandwatch, in 2016, 6 new Facebook profiles were created in every second and 
the site generates 4 petabytes of data per day. Users generated 4 million likes per minute and uploaded 350 
million photos per day. Source: 47 Facebook Statistics for 2016 (2016) Brandwatch. Available 
at: https://www.brandwatch.com/blog/47-facebook-statistics-2016/(Accessed: 7 January 2017) 
1185 Silverman, J. (2015) ‘Pics or it didn’t happen’ – the mantra of the Instagram era, The Guardian. 
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/feb/26/pics-or-it-didnt-happen-mantra-instagram-era-
facebook-twitter (Accessed: 20 January 2019) 
1186 Grimmelmann, J. (2009) ‘Saving Facebook’, Iowa Law Review, 94(4), p. 1157. 
1187 Cseh, G. (2013) ‘A közösségi portálok árnyoldalai’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (2), p. 90. 
1188 Mendel, T. et al. (2013) Étude mondiale sur le respect de la vie privée sur l’Internet et la liberté 
d’expression. Paris: Éditions Unesco (Collection Unesco sur la liberté de l’Internet). p. 38. 
1189 Grimmelmann, J. (2009) ‘Saving Facebook’, Iowa Law Review, 94(4), p. 1158, pp. 1151-1159. 
1190 Hiselius, P. (2010) ‘ICT/Internet and the Right to Privacy’, Scandinavian Studies in Law, 56, p. 202. 
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participation in social and political life and promote democracy and social cohesion.1191 
Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin also emphasized the role of the Internet in promoting the 
exercise of individual and public liberties – especially freedom of expression and right to 
information – and argued that the exercise of these rights is inseparable from the question 
of privacy protection.1192 One employment specific example can be the exercise of 
collective labour rights, as communication on SNSs might also serve the activity of trade 
unions, etc. 
360. Right to social media? Such an enhanced importance of these platforms can 
raise the question: do individuals have a right to social media? With respect to employees’ 
privacy and data protection this question is crucial, as it relates to whether and if yes, how 
employees can be told what behaviour they should adopt on these sites1193 or whether 
employees can be ordered to withdraw from the use of social media. Do employees have a 
“right to social media” in the light of the evolutive concept of private life interpreted as 
being able to live one’s life as one wishes and in the light of the growing role of social 
network sites in everyday life? The phenomenon of adopting internal social media 
regulations poses the question whether the employer can restrict – and if yes, to what 
extent –, employees’ use of SNSs? Can the employer order the employee to like certain 
content on these sites or to friend the employer? 
361. In France, the Constitutional Council’s decision on the Act furthering the 
diffusion and protection of creation on the Internet1194 must be mentioned, in which the 
Constitutional Council had to take position in a slightly similar case. The act aimed to give 
the administrative authority, the High Authority for the dissemination of works and the 
protection of rights on the Internet (“Haute Autorité pour la diffusion des œuvres et la 
protection des droits sur internet”, abbreviated as HADOPI) the power to impose penalties 
in the form of withholding access to the Internet. The Constitutional Council declared that 
the right to access to the Internet falls within the scope of the freedom of communication 
 
1191 Council of Europe (2012) ‘Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
States on the protection of human rights with regard to social networking services’.  
1192 Falque-Pierrotin, I. (2012) ‘La Constitution et l’Internet’, Les nouveaux cahiers du Conseil 
constitutionnel, (36), pp. 34-35. 
1193 For example, employers sometimes ask their employees to be actively present on these sites in order to 
enhance the employer’s e-reputation. Source: Ray, J.-E. (2012) ‘A propos de la révolution numérique. 
Actualités des TIC (mai-septembre 2012)’, Droit social, (10), p. 936. 
1194 Conseil constitutionnel: décision n° 2009-580 du 10 juin 2009 
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and expression.1195 Although – in contrast to the US court – it did not acknowledge the 
existence of a fundamental human right to access to the Internet, it affirmed that the threats 
to the freedom to access the Internet are regarded as threats posed to the right to the free 
communication of ideas and opinions.1196, 1197 
362. Considering the acknowledgement of public or social private life, the 
ECtHR’s Niemitez decision should be mentioned although the decision did not directly 
relate to SNSs but to the Internet in general. Today aren’t SNSs one of the principal forums 
where individuals “establish and develop relationships with other human beings”?1198, 1199 
Does the right to informational self-determination not go beyond simply protecting privacy 
but aim to guarantee “the primacy of the individual, to be able to exercise his/her 
freedom”?1200 Therefore social media raises the question to what extent employees are free 
to use these platforms and how their behaviour can be restricted by the employer. 
363. Neither in France nor in Hungary is the right to social media expressis 
verbis guaranteed.1201 However, considering the already presented role that social media 
 
1195 The Constitutional Council stated that the freedom of expression is one of the most important human 
rights, and that “[i]n the current state of the means of communication and given the generalized development 
of public online communication services and the importance of the latter for the participation in democracy 
and the expression of ideas and opinions, this right implies freedom to access such services.” Decision n° 
2009-580 of June 10th 2009, par. 12. 
1196 ‘Commentaire de la décision n° 2009-580 DC – 10 juin 2009 Loi relative à la diffusion et à la protection 
de la création sur internet’ (no date) Les Cahiers du Conseil Constitutionnel, (27). Available 
at: http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/root/bank/download/2009580DCccc_580dc.pdf(Accessed: 6 June 2018). p. 7. 
1197 As an illustrative example a case from the US should be mentioned as it draws attention to the 
importance of SNSs in everyday life. In the US, in 2017 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled on the 
existence of the right to social media. In 2008 the state of North Carolina adopted a statute making it a felony 
for registered sex offenders to gain access – amongst others – to social media sites. The Supreme Court stated 
that “[North Carolina’s] statute here enacts a prohibition unprecedented in the scope of First Amendment 
speech it burdens. Social media allows users to gain access to information and communicate with one another 
about it on any subject that might come to mind. […] By prohibiting sex offenders from using those 
websites, North Carolina with one broad stroke bars access to what for many are the principal sources for 
knowing current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, 
and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge. These websites can provide 
perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard.” 
Therefore, States cannot adopt in their statutes a blanket ban on the use of these sites. Source: Supreme Court 
of the United States: Lester Gerard Packingham, Petitioner v. North Carolina, June 19, 2017 
1198 ECtHR (1992) Niemietz v. Germany, Application no. 13710/88, 16 December, par. 29. 
1199 According to Alejandra Michel, it follows from the evolutive case law of the ECtHR, which is evolving 
in the light of the given societal and technological innovations, that it is possible that the individual’s right to 
“establish and develop relationships with other human beings” is guaranteed on SNSs as well. Michel, A. 
(2016) ‘L’utilisation des contenus postés sur les réseaux sociaux comme éléments de preuve d’un 
dommage’, Revue du droit des technologies de l’information, (65), p. 105. 
1200 Conseil d’Etat (2014) Le numérique et les droits fondamentaux. Les rapports du Conseil d’Etat, p. 268. 
1201 On the potential fundaments of a right to SNS see more in: Pailler, L. (2012) Les réseaux sociaux sur 
internet et le droit au respect de la vie privée. Bruxelles: Larcier. pp. 28-46.  
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plays in personal life and the rights associated with it, it can be deducted from the general 
rules of both labour codes, namely from the provisions regulating how employees’ rights 
can be limited, that as social media often constitute an important tool in exercising such 
rights, through the protection of these rights, the use of social media is protected as well. 
Therefore, employers can only limit the use of SNSs if certain requirements are met – as it 
will be examined in detail in Part II. 
364. In sum, the use of SNSs is more than a discretionary choice of the 
individual.1202 They constitute the 21st century way to fulfil basic human needs. Although 
it is not obligatory to use them, they have become part of the reality of the modern world, 
making it hard to completely avoid using these services. Of course, according to the 
temperament of the given user, the extent of being a silent observer or engaging actively in 
their use can differ. Naturally, employees are amongst SNS users as well. 
While acknowledging that the appreciation of a case depends on the exact 
circumstances and that the employee can face labour law consequences if he/she oversteps 
the limits of such a use, it should be noted that for the above reasons the behaviour of 
employees who engage in SNSs and share a certain amount of personal data during such a 
use is not automatically considered as illegitimate. However, as their intended use naturally 
comes with the share of personal information and personal data, the question of what is 
considered to be private in the context of SNSs is raised. 
(B) Social network sites and the boundaries of privacy 
365. SNSs and the ever-changing concept of privacy. It was already 
demonstrated that privacy is a flexible, ever-changing concept. Besides the individual’s 
attitudes towards privacy, privacy law is closely connected to technology, technological 
advances might call for changes in privacy laws, too. Naturally, SNSs raise different 
questions than printed letter or e-mails. As Jon L. Mills noted, “[a]n individual living in 
the 21st century does not have the same reasonable expectation of privacy as a person 
living in the 1700s.”1203, 1204 Societal norms can also have an influence on what can be 
 
1202 Del Riego, A., Sánchez Abril, P. and Levin, A. (2012) ‘Your Password or Your Paycheck?: A Job 
Applicant’s Murky Right to Social Media Privacy’, Journal of Internet Law, 16(3), p. 23. 
1203 Mills, J. L. (2015) Privacy in the New Media Age. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. p. 160. 
1204 He also draws attention to the fact that just because in the modern world it is easier to intrude into 
someone’s private life, it does not mean that this intrusion should be considered acceptable and legitimate. 
According to him, today there is danger in accepting this intrusiveness because of the possible risk of causing 
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considered private, and today it is a normal part of the 21st century – especially for the 
younger generations – to expose one’s private life in the online world.1205 Unlike in the 
“pre-SNS era” – it is considered normal to share events that used to be considered 
private.1206 
366. The worst enemy of privacy on SNSs. One of the novelties brought by 
SNSs is not the mere change in the reasonable expectation of privacy, but also the 
phenomenon that a huge amount of this private information is published at the initiative of 
the users themselves. As a consequence, many privacy issues are created by the users 
themselves,1207 as it is the users’ continuous activity that drives SNSs.1208 As Woodrow 
Hartzog noted, in the age of Warren and Brandeis the sanctity of private life was 
threatened by external parties, but today the Internet user has become his/her worst 
enemy.1209 It is unprecedented to observe during the history of mankind such an extensive 
and voluntary share of private information. 
SNSs standardize and encourage the share of personal data.1210 Privacy and data 
protection consequences arise from the very nature of social network sites, as their whole 
functioning is based on the share of personal data.1211 Today, self-exposure is the choice of 
users: they decide to share all that information.1212 These attitudes have led to the 
phenomenon that users from all around the globe share their personal data in a quantity and 
quality never seen before, “[…] pushing at the boundaries of what societies see as a 
person’s individual space[.]”1213 
 
far-reaching consequences, namely the disappearance of our collective expectation of privacy. Source: Mills, 
J. L. (2015) Privacy in the New Media Age. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. p. 162. 
1205 Newell, B. C. (2011) ‘Rethinking Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Online Social 
Networks’, Richmond Journal of Law and Technology, 17(4), p. 2. 
1206 Henderson, J. J. (2013) ‘The Boundaries of Free Speech in Social Media’, in Stewart, D. R. (ed.) Social 
Media and the Law. A Guidebook for Communication Students and Professionals. New York, London: 
Routledge, p. 4. 
1207 Qi, M. and Edgar-Nevill, D. (2011) ‘Social networking searching and privacy issues’, Information 
Security Technical Report, 16(2), p. 76. 
1208 Stroud, D. (2008) ‘Social networking: An age-neutral commodity — Social networking becomes a 
mature web application’, Journal of Direct, Data and Digital Marketing Practice, 9(3), p. 208. 
1209 Hartzog, W. (2013) ‘Privacy and Terms of Use’, in Stewart, D. R. (ed.) Social Media and the Law. A 
Guidebook for Communication Students and Professionals. New York, London: Routledge, p. 54. 
1210 Qi, M. and Edgar-Nevill, D. (2011) ‘Social networking searching and privacy issues’, Information 
Security Technical Report, 16(2), p. 75. 
1211 North, E. E. (2010) ‘Facebook Isn’t Your Space Anymore: Discovery of Social Networking 
Websites’, Kansas Law Review, 58(5), p. 1288. 
1212 Rey, B. (2012) La vie privée à l’ère du numérique. Cachan: Lavoisier. p. 197. 
1213 International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications: Report and Guidance on 
Privacy in Social Network Services –“Rome Memorandum”. 3-4 March 2008. (675.36.5.) p. 1. 
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367. Electronic exhibitionism. William A. Herbert describes this phenomenon as 
electronic exhibitionism, endemic to SNSs, which means “the increasing worldwide 
phenomenon of individuals eviscerating their own privacy by affirmatively or inadvertently 
posting and distributing private and intimate information, thoughts, activities and 
photographs via email, text messaging, blogs, and social networking pages.”1214 The 
expression exhibitionism has a negative connotation: one should refrain from 
automatically applying this expression to users actively engaging in SNSs.1215 It is a 
natural reaction to think that these individuals have given up their privacy; however, in 
reality this issue is more nuanced.1216 Even though in this scenario it is the users who 
decide to voluntarily share personal information, they still expect certain privacy through 
the limitation of the extensiveness of the exposure.1217, 1218 
368. Information relating to third parties. It comes from the very nature of these 
sites that, in order to use them properly, the sharing of personal information is needed. 
 
1214 Herbert, W. A. (2011) ‘Workplace Consequences of Electronic Exhibition and Voyeurism’, IEEE 
Technology and Society Magazine, 30(3), p. 26. 
1215 A possible clue to make a distinction between exhibitionism and the intended use of SNSs might depart 
from the notions of self-disclosure and self-presentation. While self-presentation is “communication of self-
data an individual might reveal to most any other person,” self-disclosure is the “explicit communication of 
self-data another would otherwise not have access to.” (Simms, M. (1994) ‘Defining Privacy in Employee 
Health Screening Cases: Ethical Ramifications Concerning the Employee/Employer Relationship’, Journal of 
Business Ethics, 13(5), p. 317.) Such a distinction might contribute to distinguishing between use that 
necessarily comes with the use of SNSs and use that reveals personal information beyond that extent; and 
thus determining the “hard core” of privacy on SNSs. 
1216 Solove, D. J. (2007) The Future of Reputation. Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet. New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press. p. 198. 
1217 Solove, D. J. (2007) The Future of Reputation. Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet. New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press. p. 198. 
1218 In my opinion, understanding the active use of SNSs as a self-destruction of privacy, not meriting 
protection, is similar to the existing binary apprehension of privacy in the United States. In contrast to Europe 
and the protection granted to personal data shared on these sites, in the US a different privacy approach is 
taken. In the US, a strict “all or nothing” privacy approach exists, as privacy is apprehended as the binary of 
public and private. As soon as something is exposed to the public (meaning not kept as a secret), the 
information will no longer be considered private and it will lose protection provided by privacy laws. Such an 
approach does not take into consideration the grey area between the extremities of private and public, 
ignoring the concept of privacy in public. In reality, privacy is more complex than a mere private-public 
dichotomy. Most of the activities individuals conduct do not take place in the secrecy of one’s home – and it 
does not mean that individuals aim to give up their right to privacy completely. Therefore, personal 
information uploaded to social network sites might receive no protection at all. Certain authors (such as 
Robert Sprague or Daniel Solove) argue that this all or nothing privacy approach might be outdated and a 
new approach might be needed to be adopted in US law. As technological and societal changes in the age of 
Warren and Brandeis called for new privacy laws, the technological and societal changes of today call for a 
change, too. In today’s world privacy protection might be extended to cases when the user has posted 
personal or private information to the Internet, but has made steps towards protecting it from the public, for 
example, by using strict privacy settings only granting access to his/her closest connections. See more in: 
Sprague, R. (2008) ‘Rethinking Information Privacy in an Age of Online Transparency’, Hofstra Labor & 
Employment Law Journal, 25(2), pp. 395-417, Solove, D. J. (2007) The Future of Reputation. Gossip, 
Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, pp. 161-188. 
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Naturally, the individual has the power to decide to what extent he/she is going to provide 
insight into his/her private life, and to which audiences he/she will grant access. As privacy 
is also dependent on the individual, it will vary from user to user how they will use these 
sites.  
369. However, individuals’ online presence is dependent not only on the given 
individual and on his/her choices: other users can also upload personal data relating to third 
parties. This can either be (ill-)intentioned or can constitute a natural part of self-
disclosure. The latter issue is complex because – although individuals do have the right to 
expose themselves online – in many cases exposing one’s own life naturally comes with 
exposing information relating to another person(s) as well, since the individual’s life is 
necessarily intertwined with that of others.1219 In any case, an individual does not exercise 
full control over his/her online presence and reputation.1220 
370. The notion of privacy on SNSs. Therefore, in the light of the above-
mentioned factors, the question is: what does privacy mean in the context of SNSs? What 
is considered to be a reasonable use of SNSs in relation to privacy? Considering that in the 
European legal order privacy is understood as a flexible concept, which is not limited to 
secrecy but is also closely connected to self-determination, in the dissertation it is 
understood as the individual’s right to decide how to live his/her life. However, in view of 
the technological and societal changes, should protection be extended to a certain extent to 
self-disclosing behaviour as well,1221 given the preponderant role SNSs play in establishing 
and maintaining relationships with others, shaping identity – acknowledged by the 
European legal order?1222 
371. Although privacy in public is recognized by the ECtHR, the right 
traditionally covers cases where the individual’s private life is revealed to the public 
 
1219 Solove, D. J. (2007) The Future of Reputation. Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet. New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press. p. 134. Although not naming or identifying the other individual can 
contribute to preventing privacy issues. 
1220 See more on the importance, value and fragility of online reputation, the difference between online and 
offline gossip, and the fundamental changes brought by the Internet in finding a balance between privacy and 
freedom of expression in: Solove, D. J. (2007) The Future of Reputation. Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the 
Internet. New Haven and London: Yale University Press 
1221 Just as the law reacted to the appearance of photo and video cameras by setting limits to taking one’s 
image and broadcasting it, now it is time to react to the changes brought by SNSs. 
1222 See, for example, ECtHR (1992) Niemietz v. Germany, Application no. 13710/88, 16 December and 
ECtHR (2003): Peck v. the United Kingdom, application no. 44647/98, 28 January 
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accidentally,1223 in contrast to SNSs, which are mainly fueled by users’ self-disclosing 
behaviour. In relation to the right to respect for private life, it should be asked whether 
private life can be extended to social media and if yes, to what extent. Notably relations 
between “interference” and SNSs should be examined. Historically, the notion of 
correspondence aimed to cover letters, while today in principle it can cover all kinds of 
communication, regardless of whether it is a letter, an e-mail, an SMS or a tweet.1224 
However, protection under the right to respect for private life is traditionally granted 
against “arbitrary interferences”, and is not likely to cover cases where the individual 
himself/herself has decided to publicly share information or a statement – which is often 
the case when it comes to social media.1225, 1226 
372. Even if the right to respect for private life cannot be evoked, it does not 
mean that these statements do not receive any protection: contrary to the right to respect 
for private life, the right to data protection applies, regardless of whether SNSs are public 
or private spaces and the fact that the user himself/herself decided to make the information 
or statement publicly available.1227 Although the scopes of the right to respect for private 
life and the right to data protection are not identical, the personal data published often 
relates to the private life of the individual, making it possible for data protection to provide 
an alternative protection for the private life of the individual. 
373. Existence of a dual approach? In my opinion, these observations open the 
floor for further investigating whether challenges related to SNSs in the employment 
context can successfully be examined under a dual, privacy-data protection approach. The 
question of whether employees can freely use these sites, and whether these sites are 
considered to be a private or public space seems to be more like a privacy-related question. 
In contrast to the right to respect for private, which is affected by the private or public 
 
1223 ECtHR (2004): Von Hannover v. Germany, Application no. 59320/00, 24 June; ECtHR (2003): Peck v. 
the United Kingdom, application no. 44647/98, 28 January 
1224 Alleaume, C. (2016) ‘La notion de droit à la vie privée’, in Batteur, A. (ed.) Les grandes décisions du 
droit des personnes et de la famille. 2nd edn. Issy-les-Moulineaux: LGDJ, p. 459. 
1225 Dupuis, M. (2013) ‘La vie privée à l’épreuve des réseaux sociaux’, Revue Lamy Droit Civil, (102), p. 41. 
1226 Labour courts have already addressed the question of private or public nature of these sites. Judges had 
to rule in several cases, and the practice of the courts was not always coherent, till in 2013 the Court of 
Cassation provided some guidance regarding the private or public nature of these sites, making the protection 
dependent on the use of privacy settings. Source: Denizeau, C. (2017) Droit des libertés fondamentales. 6th 
edn. Paris: Vuibert. pp. 282-284. As a consequence, protection provided by the right to respect for private life 
is limited when it comes to content publicly shared in social media. These relevant cases will be addressed in 
detail in Part II. 
1227 Dupuis, M. (2013) ‘La vie privée à l’épreuve des réseaux sociaux’, Revue Lamy Droit Civil, (102), p. 44. 
This is in harmony with the observations of the WP29 in Opinion 2/2017. 
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nature of these sites, data protection requirements shall apply regardless of the nature of 
these sites or the content, providing protection to employees using these sites. Therefore, 
the employer regulating or limiting how employees can use these sites would primarily 
constitute a privacy-related question. Using the personal data available on these sites (e.g. 
dismissing an employee because of a Facebook post), or controlling whether employees 
comply with the restrictions imposed by him/her can be either a privacy question (is that 
post considered to be a private or a public content?) or a data protection question (how can 
the employer process that data?). This privacy-data protection dichotomy should not 
constitute a strict separation amongst the legal issues arising, it should rather mean that 
certain challenges are related to one right to a greater extent than to the other. 
374. In sum, a broad understanding of privacy (see, for example, the already 
presented ECtHR case law, or the concept of personal life in French labour law) would 
mean that privacy comprises the individual being able to decide whether to use SNSs and 
how to use them. He/she can decide on which SNSs he/she is going to be a member and 
can also decide whether he/she wishes to be an active member of the site (e.g. joining 
groups or events, liking, posting content), what privacy setting he/she uses. However, as 
privacy is not an absolute right, admitting that it comprises the free use of SNSs does not 
empower the user to an unlimited use: the use of SNSs as part of privacy, must be 
reconciled with other rights and interests. 
Examining privacy from a narrower angle focusing upon the concept of secrecy 
raises different kinds of questions, notably whether such a post can be considered public or 
private from the viewpoint of intrusion into the private sphere. Data protection can also 
play its part, as rules laid down by relevant data protection legislations are also applicable 
– regardless of whether the information itself is public or private – ensuring a different 
layer of protection during the use of SNSs. 
§2. Blurring of work and personal life within social network sites 
375. In addition to the general indistinctness of the place of work, the time of 
work and the device used for work, the boundaries between professional life and personal 
life are blurred within SNSs as well. The assumption is that SNSs are used in the course of 
the personal life of the employee, although their use has in many instances become 
inseparable from the workplace. SNSs have not only altered the limits of privacy but have 
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also provided new methods to investigate people,1228 as in many cases this information is 
easily accessible to third parties – such as to employers, for example. The following 
Sections will examine the main characteristics of SNSs, including the content, the users 
and the creator of the content, from the angle of blurred professional and personal life.1229 
(A) Content 
376. SNSs a priori suppose a leisure activity pertaining to the personal life of the 
individual (except for those employees whose job description contains the managing of an 
SNSs account). However, in certain cases the content published on these sites does not 
exclusively relate to personal matters, but to matters relating to the employment – making 
the employer interested (or even entitled) in regulating and or monitoring such activity, as 
it will be examined in Part II. In such cases the SNS activity of employees can have an 
effect on their employment relationships. This is particularly the case when the content 
directly relates to the employment. The most obvious way of connecting the workplace to 
the employee’s SNSs activity is to publish something work-related. This can take various 
forms (such as a post, a comment, liking a page, joining an event, etc.) and substance (e.g. 
criticising the employer, sharing confidential information, discussing workplace conditions 
with colleagues, commenting under an article relating to professional matters, etc.). 
377. In addition, even content without direct connection to the employment can 
result in adverse employment decisions, as it can incidentally have a negative impact on 
the employer. For example, Ashley Payne, an American high school teacher was dismissed 
for posting pictures of herself holding a pint of beer and a glass of wine in her hand during 
her trip to Europe.1230 A very similar case was Stacy Snyder’s, who was training to be a 
teacher and was only few weeks from graduation. She uploaded a picture of herself to 
MySpace, taken of her at a party where she was wearing a pirate hat and was drinking from 
a plastic cup, while the caption said “drunken pirate”. The photo was discovered by her 
 
1228 Qi, M. and Edgar-Nevill, D. (2011) ‘Social networking searching and privacy issues’, Information 
Security Technical Report, 16(2), p. 74. 
1229 The detailed analysis of the legal implications arising during their use will be addressed in Part II. 
1230 Oppenheim, R. (2013) High School Teacher Files an Appeal in Case of Social Media Related 
Resignation, California Business Litigation Blog. Available at: 
https://www.californiabusinesslitigation.com/2013/05/high_school_teacher_files_an_a.html(Accessed: 3 
May 2018) 
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school and supervisor, she was qualified as unprofessional and was denied her teaching 
degree.1231 
378. In addition to the substance of SNS content, changes in relation to access to 
it must be addressed. While earlier employees’ personal lives could be separated relatively 
easily, the novelty that SNSs brought regarding the content is that employees share 
information that the employer would not have had access to in the pre-SNS era (or only by 
making great efforts). Therefore, if the employer accesses the profile of the employee (or 
views his/her activity on SNSs), the employer might have a glimpse into the employee’s 
personal life to an unprecedented extent. 
(B) Users 
379. Mixed audiences. When it comes to the audience, on SNSs users usually 
have colleagues, superiors, clients amongst their connections.1232 It means that depending 
on the choice of privacy settings that the given site offers and on whether the employee 
uses them, published content can become available to them too, giving a glimpse into the 
employees’ online activities, often pertaining to their personal life. 
If several colleagues are present on these sites, they might discuss work-related 
matters on these platforms – possibly making negative comments about the employer, as it 
is demonstrated by growing case law.1233 Employees continue to express themselves on 
SNSs just as if they were talking around the coffee machine, often without realizing the 
risks involved in such online expression.1234 In this case, due to the change of paradigm in 
the accessibility of such content, the discussion leaves the working environment and 
 
1231 Rosen, J. (2010) The Web Means the End of Forgetting, The New York Times. Available 
at: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html (Accessed: 11 May 2018) 
1232 According to an article from 2011 written by Jean-Emmanual Ray, 55 % of the employees’ contacts is 
composed of colleagues, 16 % of supervisors, 13 % of clients and 11 % of contractors. Source: Ray, J.-E. 
(2011) ‘Facebook, le salarié et l’employeur’, Droit social, 2, p. 132. 
1233 Countless examples could be listed where employees engaged in a discussion about work, such as the 
case Barbera v. Société Alten Sir (Conseil de Prud’hommes de Boulogne-Billancourt, 19 novembre 2010 
10/00853), Cour de cassation, civile, chambre civile 1, 10 avril 2013, 11-19.530; CA Rouen Chambre 
sociale, 1 novembre 2011, n° 11/01827 - These cases and legal questions arising in relation to them will be 
treated in detail in Part II.) United States District Court, District of New Jersey: Pietrylo v. Hillstone 
Restaurant Group, No. 06-05754.); United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Konop v. Hawaian 
airlines, 236 F.3d 1035.  
1234 Duez-Ruff, V. (2012) ‘Impact des nouvelles technologies sur le droit du travail : un salarié appartient-il 
virtuellement à son employeur ?’, Lexbase Hebdo - Edition Sociale, (498), p. 3. [Page number referring to the 
online version of the article downloaded from: http://www.lexbase-academie.fr.bcujas-ezp.univ-
paris1.fr/revues-juridiques/6837680-impact-des-nouvelles-technologies-sur-le-droit-du-travail--un-salarie-
appartient-il-virtuellement-a- (Accessed: 15 August 2019)] 
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becomes available to third parties, such as clients or other users, making it more probable 
to compromise the employer’s reputation. 
If the employer or the supervisor is present on SNSs, they can take a glimpse into the 
personal life of the (prospective) employee. If the employee does not apply privacy 
settings, gaining access is evident. In case the employer and the employee are “friends” on 
the SNS, the employer has the possibility to have access to a vaster amount of personal 
data. However, it is also worth remembering the existence of the hierarchal relationship 
between the parties and asking the question: if the employer sends a friend request to an 
employee, does the latter truly have the possibility to ignore it?1235 
380. Larger audiences. The novelty brought by SNSs is that the employee has 
never had the possibility to potentially “reach out” to such a big audience. Perceptions of 
private and public are elusive, and the employee’s post might become available to a 
considerably wider audience than he/she could potentially reach in the offline world. While 
formerly only those could do so who were physically present (e.g. gossiping around the 
coffee machine), today an SNS post can potentially reach a much larger audience and 
become accessible to several hundreds, even thousands of people.1236 Therefore, as the 
employee’s online activity can go beyond the workplace, the employer is more intensely 
interested in ensuring that such posts do not infringe his/her rights or legitimate economic 
interests.  
(C) Creator of the content 
381. Identifying the employer. SNSs can make it easy to link employees’ 
behaviour to the employer, as often the user can be identified as the employee of the given 
employer. This connection between employer and employee can be established in several 
ways. The most obvious way is if the employee himself/herself identifies the employer by 
naming him/her in the post or revealing the employer’s identity in other ways, such as 
visual indications. As an example of the latter one, this identification can take place by 
wearing work uniform. In the International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 50 v. 
 
1235 Though Jean-Emmanuel Ray notes that it is exceptional that an employee accepts a friend request coming 
from the employer. Source: Ray, J.-E. (2013) ‘Facebook, espace public plus que privé. A propos de l’arrêt de 
la 1 ère Chambre civile du 10 avril 2013’, Semaine sociale Lamy, (1599), p. 18. 
1236 However, one must stay realistic: in principle indeed, it is possible that a content can reach such a large 
audience, and indeed there are certain cases that went viral, but in practice most of such posts will stay 
harmless. Source: Towner, N. (2016) Social media at work. A practical guide for trade union reps. Edited by 
C. Ruhemann. London: LRD Publications (Labour Research Department Booklets). p. 5. 
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ThyssenKrupp Elevator (Canada) Ltd. case an employee was dismissed after posting a 
video to the Internet which showed him having his genitals stapled to a wooden plank. The 
employer was identifiable from the video, as the employees wore their uniform during the 
recording.1237 Another example is the case of Ellen Simonetti, a flight attendant at Delta 
Airlines, who was fired for her blog where she uploaded provocative pictures of herself 
wearing her uniform.1238 
382. Usually, users can indicate their place of employment on their profile, in 
which case it is easier to establish a connection between the employee and the employer 
than in the pre-SNS era. The audience of the given post might instantly (or just by a few 
clicks) know which employer the post relates to.1239 In exceptional cases, it is also possible 
that even if the employee does not reveal the employer’s identity in the post, the employer 
might be identified later by another user.1240 
383. “Spokespersons” of the employer. If the given content (post, comment) 
indicates somehow the affiliation to the employer, he/she might question whether the user 
published the content as a representative of the employer, or as a simple user –1241 creating 
confusion among other users. It is possible, for example, if the employee explicitly refers 
to his/her affiliation with the given employer, or if it is marked in the profile of the 
employee – in which cases employees’ activities can be associated with the employer. 
Thus, activity on SNSs can raise the question whether and when the employee can be 
considered a spokesperson of the employer – and in what regards his/her behaviour can be 
controlled in order to ensure effective separation between professional and personal 
 
1237 Kujawski, M. (2014) When Your Employees Go Too Far on Social Media, Social Media Today. 
Available at: https://www.socialmediatoday.com/content/when-your-employees-go-too-far-social-
media (Accessed: 11 May 2018) 
1238 Negroni, C. (2004) Fired Flight Attendant Finds Blogs Can Backfire, The New York Times. Available 
at: https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/16/business/fired-flight-attendant-finds-blogs-can-
backfire.html (Accessed: 11 May 2018) 
1239 For example, Justin Hutchings from London, Ontario was fired in 2012 because he published offensive 
content (“It’s about time this b**** died”) to a memorial website of a teenager who committed suicide after 
being a victim of bullying for years. Mr. Hutchings identified his employer in his profile, and one of the users 
easily “tracked him down” from that information and reported his behaviour to his employer. Source: Sarin, 
P. (2012) Employees beware: The perils of posting on Facebook, rabble.ca. Available 
at: http://rabble.ca/columnists/2012/10/employees-beware-perils-posting-facebook (Accessed: 11 May 2018).  
1240 For example, in a case at the Court of Appeal of Besançon, the employee took part in a discussion taking 
place on the wall of a former colleague and though she did not name the employer in the discussion, the 
employer’s identity was revealed later by another employee, after the employee disconnected from the site. 
(CA Besançon chamber sociale, 15 novembre 2011, 10/02642) 
1241 Such confusion can arise, for example, in cases when in the “bio” part the employer is identified, or when 
the employee explicitly states in a post or comment that he/she is an employee at the given workplace, or if 
the logo of the company is used as well as a profile picture or cover picture, making it possible to confuse the 
employee and the representative of the company. 
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use.1242 The boundaries between professional and personal activity might be blurred by 
indicating their status as employee. 
384. Disappearing anonymity. The importance of SNSs in this field is that they 
made it considerably easier to identify the user as the employee of a certain employer, 
creating a constant link between the employee’s online behaviour and the identity of the 
employer. The offline counterpart of such a link would be to wear a sign on one’s back, 
indicating the place of employment. This results in the phenomenon that today most users 
are more easily identified as the employee of a given employer, which creates a constant 
“bridge” between the employee’s personal life and place of employment, and dissolves the 
previous boundaries between professional and personal life. 
Conclusions of Title 2 
385. Due to the growing popularity and proliferation of ICT, the boundaries of 
work and personal life are increasingly blurred – which phenomenon was addressed from 
the viewpoint of its effects on the place of work, time of work and equipment used for 
work. Then, it was also observed that in relation to employees’ personal lives, SNSs – 
which are ICT products as well – also contribute to the blurring of the boundaries between 
these two spheres. 
386. SNSs especially increase the significance of the phenomenon of blurred 
boundaries in two regards. On the one hand, from the point of view of the user/employee, 
the sharing of (self-) information in relation to one’s private/personal life can be observed. 
Users of SNSs typically share on SNSs private details regarding their (or other 
individuals’) lives – details that were not (easily) accessible to the employer before the age 
of social media, allowing the employer to “enter” the employee’s personal life to an 
unprecedented extent, raising privacy questions. One of the contradictions that the research 
had to overcome was how privacy protection can be granted to activities where the user 
himself/herself decides to disclose the personal information. In this regard, two 
observations were made. First, the use of SNSs has become a general phenomenon in 
modern societies and is beyond the individual’s whim: moreover, it serves as a 21st century 
method to fulfill certain basic human needs. Second, Title 1 asserts that privacy is a 
flexible concept, sensitive to technological and societal changes. Also, given the 
 
1242 This matter will be further adressed in Title 3 of Part II. 
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embeddedness of SNSs in everyday life, privacy should not automatically exclude the use 
of SNSs: the dissertation holds that privacy should be approached as the individual’s right 
to decide how to live his/her life, thus using SNSs should be covered by privacy. 
387. On the other hand, from the employer’s viewpoint, such an activity can 
potentially reach a considerably bigger audience than in the offline world, exceeding the 
borders of the personal life of the employee and maybe even the work environment, 
jeopardizing the employer’s rights in a hitherto unprecedented way. Also, such an activity 
can even be linked to the employer (either through aiming at him/her or through indicating 
the employees’ workplace in the content or in the profile), creating a permanent contact 
between the employees’ behaviour and the employer’s identity – resulting in blurring the 
boundaries of professional and personal life within SNSs. 
388. As a result, the already presented collision of employees’ and the 
employer’s rights arise in a more intense form. As the employer can gain unprecedented 
insight into the employees’ private life (either through self-revelation or through the 
disclosure of other users), employees are increasingly interested in being able to effectively 
enforce and exercise their right to privacy and right to data protection. Also, as now 
employees are able to share various items of information that can have a connection with 
their employment with an extremely wide audience reaching far beyond their offline social 
network, employers are also increasingly interested in effectively protecting their rights, 
such as, for example, the right to reputation. 
389. Although employees should be entitled to the right to privacy even on SNSs, 
this right to privacy must be balanced against and be interpreted in the light of rights and 
obligations arising from the employment relationship in order to establish the exact 
boundaries between personal and professional life on SNSs. After examining how this 
collision of rights has appeared in a more intense form, it will be the main aim of Part II. to 
assess – while keeping the blurred boundaries and the increased conflict of interests and 
rights in mind – exactly how this collision should be resolved in given areas of 
employment, where the exact boundaries should be drawn. 
 236 
 
PART II. 
RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND RIGHT TO DATA PROTECTION DURING THE 
MONITORING AND CONTROLLING OF THE USE OF SOCIAL NETWORK 
SITES IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT 
 
390. Starting point and matters to be examined. After examining the collision of 
rights and how SNSs have intensified it, it is necessary to address how exactly SNSs 
challenge the employment relationship. Questions can arise in various areas ranging from 
employers inspecting job applicants’ Facebook profiles, through employees surfing on 
Instagram instead of performing work, to employees who heavily criticise their managers 
on SNSs. It is important to emphasize that SNSs did not give rise to fundamentally new 
questions, as all the examined conducts had existed well before their appearance (even 
without SNSs job applicants could lie in their CV, employees could waste working hours 
or could criticise their employer), and were subject to legal regulation as well. Rather, 
SNSs put these already existing legal rules into a new perspective:1243 they raise questions 
in relation to how the existing data protection and labour law rules can be applied to them. 
The novelty brought by the dissertation is that it provides a new and deep analysis of the 
“old” problem, through examining it during the whole existence of the employment 
relationship, focusing on the law of France and Hungary. 
391. Throughout the employment relationship, the personal life of the individual 
can be affected in several ways. To address them in a systematic way, the individual’s right 
to privacy/right to data protection was contrasted against the employer’s various rights 
throughout the lifetime of the employment relationship. During recruitment, it will be 
examined how inspecting job applicants’ SNS profiles in order to enforce the employer’s 
freedom of contract can collide with applicants’ rights. SNSs can seriously compromise 
working hours: it will be examined how their use (simply the fact of spending time on 
SNSs during working hours) can be controlled and monitored in accordance with the 
employer’s right to monitor. Finally, besides the mere fact of using these sites, it will be 
addressed what kind of questions the employees’ presence raises (typically their off-duty 
 
1243 Maier, J. (2013) ‘Cause for Termination in the Age of Social Media’, in Law Society of Upper 
Canada, Employment law and the new workplace in the social media age. Toronto: Irwin Law, p. 282. 
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conduct, covering cases when they post something to SNSs beyond working hours) in 
relation to the employer’s right to reputation, protection of business secrets, etc. 
392. Questions to be answered. Part I. aimed to prove that compared to the 
traditional forms of employee monitoring, SNSs increasingly blurred the boundaries of 
personal and professional life: the aim of Part II is to answer the overarching question: in 
the light of these blurred boundaries, where exactly should these boundaries be? How 
should the balance be determined between the employee’s rights (right to privacy and right 
to data protection) and the employer’s rights (e.g. right to reputation, freedom of contract, 
protection of business secrets, etc.)? Questions arise, such as how the already presented 
privacy and data protection framework should be applied to SNSs and what the arising 
challenges are. How exactly can (or should) SNSs be regulated or monitored as regards the 
different fields of the employment relationship? These questions will include – but will not 
be limited to – whether employers can look at the SNS profile of a job applicant, whether 
the personal use of SNSs during working hours can be prohibited or whether an 
employment relationship can be terminated due to a Facebook post, etc. 
393. What Part II. intends to suggest is that these matters can be assessed both 
through a privacy approach and through a data protection one. Both privacy and data 
protection are crucial in ensuring the protection of the employee’s personal life, during the 
whole employment relationship. However, depending on the given field of the employment 
relationship, either the right to privacy or the right to data protection can appear in a more 
emphatic way, giving rise to more substantial questions. This double approach is assessed 
through the division of regulation and monitoring: regulation mostly relates to imposing 
limitations on employees’ use of SNSs, while monitoring aims to cover the processing and 
the use of personal data obtained from SNSs. 
As such, the dissertation holds the view that recruitment can be more effectively 
assessed through data protection. The reason for this is that during this phase it is the 
monitoring of job applicants’ online presence and the processing of their personal data 
which are more emphatic, and not the employer’s potential to restrict such a use or to 
interfere with their personal lives. In the case of the use of SNSs at the expense of working 
hours, both the privacy and the data protection approaches are equally significant: the 
privacy approach is connected to the possible ban of the personal use of these sites, while 
data protection relates to the monitoring of such a ban. However, when it comes to 
employees’ off-duty conduct, the right to privacy gains more importance, notably through 
 238 
 
the employer’s possibility to sanction employees because of their conduct outside working 
hours. 
394. Hypotheses of Part II. Part II. is composed of three Titles, examining the 
main areas where privacy and data protection questions arise in connection with SNSs: 
each Title will have one hypothesis. Hypothesis 2 aims to prove that in the phase of 
recruitment, the protection of job applicants’ rights can be better ensured through 
regulating pre-employment SNSs screenings, instead of prohibiting them. Hypothesis 3 
intends to prove that in most regards, the personal use of SNSs during working hours can 
be adequately addressed by applying the already existing rules relating to the monitoring of 
Internet and e-mail use. Hypothesis 4 aims to prove that as regards employees’ activities 
and presence on SNSs, employers find themselves in an even more vulnerable position 
than in the pre-SNS era, which necessitates tilting the balance towards the protection of 
employer’s rights. 
395. References. Part II. focuses on French and Hungarian law and on how the 
question of SNSs can be addressed in these two legal systems. Thus, it will primarily focus 
on French and Hungarian acts, jurisprudence and documents issued by relevant national 
legal institutions. Although Part I. already dealt with it, as both France and Hungary are 
members of the same international organisations, references will be made to these 
institutions as well (e.g. CoE, EU). Also, references will be extended to other countries as 
well, as individual rights are gaining increasingly greater importance within labour law 
regulations in most countries. This tendency is universal, even though the way legislations 
deal with it can vary from country to country.1244 In addition, as the growing popularity of 
SNSs and its effects are not limited to France and Hungary but constitute a universal 
phenomenon, references will be made to other countries, notably for the purpose of 
providing illustrative examples and presenting unique legal solutions to the challenges 
posed by SNSs. 
396. Structure of Part II. Part II. is composed of three titles, each covering a 
significant area of SNSs and labour law where questions regarding privacy and data 
protection arise. Title 1 will address questions relating to prospective employees and will 
examine the phase of recruitment. Then, Title 2 will discuss SNS use at the expense of 
working hours and will examine SNS use during working hours in detail. In Title 3, focus 
 
1244 Trudeau, G. (2010) ‘En conclusion...vie professionnelle et vie personnelle ou les manifestations d’un 
nouveau droit du travail’, Droit social, (1), p. 78. 
 239 
 
will be put on the employees’ activity and presence on SNSs, particularly outside working 
hours and on how such an activity can conflict with the employer’s different rights.  
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Title 1: Concluding an employment contract in the context of online 
social network sites 
397. Characteristics of the pre-employment phase. Issues of privacy and data 
protection do not arise in relation to employees only, but are present in the pre-
employment phase as well. Spiros Simitis emphasized the importance of regulating 
prospective employees’ right to data protection, noting that they constitute one of the 
groups mainly affected by the employer’s need to obtain as much information as 
possible.1245 The specialty of pre-employment background checks is given by the fact that 
although there is no existing employment relationship between the parties, several data 
protection and labour law provisions are applicable to them.1246 Also, this relationship is 
characterised by a disparity between the parties: although formally the employment 
contract is concluded between two equally autonomous parties, de facto there is no 
equality between them: the applicant is in a more vulnerable position.1247 
398. When it comes to SNSs, employers often turn to these services in order to 
find out as much as possible about applicants. However, when conducting such screenings, 
they can also access information relating to the personal life of the applicant, which leads 
to potential privacy and data protection issues. As a main rule, for the purposes of the 
thesis, what is meant by these screenings is the employer accessing the publicly available 
information on these sites – the case when he/she accesses concealed information will be 
addressed separately. Since in these cases the information is publicly shared at the 
initiative of the user, privacy issues are less dominant than data protection issues – which 
are independent of the individual’s behaviour.1248 Therefore, the question of pre-
employment SNS screenings will be primarily dealt with from the aspect of data 
protection. 
399. Topicality of pre-employment SNS screenings. SNSs have become a 
popular tool when it comes to recruitment, as they provide quick, easy and inexpensive 
 
1245 Simitis, S. (1999) ‘Reconsidering the Premises of Labour Law: Prolegomena to an EU Regulation on the 
Protection of Employees’ Personal Data’, European Law Journal, 5(1), p. 54. 
1246 Kun, A. (2018) ‘A digitalizáció kihívásai a munkajogban’, in Homicskó, Á. O. (ed.) Egyes modern 
technológiák etikai, jogi és szabályozási kihívásai. Budapest: Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem Állam- és 
Jogtudományi Kar (Acta Caroliensia Conventorum Scientiarum Iuridico-Politicarum, XXII), p. 132. 
1247 Hajdú, J. (2004) ‘Habilitációs tézisek’. Szegedi Tudományegyetem. p. 26. 
1248 See the delimitation of privacy and data protection in Part I. 
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access to a multitude of information, allowing one to draw conclusions about the 
applicants’ character.1249 Before the widespread proliferation of SNSs, the employer had to 
assess a job candidate’s aptitude for the job through the way of conducting interviews, 
ability or aptitude tests, questionnaires (or in extreme cases by hiring a private 
investigator), while today it might be sufficient to check the candidate’s Facebook profile 
in order to have easy and cost-free access to a rich and significant amount of information 
relating to the capacities of the prospective employee. The ease, the cost-effective nature 
and the wide range of information potentially make SNSs a powerful tool during the 
recruitment process – however, the legality of such screenings must be examined.1250 
400. Applicable law. To date, there exists no “Facebook Act” – either in France, 
or in Hungary – regulating explicitly the labour law and privacy/data protection aspects of 
SNSs. The alternative legislation to be applied in this case is the relevant provisions of the 
labour law regulations and data protection regulations: SNSs are not “terra nullius”, the 
general principles of recruitment laid down in the labour codes, such as non-
discrimination, transparency, relevancy and confidentiality, apply to every method of 
recruitment, regardless of the technology used.1251 Besides the data protection regulation, 
the labour codes of both countries regulate the recruitment process, imposing limitations 
on the possible methods used. This protection applies regardless of the method used, 
therefore they include SNS background checks, too.1252 These provisions incorporate the 
most important data protection principles, such as purpose limitation, proportionality and 
prior notification. 
401. Aim of the Title. The aim of the Title is to enumerate the legal issues arising 
in relation to these screenings and the possible answers given to them. Rules applying to 
data protection and labour law and to different methods of recruitment (so-called 
“traditional methods of recruitment”) have already been elaborated: these rules are going to 
constitute the basis of the analysis. In the light of these rules, it will be examined what the 
 
1249 Suder, S. (2014) ‘Pre-Employment Background Checks on Social Networking Sites - May Your Boss Be 
Watching?’, Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology, 8(1), p. 124. 
1250 Brown, V. R. and Vaughn, E. D. (2011) ‘The Writing on the (Facebook) Wall: The Use of Social 
Networking Sites in Hiring Decisions’, Journal of Business and Psychology, 26(2), p. 220. 
1251 Tricoit, J.-P. (2013) ‘Recrutement, rupture du contrat de travail et TIC’, La Semaine Juridique Social, 
(40), p. 10. 
1252 In contrast, approaching the question from a “privacy point of view”, when the employee publicly shares 
some information, it goes beyond the protection offered by the right to respect for private life. Source: 
Tshilembe, A.-S. (2015) ‘Vie privée - protection des données personnelles du travailleur: la question de 
l’embauche’, in Martin, D., Morsa, M., and Gosseries, P. (eds) Droit du travail européen : questions 
spéciales. Bruxelles: Éditions Larcier, p. 700. 
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issues arising specific to SNSs are, and whether such screenings should be allowed and if 
yes, under what conditions. 
402. Questions to be answered. One of the questions that the Title aims to 
answer is what data protection (and privacy) issues arise in relation to pre-employment 
SNS screenings and how the protection of applicants’ rights can be ensured. How can a 
balance be established between the applicants’ rights and the employer’s rights, and 
whether SNSs can be used during recruitment and if yes, with what conditions? 
403. Hypothesis of Title 1. Title 1 aims to prove that applicants’ rights can be 
better ensured through regulating pre-employment SNSs screenings, instead of prohibiting 
them (Hypothesis 2). As it will be explored throughout Title 1, applying pre-employment 
SNS screenings raises several data protection challenges. As a response to these 
challenges, different actors1253 have suggested the possibility of banning these screenings. 
However, the dissertation takes the view that the right to data protection can be better 
ensured by acknowledging the existence of these screenings, and thus regulating them 
instead of prohibition. 
404. Structure and methodology of the Title. The Title is composed of two parts: 
Chapter 1 will focus on recruitment and the relevant labour law provisions, while Chapter 
2 will deal with the arising data protection issues. Chapter 1 will be based on the 
comparison of the French and Hungarian systems, as it is possible under the GDPR to 
adopt Member State specific data protection regulation in the field of employment, giving 
room for certain differences between the legal systems. Chapter 2 will focus on data 
protection, and since the EU has a unified data protection law, there are basically no 
problems specific only to French or to Hungarian law. Therefore, the presentation of the 
issues itself will stay on an analytical ground from a more general scope, paying special 
attention to the solutions proposed by French and Hungarian legislation and case law.1254 
 
1253 Gros, M. (2010) Recrutement : une Charte pour contrer les dérives liées aux réseaux sociaux, Le Monde 
Informatique. Available at: https://www.lemondeinformatique.fr/actualites/lire-recrutement-une-charte-pour-
contrer-les-derives-liees-aux-reseaux-sociaux-29715.html(Accessed: 13 August 2019); CNIL (no 
date) Recrutement : l’employeur peut-il rechercher des données sur moi sur Internet ? Available 
at: https://www.cnil.fr/fr/cnil-direct/question/354.; Kajtár, E. and Mestre, B. (2016) ‘Social networks and 
employees’ right to privacy in the pre-employment stage: some comparative remarks and 
interrogations’, Hungarian Labour Law E-journal, (1), p. 36.; McGeveran, W. (2006) Finnish Employers 
Cannot Google Applicants. Available at: https://blogs.harvard.edu/infolaw/2006/11/15/finnish-employers-
cannot-google-applicants/ (Accessed: 2 July 2018). 
1254 In this context, not only the court’s jurisprudence is meant by case law, but also the practice of DPAs. 
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Chapter 1: Labour law aspects of recruitment 
405. Questions arising in relation to pre-employment SNS screenings must be 
assessed in the light of the already established rules regarding recruitment. Both in France 
and in Hungary, limitations were placed on the “traditional” hiring methods (e.g. 
conducting a job interview or collecting references from the previous employer), 
addressing data protection questions under the auspices of labour law. However, these 
rules were elaborated when the methods mainly consisted of using personality tests, 
graphology tests, interviews, etc. – providing completely different kinds of personal data 
than SNSs nowadays. As a consequence, it must be examined whether SNSs affect the 
existing legal landscape. 
406. Structure of the Chapter. Section 1 will present the employer’s right 
standing against applicants’ rights: the employer’s aim during recruitment is to identify the 
best candidate and he/she has certain rights to achieve this aim. It will also present how 
SNSs can contribute to achieving this aim. Then, Section 2 will focus on the existing 
labour law regulation addressing the subject: it will present the relevant provisions of the 
FLC and HLC, and the relevant practice of the national data protection authorities. 
Although Chapter 1 will examine the subject from a more general angle and explicit focus 
will be put on SNSs in Chapter 2, even Chapter 1 will try to limit itself to the provisions 
that might be of relevance in the SNS context as well. 
Section 1: Identifying the best candidate 
The main aim of the employer during the recruitment is to identify and hire the best 
applicant. In order to achieve this aim, (§1) the employer is entitled to choose with whom 
he/she wishes to contract and is interested in obtaining as much information as possible 
regarding applicants in order to make this decision. (§2) SNSs can serve this information 
hunger of the employer and can highly contribute to identifying the right applicant. 
§1: The employer’s side: freedom of contract 
(A) The employer’s interests in obtaining information 
407. The aim of the employer during recruitment. The employer’s aim during 
the recruitment process is to identify and hire the most suitable candidate who would fit 
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into the organisation. In order to achieve this aim, the employer is interested in knowing as 
much as possible about the candidate. The employer can either “screen in” for desired 
characteristics, or “screen out” possible unsuitable applicants.1255 
Having a profound knowledge on not only the candidate’s education and 
professional experience, but also on his/her personality and beliefs can contribute to 
assessing whether he/she could easily identify with the values of the specific employer.1256 
Pre-employment background checks can contribute to higher productivity, increased 
quality and lower employee turnover,1257 and can also help to detect whether the employee 
has a history of misconduct.1258 The reason for wanting to explore the applicant’s 
background is the employer’s belief according to which “past performance is the best 
predictor of future behaviour.”1259 
408. Information relating to professional capacities. Naturally, information on 
the education, previous work experience, language skills, computer literacy skills or 
leadership skills is undoubtedly connected to the professional life of the employee. 
Knowing whether the employee has the necessary qualification and experience, where 
he/she pursued his/her studies and worked prior to applying for the job is indispensable for 
deciding who is going to be employed. It goes without saying that the employer is 
interested in obtaining as much information as possible in these fields.  
409. Importance of the personal traits of the applicant. Besides information 
bearing professional character, employers are interested in having a widest possible pool of 
information on applicants, including their personal lives. Though this interest can be 
distinct from the employer’s rights in this field, as legal regulations aim to protect 
employees’ personal lives,1260 it does not mean that the assessment of the personal traits is 
 
1255 Befort, S. F. (1997) ‘Pre-Employment Screening and Investigation: Navigating Between a Rock and a 
Hard Place’, Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, 14(2), pp. 367-368.  
1256 Sprague, R. (2011) ‘Invasion of the Social Networks: Blurring the Line Between Personal Life and the 
Employment Relationship’, University of Louisville Law Review, 50(1), p. 6. citing Finder, A. (2006) ‘For 
Some, Online Persona Undermines a Résumé’, The New York Times. Available 
at: https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/11/us/11recruit.html. 
1257 Kinsey, A. (no date) ‘The Benefits of Pre-employment Screening’. James M. Sweeney and Associates, 
Inc. Available at: http://www.sweeneyinc.com/files/benefits_preemployment_screening.pdf(Accessed: 3 
May 2018). p. 2. 
1258 Kinsey, A. (no date) ‘The Benefits of Pre-employment Screening’. James M. Sweeney and Associates, 
Inc. Available at: http://www.sweeneyinc.com/files/benefits_preemployment_screening.pdf(Accessed: 3 
May 2018). p. 3. 
1259 Sprague, R. (2008) ‘Rethinking Information Privacy in an Age of Online Transparency’, Hofstra Labor 
& Employment Law Journal, 25(2), p. 399. 
1260 See notably what has been discussed in relation to the FLC and HLC. 
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to be completely excluded during the decision-making. Besides the professional capacities 
of the applicant, employers are also interested in assessing whether the personal traits of 
the applicant make him/her suitable for the given post.1261 
410. When concluding an employment contract, the personality of the 
prospective employee has a key, determining importance, as it can highly influence his/her 
successful integration into the undertaking. SNSs can largely contribute to gaining 
information regarding the personality of the applicant. 
Usually, traditional background searches focused on matters like résumé accuracy, 
educational backgrounds, driving records, and reference verification, etc.1262 In addition to 
formally assessing submitted CVs or conducting interviews, through background checks 
employers are interested in assessing the personal traits of the applicant – such as whether 
he/she is lazy or antisocial, or has provided false information during the application – in 
order to know whether they are going to be a good choice for the workplace or for the 
job.1263 
With (SNS) background checks, employers can assess the applicant’s personality in 
order to assess whether they are going to integrate well into the company.1264 The 
employer is interested in knowing whether the employees would fit well into the existing 
work community and would be able to effectively cooperate with colleagues. Also, 
personal sympathy can play a role: the employer is interested in employing someone with 
whom he/she can imagine working with.  
Employers might also be concerned about the lifestyle (e.g. drug or alcohol 
consumption, expressing extreme political or religious views, etc.) and the reputation of 
the applicant, as the applicant’s questionable conduct or poor reputation can have a 
negative impact on the employer.1265  
(B) Freedom of contract 
 
1261 Lehoczkyné Kollonay, Cs. (ed.) (1997) A magyar munkajog I. Budapest: Kulturtrade Kiadó. p. 91. 
1262 Jones, M., Schuckman, A. and Watson, K. (2007) ‘The Ethics of Pre-Employment Screening Through the 
Use of the Internet’, in McIntosh, D. et al. (eds) The Ethical Imperative in the Context of Evolving 
Technologies. University of Colorado Leeds School of Business. Available 
at: http://www.ethicapublishing.com/ethicalimperative.pdf (Accessed: 13 July 2016). pp. 53-54. 
1263 Peebles, K. A. (2012) ‘Negligent Hiring and the Information Age: How State Legislatures Can Save 
Employers from Inevitable Liability’, William and Mary Law Review, 53(4), p. 1399. 
1264 Baumhart, P. B. (2015) ‘Social Media and the Job Market: How to Reconcile Applicant Privacy with 
Employer Needs’, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 48(2), p. 508. 
1265 Del Riego, A., Sánchez Abril, P. and Levin, A. (2012) ‘Your Password or Your Paycheck?: A Job 
Applicant’s Murky Right to Social Media Privacy’, Journal of Internet Law, 16(3), p. 18. 
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411. Legal relevance of the identity of the parties. From a legal perspective, the 
employment relationship is considered to be a personal, long-term legal relationship,1266 
where the identity of the parties plays an important role: performing work in person is one 
of the primary qualifying attributes of the employment relationship,1267 having crucial 
importance. The HLC also defines among the employee’s main obligations the obligation 
to perform work personally.1268 The employee cannot use a replacement, as the education, 
work experience, professional aptitudes are all connected to the person of the employee.1269 
The intuitu personae character, meaning that the identity of the contracting parties is 
the essential element of the contract,1270 plays an important role in concluding the 
employment contract.1271 It means that the employer can take into consideration the person 
of the applicant, in order to ensure the good functioning of the workplace.1272 Although 
legal regulations impose limits on the extent of the information that can be asked (such as 
rules relating to the prohibition of discrimination,1273 or respecting personal life1274); 
considering certain subjective characteristics, such as the personality of the applicant, 
cannot be fully eliminated from the employment relationship.1275 
412. Freedom to contract. The importance of the identity of the parties is 
manifested in the freedom to contract: a general principle of civil law stipulated both by 
the French1276 and by the Hungarian1277 civil codes. It means that the parties can freely 
 
1266 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2012) Munkajog. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, p. 19. 
1267 7001/2005. (MK 170.) FMM-PM együttes irányelv a munkavégzés alapjául szolgáló szerződések 
minősítése során figyelembe veendő szempontokról 
1268 Item c of Subsection 1 of Section 52 of the HLC 
1269 Hajdú, J. and Kun, A. (eds) (2014) Munkajog. Budapest: Patrocinium, p. 194. 
1270 “[A] personal service contract where the particular individual cannot be replaced”. Source: Canadian 
National Railway Co. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., [1992] 1 SCR 1021, 1992 CanLII 105 (SCC) 
1271 Rivero, J. and Savatier, J. (1978) Droit du travail. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, p. 62. 
1272 Péano, M.-A. (1995) ‘L’intuitus personae dans le contrat de travail’, Droit social, (2) p. 3. [Page number 
referring to the online version of the article downloaded from: https://cutt.ly/dwsvrDY (Accessed: 15 August 
2019)]  
1273 Article L1132-1 of the FLC stipulates that no one should be a victim of discrimination during recruitment 
and refers to Act No. 2008-496 of 27 May 2008 on various provisions of adaptation to Community law in the 
field of the fight against discrimination (“loi n° 2008-496 du 27 mai 2008 portant diverses dispositions 
d'adaptation au droit communautaire dans le domaine de la lutte contre les discriminations”). Subsection (1) 
of Section 12 of the HLC also states that equal treatment should be respected in relation to employment, and 
Act CXXV of 2003 on Equal Treatment and Promotion of Equal Opportunities stipulates that the 
requirements laid down in the act shall apply to prior entering into the employment relationship [items a)-c) 
of Section 21]. 
1274 See Article L1221-6 of the FLC and Section 10 of the HLC imposing the protection of the personal life 
of applicants. 
1275 Péano, M.-A. (1995) ‘L’intuitus personae dans le contrat de travail’, Droit social, (2) p. 4. [Page number 
referring to the online version of the article downloaded from: https://cutt.ly/dwsvrDY (Accessed: 15 August 
2019)] 
1276 Article 1102 of the French Civil Code 
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decide whether they wish to contract, with whom to contract and on which terms to 
contract.1278 For the subject of the thesis, deciding the person of the contracting party has 
special importance. 
413. This freedom of contract covers the conclusion of the employment contract: 
the employer can decide with whom to conclude an employment contract and the future 
employee can choose where to apply.1279 Identified as a principle with constitutional value 
in French law, the employer has the freedom to choose his/her collaborators:1280 he/she has 
the possibility to have preferences when it comes to choosing between applicants.1281 The 
employee also has the freedom to choose whether he/she is going to apply for or accept a 
position, and can decide where to apply.1282  
414. As a result, the interests of the employer demand to consider not only the 
candidate’s professional capacities,1283 but also his/her personal traits.1284 He/she is legally 
entitled to take into consideration certain extra-professional elements of the applicant’s 
life,1285 although legal regulations impose serious limitations regarding the intuitu 
personae character of the employment (e.g. discrimination, equality, individual 
freedoms).1286 
 
1277 Subsections (1) and (2) of Section 6:59 of Act V of 2013 on the Hungarian Civil Code 
1278 Vékás, L. (ed.) (2013) A Polgári Törvénykönyv magyarázatokkal. Budapest: Complex. p. 545. 
1279 Kiss, Gy. (2002) ‘A szerződéses szabadság átalakulása a munkajogban az alapjogok tükrében’, in Czúcz, 
O. and Szabó, I. (eds) Ünnepi tanulmányok. Munkaügyi igazgatás, munkaügyi bíráskodás: Radnay József 75. 
születésnapjára. Miskolc: Bíbor Kiadó, p. 268.; Radnay, J. (2008) Munkajog. Budapest: Szent István 
Társulat, p. 88.  
1280 Conseil constitutionnel: décision n° 88-244 DC du 20 juillet 1988 
1281 Lyon-Caen, G. (1992) Les libertés publiques et l’emploi. Paris: la Documentation française (Collection 
des rapports officiels). p. 57. 
1282 Lyon-Caen, G. (1992) Les libertés publiques et l’emploi. Paris: la Documentation française (Collection 
des rapports officiels). pp. 57-58. Article XII of the Fundamental Law of Hungary 
1283 The employer can verify whether the applicant truly has the professional capacities necessary for the 
given job and whether information in the applicant's CV is authentic. Source: Cantero, I. and Coupez, F. 
(2014) ‘L’utilisation des réseaux sociaux par l’entreprise : des risques maîtrisés ?’, Revue Banque, (769), p. 
39. 
1284 Teyssié, B. (1988) ‘Personnes, entreprises et relations de travail’, Droit social, (5), p. 375.; Arany-Tóth, 
M. (2008) A munkavállalók személyes adatainak védelme a magyar munkajogban, Szeged: Bába Kiadó, p. 
112. 
1285 Jacquelet, C. (2008) La vie privée du salarié à l’épreuve des relations de travail. Aix-en-Provence: 
Presses universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, p. 64. 
1286 Péano, M.-A. (1995) ‘L’intuitus personae dans le contrat de travail’, Droit social, (2), pp. 132-133. 
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§2: Methods of recruitment: Internet and social network sites 
Different methods of selection help to provide the HR manager with a complete view 
of the candidate’s aptitudes or inaptitudes,1287 through which the employer can obtain an 
extensive range of information regarding the candidate’s professional aptitudes, his/her 
personality or even his/her private life. Besides the traditional methods of recruitment, such 
as conducting an interview, polygraph test, aptitude test, graphological tests, personality 
tests, medical tests, collecting references, etc., online background checks have gained 
considerable importance. 
The advent of the Internet and SNSs has considerably changed what kind of 
information employers can discover regarding job candidates. They have become a popular 
recruitment method and gained ground in the phase of recruitment: in France, according to 
a survey conducted by RegionsJob in 2017, the huge majority of French employers (85 %) 
googled job candidates1288 in order to verify information provided by them and to learn 
about their personalities.1289 Although during the research no official statistics relating to 
the use of SNSs by Hungarian employers during the recruitment process was found, it can 
be assumed that with regard to the international scale of the use of SNSs, Hungarian 
employers are no exception.1290 This is not a phenomenon limited to these two countries: 
employers from other countries/continents often have recourse to SNSs during hiring.1291 
 
1287 Bokor, A. et al. (2007) Emberi erőforrás menedzsment. Budapest: Aula Kiadó, p. 150. 
1288 Dauvergne, G. (2017) 85% des recruteurs font des recherches en ligne sur les candidats, Les Echos.fr. 
Available at: https://business.lesechos.fr/directions-ressources-humaines/ressources-
humaines/recrutement/030656487193-85-des-recruteurs-font-des-recherches-en-ligne-sur-les-candidats-
314060.php (Accessed: 20 June 2019). According to other surveys, this phenomenon already existed back in 
2009 (Desfeuillet, X. (2009) Presque tous les employeurs consultent le profil Internet des candidats à 
l’embauche, Le Monde. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/chat/2009/11/20/internautes-comment-
ameliorer-son-image-sur-internet-un-expert-en-e-reputation-vous-repond_1270030_3224.html (Accessed: 20 
June 2019). ) and in 2015 this number was 52 % (Lhermenault, A. (2015) Réseaux sociaux : 52% des 
employeurs ont déjà fait des recherches sur des candidats, Le Figaro. Available 
at: https://etudiant.lefigaro.fr/stage-emploi/actu/detail/article/reseaux-sociaux-52-des-employeurs-ont-deja-
fait-des-recherches-sur-des-candidats-15425/(Accessed: 20 June 2019).). 
1289 A field experiment conducted by Matthieu Manant, Serge Pajak and Nicolas Soulié at Paris-Sud 
University affirmed the use of Facebook profiles as part of the recruitment process. Source: Manant, M., 
Pajak, S. and Soulié, N. (2014) Online social networks and hiring: a field experiment on the French labor 
market. [in press] Munich Personal RePEc Archive. Available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2458468 [Accessed 2 February 2017]. 
1290 Although references are made to such a practice. For example, Zoltán Szűts reported in an article that his 
students were typically employed after “cleaning” their Facebook profiles. Source: Szűts, Z. (2015) ‘A 
Munka Világának Online Kommunikációs Kérdései’, Opus et Educatio, 2(2), p. 29. 
1291 According to survey conducted on behalf of Carreer Builder, in 2017 in the US 70 % of employers 
screened applicants’ social media profiles. Salm, L. (2017) 70% of employers are snooping candidates’ 
social media profiles, Career Builder. Available at: https://www.careerbuilder.com/advice/social-media-
survey-2017 (Accessed: 20 June 2019).  
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415. Scope: personal vs. professional SNSs. The rich amount of personal data 
and information present on SNSs can contribute to the identification of the most suitable 
candidate. However, regarding the scope of the thesis, in the recruitment process a 
difference should be made between professional SNSs and personal SNSs. Professional 
SNSs (e.g. LinkedIn, Viadeo) have the aim to maintain a professional identity, make useful 
contacts and search for opportunities. In contrast, their personal counterparts (e.g. 
Facebook, Instagram) are primarily used for entertainment and to engage with the 
“friends” of the user.1292 
Professional SNS profiles contain information primarily relating to the professional 
life of the individual: often information also present in the CV (education, work 
experience) completed with information typically not present in a CV but still having 
professional characteristics (work contacts, articles written by the individual, etc.). The 
professional or personal nature of the given SNS – together with the use(/lack) of the 
privacy settings – can have major importance when it comes to evoking the employee’s 
right to respect for private life.1293 Naturally, the candidate’s personal life is concerned to a 
lesser extent when it comes to the inspection of professional SNSs,1294 due to the fact they 
primarily contain information relating to the professional life of the individual, in contrast 
to personal SNSs, such as Facebook. For this reason, the following analysis will 
concentrate on personal SNSs, as their inspection might raise more severe privacy and data 
protection challenges or even infringements.1295 
416. Advantages of online background checks. Conducting such background 
checks can be beneficial to the employer for two reasons. First, as it was already 
demonstrated in Part I, SNSs provide an unprecedented access to a wide range of 
information on prospective employees – both regarding information relating to 
 
1292 Robles, P. (2012) Personal versus professional social networks: infographic, Econsultancy. Available 
at: https://econsultancy.com/personal-versus-professional-social-networks-infographic/(Accessed: 13 August 
2019). 
1293 Tshilembe, A.-S. (2015) ‘Vie privée - protection des données personnelles du travailleur: la question de 
l’embauche’, in Martin, D., Morsa, M., and Gosseries, P. (eds) Droit du travail européen : questions 
spéciales. Bruxelles: Éditions Larcier, pp. 699-700. 
1294 Instead of leading to issues, (especially) a professional account treated with due care can highly enhance 
the individual’s chances of getting employed. Source: Byrnside, I. (2008) ‘Six Clicks of Separation: The 
Legal Ramifications of Employers Using Social Networking Sites to Research Applicants’, Vanderbilt 
Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, 10(2), p. 457-458. On the positive role that SNSs can play 
during recruitment see more in: Szabó, R. (2016) ‘Toborzási módszerek és lehetőségek a közösségi média 
korában’, HR & Munkajog, 7(1), pp. 36–39. 
1295 Therefore, when using the expression SNS, a personal SNS should be understood by it, and not a 
professional SNS. 
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professional capacities and personal traits. Applicants are often inaccurate or even 
dishonest when writing a résumé and have rehearsed answers to interview questions that 
hide their true personality traits.1296 However, SNSs can reveal a multitude of information. 
The information obtained in such a way can be of interest to the employer in several 
regards. A study from 2010 conducted by Cross-Tab on the attitudes relating to “online 
reputation”1297 searches reveals that the following – quite extensive – reasons were 
considered in the recruitment process and led to the rejection of a candidate: concerns 
about the candidate’s lifestyle; inappropriate comments and text written by the candidate; 
unsuitable photos, videos, and information; inappropriate comments or text written by 
friends and relatives; comments criticizing previous employers, co-workers, or clients; 
inappropriate comments or text written by colleagues or work acquaintances; membership 
in certain groups and networks; discovering that information the candidate shared was 
false;1298 poor communication skills displayed online and concerns about the candidate’s 
financial background.1299 
417. Second, these searches are extremely easy to be conducted, entail minimal 
costs and allow the employer to obtain a rich pool of information beyond the candidate’s 
professional capacities, which in the pre SNS-era would have been more difficult and less 
cost-effective to obtain through the traditional methods.1300 They require only an electronic 
device capable of connecting to the Internet and an Internet connection. Then, the 
employer can easily inspect the candidate’s profiles through a simple Internet search. 
418. Disadvantages of online background checks. Despite providing such a 
huge amount of information with minimal costs and efforts, SNS background checks 
present certain risks as well. In particular, several legal issues arise during their use, with 
special regard to the right to privacy and the right to data protection and relating to 
 
1296 Mooney, D. E. (2010) ‘Employer on the Web Wire: Balancing the Legal Pros and Cons of Online 
Employee Screening’, Idaho Law Review, 46(3), p. 737. 
1297 Meaning by online reputation the “[…] publicly held social evaluation of a person based on his or her 
behavior, what he or she posts, and what others (such as individuals, groups, and Web services) share about 
the person on the Internet.” Cross-Tab (2010) Online Reputation in a Connected World. Available 
at: https://www.job-hunt.org/guides/DPD_Online-Reputation-Research_overview.pdf. p. 3. 
1298 According to certain surveys, nearly half of the job applicants lie about their work history and education. 
Source: Sprague, R. (2008) ‘Rethinking Information Privacy in an Age of Online Transparency’, Hofstra 
Labor & Employment Law Journal, 25(2), p. 398. 
1299 Cross-Tab (2010) Online Reputation in a Connected World. Available at: https://www.job-
hunt.org/guides/DPD_Online-Reputation-Research_overview.pdf(Accessed: 3 May 2018). p. 9. 
1300 Brown, V. R. and Vaughn, E. D. (2011) ‘The Writing on the (Facebook) Wall: The Use of Social 
Networking Sites in Hiring Decisions’, Journal of Business and Psychology, 26(2), p. 220. 
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discrimination as well.1301 These legal issues will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 2. Also, 
beyond legal arguments, conducting SNS background checks can have a detrimental effect: 
the employer’s perception by job candidates might also be adversely affected: especially 
young job seekers would feel frustrated if the employer conducted a detailed online 
background check.1302 
Section 2: The traditional recruitment procedure 
419. Differentiation must be made between the information that the employer 
would like to obtain (as much information as possible) and between the information that 
he/she is legally entitled to obtain (regulated by labour law and data protection 
regulations). Despite the existence of the employer’s right to choose with whom to 
contract, this right is not limitless.1303 Section 2 will examine the rules imposing limitations 
on the employer’s information thirst.  
Rules relating to the “traditional” recruitment procedure (e.g. tests, job interviews) 
were already elaborated especially by the doctrine and the practice of the data protection 
supervisory authorities. The following paragraphs will limit themselves to the presentation 
of the data protection rules in general during the recruitment phase, while their application 
and the specific data protection questions relating to SNSs will be discussed under Chapter 
2. 
420. First, it will be examined what rules constitute the general data protection 
framework during recruitment: the provisions of the labour codes and the practice of the 
data protection supervisory authorities will be presented. Then, rules relating to the 
protection of applicants’ private life and job interviews will be addressed. Job interviews 
are chosen, as the scope of questions that can be asked provides a useful indication for 
tracing the boundaries of personal and professional life – which can be adequately 
applicable to SNSs as well. 
 
1301 Del Riego, A., Sánchez Abril, P. and Levin, A. (2012) ‘Your Password or Your Paycheck?: A Job 
Applicant’s Murky Right to Social Media Privacy’, Journal of Internet Law, 16(3), pp. 18-21. 
1302 Byrnside, I. (2008) ‘Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using Social 
Networking Sites to Research Applicants’, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, 10(2), 
p. 475. Though back in 2008 (and in 2006, as the source referred to it) a pre-employment social media vetting 
might have been considered outrageous by candidates, today it has become a mainstream phenomenon, so it 
might be judged differently. 
1303 Arany-Tóth, M. (2008) A munkavállalók személyes adatainak védelme a magyar munkajogban. Szeged: 
Bába Kiadó, p. 112. 
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§1: Labour law and applicants’ rights 
As it was already referred to in Part I, both the FLC and the HLC contain provisions 
regulating employment and data protection. They also regulate the recruitment phase as 
well. Even though these provisions do not explicitly aim SNSs, they are adequately 
applicable to them as well. 
(A) Provisions of the labour codes 
Prior to discussing the issues specific to SNSs, it is necessary to review the data 
protection provisions of the labour codes. Before addressing (b) the data protection 
requirements laid down in the labour codes, it must be examined (a) whether these 
provisions are applicable to job applicants at all. 
(a) Applicability to job candidates 
421. Personal scope of the labour law regulations. Naturally, when it comes to 
the recruitment process, the subjects of the different recruitment methods are prospective 
employees and not employees. As these individuals are not yet employees, the question of 
the applicability of the labour law regulations might be raised and therefore should be 
clarified. 
422. Personal scope of the FLC. The question whether the provisions of the 
labour code are applicable only to employees or they include prospective employees as 
well is not raised in French legislation. France was the first country in the European 
Economic Community to adopt a legislation specifically aiming to regulate recruitment 
methods:1304 since 1992, due to the act relating to employment, the development of part-
time work and unemployment insurance,1305 the FLC contains provisions explicitly 
 
1304 Ray, J.-E. (1993) ‘Une loi macédonienne ? Étude critique du V de la loi du 31 décembre 1992. 
« Dispositions relatives au recrutement et aux libertés individuelles »’, Droit social, (2), p. 109. Already back 
in 1985, the CNIL addressed the question of data protection and recruitment in one of its deliberations. See 
more in: CNIL (1985) Délibération portant adoption d’une recommandation relative à la collecte et au 
traitement d’informations nominatives lors d’opérations de conseil en recrutement. Délibération n°85-44 du 
15 octobre 1985. 
1305 Act No. 92-1446 of 31 December 1992 on employment, the development of part-time work and 
unemployment insurance (“Loi n° 92-1446 du 31 décembre 1992 relative à l'emploi, au développement du 
travail à temps partiel et à l'assurance chômage”) 
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regulating the recruitment process (Article L1221-6 – Article L1221-9), making it 
unquestionable that job applicants are covered by these provisions.1306 
423. Personal scope of the HLC. In contrast to the FLC, the HLC contains no 
expressed provision regarding the hiring procedure, leaving room for certain questions. 
The HLC does not mention the expression “job applicant”, it uses the term of employee. 
Even when determining the personal scope of the HLC, the word employee is used.1307 
With respect to the recruitment phase, only a reference can be found in Subsection 1 of 
Section 10, which regulates statements and disclosure of information and states that “[an] 
employee may be requested to make a statement or to disclose certain information only if it 
does not violate his/[her] rights relating to personality, and if deemed necessary for the 
conclusion […] of the employment relationship[.]”1308 
424. These provisions raise an important point of law, such as: does the personal 
scope of the HLC cover the candidate, too? Opinions differ regarding this question. When 
examining this section,1309 Tibor Breznay mentions only the employee and not 
recruitment,1310 while Katalin Berki et al. stipulate that this provision only aims 
employees.1311 According to the Equal Treatment Advisory Board, the HLC’s provisions 
are only applicable to employees and employers and therefore do not cover the recruitment 
process.1312 In contrast, according to Csilla Lehoczkyné Kollonay, the provisions aiming to 
ensure the protection of employees are applicable to the selection process, too.1313 Mariann 
Arany Tóth, and József Hajdú and Attila Kun are of the same opinion, namely that the 
personal scope of the provisions mentioned covers the candidate, too.1314, 1315 
 
1306 Not to mention the general formulation of Article L1121-1 of the FLC, not only aiming to protect 
employees, but every person. 
1307 Subsection (1) of Section 2 of the HLC 
1308 Subsection (1) of Section 10 of the HLC. Emphasis added by the author. 
1309 It should be mentioned that the sources below concern the previous HLC (Act XXII of 1992), which 
contained a similar provision. (Section 77) 
1310 Breznay, T. (2002) A munka törvénykönyve egységes szerkezetben állásfoglalásokkal és 
magyarázatokkal. Bővített kiadás. Budapest: Kompkonzult. p. 115. 
1311 Berki, K. et al. (2008) A munka törvénykönyve magyarázata. 2nd edn. Budapest: Complex. p. 278. 
1312 Az Egyenlő Bánásmód Tanácsadó Testület 1/2007. TT. sz. állásfoglalása az állásinterjún feltehető 
munkáltatói kérdésekről 
1313 Lehoczkyné Kollonay, Cs. (ed.) (1997) A magyar munkajog I.Budapest: Kulturtrade Kiadó. p. 91. 
1314 Arany-Tóth, M. (2008) A munkavállalók személyes adatainak védelme a magyar munkajogban. Szeged: 
Bába Kiadó, p. 114.; Hajdú, J. and Kun, A. (eds) (2014) Munkajog. Budapest: Patrocinium, p. 94. 
1315 According to Jóri et al., the material scope of the act covers the hiring phase, too. Source: Jóri, A., 
Hegedűs, B. and Kerekes, Zs. (eds) (2010) Adatvédelem és információszabadság a gyakorlatban. Budapest: 
Complex, p. 278. 
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The latter viewpoint is supported by the fact that the general reasoning of the HLC 
emphasizes that according to the general principle, unless contrary to labour law 
regulation, civil law rules constitute the underlying rules of the HLC.1316 When declaring 
the protection of personality rights in the employment context (Section 9), the HLC refers 
to the Civil Code – which states that every person is entitled to the protection of the 
personality rights.1317 
Also, in the employment relationship a hierarchal relation can be found between the 
parties, the employee is in a position of existential vulnerability.1318 One of the aims of 
labour law is to counterweigh this vulnerability; in order to achieve this, labour law 
contains several provisions for the protection of the employee.1319 However, this existential 
vulnerability is not unique to the employee-employer relationship: it is (even more 
intensely)1320 present before the conclusion of the employment contract, as – under the not 
always favourable labour market conditions – the candidate is typically not in the position 
to balance between concluding a contract and the violation of his/her fundamental 
rights.1321 
425. Based on the above-mentioned arguments, it seems logical that the 
provisions protecting employees must be adequately applicable to candidates. The phrasing 
of Section 10 itself also suggests the applicability of these provisions to candidates as it 
regulates the case of concluding the employment contract – for which one needs to be a 
candidate and not an employee.1322 
426. De lege ferenda suggestion. With regard to the above, as a de lege ferenda 
suggestion, it would be recommended to clarify in Hungarian law – similarly to French law 
– that the relevant data protection provisions of the HLC are also applicable to job 
 
1316 T/4786. számú törvényjavaslat a Munka Törvénykönyvéről (2011). Előadó: Dr. Matolcsy György 
nemzetgazdasági miniszter. Budapest. p. 86. 
1317 Similarly, the basic principles of the Privacy Act are applied to every data processing, not only to the 
processing of personal data relating to employees. 
1318 However, it also has to be seen that this defencelessness does not characterize all employees. Bankó, Z. 
and Szőke, G. L. (2016) Issues of the digital workplace - The situation in Hungary. Pécs: JurInfo, pp. 43-44. 
1319 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2013) Munkajog. ELTE Eötvös Kiadó. Budapest, p. 19. 
1320 The Commissioner’s Recommendation on job advertisements and on the activity of private recruitment 
agencies  
1321 Hajdú, J. (2005) A munkavállalók személyiségi jogainak védelme. Szeged: Pólay Elemér Alapítvány, p. 
170. 
1322 Arany-Tóth, M. (2008) A munkavállalók személyes adatainak védelme a magyar munkajogban. Szeged: 
Bába Kiadó, p. 114. 
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applicants. Such a clarification might include the insertion of a subsection stating that these 
provisions are to be applied to job applicants as well.1323 
(b) Applicants’ right to data protection in the labour codes 
427. While the FLC explicitly aims recruitment, the HLC does it in a more 
abstract way, through regulating employee statements and disclosure of personal 
information in order to conclude an employment relationship. These provisions echo data 
protection requirements such as purpose limitation, necessity, relevancy and transparency. 
428. Recruitment in the FLC. Besides the general clause of Article L1121-1 
stipulating the protection of individual and collective rights and freedoms, from Article 
L1221-6 to Article L1221-9 the FLC contains provisions explicitly regulating the 
recruitment process. In these provisions it expressly refers to the most important data 
protection principles, leaving no question regarding whether these principles are applied to 
the recruitment phase or not. 
Article L1221-6 asserts the principle of finality, which requires that information 
asked from a job applicant in any form must only be processed for the aim of assessing the 
applicant’s capacities to occupy the given employment or to evaluate his/her professional 
abilities. Therefore it aims to protect the applicant’s extra-professional life through limiting 
the processing of personal data to the professional capacities of the applicant.1324 
Moreover, it emphasizes the principle of necessity by stipulating that the information 
obtained must have a direct link and must be necessary for the proposed job or for the 
evaluation of professional aptitudes. The Article also prescribes that the applicant must 
reply in good faith to the information requests. 
429. Article L1221-8 requires the employer to inform the applicants regarding 
the methods and techniques used for recruitment, prior to their application. It also declares 
that the results obtained with such methods and techniques are confidential. These methods 
and techniques must be relevant in the light of the objectives sought. Article L1221-9 
further emphasizes the principle of transparency and the employer’s obligation to inform 
applicants prior to the collection of personal data. 
 
1323 Such a subsection might be formulated as follows: “Subsection (6) of Section 10: Subsections (1)-(5) are 
also adequately applicable to job applicants.” 
1324 For example, the employer can ask for a school certificate, proof of a degree, driving licence, but cannot 
ask for academic records or for personal files. Source: Radé, C. (2002) Droit du travail. 2nd edn. Paris: 
Montchrestien, p. 184. 
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430. Data protection in the HLC. The HLC contains provisions relating to 
employee statements and disclosure of personal information – which covers the case of 
processing the job applicants’ personal data through obtaining different kinds of 
information. The HLC also prescribes the purpose limitation principle; it defines the 
purpose of such processing, which is the conclusion of the employment relationship,1325 
and in relation to this identifying the best candidate. 1326 It further refers to the principle of 
necessity and adds that statements and disclosure must be necessary in order to conclude 
the employment relationship1327 – imposing limitations on the scope of information that 
can be processed.1328 Also, similarly to the FLC, the HLC also contains provisions with 
respect to informing candidates: it requires employers to inform candidates in writing prior 
to the data processing.1329 It means that information must be provided to applicants, 
thereby ensuring the transparency of the processing. 
431. De lege ferenda suggestion. With regard to the grammatical formulation of 
the labour codes regulating data processing in the recruitment phase, a de lege ferenda 
suggestion is made. As these provisions were adopted before the vast proliferation of 
SNSs, their application to these Web 2. 0. services might raise certain concerns, as the 
grammatical formulation of the relevant provisions of the labour codes does not correspond 
perfectly with the reality of the information society. The FLC uses the expression 
“information requested” (“informations demandées”) in the first subparagraph of Article 
L1221-6, while the HLC employs the expression “making a statement or disclosing certain 
information” (“nyilatkozat megtétele vagy adat közlése”) in Subsection 1 of Section 10. 
Interpreting these provisions from a strict grammatical point of view would result in 
excluding information obtained by the employer through unilaterally accessing (without 
requesting) the prospective employee’s SNS profile. 
432. The aim of these provisions is to protect job candidates’ rights during 
recruitment, regardless of the method used. Data protection requirements also apply to 
every processing during recruitment. So, despite this grammatical lack, the data protection 
requirements apply; still, it would be desirable to clarify the scope of protection. In order 
 
1325 Subsection (1) of Section 10 of the HLC 
1326 Arany-Tóth, M. (2016) Személyes adatok kezelése a munkaviszonyban. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer. p. 29. 
1327 Subsection (1) of Section 10 of the HLC 
1328 Usually information directly connected to the identity of the applicant is not considered to be essential for 
the conclusion of the employment contract. Source: Bankó, Z., Berke, Gy. and Kiss, Gy. (2017) Kommentár 
a munka törvénykönyvéhez. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer, p. 46.  
1329 Subsection (5) of Section 10 of the HLC 
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that the grammatical formulation of these provisions better correspond with real-life 
conditions, it would be desirable to complete the regulation with the expression 
“collected”,1330 reflecting better the reality of the methods of obtaining personal data in the 
age of the information society. 
 (B) Practice of the data protection supervisory bodies 
433. Both the CNIL and the NAIH have addressed the question of the job 
applicant’s right to data protection, emphasizing that the employer must respect data 
protection requirements during the recruitment as well and clarified how exactly employers 
should comply with these requirements in this context. They examined the proper use of 
different recruitment tools (e.g. lie detectors, personality tests, etc.) from a data protection 
point of view, giving substance to the general provisions of the labour codes. In the 
following, instead of the exhaustive presentation of the CNIL’s and NAIH’s practice, focus 
will be put on their conclusions which might be relevant in relation to SNSs. 
(a) France: the CNIL 
434. The CNIL issued a deliberation in 2002 on the collection and processing of 
personal information during recruitment,1331 in which it clarified the application of the 
data protection principles to the recruitment process. It stated that unless justified by the 
specific nature of the job, or by the legal regulation of a foreign country concerned by the 
post, generally – amongst others – information such as date of entry to France, information 
relating to family members (name, nationality, profession), height, weights, housing 
conditions or community life shall not be processed. The deliberation also states that it is 
prohibited to process personal data relating to the candidate’s racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinion, religious or philosophical convictions, membership in a trade union, data 
relating to his/her health or sexual life1332 – without the consent of the applicant. Even in 
 
1330 The following solution (suggestion marked in italics) is recommended as a de lege ferenda suggestion: 
Proposed Article L1221-6 of the FLC: “The information requested from or collected about a job applicant – 
in any form whatsoever – shall only have the aim to assess his/her fitness for the proposed employment or 
his/her professional competence.” 
Proposed Subsection (1) of Section 10 of the HLC: “An employee may be requested to make a statement or 
to disclose certain information, or information relating to him/her can be collected only if it does not violate 
his/her rights relating to personality, and if deemed necessary for the conclusion, fulfilment or termination of 
the employment relationship.” 
1331 CNIL (2002) Délibération portant adoption d’une recommandation relative à la collecte et au traitement 
d’informations nominatives lors d’opérations de recrutement. Délibération n°02-017 du 21 mars 2002. 
1332 General principle enshrined in Article 6 of the FDPA. 
 258 
 
the case of consent, the processing cannot lack a direct and necessary link to the job 
proposed.1333, 1334 
435. The CNIL reiterated this position in several of its documents. In 2013 it 
provided a list of information which is, as a main rule, not relevant, unless justified by 
particular circumstances. These items of information include, for example, date of arrival 
in France, original citizenship, family background, health status or community life1335 – 
information which is often shared on SNSs by an average user. In its information sheets 
relating to employment, the CNIL also dealt with the phase of recruitment, and again it 
reiterated the importance of the principle of relevancy and the importance of being 
informed on the processing of applicants’ personal data.1336 
436. While previously the employer had to actively look for that information, 
today it is not uncommon to find this information within reach on SNSs. In addition, 
drawing conclusions from this information might matter, too. In another deliberation in 
2007,1337 the CNIL recognized the lack of relevancy and the very subjective nature of 
comments contained in files relating to applicants (and former employees).1338 So the 
conclusions drawn from the consultation of the profile of the applicant shall also present an 
objective nature. 
(b) Hungary: the Data Protection Commissioner and the NAIH 
437. In 2006 the Hungarian Data Protection Commissioner adopted a 
recommendation on job advertisements and on the activity of private recruitment 
agencies1339 in order to ensure the uniform protection of job applicants’ rights. In this 
 
1333 It should not be forgotten that, as demonstrated before, since 2002, the appreciation of the validity of 
employee consent as a legal ground of processing has considerably changed. 
1334 The deliberation also treated the question of transparency and prior information of the individual, the 
exercise of the rights of the data subject and the prohibition of automated profiles. 
1335 CNIL (2013) Les opérations de recrutement. Available at: https://www.cnil.fr/fr/les-operations-de-
recrutement (Accessed: 20 June 2019). 
1336 CNIL (2018) Le recrutement et la gestion du personnel. Fiches pratiques. Travail & Données 
personnelles. Available at: https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/_travail-
vie_privee_recrutement_gestion_du_personnel.pdf (Accessed: 20 June 2019). 
1337 CNIL (2007) Délibération n°2007-374 du 11 décembre 2007 sanctionnant la société X. Délibération 
n°2007-374 du 11 décembre 2007. 
1338 These comments included, for example, comments relating to the behaviour of the individual 
(“catastrophe”, “liar and unreliable”, “lame”, “not great”, “hygienic problems (smell) !!!!!”, “so annoying”), 
comments relating to their health status (“disappeared after a depression”, “depressive”, “problems with 
alcoholism”, “suffers from cancer, cannot work anymore”) or comments relating to the personal or family 
relations (“girlfriend/friend of M. – not reliable”, “does not live with her husband anymore”, “wife of G.”). 
1339 ABI 167/A/2006-3. 
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recommendation the Commissioner drew attention to the informational vulnerability of job 
applicants and the increased importance that he/she can follow and control the processing 
of his/her personal data during the hiring process. It is crucial that the applicant is aware to 
whom he/she is sending the information and knows where he/she can ask for information 
regarding the status of the decision. Therefore, job advertisements must contain 
information about the controller and about the contact information ensuring that the 
applicants can exercise their rights relating to the processing. In a case1340 on the questions 
that can be asked during a job interview, the Commissioner noted that if the employer asks 
a question violating privacy rights, in order to prevent impairment of rights, the applicant 
can refuse to answer or can give an untruthful answer.1341 
438. The former Hungarian Data Protection Commissioner extensively dealt 
with the issue of tests and data protection. According to him, a difference must be made 
between two types of the tests: between tests evaluating the professional suitability and 
readiness, and between tests relating to psychological and personality traits of the 
individual.1342 The former case relates to tests aiming to map the professional competences 
and expertise of employees, and indeed the employer is entitled to obtain that information, 
before and also during the employment.1343 In contrast, tests aiming to know the 
psychological or personality traits can enable the employer to draw conclusions relating to 
the individual’s personal traits that can contribute to organizing work more effectively. 
Although this is a legitimate interest on the part of the employer, during the enforcement of 
this interest the employer must respect the employee’s personality rights.1344 
Relating to this case, the Commissioner also emphasized that depending on the 
characteristics of the given job, certain personality traits might have increased relevancy, 
these tests cannot be used on a general basis to a large group of employees: its use should 
be carefully planned and selected. Also, the tests should be limited to the examination of 
the personal traits essential for the employment, with the existence of a legitimate purpose. 
It was also recommended that an independent third party should analyse the tests.1345 In the 
same case, the Commissioner also stated that the psychological test should be based on the 
informed, voluntary consent of the employee. However, this statement has become 
 
1340 ABI 900/A/2006) 
1341 ABI 900/A/2006) 
1342 ABI 814/A/2004-8. 
1343 ABI 814/A/2004-8. 
1344 ABI 814/A/2004-8. 
1345 ABI 814/A/2004-8. 
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outdated since, as the case took place in 2004; later it was concluded that the voluntary 
nature of the consent is highly questionable and that the legitimate ground of balancing 
rights and interests might be better adapted to the employment context.1346 As on SNSs the 
employer has an unprecedented possibility to assess the personal traits of job applicants 
(and employees), these requirements will have high importance in the case of pre-
employment SNS screenings – as will be presented in Chapter 2. 
439. In another case1347 the Commissioner dealt with a machine using digital face 
recognition destined to be applied during interviews. The machine would analyse the 
features of the applicant and draw consequences regarding his/her personality traits and 
behaviour. In relation to personality tests, the Commissioner laid down that the employee 
cannot be subjected to a method which would provide the employer data over which the 
individual does not have control. First, the result of the test should be transferred to the 
individual, who can then decide whether he/she consents to transfer it to the employer, 
providing him/her the possibility to make a decision. The Commissioner also outlines that 
there is another, more traditional method to effectively assess whether the employee is 
truly competent and well-suited for the job: probation. 
440. In 2012 president of the NAIH Attila Péterfalvi et al. summarized what 
requirements an aptitude test must meet.1348 First of all, the principle of purpose limitation 
requires that it must be determined exactly what competences these tests aim to measure 
and how it is relevant regarding the employment relationship. In addition, the methods 
chosen must be able to assess these competences: they shall provide relevant data that can 
in reality contribute to achieving the purpose of the processing. As these tests are able to 
reveal information that the individual is not even aware of, first the individual should be 
informed of the result of test and then he/she can decide (and bear the consequences of 
refusing) whether the result can be transferred to the employer as well. Attention was 
raised also to the fact that these tests may inadvertently reveal information which has no 
relation to the purpose of the processing: these data should be erased. 
 
1346 NAIH (2013) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság ajánlása a munkahelyen 
alkalmazott elektronikus megfigyelőrendszer alapvető követelményeiről. NAIH-4001-6/2012/V. Budapest, 
pp. 2-3. 
1347 ABI 2550/K/2007-3. 
1348 Péterfalvi, A. (ed.) (2012) Adatvédelem és információszabadság a mindennapokban. Budapest: HVG-
ORAC, pp. 298-299. 
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§2: Asking for information from applicants 
441. Special attention will be paid to job interviews, as they provide the 
employer the possibility to pose a vast amount of questions to the applicant, thus learning a 
little more about his/her personality. While in practice the employer might even ask 
questions relating to the personal life of the applicant, (A) the previously presented data 
protection principles, such as purpose limitation or necessity, impose limitations to what 
kinds of questions can be asked. Following from the general labour law principles such as 
cooperation, (B) the applicant also has certain tools to protect himself/herself against the 
unlawful questions of the employer. 
442. It was already addressed both in France and in Hungary what questions can 
be asked during a job interview, thereby determining the boundaries of personal and 
professional life, and according to my opinion, these observations provide a useful 
guidance when it comes to the protection of applicants’ personal lives on SNSs, as the 
observations can be adequately applied to identifying this boundary on these online 
platforms. 
(A) Job interviews 
443. Naturally, the employer is interested in knowing all the essential 
information about an applicant, including his/her personality as well.1349 During job 
interviews this information need is manifested in asking questions from the applicant: the 
employer is entitled and is required as well to pose questions.1350  
444. Questions to be asked during a job interview and Hungarian labour law. 
In line with the data protection principles, these questions can relate to the employment 
relationship or checking the aptitudes necessary for the job.1351 Therefore – just as it was 
the case when asking for information from the applicant – the questions must be connected 
to the professional life of the candidate, personal considerations should be excluded from 
the decision-making process. 
 
1349 Bankó, Z., Berke, Gy. and Kiss, Gy. (2017) Kommentár a munka törvénykönyvéhez. Budapest: Wolters 
Kluwer, p. 45. and Arany-Tóth, M. (2008) A munkavállalók személyes adatainak védelme a magyar 
munkajogban. Szeged: Bába Kiadó, p. 112. 
1350 Duquesne, F. (2003) Droit du travail. 2nd edn. Paris: Gualino, p. 58. 
1351 Hajdú, J. (2005) A munkavállalók személyiségi jogainak védelme. Szeged: Pólay Elemér Alapítvány, p. 
170. and Duquesne, F. (2003) Droit du travail. 2nd edn. Paris: Gualino, p. 58. 
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445. However, it is difficult to exhaustively define what the questions belonging 
to this circle are, as it is difficult to exhaustively define what falls under the notion of 
“competency” in this context.1352 In France, a bulletin from 1993 provided certain 
clarification: the employer can obtain information relating to the applicant’s competences, 
technical knowledge, adaptability, the ability to integrate into a team, etc.1353  
446. Discrimination and personal data protection. Even though it is beyond the 
scope of the present dissertation to examine this question in detail, certain similarities still 
have to be outlined between discrimination and privacy/data protection. Information 
belonging to the personal life of the prospective employee or being beyond the scope of 
purpose limitation and data minimization often overlaps with what constitutes protected 
characteristics in discrimination law,1354 and the more information employers gather, the 
more they can be exposed to discrimination claims.1355 
447. Discrimination might appear in the form of discriminative questions during 
interviews (e.g. question relating to the potential pregnancy of the applicant), or also 
through obtaining such information via SNSs.1356, 1357 On SNSs users typically share 
 
1352 Arany-Tóth, M. (2008) A munkavállalók személyes adatainak védelme a magyar munkajogban. Szeged: 
Bába Kiadó, p. 117. 
1353 Radé, C. (2002) Droit du travail. 2nd edn. Paris: Montchrestien, p. 184. 
1354 See these characteristics in: Article 1 of Directive 2000/78/EC; Section 8 of Act CXXV of 2003 on Equal 
Treatment and Promotion of Equal Opportunities; Article L1132-1 of the FLC; Article 1of the Act No. 2008-
496 of 27 May 2008 on various provisions of adaptation to Community law in the field of the fight against 
discrimination.  
1355 Lory, B. E. H. (2010) ‘Using Facebook to Assess Candidates During the Recruiting Process: Ethical 
Implications’, NACE Journal, 71(1), p. 38. 
1356 See the field experiment conducted by Matthieu Manant, Serge Pajak and Nicolas Soulié at Paris-Sud 
University, justifying the existence of obtaining information to be the ground of discrimination on SNSs. In 
their experiment they created two fictitious job candidates and sent their applications (with identical cover 
letters and résumés) to different companies. They also created profiles for these two candidates and indicated 
their hometowns and spoken languages, in which the two candidates considerably differed. While the first 
candidate was born in a French city, the second one was born in Marrakesh and spoke Arabic. This 
information was only available on Facebook, not in the CV. As a result of the field experiment, they found 
that the first candidate received 40 % more call-backs than the second one – which they thought is due to the 
subject’s protected characteristic. Source: Manant, M., Pajak, S. and Soulié, N. (2014) Online social 
networks and hiring: a field experiment on the French labor market. [in press] Munich Personal RePEc 
Archive. Available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2458468 [Accessed 2 
February 2017]. 
1357 Discrimination in relation to SNSs is realised not only if the candidate’s profile reveals protected 
characteristics: the procedure itself can also be discriminative – and therefore is to be avoided. These cases 
include when instead of inspecting equally every candidate’s profiles, the employer decides to inspect the 
profiles of candidates pertaining to a certain race or to an age group. (Source: Byrnside, I. (2008) ‘Six Clicks 
of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using Social Networking Sites to Research 
Applicants’, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, 10(2), p. 464.) In addition to being 
discriminative, such a practice might also possibly infringe the data protection principle of fairness.  
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information also falling under the scope of protected characteristics, such as religious or 
political view, relationship status, sexual orientation, etc. 
448. One illustrative example is the case of Gaskell v. University of Kentucky 
from the US. The University of Kentucky created a hiring committee for the position of 
founding director for the university’s astronomical observatory. Mr. Gaskell was the 
leading candidate, “clearly the most experienced” candidate and had “already done 
everything [the hiring committee] could possibly want the observatory director to do.” 
However, the committee conducted an Internet search and found Mr. Gaskell’s personal 
website, containing an article entitled Modern Astronomy, the Bible, and Creation. This 
article made the committee decide to hire another candidate, based on concerns relating to 
the religious views of Mr. Gaskell.1358 
449. The Hungarian Equal Treatment Advisory Board. In Hungary, the Equal 
Treatment Advisory Board (“Egyenlő Bánásmód Tanácsadó Testület”) already regulated 
what kinds of questions cannot be asked during a job interview: in 2007 they issued a 
resolution on the questions that can be asked during a job interview.1359 In its resolution, 
the Equal Treatment Advisory Board emphasized that it is not possible to provide an 
exhaustive list of the questions that cannot be asked during a job interview because of 
being considered discriminative. The assessment of such questions must be based on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the given circumstances. Generally, it is prohibited to ask 
questions which are not necessary for assessing whether the potential employee is capable 
of performing the given job. By way of example, these include questions relating to the 
relationship of the applicant, to family life, to origins, to place of habitation, to sexual 
habits, to religious or to political views, etc. However, the Equal Treatment Advisory 
Board also draws attention to the fact that in some certain, exceptional cases the employer 
might be entitled to ask certain information relating to these matters. 
450. The French Defender of Rights. In France the Defender of Rights issued a 
guide on how to recruit with the help of digital tools without discriminating. In the 
document attention was raised to SNSs, which are deemed to present an increased risk to 
the right of job applicants, especially when it comes to the inspection of personal SNS 
 
1358 Carlson, K. (2014) ‘Social Media and the Workplace: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Privacy 
Settings and the NLRB’, Florida Law Review, 66(1), pp. 484-485. 
1359 Az Egyenlő Bánásmód Tanácsadó Testület 1/2007. TT. sz. állásfoglalása az állásinterjún feltehető 
munkáltatói kérdésekről 
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profiles – a common practice amongst recruiters. According to the Defender of Rights, the 
employer’s access to such sites presents a considerable risk to the applicant’s rights and 
highly enables the employer to make a biased decision.1360 
451. To conclude, the employer’s questions fall into two groups: questions 
relating to personal life and to professional life. If the question relates to the personal life 
of the applicant, the employer must not ask it, apart from certain strict exceptions1361 – thus 
ensuring the protection of the personal life of the applicant. However, if the question 
relates to the professional life, it is lawful to ask it. Although it is difficult to define a strict 
dividing line between these two spheres, as it was already seen, doctrine, data protection 
authorities and other institutions already gave numerous examples for these two categories, 
providing essential guidance. 
(B) The “right to lie” 
 In case the employer does not respect the above limitations, the applicants have 
certain possibilities resulting from the general requirements set by labour law with the aim 
of protecting themselves against the unlawful questions of the employer. 
452. Obligations of the parties. The HLC contains a provision amongst the 
general requirements of conduct, declaring the obligation of cooperation.1362 During the 
performance of rights and obligations, the parties are obliged to act mutually taking into 
account the other party’s rights and interests.1363 As a subset of this obligation of 
cooperation, the HLC also specifies the obligation to inform.1364 In this regard, it states that 
the parties must inform each other concerning all facts, information and circumstances, and 
any changes therein, which are considered essential from the point of view of concluding 
the employment relationship.1365 The FLC also declares the principle of good faith,1366 
 
1360 Le Défenseur des droits (no date) Guide pratique pour les professionnels du recrutement. Recruter avec 
des outils numériques sans discriminer. Available at: 
https://www.defenseurdesdroits.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/636150490_int_valide_ft_fini_complet.pdf 
(Accessed: 27 June 2018). p. 14. 
1361 For example: ideologically oriented enterprises or faith-oriented enterprises (“entreprise de tendance”). 
1362 Subsection (2) of Section 6 of the HLC 
1363 Cséffán, J. (2019) A Munka Törvénykönyve és magyarázata. Szeged: Szegedi Rendezvényszervező Kft, 
p. 19. 
1364 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2017) Munkajog. 3rd edn. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, p. 74.  
1365 Subsection (4) of Section 6 of the HLC 
1366 Article L1222-1 of the FLC 
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moreover, it specifically states that the job applicant is required to answer truthfully to the 
employer’s information requests.1367 
453. Obligation of cooperation during job interviews. In relation to job 
interviews, these obligations can be interpreted in such a way that the employee is obliged 
to answer questions that are directly related to the employment relationship –1368 expressly 
stated as such by the FLC.1369 It means that the candidate is expected to give the demanded 
information regarding his/her qualification, professional experience. The candidate must 
answer truthfully if the purpose of the question is to assess the aptitudes for the job, but if 
the question is not related to the employment relationship, he/she can refuse to answer or 
cannot be sanctioned if he/she has not given a truthful answer to the question violating 
personality rights.1370 
454. Refusing to answer and the “right to lie”. It follows from the general 
requirement of conduct of cooperation and obligation of information, as well as from the 
applicant’s right to privacy and right to data protection, enshrined in the labour codes, that 
in case the employer asks questions going beyond the lawful scope enounced above, the 
applicant is not in breach of the obligations imposed on him/her if he/she does not provide 
a truthful answer to them.1371 
455. Refusing to answer and the “right to lie” – on SNSs. All these rules 
provide the applicant the legal possibility to protect himself/herself against the unlawful 
questions asked by the employer during job interviews – recognizing the importance of 
such protection. However, in the case of SNSs, the scenario is different: instead of asking 
 
1367 Paragraph 3 of Article L1221-6 of the FLC 
1368 Bankó, Z., Berke, Gy. and Kiss, Gy. (2017) Kommentár a munka törvénykönyvéhez. Budapest: Wolters 
Kluwer. 
1369 Paragraph 3 of Article L1221-6 of the FLC 
1370 Berke, Gy. and Kiss, Gy. (eds) (2014) Kommentár a munka törvénykönyvéhez: kommentár a munka 
törvénykönyvéről szóló 2012. évi I. törvényhez. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer, p. 60.; Bankó, Z., Berke, Gy. and 
Kiss, Gy. (2017) Kommentár a munka törvénykönyvéhez. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer, p. 61.; ABI (case 
900/A/2006) and Le Lamy Droit Du Numérique (Guide), 2014 - Section 1 - Gestion Du Personnel Par Le 
Biais de L’informatique et Des Nouvelles Technologies de L’information’, 2014.) p. 3. [Page number 
referring to the online version of the article downloaded from the website of the Cujas Library in Paris 
(Accessed: 19 December 2019)] 
1371 Other authors only refer to the applicant’s possibility to deny answering an unlawful question. (Source: 
Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2017) Munkajog. 3rd edn. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, p. 134.) The wording chosen 
by Mariann Arany-Tóth also suggests the existence of a mere right to refusal. (Arany-Tóth, M. (2008) A 
munkavállalók személyes adatainak védelme a magyar munkajogban. Szeged: Bába Kiadó, p. 125.) 
However, in my opinion, providing the possibility to the applicant to merely refuse to answer an unlawful 
question does not provide effective protection, as then the applicant would instantly have to face the 
consequences of the refusal, while in the case of being able to provide an untruthful answer, the employer 
would not even necessarily notice the applicant’s act. 
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the question face-to-face from the applicant, thus providing the possibility whether to 
(truthfully) answer, in the case of SNSs the employer does not ask for the same 
information face-to-face, but checks it by himself/herself without the involvement of the 
applicant. Therefore, the applicant is unable to effectively protect his/her rights during SNS 
background checks. 
Chapter 2: Social network sites and arising data protection questions 
456. Part I. already presented the most important data protection requirements, 
which were laid down in the GDPR. However, obtaining personal data from SNSs raises 
certain challenges to these existing requirements, putting applicants’ right to data 
protection at risk. The aim of Chapter 2 is to present the arising data protection issues in 
relation to SNSs and recruitment and suggest answers to these questions. 
457. Chapter 2 is composed of two parts: Section 1 will discuss the most 
important principles of data processing, while Section 2 will focus on issues relating to 
access and transparency. Here, a refinement must be made: though in Part I. access and 
transparency were mentioned among the data protection principles, here they are discussed 
under separate headings. The reason for this separation is due to the other principles being 
more relevant regarding the content available on SNSs, transparency and access rather 
relate to the procedure of conducting pre-employment SNS background checks. 
458. Scope of the data protection regulation during the recruitment. Before 
addressing the legal issues specific to data protection, it must be examined whether data 
protection rules can apply to the phase of recruitment, and especially to (which) SNSs. 
According to certain public perceptions, once they posted information online, it should not 
come as a surprise to users of SNSs that this information is used, for example, in the hiring 
process.1372 It cannot be emphasized enough that while privacy protection indeed might be 
affected by the behaviour of the user, data protection rules apply regardless of whether it 
was the user who published himself/herself the information.1373, 1374 
 
1372 Flaherty, P. and Whitmore, S. (2013) ‘Privacy Protection in the Digital Workplace’, in Law Society of 
Upper Canada, Employment Law and the New Workplace in the Social Media Age. Toronto: Irwin Law, p. 
23. and Lory, B. E. H. (2010) ‘Using Facebook to Assess Candidates During the Recruiting Process: Ethical 
Implications’, NACE Journal, 71(1), p. 37. 
1373 Dupuis, M. (2013) ‘La vie privée à l’épreuve des réseaux sociaux’, Revue Lamy Droit Civil, (102), p. 44. 
1374 The contrary might be true for questions asked during a job interview. According to an EU study, 
prepared by Paul De Hert and Hans Lammerant, the questions that are asked during an interview do not 
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459. EU perspective: the WP29 opinion. The material scope of the GDPR 
applies to automated means of processing and to manual processing if the processed 
personal data are contained or are intended to be contained in a filing system,1375 regardless 
of the methods used. Therefore, when processing takes place through SNSs, data 
protection rules apply. The WP29 explicitly addressed the question of pre-employment and 
SNSs and stated in its “Opinion on data processing at work” that just because the personal 
data are made publicly available by the applicant, it does not mean that requirements, such 
as the legal ground, necessity, etc. would not apply to this kind of processing.1376, 1377 
460. The NAIH. In 2016 the NAIH came to the same conclusion as the WP29 in 
its “Information notice on the basic requirements of data processing at work”, emphasizing 
that data protection requirements – such as prior notification, necessity, respect of the 
chosen data protection settings – shall apply.1378 In a case relating to employment 
background checks, similar conclusions were drawn, supplemented by raising attention to 
the arising data protection challenges, such as the enforcement of accuracy, lawfulness and 
the rights of the data subject.1379 Therefore, SNSs during recruitment are subject to data 
protection regulations. 
Section 1: Questions relating to data processing principles 
461. Using SNSs to assess the suitability of job applicants poses several 
questions in relation to the enforcement of the data protection principles. These principles 
were already presented in Part I., which contains their more detailed presentation: here, 
brief reference will be made to their core attributes, then focus will be put on the SNS-
specific questions. Although Title 1 focuses on the phase of recruitment, even at this stage 
 
necessarily fall under the scope of data protection law, as they are not always processed by automated means 
or are not intended to form part of a filing system. Even if that is the case, these questions are clearly related 
to privacy. Source: De Hert, P. and Lammerant, H. (2013) Protection of Personal Data in Work-related 
Relations. Study PE 474.440. Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ 
Rights and Constitutional Affairs. Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, p. 40. 
1375 Recital (15) of the GDPR; Paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the GDPR 
1376 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. p. 11. 
1377 The CoE also expressly refers to the importance of refraining from bypassing a candidate’s (and 
employee’s) chosen privacy settings and from collecting data without their knowledge through an 
intermediary, under another name or using a pseudonym. Council of Europe (2015) Recommendation 
CM/Rec(2015)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the processing of personal data in the 
context of employment, 5. 3. and Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers (2015) Explanatory 
memorandum to Recommendation CM/Rec(2015)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the 
processing of personal data in the context of employment, p. 7. 
1378 NAIH (2016): A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi 
adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről, p. 19.  
1379 NAIH/2016/4386/2/V 
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it must be highlighted that the same or very similar data protection questions might arise in 
other phases of the employment relationship as well. As a consequence, what is going to be 
discussed in this Chapter might be adequately applicable to other phases. 
462.  A subtitle must be clarified: part §2 employs the expression “data quality 
principle”, an expression missing from Part I’s analysis on the most important provisions 
of the GDPR. “Data quality” is a reference to the OECD’s data protection guidelines, and 
it means that “[p]ersonal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be 
used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and 
kept up-to-date.”1380 The same principles exist in the GDPR as well,1381 so in the 
dissertation the term data quality principle is used, which includes the principles of data 
minimisaton and accuracy laid down in the GDPR.  
(§1) Lawfulness and purpose limitation 
463. Before addressing issues relating to the data quality principles, two 
preliminary questions must be discussed: lawfulness and the purpose limitation principle. 
As it was already examined in Part I., lawfulness requires the processing to be based on 
one of the six legal grounds: having a legal ground is an obligatory pre-requirement to any 
processing. The principle of purpose limitation is one of the most significant data 
processing principles,1382 therefore reference to it must also be made. 
(A) Principle of lawfulness 
464. Possibly applicable legal grounds. Under the GDPR, every data processing 
shall have a legal ground. According to Edit Kajtár, out of the six legal grounds regulated 
by the GDPR three might possibly be applied: consent, the necessity of processing in order 
to enter into the contract and the balancing between the rights of the individual and the data 
controller’s legitimate interest. [(a), (b) and (f) of Article 6 of the GDPR]1383 The possible 
application of these legal grounds must be assessed. 
 
1380 OECD (1980) Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, Article 8 
1381 Such as principles of data minimisation and accuracy – already addressed in Part I. 
1382 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe (2018) Handbook on European 
data protection law: 2018 edition. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, p. 122. 
1383 Kajtár, E. (2015) ‘Think it over! Pre-employment search on social network sites’, in Vinković, M. 
(ed.) New Developments in EU Labour, Equality and Human Rights Law. Proceedings from the International 
Jean Monnet Conference “New Developments in EU Labour, Equality and Human Rights Law”, Osijek 21 
and 22 May 2015. Osijek: Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek Faculty of Law, p. 100. 
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465. Consent. One might ask the question: can the applicant consent to 
conducting an SNS background check? The GDPR reinforced the requirements towards 
consent, questioning its applicability in the employment context.1384 One of the 
requirements of consent is to be freely given – which is not ensured in cases when there is 
a clear imbalance between the controller and the data subject.1385 As a hierarchal 
relationship is present between job applicants and employers, consent does not seem to be 
appropriate when it comes to the lawfulness of pre-employment SNS background 
checks.1386 
466. The necessity of processing in order to enter into a contract. Another 
possible legal ground is the performance of a contract, when processing is necessary in 
order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract: when 
without the processing of personal data the contract between the parties could not be 
executed, the processing of these data will be considered lawful.1387 However, according to 
the WP29, prior to entering into contract, conducting a detailed background check 
following a candidate’s application should not be understood as a necessary measure for 
entering into contract.1388 
467. Balancing of rights and legitimate interests. The application of the 
‘balancing test’ is also dubious, as it is the employer’s legitimate interest to identify the 
best candidate possible, but he/she can achieve this purpose with less intrusive methods.1389 
Still, for the above-mentioned reasons, it seems to be the most appropriate legal ground 
applicable to the case of pre-employment SNS screenings. 
 
1384 Zsolt György Balogh et al. are of the same opinion, though according to them consent as a legal ground 
was generally accepted by Hungarian doctrine. Source: Balogh, Zs. Gy. et al. (2012) ‘Privacy in the 
Workplace’, in Essays of Faculty of Law University of Pécs: Yearbook of 2012. Pécs: University of Pécs 
Faculty of Law, pp. 16-17. 
1385 Recital (43) of the GDPR 
1386 However, according to the (previous) Hungarian literature, the voluntary nature of consent was present 
prior to concluding the employment relationship - erroneously according to my opinion. Athough these 
opinions did not address SNS background checks but the recruitment in general, especially the case of 
presumed consent when the applicant initiated the processing by applying for a position. Source: Balogh, Zs. 
Gy. et al. (2012) ‘Privacy in the Workplace’, in Essays of Faculty of Law University of Pécs: Yearbook of 
2012. Pécs: University of Pécs Faculty of Law, p. 16. 
1387 Péterfalvi, A., Révész, B. and Buzás, P. (eds) (2018) Magyarázat a GDPR-ról. Budapest: Wolters 
Kluwer Hungary, p. 123. 
1388 WP29 (2014) Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 
of Directive 95/46/EC. 844/14/EN WP 217. p. 18. 
1389 Kajtár, E. and Mestre, B. (2016) ‘Social networks and employees’ right to privacy in the pre-employment 
stage: some comparative remarks and interrogations’, Hungarian Labour Law E-journal, (1), pp. 32-33.; 
Kajtár, E. (2015) ‘Till Facebook Do Us Part? Social Networking Sites and the Employment 
Relationship’, Acta Juridica Hungarica, 56(4), p. 271. 
 270 
 
(B) Purpose limitation 
468. The purpose of pre-employment SNS background checks is the same as for 
the whole recruitment process: to identify the best applicant. Following from the freedom 
to contract, this purpose will be legitimate. As it was already addressed in Chapter 1, both 
the FLC and the HLC define the purpose of processing: the employer can only access 
personal data available on SNSs if it serves the purpose of assessing the professional 
capacities of the applicant. The applicant’s personal life must not be subject to pre-
employment SNS background checks. Pre-employment SNS background checks can serve 
this purpose, as information available on these sites can contribute to assessing the 
professional capacities of the applicant. 
469. What have already been stated regarding the employer’s legitimate interests 
during recruitment (identifying the best candidate) apply to SNSs as well, the purpose is 
unchanged. However, even with the existence of a legitimate purpose, processing can 
become unlawful if other data quality principles are not met. The following pages will 
focus on presenting the data quality principles that the employer must respect in addition to 
purpose limitation. 
(§2) Data quality principle 
The reliability of the information is closely connected to the data protection 
principles, but their enforcement during a pre-employment SNS background check is 
highly questionable1390 – as it will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs. As it was 
referred to in the introduction, the principle of data quality means that “[p]ersonal data 
should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used, and, to the extent 
necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and kept up-to-date.”1391 
(A) Principle of data minimization 
470. Principle of data minimization. According to the principle of data 
minimization, personal data must be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in 
 
1390 Flaherty, P. and Whitmore, S. (2013) ‘Privacy Protection in the Digital Workplace’, in Law Society of 
Upper Canada, Employment Law and the New Workplace in the Social Media Age. Toronto: Irwin Law, pp. 
21-22. 
1391 OECD (1980) Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, Article 8 
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relation to the purposes for which they are processed,1392 basically requiring that only the 
minimum necessary personal data shall be processed. The following paragraphs will deal 
with the two components of this principle: relevancy and necessity. 
471. Relevancy. Relevancy is ensured by both labour codes through limiting 
recruitment methods to information which is connected to the professional life of the 
applicant. Although these provisions aim to protect applicants’ personal lives by stating 
that during recruitment only necessary information relating directly to the professional 
capacities of the candidate can be processed,1393 the implementation of this principle is 
quite challenging in the context of SNSs. Even though it is true that several types of 
personal data might contribute to assessing the applicant’s professional aptitudes (e.g. 
verifying professional experience, communication skills, etc.), SNS profiles might also 
contain personal data directly relating to the personal life of the applicant – not fulfilling 
the requirement of relevancy. 
472. The legal issue is that this “legally consultable” data (information relating to 
the professional life) and data not meeting the requirement of data minimization 
(information relating to personal life) are inseparable on the profile of the user.1394 For 
example, the employer might be entitled to access a candidate’s profile in order to identify 
the best candidate, to verify information from the CV1395 or to look for negative comments 
regarding the previous employer. However, at the same time he/she could automatically 
gain access to data which have no connection or relevancy to the legitimate purpose – e.g. 
relationship status, political opinion, hobbies, family members, etc. 
This is a recent issue, as in the pre-SNS era this information usually would not have 
been available to the employer in the course of a traditional job interview. For example, 
while race, sex, age are (usually) evident when the employer conducts an interview, other 
factors (often available on SNSs), such as relationship status, political affiliation, etc. are 
 
1392 Item c) of Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the GDPR 
1393 Article L1221-6 of the FLC and Subsection (1) of Section 10 of the HLC 
1394 Kajtár, E. (2015) ‘Till Facebook Do Us Part? Social Networking Sites and the Employment 
Relationship’, Acta Juridica Hungarica, 56(4), pp. 271-272. 
1395 Kajtár, E. (2015) ‘Think it over! Pre-employment search on social network sites’, in Vinković, M. 
(ed.) New Developments in EU Labour, Equality and Human Rights Law. Proceedings from the International 
Jean Monnet Conference “New Developments in EU Labour, Equality and Human Rights Law”, Osijek 21 
and 22 May 2015. Osijek: Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek Faculty of Law, p. 101. 
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typically not discovered through an interview (unless shared by the applicant or asked by 
the employer).1396  
473. Necessity. Any monitoring shall be proportionate and the least intrusive 
possible1397 compared to the purpose of the processing. In the context of SNSs, the 
employer must also consider if he/she can obtain the desired information with less 
intrusive methods, whether the monitoring is truly needed, or the same result could be 
achieved through traditional forms of monitoring.1398 It means that he/she must assess 
whether having a job interview, conducting a professional aptitude test, asking 
recommendation from the previous employer, or checking a professional SNS (e.g. 
LinkedIn) instead of a personal one would be a more privacy-friendly solution, which can 
still provide the necessary information. 
474. Differentiation must be made between two types of personal data: personal 
data relating to the professional capacities of the applicant and personal data relating to 
his/her personal life. Regarding the first category, it must be assessed whether the 
traditional methods of recruitment (interview, tests, etc.) are capable of providing the 
employer the information sought. Regarding the second category, it was already 
established that SNSs might provide a glimpse into the user’s personal life to an extent 
never experienced before. 
Although the requirement of relevancy should limit employers to collecting personal 
data relating only to the professional life of the applicant, however, again, on SNSs it is 
technologically impossible to only collect this minimum necessary data, as the personal 
data which – in harmony with data minimization – could be collected and personal data not 
corresponding to this principle are inseparable on these sites.1399 As a result, even if the 
employer accesses the applicant’s SNS profile to obtain information fulfilling the data 
 
1396 Byrnside, I. (2008) ‘Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using Social 
Networking Sites to Research Applicants’, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, 10(2), 
p. 463 
1397 WP29 (2001) Opinion 8/2001 on the processing of personal data in the employment context. 
5062/01/EN/Final WP 48. p. 4, p. 21, p. 25.; WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 
17/EN WP 249. p. 7.  
1398 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 13. 
1399 Kajtár, E. (2015) ‘Think it over! Pre-employment search on social network sites’, in Vinković, M. 
(ed.) New Developments in EU Labour, Equality and Human Rights Law. Proceedings from the International 
Jean Monnet Conference “New Developments in EU Labour, Equality and Human Rights Law”, Osijek 21 
and 22 May 2015. Osijek: Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek Faculty of Law, p. 101. 
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protection requirements, he/she might automatically gain access to personal data that 
he/she is not entitled to process. 
475. An exception might be the use of professional SNSs (e.g. LinkedIn). 
Professional SNSs operate with the aim of providing the users the possibility to shape their 
online identities relating to their professional lives. Usually, users on these sites limit 
themselves to sharing personal data relating to their professional life (e.g. education, work 
experience, professional connections, etc.) – unlike on Facebook, Instagram and other 
personal SNSs. The CNIL is of the opinion that the use of professional SNS sites is 
allowed, as on these sites users provide only information regarding their professional lives. 
However, the employer is not entitled to search for the profiles on personal SNSs.1400 
(B) Principle of accuracy 
476. Accuracy. The principle of accuracy requires that personal data shall be 
accurate and, where necessary, kept up-to-date.1401 Usually personal data are considered to 
be inaccurate if they do not correspond with reality and also if they are not complete or are 
embedded into the wrong context.1402 These requirements are highly endangered in several 
regards when it comes to data obtained from SNSs. First, it will be examined whether the 
applicant himself/herself can be correctly identified during pre-employment SNS 
background checks. Second, it will be addressed whether the author of the content can play 
a role in relation to accuracy. Third, questions relating to the possible conclusions drawn 
from the content itself will be addressed. Then, the time factor, up-to-dateness will be 
examined. 
477. Accuracy and identifying the applicant. First, the principle of accuracy can 
be very important regarding the identification of the job applicant. Identifying the right 
applicant is crucial in order to avoid situations where the employer finds the wrong 
 
1400 CNIL (no date) Recrutement : l’employeur peut-il rechercher des données sur moi sur 
Internet ? Available at: https://www.cnil.fr/fr/cnil-direct/question/354. 
A proposed German bill (though rejected in 2013) reached the same conclusion, by making a distinction 
between personal and professional SNSs, prohibiting the access to the first category, but permitting access to 
the second one. Source: Kajtár, E. and Mestre, B. (2016) ‘Social networks and employees’ right to privacy in 
the pre-employment stage: some comparative remarks and interrogations’, Hungarian Labour Law E-
journal, (1), p. 36. 
1401 Item d) of Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the GDPR 
1402 Rücker, D. and Kugler, T. (eds) (2018) New European General Data Protection Regulation. A 
Practitioner’s Guide. München, Oxford, Baden-Baden: C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos. p. 68.  
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candidate1403 and the prospective employee is mistakenly associated with the SNS activity 
of someone else. This scenario can happen for several reasons: especially if the applicant 
has a very common name (e.g. Kovács Péter or Pierre Martin) and/or there is no other 
publicly available personal data (e.g. profile picture) which can help to correctly identify 
him/her.1404 Associating the online activities with the wrong individual unquestionably 
infringes the principle of accuracy. 
478. Accuracy and posting information online. Second, the employee might not 
have been the author of the given content – a profile can be hacked by a third party: for 
example, Sherry D. Sanders describes a hypothetical situation where an applicant’s Twitter 
profile is hacked: the hacker posts racist comments in the name of the applicant – which 
the applicant does not see, as he has not accessed his Twitter account for months.1405 
Besides hacking, even friends or colleagues can post, as a prank, in the name of the 
applicant (for example, if he/she leaves his/her device unattended): see, for example, the 
case of an employee of a security company whose colleagues uploaded a video of him to 
his Facebook page, showing him demonstrating his physical competences on a floor of the 
European Commission only reserved for commissioners – and was dismissed as a 
consequence.1406 In extreme cases even fake profiles can be created: Ian Byrnside 
describes the phenomenon of college students intentionally creating fake profiles of others 
who are considered to be competition, containing unflattering information – ruining his/her 
chances of finding employment.1407 
479. Accuracy and conclusions drawn from SNSs. Third, processing personal 
data obtained from SNSs can often lead to the misinterpretation of the personal data. It is 
highly questionable how/whether the employer can make reliable conclusions from 
accessing candidates’ SNS profiles. Teresa Coelho Moreira illustrates how certain 
 
1403 Tenenbaum, J. M. (2012) ‘Posting Yourself Out of a Posting: Using Social Networks to Screen Job 
Applicants in America and Germany. [pre-print]’. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2062462_code1805294.pdf?abstractid=2020477&mirid=1(Accessed: 14 July 2016). 
p. 13. Jason Tenenbaum googled himself and found out that typing “Jason Tenenbaum” into Google returns 
results for another attorney from a neighbouring town – providing the possibility to easily mistaken the two 
persons. 
1404 Flynn, N. (2012) The Social Media Handbook. Policies and Best Practices to Effectively Manage Your 
Organization’s Social Media Presence, Posts, and Potential Risks. San Francisco: Pfeiffer. pp. 20-21. 
1405 Sanders, S. D. (2012) ‘Privacy is Dead: The Birth of Social Media Background Checks’, Southern 
University Law Review, 39(2), p. 243. 
1406 Lambert, P. (2014) International Handbook of Social Media Laws. Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury, p. 
230. 
1407 Byrnside, I. (2008) ‘Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using Social 
Networking Sites to Research Applicants’, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, 10(2), 
p. 471. 
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information can have dubious interpretation, therefore contradicting the principle of data 
quality. For example, there are several ways for the employer to interpret the fact that 
certain candidates are available on these sites, while others are not (do those present on 
these sites have more developed skills relating to technology or are the others more 
conscious regarding privacy issues?), or that an applicant likes to travel (is he/she flexible 
or rather unreliable?).1408 
480. Also, often the information originally posted was intended for a different 
audience,1409 and although in a legal way it does not exempt the user, it constitutes a 
problem that users may not be aware of the functioning of SNSs and may be mistaken 
regarding the public or private nature of the published content,1410 publishing something 
presuming that it would be accessible only to a narrow circle of users – e.g. only to friends 
–, but not to the employer. Personal data available on these sites can be inaccurate, 
incomplete and easily interpreted out of context, thereby giving a false impression of the 
user.1411 As a result, the quality of personal data is not guaranteed.1412 
481. Up-to-dateness. Fourth, up-to-dateness: in the context of recruitment, up-to-
dateness means that a decision should not be based on outdated information. However, it 
must be seen that the Internet does not forget – it is also true in the case of SNSs: on SNSs 
information is often available dating back years. This principle also has a close connection 
with the right to be forgotten. 
482. If personal data are outdated, the requirements of relevancy and accuracy 
are more easily infringed. A prospective employee might have loved partying wildly at a 
younger age and might have provided a rich documentation of this activity on Facebook – 
bearing no relevancy with regard to his/her professional aptitudes years later. People are 
 
1408 Moreira, T. C. (2013) ‘The Digital To Be or Not To Be: Privacy of Employees and the Use of Online 
Social Networks in the Recruitment Process’, GSTF International Journal of Law and Social Sciences 
(JLSS), 2(2), p. 77. 
1409 In the age of SNSs, when everyone equipped with a smartphone may feel as a celebrity, online profiles 
do not reflect the professional capacities of a user. Source: Ghoshray, S. (2013) ‘The Emerging Reality of 
Social Media: Erosion of Individual Privacy Through Cyber-Vetting and Law’s Inability to Catch Up’, The 
John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law, 12(3), p. 572. 
1410 See more Sprague, R. (2011) ‘Invasion of the Social Networks: Blurring the Line Between Personal Life 
and the Employment Relationship’, University of Louisville Law Review, 50(1), p. 15.; Kajtár, E. and Mestre, 
B. (2016) ‘Social networks and employees’ right to privacy in the pre-employment stage: some comparative 
remarks and interrogations’, Hungarian Labour Law E-journal, (1), pp. 24-25. 
1411 Ghoshray, S. (2013) ‘The Emerging Reality of Social Media: Erosion of Individual Privacy Through 
Cyber-Vetting and Law’s Inability to Catch Up’, The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law, 
12(3), pp. 562-563. 
1412 Szabó, E. Gy. (2010) ‘A személyes adatok védelmének kérdései a virtuális világban’, in Talyigás, J. 
(ed.) Az internet a kockázatok és a mellékhatások tekintetében. Budapest: Scolar Kiadó, pp.pp. 58-59. 
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able to change and to develop, but the unforgettable (and unforgivable) nature of the 
Internet might stigmatize them and might not let them change and “escape” from their past 
mistakes or their past selves. For example, a funny photo taken in high school years ago or 
a compromising content can have an impact on the future carrier options even if it is not 
relevant anymore.1413 Five seconds eternalized on the web can define someone’s whole 
Internet presence.1414 
483. Since the wide adoption of SNSs, years have passed, leading to the 
phenomenon that certain (early) users possess a digital footprint on these platforms dating 
back years. The right to be forgotten aims to ensure that individuals can “escape” from 
their online past.1415 It is alarming that especially young users have the tendency to share 
the most intimate details of their personal lives.1416 However, following from the very 
nature of the SNSs’ function, the documentation of these “reckless” young years 
permanently stays on the Internet. Accessing that past information might lead to the 
consequence that the employer draws present conclusions from the past,1417 which may 
lead to coming to incorrect conclusions.1418 
484. In conclusion, data quality principles are highly at stake when it comes to 
processing information obtained from applicants’ SNS profiles – possibly raising the 
 
1413 On the importance of forgetting see Mayer-Schönberger, V. (2011) Delete – The Virtue of Forgetting in 
the Digital Age. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press and Székely, I. (2013) ‘Jog ahhoz, hogy 
elfelejtsenek és töröljenek’, Információs társadalom, 13(3–4), pp. 7–27. 
1414 In the US, Lindsey Stone was fired after her colleague posted a photo to Facebook, showing Ms. Stone 
engaging in disrespectful behaviour (giving a finger and imitating a scream) in the Arlington National 
(military) Cemetery – next to a sign asking for silence and respect. According to her, she did not think, it was 
just part of an inside joke between her and her colleague. However, the firing was not the only negative 
outcome for Ms Stone: the photo went viral and she became the target of extremely hostile comments from 
the Internet community. Since then, she started working for a new employer, but said that she was terrified 
that the new employer would find out about what had happened in the cemetery. “Those five seconds of her 
life is her entire Internet presence [.]” Source: Ronson, J. (2015) ‘Overnight, everything I loved was gone’: 
the internet shaming of Lindsey Stone, The Guardian. Available 
at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/21/internet-shaming-lindsey-stone-jon-
ronson (Accessed: 3 May 2018). 
1415 Rosen, J. (2012) The Right to Be Forgotten, Stanford Law Review. Available 
at: https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-paradox-the-right-to-be-forgotten/ (Accessed: 13 
August 2019). 
1416 Mayer-Schönberger, V. (2011) Delete – The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age. Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press. p. 3. 
1417 Hajdú, J. et al. (forthcoming) ‘Közösségi média és munkajog – különös tekintettel a Facebook-ra alapított 
felmondásokra a hazai szabályozás és a nemzetközi joggyakorlat tükrében’, De iurisprudentia et iure publico 
(DIEIP). 
1418 As an illustrative example see the hypothetical scenario in which an individual’s whole online presence 
was determined by a 2-minute-long interview in which he expressed his controversial opinion on a certain 
topic. Source: Ghoshray, S. (2013) ‘The Emerging Reality of Social Media: Erosion of Individual Privacy 
Through Cyber-Vetting and Law’s Inability to Catch Up’, The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property 
Law, 12(3), p. 555. 
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question of completely banning these searches, as it will be discussed later. It means on the 
one hand that the applicants’ rights can be easily infringed, and on the other hand that the 
employer can easily base his/her decision on unreliable data. These issues mainly arise on 
personal SNSs, which contain more information relating to personal life due to their 
nature. 
(§3) Conducting the background checks 
485. In order to find a right balance between the employer’s interest of choosing 
the best applicant and the applicant’s rights, it is important that if the employer decides to 
conduct an SNS background check, he/she follows a systematic approach instead of 
performing it in an ad hoc way. Drafting internal policies, providing trainings and 
documenting1419 could be useful means to achieve this objective. On the following pages 
the scope of the information to be viewed, the procedure in which they should be treated 
and the question of who should conduct these background checks will be discussed. 
486. Scope of information. It was proposed on several occasions1420 that the 
employer should only access professional SNSs, but access to personal SNSs should be 
prohibited. Through legitimizing the consultation of only professional SNSs – and banning 
that of personal SNSs –, it could be achieved that the personal life of the applicant is left 
unaffected by the screening, while the professional profiles can help the employer better 
judge the professional capacity of the applicant. However, as it will be discussed in §2, 
prohibition in itself is not considered to be an effective solution, as because of the 
invisibility of such searches, the technical feasibility of such prohibition is highly 
questionable. 
487. Time factors must also be taken into consideration: to handle the challenges 
relating to outdatedness and to the right to be forgotten, – in a joint publication with with 
József Hajdú, Viktória Lechner and Attila Turi – we recommended as a de lege ferenda 
suggestion to introduce a time limitation period for the processing of personal data 
originating from SNSs. It would mean that in accordance with the general limitation period 
 
1419 Brown, V. R. and Vaughn, E. D. (2011) ‘The Writing on the (Facebook) Wall: The Use of Social 
Networking Sites in Hiring Decisions’, Journal of Business and Psychology, 26(2), pp. 223-224. 
1420 CNIL (no date) Recrutement : l’employeur peut-il rechercher des données sur moi sur 
Internet? Available at: https://www.cnil.fr/fr/cnil-direct/question/354. and a proposed Germna draft bill from 
2010: Source: Kajtár, E. and Mestre, B. (2016) ‘Social networks and employees’ right to privacy in the pre-
employment stage: some comparative remarks and interrogations’, Hungarian Labour Law E-journal, (1), p. 
36. 
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in labour law,1421 posts, pictures and other contents published to SNSs before that period 
should not be processed in the recruitment process.1422  
488. Procedure. If the employer decides to conduct pre-employment SNS 
screening, he/she should do it through a fair and uniform procedure. Case-by-case or 
discriminatory screenings are to be avoided.1423 If for a position a screening is required, 
each applicant should be screened, preferably at the late stage of the selection process in 
order to minimize the number of applicants screened.1424 
489. SNS pre-employment screenings should not be conducted on a general 
basis. Their application should be limited to those cases when they are truly necessary, for 
example, when the nature of the given job or the type of employer justifies it (e.g. it is 
more probable that background checks can be justified if the position comes with high 
responsibility). Prior to the screening, objective criteria should be established in relation to 
what exactly the employer aims to know about the applicant (For example, are there 
spelling mistakes on the profile? Is there content promoting hatred? Are there negative 
comments regarding the previous employer?) – in accordance with the principle of 
relevancy. 
490. Persons conducting the background checks. In order to solve the problem 
of the inseparability of personal and work-related information, it is advisable that a third 
party – who will not participate in the decision-making – conducts the background check 
and transmits only the work-related information to the decision-makers.1425 Thus it can be 
avoided that the decision-maker would make the decision based on personal data not 
fulfilling the criteria of data minimization and proportionality. 
 
1421 In Hungary the general limitation period is 3 years [Subsection (19) of Section 286 of the HLC]. In 
contrast, French regulation contains several limitation periods: which seems to be the most relevant is 5 years 
in case of discrimination. (Article L1134-5 of the FLC) 
1422 Hajdú, J. et al. (forthcoming) ‘Közösségi média és munkajog – különös tekintettel a Facebook-ra alapított 
felmondásokra a hazai szabályozás és a nemzetközi joggyakorlat tükrében’, De iurisprudentia et iure publico 
(DIEIP). 
1423 Brown, V. R. and Vaughn, E. D. (2011) ‘The Writing on the (Facebook) Wall: The Use of Social 
Networking Sites in Hiring Decisions’, Journal of Business and Psychology, 26(2), p. 223. 
1424 Information Commissioner’s Office (2011) The employment practices code. Available from: 
https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1064/the_employment_practices_code 
.pdf [Accessed 1 February 2017], p. 23. 
1425 Peebles, K. A. (2012) ‘Negligent Hiring and the Information Age: How State Legislatures Can Save 
Employers from Inevitable Liability’, William and Mary Law Review, 53(4), pp. 1428-1429.; Sprague, R. 
(2011) ‘Invasion of the Social Networks: Blurring the Line Between Personal Life and the Employment 
Relationship’, University of Louisville Law Review, 50(1), p. 32. 
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In this regard, the proposition of Nathan J. Ebnet might be relevant to French and 
Hungarian law, despite being recommended in the first place to US law. He recommends 
the use of third-party background screening service. He cites the example of Social 
Intelligence:1426 a company offering to conduct pre-employment online background checks 
in accordance with the legal regulations in force.1427 According to the description on Social 
Intelligence’s website, they primarily search for and flag user-generated content in the field 
of (a) racist, sexist, or discriminatory behaviour, (b) sexually explicit material, (c) threats 
or acts of violence and (d) potentially illegal activity. At the end of the process the 
employer can review the report which contains examples of the negative content found, but 
none related to protected characteristics or private information with no connection to the 
job. If no negative information is found, the report will state that “No Pertinent 
Information” was found.1428 Although Ebnet admits that involving a third party in the 
background check comes with extra expenses to the employer, he believes that the 
efficiency of these searches would transform this expense into an investment.1429 
In addition to involving an independent third-party in the recruitment process, he also 
suggests adopting elements from the already existing US Fair Credit Reporting Act, 
covering credit reports.1430 Namely, he recommends to require the prior approval of 
applicants of such a screening taking place and to notify applicants if an adverse decision 
is made.1431 Therefore transparency would be ensured and applicants would have the 
possibility to explain certain compromising content. He argues that through the adoption of 
these measures, an adequate balance can be found between the employer’s legitimate 
interests and applicants’ rights. 
 
1426 Social Intelligence (no date) Social Media Screening for Intelligent Hiring. Available 
at: https://www.socialintel.com/(Accessed: 13 August 2019). 
1427 Bell, M. (2011) More employers using firms that check applicants’ social media history, The Washington 
Post. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/more-employers-using-firms-that-check-
applicants-social-media-
history/2011/07/12/gIQAxnJYGI_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1506923db7c6(Accessed: 16 
August 2018). 
1428 Social Intelligence (no date) The Social Media Hiring Report. Available 
at: https://www.socialintel.com/how-it-works/ (Accessed: 16 August 2018). 
1429 Ebnet, N. J. (2012) ‘It Can Do More Than Protect Your Credit Score: Regulating Social Media Pre-
Employment Screening with the Fair Credit Reporting Act’, Minnesota Law Review, 97(1), p. 327. 
1430 The Fair Credit Reporting Act was adopted in 1970 and aims to regulate the collection and reporting of 
credit information about consumers, with the purpose of ensuring accuracy of the information collected. 
Ebnet, N. J. (2012) ‘It Can Do More Than Protect Your Credit Score: Regulating Social Media Pre-
Employment Screening with the Fair Credit Reporting Act’, Minnesota Law Review, 97(1), pp. 312-314. 
1431 Ebnet, N. J. (2012) ‘It Can Do More Than Protect Your Credit Score: Regulating Social Media Pre-
Employment Screening with the Fair Credit Reporting Act’, Minnesota Law Review, 97(1), pp. 326-327. 
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491. Another type of third-party intermediary was suggested by Peter Baumhart. 
In response to the growing phenomenon of employers asking for applicants’ passwords, he 
suggests the involvement of an information escrow agent in the pre-employment 
background check. The information escrow agent would act as an intermediary between 
the parties to whom applicants could disclose their passwords and employers could provide 
a list of information that needs to be flagged.1432 The employer would only receive the red 
flags relevant to the employment and no other irrelevant information. While the intrusion 
into the applicant’s privacy exists, it is present to a lesser extent compared to the situation 
when the employer asks for the password.1433 
Although it would be incompatible with French and Hungarian laws to legitimize a 
system where the applicant should provide his/her login credentials, some elements of 
these two solutions might be adapted to the legal system. The idea of involving an 
intermediary into the recruitment process could and should be adequately implemented – 
although it would be better suited in the form of a third-party background screening 
service. With the participation of these third parties it could be prevented that the employer 
accesses data irrelevant to the employment – eliminating the issues in relation to the 
inseparability of professional and personal life during pre-employment SNS background 
checks.  
Section 2. Access and transparency of processing 
492. As data protection requirements apply even if the information was publicly 
made available by the applicant and is easily available, the employer still must inform 
applicants that an SNS background check might take place. It should be indicated prior to 
the recruitment – for example, in the job advertisement – that an SNS background check 
will be conducted during the selection process, and it should state precisely which sites 
will be checked and what the lawful information that the employer aims to obtain is.1434, 
1435 However, in practice, this principle is often violated especially due to the (§1) 
 
1432 Baumhart, P. B. (2015) ‘Social Media and the Job Market: How to Reconcile Applicant Privacy with 
Employer Needs’, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 48(2), pp. 524-525. 
1433 Baumhart, P. B. (2015) ‘Social Media and the Job Market: How to Reconcile Applicant Privacy with 
Employer Needs’, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 48(2), pp. 526-527. 
1434 Mikkelson, K. (2010) Cybervetting and Monitoring Employees’ Online Activities: Assessing the Legal 
Risks for Employers. The Public Lawyer, 18 (2), p. 6. 
1435 NAIH (2016) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi 
adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről. Budapest, p. 19. 
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invisibility of such searches. Besides transparency, it has also importance (§2) how the 
employer can gain access to the information. 
(§1) Access and transparency 
493. Principle of direct collection. According to the principle of direct 
collection, it is desirable that when it is possible, employers collect personal data directly 
from the individual concerned.1436 Although even before the expansion of SNSs the 
employer had different possibilities to obtain personal data not directly from the 
prospective employee (e.g. investigation, asking the previous employer for 
recommendation), with the advent and expansion of SNSs it has become considerably 
easier to collect personal data not directly from the data subject.1437 This fundamentally 
affects the ways of accessing personal data, giving room on the one hand for (A) invisible 
searches and on the other hand for (B) searches bypassing the individual’s choice of 
privacy settings. These new ways of access also have serious implications for the 
transparency of processing. 
(A) Invisible background checks 
494. Transparency versus invisibility. The principle of transparency is highly at 
stake, as these SNS background checks often stay invisible for the applicant. What is 
meant by invisible background check is the employer accessing the publicly available 
profiles of the applicant – without his/her awareness. Often – depending on the (non) use 
of privacy settings – gaining access to a job applicants’ profile is effortless and provides 
access to a wide amount of personal data. For example, the employer/recruiter might 
access the applicant’s profile from outside of the SNS (if the privacy settings are set to 
public), or (if the privacy settings make the content available to other users) he/she can 
have access to the candidate’s profile from his/her or the company’s profile. Either way, 
access is fast, easy to conduct and cost-effective – and the individual is not necessarily 
aware of the conducted search. 
 
1436 This principle is enshrined in the Council of Europe (2015) Recommendation CM/Rec(2015)5 of the 
Committee of Ministers to member States on the processing of personal data in the context of employment. 5. 
1.: “Employers should collect personal data directly from the data subject concerned. When it is necessary 
and lawful to process data collected from third parties, for example, to obtain professional references, the 
data subject should be duly informed in advance.” 
1437 Kajtár, E. (2016) Dignity at Work: Employee’s Personality Rights in the 21st Century. Pécs: University 
of Pécs, Faculty of Law (PMJK Monographs 6). p. 149. 
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495. Theoretically, labour law and data protection provisions are able to 
adequately regulate pre-employment SNS screenings. However, their enforcement in 
practice is highly problematic, as these screenings stay undetected,1438 often applicants are 
not aware that an adverse decision was based on an SNS background check. In practice, 
they (or DPAs) have limited chance to find out about the existence of such searches: for 
example, it might be possible that the applicant discovers the existence of a background 
check during the job interview, for example, if an employer asks questions about an event 
that he/she learned during an Internet search.1439 Still, besides these extreme cases, it is 
quasi impossible for the applicant to prove (or know) that the decision was based on the 
content found on SNSs.1440 
496. Transparency and rights of the data subject. As a result, the legal issue is 
that the job applicant might not even be aware of the fact that a processing takes place – 
which is contrary to the requirement of transparency. Knowing about the existence of a 
processing is a precondition to exercising the rights of the data subject. In the case of 
invisible searches, the applicant will not know what data the employer has access to, how 
he/she will interpret that information: the requirement of prior information and the 
principle of transparency guaranteed by the data protection regulation will be infringed.  
497. Transparency is closely related to the exercise of the rights of the data 
subject: it follows from the invisible nature of these searches that the job applicant cannot 
participate in the data processing and cannot exercise his/her rights relating to data 
processing, as he/she might not even know about the processing. In addition, because of 
the high unreliability of personal data collected from SNSs, the infringement of rights 
might be considerable. Due to the challenges relating to the principle of accuracy, it is very 
easy to misinterpret those data, as they are taken out of context – and the user has no 
chance to participate in the processing.1441 The information vulnerability of the job 
 
1438 Pók, L. (2012) ‘A közösség hálójában – Közösségi oldalak munkajogi vonatkozásai’, Infokommunikáció 
és jog, (1), p. 13. 
1439 McGeveran, W. (2006) Finnish Employers Cannot Google Applicants. Available 
at: https://blogs.harvard.edu/infolaw/2006/11/15/finnish-employers-cannot-google-applicants/ (Accessed: 2 
July 2018). Though the article did not detail it, in my opinion revealing the existence of a background check 
might be possible through accidentally seeing documentation, or by the interviewer asking questions that 
without a background check would not have been asked. 
1440 Kajtár, E. (2015) Till Facebook Do Us Part? Social Networking Sites and the Employment Relationship. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica, 56 (4), p. 278. 
1441 See, for example, the case of Nathalie Blanchard, who was diagnosed with major depression and went on 
sick-leave. However, all of a sudden, her insurance company cut her benefits because they saw photos of her 
on Facebook, in which she went to the beach, had fun with her friends, and went to bars. Therefore, the 
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applicant might be considerable, therefore ensuring his/her participation in the processing 
and guaranteeing the exercise of the above-mentioned rights is crucial. If the true 
participation of the data subject through informing him/her about the existence of the 
screening and the exercise of the data subjects’ rights are ensured, compliance with data 
protection regulation is realized, as a consequence of which the hiring decisions could be 
based on reliable data more effectively, thus serving the purpose of identifying the best 
candidate. 
498. Providing prior information to applicants is crucial in ensuring the 
transparency of processing. However, as Attila Péterfalvi et al. noted, if providing prior 
information can jeopardize the principle of accuracy, the information should be kept to the 
necessary extent.1442 The employer should inform employees that an SNS background 
check will be conducted during the selection process, state precisely which sites will be 
checked and what the lawful information that the employer aims to obtain is.1443 Also, a 
contact should be provided to applicants, where they could turn in case they wanted to 
exercise their rights of data subject. Applicants should be given the possibility to consult 
and if necessary, to rectify the personal data processed. 
(B) Other ways of access 
499. Invisible searches are not the only way to access data on SNSs although 
they constitute the most evident way of access. Other, more intrusive practices exist which 
can provide the employer access to a candidate’s profile. Among these “other ways of 
access” differentiation is made between two groups: obtaining access to content available 
to other users and obtaining access to content available to the user himself/herself.1444 
 
company judged that she is not sick anymore. However, what was not known to them was that Ms. Blanchard 
performed these activities on her doctor’s orders, as part of her healing process. Source: Depressed woman 
loses benefits over Facebook photos (2009) CBC News. Available 
at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/depressed-woman-loses-benefits-over-facebook-photos-
1.861843(Accessed: 3 May 2018). 
1442 Péterfalvi, A. (ed.) (2012) Adatvédelem és információszabadság a mindennapokban. Budapest: HVG-
ORAC, p. 299. However, such statement might raise the question whether in relation to SNSs employees can 
alter the result of the background checks by taking certain steps (e.g. applying privacy settings) and hindering 
access to the profile. 
1443 Mikkelson, K. (2010) ‘Cybervetting and Monitoring Employees’ Online Activities: Assessing the Legal 
Risks for Employers’, The Public Lawyer, 18(2), p. 6. 
1444 The ways of accessing that are grouped into these two categories are from: Engler, P. and Tanoury, P. 
(2007) ‘Employers Use of Facebook in Recruiting’, in McIntosh, D. et al. (eds) The Ethical Imperative in the 
Context of Evolving Technologies. University of Colorado Leeds School of Business, pp. 65–66. Available 
at: http://www.ethicapublishing.com/ethicalimperative.pdf (Accessed: 13 July 2016)..; Park, S. (2014) 
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500. Obtaining access to content available to other users. Under this category it 
is supposed that the applicant has used privacy settings and made steps towards concealing 
information from certain categories of users and the employer would like to bypass those 
settings and gain access to more information than by default he/she is allowed to. He/she 
can do so by friending the applicant, asking the applicant to change the privacy settings or 
ask a friend of the applicant who is employed at the workplace to provide access through 
his/her own profile. 
501. Obtaining access to content available to the user himself/herself. In this 
case the interference in the applicant’s private life is more serious, as through these means 
the employer can access an extremely wide circle of information – even those only 
available to the data subject. In the most serious case hacking might also be imaginable.1445 
During a job interview the employer might ask the applicant to log in to his/her profile and 
“show the employer around” or can ask for the applicant’s password. 
502. Asking for applicants’ password is not an uncommon phenomenon,1446 
especially in the US, where the States enacted several password protection acts in order to 
ensure the protection of applicants’ rights.1447, 1448 As an illustrative example, see the hiring 
policy of the city of Bozeman in the US, resulting in a public outcry. In 2009 the Bozeman 
Daily Chronicle aired an article describing the excessive online pre-employment 
background checks conducted by the city. For years, the city systematically asked 
 
‘Employee Internet Privacy: A Proposed Act that Balances Legitimate Employer Rights and Employee 
Privacy’, American Business Law Journal, 51(4), p. 790. 
1445 That was the case of a Finnish employer, where two managers intercepted an employee’s private 
communication on Facebook and were accused of hacking and were finally sentenced. Source: Lambert, P. 
(2014) International Handbook of Social Media Laws. Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury. pp. 307-308. 
1446 Reacting to this emerging issue, even Facebook published an announcement in which it encouraged 
applicants/employees not to provide their passwords to the employer and called upon employers not to ask 
for passwords. Facebook newsroom (2012) Protecting Your Passwords and Your Privacy. Available 
at: https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2012/03/protecting-your-passwords-and-your-privacy/ (Accessed: 13 
August 2019). 
1447 This was especially a concern in the US. Against these phenomena various password protection acts were 
enacted. See more in: Sprague, R. (2014) ‘No Surfing Allowed: A Review & Analysis of Legislation 
Prohibiting Employers from Demanding Access to Employees’ & Job Applicants’ Social Media 
Accounts’, Albany Law Journal of Science and Technology, 24(3), pp. 481–513. and Del Riego, A., Sánchez 
Abril, P. and Levin, A. (2012) ‘Your Password or Your Paycheck?: A Job Applicant’s Murky Right to Social 
Media Privacy’, Journal of Internet Law, 16(3), pp. 1, 18–26. 
1448 There were also reported cases in Canada, where the Office of the Information & Privacy Commissioner 
for British Columbia had to react to a case concerning an employer asking for job applicants’ passwords. 
Source: Office of the Information & Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia (no date) Summary of the 
Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner’s Investigation of the BC NDP’s use of social media 
and passwords to evaluate candidates. P11-01-MS. Available at: https://www.oipc.bc.ca/mediation-
summaries/1399 (Accessed: 8 July 2019). 
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prospective employees to provide their login credentials (username and passwords) to 
SNSs they were present on as part of their general recruiting practice.1449 
503. Infringement of the applicant’s rights. In these cases, the applicant’s right 
to respect for private life is infringed as the employer gains access to information that the 
applicant intended to conceal from him/her or even not to publicly share with anyone (e.g. 
chat messages). Also, by using the privacy settings and customizing access to the content, 
the applicant exercises his/her right to informational self-determination – which is 
bypassed by the employer. 
From a data protection viewpoint, bypassing the privacy settings is not compatible 
with EU or national legislation either. The CoE, the WP29 and the NAIH all stated that 
only the publicly available personal data can be used in the recruitment process,1450 while 
the CNIL completely excluded personal SNSs from the process:1451 therefore no 
corresponding legal ground can be found in these regulations. In addition, it constitutes a 
problem that when the applicant is requested to act (accept friend request, change the 
privacy settings, log into or provide password), the hierarchal relation between the parties 
poses a challenge. If the applicant complies with the request, the voluntary nature of this 
act is highly questionable. When instead of the applicant, a common friend, an employee is 
asked to provide access through his/her own profile,1452 the drawbacks of the hierarchal 
relation are manifested between the employee and the employer. In the latter case 
transparency issues might also arise, as the applicant is not necessarily aware that an 
employee provided access to his/her profile. 
(C) Regulating instead of prohibiting 
 
1449 Ricker, A. (2009) City requires Facebook passwords from job applicants, Bozeman Daily Chronicle. 
Available at: https://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/news/city-requires-facebook-passwords-from-job-
applicants/article_a9458e22-498a-5b71-b07d-6628b487f797.html (Accessed: 3 May 2018) 
1450 Council of Europe (2015) Recommendation CM/Rec(2015)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
States on the processing of personal data in the context of employment, 5. 3. and Council of Europe, 
Committee of Ministers (2015) Explanatory memorandum to Recommendation CM/Rec(2015)5 of the 
Committee of Ministers to member States on the processing of personal data in the context of employment, p. 
7.; NAIH (2016) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi 
adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről. Budapest, p. 19.  
1451 CNIL (no date) Recrutement : l’employeur peut-il rechercher des données sur moi sur 
Internet ? Available at: https://www.cnil.fr/fr/cnil-direct/question/354. 
1452 In a Belgian case in 2011 the employer gained access to an employee’s account by asking another 
employee to communicate him a certain content. Lambert, P. (2014) International Handbook of Social Media 
Laws. Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury. p. 230. 
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504. Prohibiting SNS screening. The hypothesis of Title 1 is that instead of 
prohibiting the conduct of pre-employment SNS background checks, they should rather be 
regulated. Certain steps were made towards prohibiting SNS background checks: in France 
an agreement was signed between different professional associations, aiming to achieve 
that employers do not use search engines and SNSs for recruitment.1453 Others 
differentiated between personal and professional SNSs: the CNIL also expressed that 
personal SNSs should not be consulted in the recruitment process as they reveal a 
multitude of information pertaining to the private life of the applicant.1454, 1455 A German 
draft bill from 2010 adopted the same position and prohibited access to personal SNS 
profiles, while allowing to use information from professional SNSs.1456 In Finland, due to 
the principle of direct collection, it is forbidden to google applicants1457 or to perform an 
SNS background check.1458 
505. Regulating pre-employment SNS background checks. In contrast to the 
opinions arguing that SNS background checks should be prohibited, other solutions 
welcomed the regulation of SNS background checks, instead of prohibiting them. It was 
already discussed that the WP29 expressed how the data protection requirements shall 
apply to SNS screenings,1459 indirectly implying that these searches are not prohibited. In 
the UK, the Information Commissioner’s Office’s (hereinafter referred to as: ICO) 
Employment Practices Code, instead of banning these searches, laid down the 
 
1453 A Compétence Egale (no date) Charte réseaux sociaux, Internet, Vie Privée et Recrutement. Available 
at: https://www.michaelpage.fr/sites/michaelpage.fr/files/Charte_rxseaux_sociaux_internet_vie_privxe_et_re
crutement.pdf(Accessed: 13 August 2019). Gros, M. (2010) Recrutement : une Charte pour contrer les 
dérives liées aux réseaux sociaux, Le Monde Informatique. Available 
at: https://www.lemondeinformatique.fr/actualites/lire-recrutement-une-charte-pour-contrer-les-derives-liees-
aux-reseaux-sociaux-29715.html (Accessed: 13 August 2019). 
1454 CNIL (no date) Recrutement : l’employeur peut-il rechercher des données sur moi sur 
Internet ? Available at: https://www.cnil.fr/fr/cnil-direct/question/354. 
1455 This standpoint is further nuanced by doctrine: Caroline Fel and Emmanuel Sordet argue that if the 
applicant’s SNS profile is accessible to the public, his/her right to privacy is not infringed if the employer 
accesses the profile. Source: Fel, C. and Sordet, E. (2010) ‘L’utilisation des réseaux sociaux par l’entreprise 
et ses collaborateurs’, JCP S (édition sociale), (29), p. 22. 
1456 Finally, for reasons of lack of consensus, the proposed bill was rejected in 2013. Source: Kajtár, E. and 
Mestre, B. (2016) ‘Social networks and employees’ right to privacy in the pre-employment stage: some 
comparative remarks and interrogations’, Hungarian Labour Law E-journal, (1), p. 36. 
1457 McGeveran, W. (2006) Finnish Employers Cannot Google Applicants. Available 
at: https://blogs.harvard.edu/infolaw/2006/11/15/finnish-employers-cannot-google-applicants/ (Accessed: 2 
July 2018). 
1458 Knaaplia, S., Koskela, I. and Havia, S. (2018) Employment & labour law in Finland, Lexology. Available 
at: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b03caa90-2830-4194-a967-6cceaa561e7e (Accessed: 17 
July 2018) 
1459 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249, p. 11. 
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requirements towards pre-employment vetting, such as notifying applicants.1460 In 2016 the 
NAIH in its “Information notice on the basic requirements of data processing at work” 
argued that it would not be reasonable to prohibit the use of SNSs in the recruitment 
process.1461 The NAIH also noted that it is permissible to make conclusions from the 
profiles but further processing operations such as making copies of the profile, storing or 
transferring it are prohibited.1462 
506. Even though banning pre-employment SNS screenings would indeed 
constitute a straightforward solution and in theory would eliminate all the data protection 
challenges discussed throughout Title 1, in practice this solution seems unreasonable 
because of the invisibility of such searches and because of its benefits.1463 Due to the ease 
and the invisibility of these searches, in practice it seems to be more effective to allow 
conducting them while providing guidance on how to comply with the data protection 
requirements than completely prohibiting such screenings – also corresponding better with 
the reality of social media. Regulated SNS pre-employment background checks could 
contribute to ensuring accessibility, accuracy, relevancy and other principles,1464 thus 
respecting individuals’ rights to a greater extent – in contrast to “clandestine” searches. 
However, as even in the case of regulation these searches stay invisible and evade 
enforcement, one might ask why regulation would be a better solution when prohibition is 
judged to be ineffective. 
507. Employer’s interest in regulating SNS background checks. The answer is 
because employers as well are interested in conducting background checks in accordance 
with data protection requirements. It would be necessary and welcomed that employers 
realize that it is also in their own interest to comply with the data protection regulation for 
two reasons. On the one hand, in the case of non-compliance with the data protection 
requirements, they can face various consequences in which the GDPR has become more 
severe: they can face administrative fines up to 20 million euros, or in the case of an 
 
1460 Information Commissioner’s Office (2011) The employment practices code. Available 
at: https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1064/the_employment_practices_code.pdf(Accessed: 8 October 2018), p. 23. 
1461 NAIH (2016): A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi 
adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről, p. 19.  
1462 NAIH (2016): A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi 
adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről, p. 19.  
1463 Kajtár, E. and Mestre, B. (2016) ‘Social networks and employees’ right to privacy in the pre-employment 
stage: some comparative remarks and interrogations’, Hungarian Labour Law E-journal, (1), p. 38. 
1464 Ebnet, N. J. (2012) ‘It Can Do More Than Protect Your Credit Score: Regulating Social Media Pre-
Employment Screening with the Fair Credit Reporting Act’, Minnesota Law Review, 97(1), p. 326. 
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undertaking, up to 4 % of the total worldwide annual turnover.1465 However, because of the 
invisibility of these searches, this scenario has little practical relevance. 
On the other hand, the issues relating to the data protection principles highly 
question the relevancy, necessity, reliability, up-to-dateness and accuracy of the obtained 
data. If no safeguards are applied during the screenings, this practice could be 
counterproductive in choosing the best candidate possible. This means that not only 
prospective employees’ rights might be infringed but the employer would base his/her 
decision on unreliable data. Because of invisibility, it is of key importance that employers 
realize that – in addition to respecting applicants’ rights – it also serves their own interests 
to comply with the data protection regulation and avoid screening in an inefficient or 
illegal way. If the employer is aware of these potential risks and proceeds accordingly, 
these risks can be eliminated.1466 Ensuring the participation of the applicant and 
considering that too much information does not necessarily help making the decision can 
be the means to achieve that.1467 
(§2) Role of the applicant 
508. Although it is the employer who is in a more dominant position as he/she 
defines the methods used during the recruitment, leaving no decision-making position for 
the employee, and conducts the background check himself/herself, it is important to realize 
that applicants can also take steps towards ensuring the protection of their rights in the 21st 
century. Although data protection applies irrespective of whether the applicant is 
oversharing or posting once in a lifetime, applicants can also take further steps in order to 
actively practice their right to informational self-determination and they can highly 
contribute to preventing the occurrence of negative consequences in the hiring process: 
both in the field of preventing the rise of these issues and also in detecting them after they 
have occurred. 
(A) Increased consciousness during the use of SNSs 
 
1465 Article 83 of the GDPR 
1466 Byrnside, I. (2008) ‘Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using Social 
Networking Sites to Research Applicants’, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, 10(2), 
p. 471. 
1467 Byrnside, I. (2008) ‘Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using Social 
Networking Sites to Research Applicants’, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, 10(2), 
p. 474. 
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Through the adoption of a more conscious behaviour while using and posting to 
SNSs – in accordance with the right to informational self-determination requiring data 
subjects to be an active part in the processing –, applicants can increasingly contribute to 
the protection of their rights – while still enjoying the possibilities provided by SNSs. With 
such conduct, the major part of problems might even be prevented. 
509. Using privacy settings. Concerning the appropriate audiences, the use of 
privacy settings is a crucial point. The CNIL emphasizes the importance of actively 
managing the privacy settings in order to control which audiences can have access to the 
content on their profiles.1468 For example, Facebook gives users the possibility to use 
differentiated privacy settings – in theory it is possible that every friend of the user has 
access to a different content on the profile.1469 By effectively using the privacy settings, it 
would be possible to shape the online identity into an “employer-friendly” version, where 
the employer (or users with whom the employee is not friends) can only have access to one 
part of the profile – for example, to a part only containing professional information, while 
access is reserved to the closest friends of the user. 
Even though 100 % safe protection does not exist, and a very determined employer 
can somehow bypass privacy settings, most employers encountering the barriers imposed 
by data protection settings would not start to hack the profile in order to gain access to it. 
Even with such minimal precaution a considerable part of the problems – except for the 
extreme cases – could be successfully prevented. 
510. Sharing the right content. Besides applying at least basic privacy settings, 
it is crucial that the applicant should be aware of what kind of information he/she shares 
and with which audience. Regarding the content shared, at the 30th International 
Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners it was advised that SNS users 
carefully consider what kind of personal data they publish on these sites and whether they 
 
1468 CNIL (no date) Maîtriser les informations publiées sur les réseaux sociaux. Available 
at: https://www.cnil.fr/fr/maitriser-les-informations-publiees-sur-les-reseaux-sociaux (Accessed: 26 February 
2017) and Cornesse, I. (2011) ‘Quand la CNIL vient au secours des salariés’, Revue Lamy Droit des affaires, 
58, pp. 52–53.  
1469 To stay with the example of Facebook, before sharing something, the applicant should think over what 
the right form for the given content is: would he/she want to share – for example, holiday pictures – in an 
album accessible to all Facebook users, or “only” to all of his/her friends, to his/her closest friends or in a 
private group destined for communication with the closest friends, or in a private message, etc.? 
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publish any personal data to these sites. They should not forget that they might be later 
confronted with that information in a different context, for example, in a hiring process.1470 
Although the use of privacy settings can provide certain protection, it is safer if users 
do not rely heavily on them and, in addition, carefully think over whether to post or not to 
post.1471 There exists a so-called Grandmother rule, which can help users to judge the 
appropriateness of material published on SNSs: according to this rule, users should only 
share information on SNSs that they would feel comfortable to share with their 
grandmother.1472 
511. Respecting the rights of others. Privacy is a collective matter: what a user 
does might affect another user.1473 In the age of Web 2.0 individuals do not owe a perfect 
control over their online presence.1474 Even if someone is conscious regarding his/her e-
reputation, other users can publish information relating to third parties. It is important that 
users should refrain from publishing personal data relating to other users without their 
consent (e.g. pictures and tagging).1475 
(B) E-reputation and awareness 
Managing e-reputation1476 does not consist simply of the single act of abstaining 
from posting certain content: it should be continuously monitored. Even if the individual 
himself/herself does not use SNSs, it is recommended to monitor possible online presence 
in order to be able to detect any possibly compromising information and take the necessary 
steps. In order to promote such behaviour, raising awareness is crucial, so that individuals 
can have knowledge of the possible risks and adopt a more conscious behaviour. 
 
1470 30th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners Strasbourg, 17 October 
2008 p. 2. 
1471 Pók, L. (2012) ‘A közösség hálójában – Közösségi oldalak munkajogi vonatkozásai’, Infokommunikáció 
és jog, (1), p. 13. 
1472 Byrnside, I. (2008) ‘Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using Social 
Networking Sites to Research Applicants’, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, 
10(2),p. 474. 
1473 boyd, danah (2011) ‘Networked Privacy’. Personal Democracy Forum, New York, NY, 6 June. 
Available at: http://www.danah.org/papers/talks/2011/PDF2011.html (Accessed: 28 February 2017). 
1474 Szabó, E. Gy. (2010) ‘A személyes adatok védelmének kérdései a virtuális világban’, in Talyigás, J. (ed.) 
Az internet a kockázatok és a mellékhatások tekintetében. Budapest: Scolar Kiadó, p. 58. 
1475 30th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners Strasbourg, 17 October 
2008 p. 2. 
1476 According to the CNIL, e-reputation is the online image of the individual, composed of every piece of 
information relating to the individual available online, e.g. blog, videos, photos either published by the 
individual or by others. Source: CNIL (2011) L’e-réputation en questions. Available 
at: https://www.cnil.fr/fr/le-reputation-en-questions-0 (Accessed: 4 April 2017). 
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512. Monitoring e-reputation. The user should also control his/her digital 
identity by monitoring what information is available regarding him/her on the Internet – 
for example, typing his/her name into a search engine in order to monitor whether third 
persons have posted information relating to him/her.1477 Such content could have been 
posted by the individual or by other parties (see, for instance, the example of creating fake 
profiles for competition), or can simply give results of individuals sharing the same name. 
If the applicant is aware of the content which the employer might have access to, 
he/she can make the necessary steps to remove that content.1478 Either he/she can ask the 
third party to remove the content, or can report it, or can even use online reputation 
management services. These online reputation management services help users track, 
verify online information or shape online personas.1479 
513. Not only information published by third parties should be monitored: 
regularly reviewing the content previously published by the user himself/herself (e.g. 
pictures from years before) and removing what is not relevant any more can also play an 
important role. 
514. Raising awareness amongst users. In order to ensure the active and 
effective participation of individuals, it is crucial that individuals are aware of the basic 
functioning of these sites, the issues in relation to their right to data protection and the 
possible consequences of the use of SNSs. As an example, in France, the CNIL takes very 
forward-thinking steps in informing users on what behaviour they should adopt in order to 
take steps to protect their own privacy. They actively engage in social media and promote 
their activity. They publish information notices, informing users in a plain, concise 
language on their rights or on how to protect them. Two documents relate directly to the 
subject of the present Chapter: an article entitled “Job applicants: protect your own 
 
1477 CNIL (2011) L’e-réputation en questions. Available at: https://www.cnil.fr/fr/le-reputation-en-questions-
0 (Accessed: 4 April 2017). 
1478 Byrnside, I. (2008) ‘Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using Social 
Networking Sites to Research Applicants’, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, 10(2), 
p. 474. 
1479 Kennedy, N. and Macko, M. (2007) ‘Social Networking Privacy and Its Effects on Employment 
Opportunities’, in Larsen, K. R. and Voronovich, Z. A. (eds) Convenient Or Invasive: The Information Age. 
Ethica Publishing. Available 
at: http://www.ethicapublishing.com/inconvenientorinvasive/2CH12.pdf (Accessed: 10 December 2019), p. 
11. (Page number referring to the online version of the article.) 
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reputation on the web!”1480 and a poster entitled “10 pieces of advice to stay clean on the 
web.”1481, 1482 The first document aims directly job applicants and includes pieces of 
advice, such as think before posting, manage e-reputation, highlight content that puts the 
user in a favourable light, pay attention to tags and to privacy settings. The second 
document is more general and provides practical advice to users of the Internet, such as the 
use of privacy settings, respecting the privacy of others, managing e-reputation, using 
several e-mail addresses and pseudonyms, choosing passwords, etc. 
515. In contrast to this active, awareness raising activity of the CNIL, in 
Hungary, the NAIH has room for improvement. Even though on the website of the NAIH 
rich documentation is available including the annual reports, cases and information notices, 
these are official documents, lacking a plain language. To date the NAIH is not present in 
social media. Although different information notices and other materials were published in 
the field of children’s online data protection,1483 their awareness raising activity is not as 
comprehensive as the CNIL’s. 
516. Suggestion for the NAIH. As a suggestion it would be recommended for 
the NAIH to become present in social media in order to make its activity more available 
for individuals – such as the CNIL in France. Although this would not instantly resolve 
challenges relating to data protection and employment, it would constitute an important 
step in raising awareness and promoting the right to data protection. 
Conclusions of Title 1 
517. It was demonstrated that it is the employer’s natural need to be interested in 
knowing as much as possible about job applicants in order to identify and hire the most 
 
1480 CNIL (2014) Candidats à l’emploi : protégez votre réputation sur le web ! Available 
at: https://www.cnil.fr/fr/candidats-lemploi-protegez-votre-reputation-sur-le-web (Accessed: 19 August 
2018). 
1481 CNIL (2016) 10 conseils pour rester net sur le web. Available at: https://www.cnil.fr/fr/10-conseils-pour-
rester-net-sur-le-web (Accessed: 19 August 2018). 
1482 Other, more general articles advise users on how to adopt a more privacy and data protection conscious 
use on the Internet and on SNS, e.g. how to secure their accounts through adopting appropriate passwords, 
what precautions to adopt when using a public WIFI, how to use privacy settings etc. See these articles in: 
CNIL (no date) Configurer ses outils. Available at: https://www.cnil.fr/fr/configurer (Accessed: 5 November 
2018). 
1483 They were published in the frame of the project entitled “Key to the World of the Net!” and aimed to 
ensure the protection of children in the online world. A study was published together with different videos, 
quizzes and advice. The materials are available at the following site: NAIH (no date) Adatvédelemről 
fiataloknak ‘kulcs a net világához’ projekt. Available at: https://www.naih.hu/adatvedelemr-l-fiataloknak--
kulcs-a-net-vilagahoz--projekt.html (Accessed: 19 August 2018). 
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suitable individual for the given post. From a legal perspective, this interest is manifested 
in the freedom to contract, meaning that the employer is entitled to choose with whom 
he/she would like to conclude an employment relationship – for which he/she needs to 
obtain certain information to assess the aptitude of the applicant during the recruitment. 
However, during this recruitment procedure the applicant is entitled to the right to privacy 
and the right to data protection. 
Due to the vast amounts of information available on these sites, employers often use 
SNSs during recruitment. SNSs put these already existing rights into a new light: the 
proliferation of using SNSs during the recruitment resulted in the emergence of a new kind 
of privacy and data protection issues. These issues were analysed in detail throughout the 
Title. 
One of the de lege ferenda suggestions concerned the legal “acknowledgement” of 
SNSs as an often-used recruitment tool: it was suggested that the relevant provisions of the 
FLC and the HLC on data protection should be amended to include cases when the 
employer does not ask the applicant to provide certain information but obtains the 
information sought unilaterally, without involving the applicant in the process. The latter is 
typically the case of SNSs, when employers access the publicly available profiles of the 
applicant. This grammatical clarification of the labour codes would make it unequivocal 
that SNSs do not evade legal regulations – even despite the fact that it is usually the 
applicant who made the information available. Another de lege ferenda suggestion related 
to Hungarian labour law and opted for clarifying that the provisions of the HLC are to be 
applied to job applicants as well – as it is already the case with the FLC. 
518. Prohibition or regulation? It was also discussed whether it should be 
prohibited to conduct pre-employment SNS background searches in order to better protect 
applicants’ personal lives.1484 After having examined the existing viewpoints, the 
dissertation adopts the position that it would be unreasonable to prohibit such searches: 
instead, they should be tolerated and regulated regarding how exactly they should be 
conducted in order to effectively protect applicants’ rights. The main reason for opting for 
such a viewpoint is that even if these searches are legally prohibited, they stay invisible, 
 
1484 This was the matter where differences were found between the French and Hungarian approach: the 
NAIH argued that it would not be reasonable to ban the employer from looking at publicly available data on 
SNSs (even on personal SNSs), while the CNIL argued that the screening of personal SNSs should be 
prohibited. 
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making it easy and effortless to bypass such a prohibition. Therefore, it would be more 
reasonable to make employers realize1485 that it is also their interest to control themselves 
while executing these searches and comply with the legal regulations and not to conduct 
unlimited background checks. Indeed, respecting the data protection requirements 
primarily has the purpose of enforcing applicants’ rights, but secondarily it also serves the 
interests of the employer, as non-compliance with these requirements would provide the 
employer with unreliable data, which may result in sorting out an otherwise perfect 
applicant and being counterproductive in relation to the aim of finding the best applicant. 
As a solution, employers should understand how to screen properly, in order to avoid 
screening in an inefficient or illegal way. 
519. Issues relating to data quality. As for the data protection principles, the 
most problematic areas were authenticity, accuracy and relevancy of the personal data. Not 
respecting these requirements does not only infringe the right to data protection, but also 
leads to the processing of unreliable, inaccurate data. As a de lege ferenda suggestion it 
was recommended to set a time limit: the employer should not use personal data published 
on SNSs before a certain time period – set according to the limitation period in labour law. 
520. Transparency. Transparency – and in connection with it the invisibility of 
the searches – is important not only because it makes the prohibition of searches 
unreasonable, but also because it can highly contribute to the enforcement of the data 
quality principles through ensuring the applicants’ participation. It was also argued that 
besides exercising data subjects’ rights, individuals should adopt a more conscious 
behaviour in relation to their online presence and e-reputation. 
521. In conclusion, instead of “googling” applicants in an ad hoc way, 
systematic, well-planned searches should be encouraged – if they are necessary at all. It 
always depends on the given job whether such searches are necessary, or they can be 
replaced by a job interview or probation. The necessity and the exact conditions of 
conducting these searches must be assessed on a case-by-case basis: it is impossible to 
provide a universal solution, applicable in all cases, only the criteria of how to conduct 
them should be established. 
 
1485 A recommendation related to the awareness raising activity of the DPAs – as they would play a crucial 
role in making employers understand the importance of respecting data protection requirements during SNS 
screenings. As part of this activity it is recommended for the NAIH to become present in social media as well 
– the online presence of CNIL might serve as a possible source of inspiration. 
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If these screenings are absolutely necessary, it is recommended that they should be 
conducted in a uniform manner, preferably at the late stage of recruitment, according to 
pre-established criteria and with the involvement of a third party – as it was presented in 
Chapter 2. Regarding the information to be assessed, the employer should only access data 
that is publicly available. If the employee uses privacy settings, or in any way limits access 
to his/her profile, this “concealed” information should be left out from the screening: the 
privacy settings chosen by the user shall not be bypassed in any way. Such regulated 
background checks can establish the balance between the employer’s legitimate interests 
and the applicants’ rights.  
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Title 2: The use of social network sites at the expense of working 
hours 
522. Issues posed by SNSs. SNSs can have an important effect on working 
hours. The main issue that they represent is that a huge number of employees spend their 
working hours surfing on SNSs instead of working – seriously compromising the interests 
of the employer, who lawfully expects the employee to work during working hours. It was 
already demonstrated that one of the employee’s main obligation is to perform work: this 
obligation can be violated by the personal use of SNSs during working hours. 
An employment relationship necessarily comes with the limitation of certain rights 
and the autonomy of the employees,1486 meaning, for example, that the employee is not 
free to spend working time as he/she wishes. It is the very nature of employment that the 
employee must perform work under the subordination of the employer.1487 It follows from 
the main labour law principles that employers have the contractually based right to 
determine the work and to control whether the employees perform their contractual 
obligations.1488 
523. Subjects treated. In Title 2, emphasis will be put on the examination of 
using SNSs at the expense of working hours, with the main focus on the traditional 
(typical) employment contract.1489 Therefore, the assessment of the content of SNS posts is 
not as relevant as in the case of examining the employees’ exercise of freedom of 
expression or behaviour outside working hours: what is important is that the employee 
used SNSs during working hours. Although it is possible to publish excessive criticism, 
libel or harm the employer’s legitimate interest in other ways during the working hours as 
well, these issues will be further discussed under Title 3. 
524. Legal foundations. The starting point is that the employer has the right to 
regulate the personal use of the devices provided by him/her and has the right to monitor 
 
1486 Kardkovács, K. (ed.) (2012) A Munka Törvénykönyvének magyarázata. Budapest: HVG-ORAC Lap- és 
Könyvkiadó, p. 40. 
1487 Cour de cassation, 22 juillet 1954 (Bull. civ. IV, no 576) referred to in: Le Lamy social (2019) 
150. Définition du contrat de travail. Available at: shorturl.at/adoty (Accessed: 12 August 2019) 
1488 Hendrickx, F. (2002) ‘Protection of workers’ personal data in the European Union, Two studies’. EC. p. 
97. 
1489 Although the case of the bring your own device phenomenon will be addressed as well. 
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whether the employee complies with his/her instructions.1490 One of the employees’ main 
obligations is the obligation to perform work during working hours, while the employer is 
entitled to monitor whether employees comply with that obligation.  
In French law, the notion of employment contract itself refers to employees’ 
obligation to work.1491 The employee is obliged to perform the work for which he/she has 
been hired,1492 and arising from the intuitu personae nature of the employment 
relationship, he/she has to do it in person.1493 In addition, he/she is subject to a requirement 
of availability: he/she is obliged to be at the employer’s disposal and follow his/her orders 
without being able to freely carry on his/her personal affairs.1494 The employee also has to 
respect working hours and follow the instructions of the employer.1495 From the 
employer’s perspective, it is a confirmed principle in jurisprudence that the employer has 
the right to control and monitor the activity of employees during working hours.1496 
Similarly, in Hungarian law, the very definition of employment contract refers to the 
employees’ obligation to perform work,1497 and the employees’ other obligations give 
further guidance on the substance of this obligation.1498 The employees’ two most 
important obligations are to perform work and to be at the disposal of the employer during 
working hours.1499 The employee should not just show up at the workplace, he/she has to 
spend his/her whole worktime performing work of high quality and quantity. If the 
employee is present at the workplace but spends his/her time, for example, reading or 
 
1490 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 24. 
1491 As an employment contract is “a convention according to which a person engages in performing work for 
another person under its subordination for remuneration.” Source: Cour de cassation, 22 juillet 1954 (Bull. 
civ. IV, no 576) referred to in: Le Lamy social (2019) 150. Définition du contrat de travail. Available at: 
shorturl.at/adoty (Accessed : 12 August 2019) 
1492 Ouaissi, H. (2017) Droit du travail : de l’individuel au collectif. 2nd edn. Bruxelles: Bruylant. p. 141. 
1493 Favennec-Héry, F. and Verkindt, P.-Y. (2016) Droit du travail. 5th edn. Issy-les-Moulineaux: LGDJ 
Lextenso éditions. p. 421. 
1494 Article L3121-1 of the FLC 
1495 Ministère du travail, de l’emploi, de la formation professionnelle et du dialogue social (2015) Guide 
pratique du droit du travail. Paris: La Documentation française. p. 90. 
1496 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 14 mars 2000, N° 98-42090; Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 4 
juillet 2012, N° 11-30266; Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 18 mars 2008, N° 06-45093  
1497 Subsection (2) of Section 42 of the HLC: “Under an employment contract: 
a) the employee is required to work as instructed by the employer; 
b) the employer is required to provide work for the employee and to pay wages.” 
1498 Subsection (1) of Section 52 of the HLC: “Employees shall: 
a) appear at the place and time specified by the employer, in a condition fit for work; 
b) be at the employer’s disposal in a condition fit for work during their working time for the purpose of 
performing work; 
c) perform work in person, with the level of professional expertise and workmanship that can be reasonably 
expected, in accordance with the relevant regulations, requirements, instructions and customs[.]” 
1499 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2013) Munkajog. 2nd edn. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, p. 254. 
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sending instant messages instead of performing work, the employer is entitled to terminate 
his/her relationship.1500 On the other side, the employer is entitled to give instructions 
regarding the organization of work1501 and has the right and obligation to control 
employees’ work and maintain work discipline: as a consequence, he/she may apply 
detrimental legal consequences in the case of the employee’s breach of obligation.1502 
Therefore he/she can monitor – respecting the requirements set by Sections 9-11/A of the 
HLC – whether employees respect their obligations and spend their working time 
performing work. 
525. Main questions to be answered. Although today it is a well-established 
principle that “[w]orkers do not abandon their right to privacy and data protection every 
morning at the doors of the workplace[,]”1503 drawing the exact lines of these rights can 
pose questions. Because of the subordinate relationship between the employees and the 
employer, these rights have to be balanced against the employer’s legitimate economic 
interests. 
Regulating and monitoring the use of SNSs can concern the employee’s right to 
privacy, while the monitoring necessarily comes with the processing of personal data and 
falls under the scope of the data protection legislation, meaning that the data protection 
requirements aiming to ensure the employees’ right to personal data protection shall be 
respected during such monitoring. Therefore, the main question that Title 2 intends to 
answer is: how do the rights of the employee collide with the employer’s rights? More 
precisely, whether and to what extent can the employer interfere with employees’ personal 
lives through regulating the personal use of social media during working hours and how is 
it possible to monitor compliance? 
526. Main hypothesis of Title 2. Title 2 intends to prove that in most regards, the 
personal use of SNSs during working hours can be adequately addressed through the 
already existing rules relating to the monitoring of Internet and e-mail use (Hypothesis 3). 
Neither of the two labour codes or the data protection acts regulate specifically employee 
monitoring jointly with SNSs. Therefore SNSs must be assessed in the light of the rules 
 
1500 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2013) Munkajog. 2nd edn. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, p. 257. 
1501 While the employee must also perform work according to the employer’s instructions. Source: 
7001/2005. (MK 170.) FMM-PM együttes irányelv a munkavégzés alapjául szolgáló szerződések minősítése 
során figyelembe veendő szempontokról. 
1502 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2013) Munkajog. 2nd edn. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó. p. 249. 
1503 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 4. 
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laid down in the labour codes relating to employee monitoring in general.1504 Also, the 
practice of the courts and the data protection supervisory authorities elaborated the detailed 
conditions of certain types of monitoring – amongst them the monitoring of Internet and e-
mail. 
As social media and SNSs are Internet based platforms which enable to post certain 
content and to communicate with other users, the rules relating to Internet and e-mail 
monitoring are adequately applicable to employees’ use of social media during working 
hours. However, SNSs have certain characteristics that make it necessary to enumerate the 
special issues raised by them, in order to be able to judge whether already established rules 
need adjustments and if yes, in what regards. A great difference compared to e-mail 
monitoring is that while sending e-mails usually necessarily comes with the job (meaning 
that the employee might use the same platform for work and personal purposes), as a main 
rule, messaging on SNSs is usually not part of a job at all and is purely personal. 
Therefore, while the access of an e-mail account can be associated with working as well, 
accessing an SNS (regardless of whether it is for surfing or communicating) supposes 
personal activity. 
527. A double approach should be adopted, as it must be taken into consideration 
that when an employee surfs SNSs (e.g. the Facebook or Instagram newsfeed), this activity 
is like surfing the Internet; whereas when using the instant chat messaging services 
incorporated into these platforms (e.g. Facebook Messenger, Instagram Direct), more 
emphatic similarities with the regulation of the use and monitoring of e-mail can be 
observed. Title 2 aims to prove that these already elaborated rules are capable of 
adequately regulating the case of SNSs as well, with the application of minimal 
adjustments, taking into consideration the specificities of SNSs. 
528. Starting point: regulation of monitoring of the Internet and e-mail. As the 
use of SNSs is based on the use of the Internet, the already elaborated rules of monitoring 
employees’ personal use of the Internet are applicable to the personal use of SNSs as well. 
The already presented general rules of monitoring are adequately applicable to Internet 
monitoring as well. Both French and Hungarian legal systems have already addressed the 
question of monitoring employees’ use of the Internet and e-mail. 
 
1504 Article L1121-1, and Articles L1222-2 to L1222-4 of the FLC and Sections 9-11/A of the HLC 
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In French law, the CNIL’s standpoint is that the employer is entitled to regulate the 
use of the Internet and e-mail by imposing limitations on its personal use for the purpose of 
guaranteeing the security of the network and preventing abusive personal use. However, 
certain personal use is usually tolerated if it is reasonable and does not affect security or 
productivity.1505 At the core of the regulation a presumption is found: e-mails are presumed 
to be of professional nature, unless the employee obviously indicates the personal character 
of the messages – imposing limitations on the employer’s right to monitor them, giving 
room for the employee’s right to respect for private life.1506 The employer cannot have 
access to those messages even if the personal use was forbidden, unless authorized to do so 
by a judge.1507 However, the employer can freely access professional e-mails:1508 he/she 
can have access to them even without the employee’s presence.1509, 1510 In contrast, in the 
case of Internet connections, no such exception exists: Internet connections and the sites 
visited are presumed to be professional so the employer can have access to them.1511, 1512 
In Hungary, the legal situation is slightly different as, due to the amendment of the 
HLC in 2019, a provision was added regulating explicitly the use of electronic equipment 
provided by the employer.1513 The HLC now stipulates that unless the parties agreed 
otherwise, the employee can use the equipment provided by the employer exclusively for 
professional purposes. It also adds that during the monitoring of such use, the employer 
can only process data in relation to the employment relationship. The amendment 
corresponds with the prevailing view in doctrine related to the legislation prior to this 
amendment, arguing that the employer is free to decide whether he/she allows the personal 
 
1505 CNIL (2018) Les outils informatiques au travail. Fiches pratiques: Travail & données personnelles 
1506 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 30 mai 2007, N° 05-43102. “However, the correspondences sent or 
received by the employee at the workplace are presumed to have a professional character, so the employer 
may open them without the presence of the concerned employee, except if they are identified as personal.” 
Source: Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 11 juillet 2012 n˚ 11-22.972 
1507 La Rédaction D.O. (2013) ‘Diffusion des bonnes pratiques en matière de protection des données 
personnelles des salariés’, JCP S (édition sociale), (7), p. 3. 
1508 CNIL (2010) Guide pour les employeurs et les salariés. Les guides de la CNIL. p. 19. 
1509 CNIL (2018) Les outils informatiques au travail. Fiches pratiques: Travail & données personnelles 
1510 However, certain limits are imposed on the employer’s access in line with the general principle of 
proportionality: it is forbidden to automatically receive a copy of each message or to use a key logger 
program. CNIL (2018) Les outils informatiques au travail. Fiches pratiques: Travail & données personnelles. 
1511 “[…] the connections made by an employee on websites during working hours from an IT tool provided 
by the employer for the performance of work are presumed to have a professional nature so the employer can 
look into them for the purpose of identifying them, without the presence of the employee.” Cour de cassation, 
chambre sociale, 9 juillet 2008, N° 06-45800; Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 9 février 2010, N° 08-
45253 
1512 Again, this access is not limitless: the use of key logger programs or storing information related to the 
sites visited for a period longer than 6 months is prohibited. Griguer, M. (2013) ‘Protection des données 
personnelles : conformité et bonnes pratiques des entreprises’, Cahiers de droit de l’entreprise, (1), p. 75. 
1513 Subsections (2) and (3) of Section 11/A of the HLC 
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use of the Internet, and if yes, to what extent.1514 Then, the extent of the monitoring will be 
highly dependent on whether the employer has allowed personal use or not: in Hungarian 
law as well, more extensive protection is afforded to personal communication/use of the 
Internet. 
529. Structure of Title 2. The case of SNS use during working hours will be 
examined by taking a double, privacy-data protection/regulation-monitoring approach: 
attaching privacy to the regulation of SNS use, and data protection to the monitoring of 
compliance with the regulation. First, in Chapter 1 it will be addressed to what extent 
employees’ right to private life is extended to the workplace, namely: do they have the 
“right” to use social media during working hours and how can the employer regulate or 
prohibit their use? Then, in Chapter 2 it will be discussed what data protection 
requirements must be enforced during the monitoring of whether employees comply with 
the employer’s regulation. Therefore, regulation and monitoring will be treated separately. 
Chapter 1: Possible prohibition of personal use of SNSs during working hours 
The regulation of the personal use of SNSs (and within this subject the question of 
possibly prohibiting its use) will be treated from a privacy angle. When regulating such a 
use, the employee’s right to privacy can be affected, as since the Niemietz case it is 
established that “[r]espect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right 
to establish and develop relationships with other human beings[,]”1515 which are very 
often established at the workplace.1516 The personal use of the employer’s electronic 
devices can constitute a way to establish relationship with others. It is undisputable that as 
a main rule, the employer is entitled to decide whether he/she allows the personal use of 
the Internet, e-mail (and SNS). However, the question that needs to be considered is 
whether the use of SNSs – one of today’s main platforms of communicating and 
establishing relation with others – can be completely prohibited during working hours? 
 
1514 Arany-Tóth, M. (2016) Személyes adatok kezelése a munkaviszonyban. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer. p. 
107.; Berke, Gy. and Kiss, Gy. (eds) (2014) Kommentár a munka törvénykönyvéhez: kommentár a munka 
törvénykönyvéről szóló 2012. évi I. törvényhez. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer. p. 62.; Németh, J. (2013) 
‘Internet és közösségi háló mint munkaeszköz’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (1). pp. 37-38.; Kun, A. (2013) 
‘Közösségi média és munkajog – avagy „online” munkaidőben és azon túl’, Munkaügyi Szemle, (3), p. 13., 
Szőke, G. L. et al. (2012) Munkahelyi adatvédelem. Nemzeti jelentés – Magyarország. Available 
at: http://pawproject.eu/en/sites/default/files/page/web_national_report_hungary_hu.pdf (Accessed: 21 
October 2016). p. 34. 
1515 ECtHR (1992) Niemietz v. Germany, Application no. 13710/88, 16 December, par. 29. 
1516 ECtHR (1992) Niemietz v. Germany, Application no. 13710/88, 16 December, par. 29. 
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The starting point of Chapter 1 will be the already elaborated set of rules in the field 
of regulating/prohibiting the personal use of the Internet and e-mail – addressed in Section 
1. Then, Section 2 will examine what kind of new challenges SNSs raise compared to the 
existing regulation, and in the light of these challenges, how their personal uses should be 
regulated. 
Section 1. Employees’ right to personal life within the workplace: regulating 
personal use of the Internet and e-mail during working hours 
The examination of the already established regulation in the field of Internet and e-
mail monitoring can constitute the basis for the further examination of the main subject. 
This is because of the similarities between the Internet/e-mail and SNSs: as SNSs are 
Internet based platforms, they allow the user to “surf” on them (like on the Internet); and 
they also allow the employee to communicate with other users (like in the case of e-mail). 
Regulating the personal use of the Internet and e-mail was already addressed by 
regulations: detailed rules were elaborated both at (§1) the international level (amongst 
which focus will be put on the European regime) and at (§2) the national level. 
§1. Outlook to European law 
Under European law, attention should be paid especially to documents issued by the 
EU’s WP29, and by the CoE’s ECtHR. The WP29’s documents provide useful and 
detailed guidance to Member States, while the ECtHR recently addressed the question of 
employee monitoring, putting this already existing phenomenon into a new perspective. 
Besides, contracting parties, such as France or Hungary are also obliged to take into 
consideration the ECtHR’s decisions both during legislation and the application of law.1517 
Therefore the documents of the WP29 and the ECtHR’s decisions are of high importance 
in relation to the national regulation (and monitoring discussed in detail in Chapter 2) of 
SNS use at the expense of working hours. 
(A) EU perspective: the WP29’s documents 
 
1517 Rózsavölgyi, B. (2018) ‘Mikor lehet jogszerű a munkáltató ellenőrzése? – az Emberi Jogok Európai 
Bírósága Nagykamarája Bărbulescu kontra Románia ügyben hozott ítéletének iránymutatásai’, Munkajog, 
2(1), p. 47. 
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530. Opinions of the WP29. The WP29 expressed in the Working document on 
the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace, already presented in Part I, 
that it is up to the employer to decide whether he/she allows the personal use of the 
Internet and if yes, to what extent.1518 However, the working document does not address 
the question whether a complete ban is possible, it only adds, without providing legal 
arguments, that a blanket ban seems to be impractical and unrealistic, as the Internet has 
gained a huge importance even during work.1519.  
531. Although the WP29 mostly deals with monitoring and the extent of 
prohibition/regulation, in its Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work the WP29 
explicitly refers to employees’ “legitimate right to use work facilities for some private 
usage”.1520 When stating that, the WP29 referred to the ECtHR’s Halford case1521 and 
Bărbulescu case.1522 However, according to my opinion, these references do not truly show 
the existence or the content of employees’ right to use the employer’s equipment for 
personal use, as the formulation of their reasoning rather suggests that it is only ensured 
that the use of such devices by employees for personal purposes might be covered by 
Article 8 of the ECHR. 
532. The WP29’s latter conclusion might be more crystallized through Paul De 
Hert’s and Hans Lammerant’s study relating to European workplace privacy/data 
protection, which referred to the ECtHR case law:1523 therefore this study might help more 
to better understand employees’ “right to private usage”. In the study they pointed out that 
employees’ have their rights even within the workplace, meaning that although the 
existence of the employer’s right to decide how his/her equipment can be used (and to 
monitor compliance) is not questioned, it is limited not only by the employees’ right to 
privacy (including the protection of communication), but also by their right to 
communication. This results in the fact that the employer cannot prohibit all private 
 
1518 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 24 
1519 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 24 
1520 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. p. 14. 
1521 “telephone calls made from business premises as well as from the home may be covered by the notions of 
‘private life’ and ‘correspondence’ within the meaning of Article 8 paragraph 1” ECtHR (1997) Halford v. 
the United Kingdom, Application no. 20605/92, 25 June, par. 44. 
1522 Although in a reference to the 2016 judgement and not to the 2017 Grand Chamber judgement. They 
referred to the ECtHR stating that the employer can only monitor the use to a limited and proportionate 
extent. 
1523 Notably to the case of Halford and Copland. 
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communication. Although he/she can prohibit the privative use of certain 
telecommunication means, this should not mean that employees can be left without any 
alternative to communicate.1524 
(B) CoE: the ECtHR’s case law 
The ECtHR’s case law in the field of monitoring employees’ use of the employer’s 
equipment (such as telephone, the Internet, e-mail)1525 has not addressed the extent to 
which personal use can be prohibited (whether the employer has the possibility to ban it 
completely), it rather focused on the existence of the right to privacy, which is a separate 
issue and will be discussed in relation to monitoring.1526 However, cases such as the 
Bărbulescu v. Romania (2017) directly address the question, and the Libert v. France case 
(2018) also contains some important observations. 
(a) Case of Bărbulescu v. Romania 
533. Case of Bărbulescu v. Romania. The Bărbulescu v. Romania (2017) case 
can serve as an important starting point when it comes to both regulating and monitoring 
the personal use of SNSs. The applicant, Mr. Bărbulescu was dismissed for using the 
Internet and a Yahoo account for private purposes against the prohibition of the employer – 
also, the account was created at the initiative of the employer. The employer found this out 
by monitoring the use of the equipment. Although Mr. Bărbulescu was informed that the 
personal use if IT equipment was prohibited, he was not informed as concerns the details 
of the implementation of the monitoring which, as it turned out, registered all content of 
his communication for a certain period. 
 
1524 De Hert, P. and Lammerant, H. (2013) Protection of Personal Data in Work-related Relations. Study PE 
474.440. Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional 
Affairs. Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. p. 53. 
1525 E.g. Halford v. the United Kingdom, Copland v. the United Kingdom 
1526 Though in the Copland case the ECtHR remarked in par. 42. that “[t]he applicant in the present case had 
been given no warning that her calls would be liable to monitoring, therefore she had a reasonable 
expectation as to the privacy of calls made from her work telephone”, implying that unless given prior 
notification, the employee can reasonably think that the equipment can be used for personal purposes as well. 
(Source: Rózsavölgyi, B. (2018) ‘Mikor lehet jogszerű a munkáltató ellenőrzése? – az Emberi Jogok Európai 
Bírósága Nagykamarája Bărbulescu kontra Románia ügyben hozott ítéletének iránymutatásai’, Munkajog, 
2(1), p. 43.) 
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534. Besides elaborating the rules relating to monitoring,1527 the decision is also 
significant for what it stated on social private life. In this case the ECtHR acknowledged 
the existence of “social private life” and ruled that “[…] an employer’s instructions cannot 
reduce private social life in the workplace to zero.”1528, 1529 In this context private social 
life means the possibility for the individual to develop his/her social identity,1530 and the 
ECtHR noted that instant messaging services constitute one form of leading a private 
social life.1531 The ECtHR also stated that restrictions on an individual’s professional life 
may fall within Article 8 in the case that they have “repercussions on the manner in which 
he or she constructs his or her social identity by developing relationships with others.”1532 
Even in the workplace, respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence 
continues to exist, although it may be restricted to a necessary extent.1533 Thus, the 
complete ban of personal communication seems to restrict the private social life of 
employees to an unreasonable extent. 
(b) Case of Libert v. France 
535. Case of Libert v. France. Even though it mainly relates to the storage of 
personal files on the employer’s computer, the Libert v. France (2018) case1534 contains 
some important observations. The case related to the opening of personal files stored on a 
work computer. The applicant, employee of the French national railway company (SNCF), 
was dismissed after the seizure of his work computer revealed that he stored a considerable 
number of pornographic files and forged documents. The applicant argued that the 
employer violated Article 8, by accessing those files in his absence. 
In its judgement the ECtHR recalled that the employer has the right to ensure that 
employees use the equipment provided by him/her for executing their work in compliance 
 
1527 Costes, L. (2017) ‘CEDH : surveillance des courriels d’un employé à son insu constitutive d’une 
violation du droit au respect de la vie privée et de la correspondance’, Revue Lamy droit de l’immatériel, 
(140), p. 35. 
1528 ECtHR (2017) Bărbulescu v. Romania, Application no. 61496/08, 5 September, par. 80. 
1529 The ECtHR also had important remarks as regards the monitoring of itself, to be treated in §2. 
1530 ECtHR (2017) Bărbulescu v. Romania, Application no. 61496/08, 5 September, par. 70. 
1531 Colonna, J. and Renaux-Personnic, V. (2017) ‘Vie privée et surveillance des communications du salarié : 
la position de la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme ; Note sous Cour Européenne des Droits de 
l’Homme, grande Chambre, 5 septembre 2017, arrêt numéro 61496/08’, La Gazette du Palais, (43), p. 2. 
[Page number referring to the online version of the article downloaded from: https://www.gazette-du-
palais.fr/article/GPL309w2/ (Accessed: 15 August 2019)]  
1532 ECtHR (2017) Bărbulescu v. Romania, Application no. 61496/08, 5 September, par. 71. 
1533 ECtHR (2017) Bărbulescu v. Romania, Application no. 61496/08, 5 September, par. 80. 
1534 ECtHR (2018) Libert v. France, Application no. 588/13, 22 February 
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with their contractual obligations and applicable regulation.1535 The employee’s files 
identified as personal receive more protection, as according to French law they can only be 
opened if there is a risk or a particular event and in the presence of the employee or if 
he/she has been properly notified of it – contrary to files presumed to be of professional 
nature.1536 The ECtHR confirmed the principle that the employee is entitled to the right to 
respect for private life even within the workplace, and that files obviously identified as 
personal, stored on the computer provided by the employer for work purposes, might 
pertain to the private life of the employee.1537 Although the decision does not mention a 
right to use the employer’s equipment for personal purposes, through providing protection 
to the personal files stored on work computers, certain tolerance is manifested, suggesting 
that a complete ban of personal use would not be feasible.1538 
§2. Regulation at the national level: France and Hungary 
Besides the regional level, detailed rules were elaborated at the national level as well, 
including French and Hungarian law. When assessing the legitimacy of a complete ban of 
personal use in the French and the Hungarian system, first (A) the fundaments of protecting 
employees’ personal lives will be discussed mostly through presenting the labour codes 
and scholars’ opinion on the subject. Then (B) the DPA’s position will be examined. 
Finally, (C) relevant case law will be examined, with the aim of tracing the line between 
abusive personal use, and personal use that should be tolerated by the employer1539 – 
thereby determining the possibility to apply legal consequences against employees who use 
the Internet/e-mail/SNSs for personal purposes during working hours. 
(A) Private/personal life at work 
 
1535 ECtHR (2018) Libert v. France, Application no. 588/13, 22 February, par. 46. 
1536 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 17 mai 2005, N° 03-40017 
1537 ECtHR (2018) Libert v. France, Application no. 588/13, 22 February, par 25. 
1538 On the Libert case see more in: Sipka, P. and Zaccaria, M. L. (2018) ‘A munkáltató ellenőrzési joga a 
munkavállaló munkahelyi számítógépén tárolt magánadatai fölött’, Munkajog, 2(2), pp. 45–49., Marchadier, 
F. (2018) ‘La protection des données informatiques stockées sur l’ordinateur professionnel du salarié à titre 
du droit au respect de la vie privée’, JCP G Semaine Juridique (édition générale), (15), pp. 59–63.; Nasom-
Tissandier, H. (2018) ‘L’importance de la charte informatique dans la justification de mesures de surveillance 
des salariés’, Jurisprudence sociale Lamy, (451), pp. 12–14. 
1539 Márton Leó Zaccaria observed the employees’ increasing possibilities due to technological development: 
today employees often feel limited in their rights when the employer wants to restrict or prohibit such 
personal use, while even before the proliferation of ICT and SNSs it was not an established practice that 
employees spend their working hours writing letters to their friends. Source: Zaccaria, M. L. (2016) 
‘Munkavállalók a világhálón - “Megosztani ér?”’, HR & Munkajog, 7(10), p. 16. 
 307 
 
536. France. The FLC contains no direct provision aiming to regulate the use of 
the employer’s equipment and its monitoring. However, an important principle, namely the 
respect of the employee’s right to respect for private life within the workplace (during the 
use of the company’s equipment) was established by the jurisprudence, which serves as a 
basis for the further analysis of the relevant rules. In France, the Court of Cassation’s 
landmark1540 Nikon decision1541 must be first mentioned.1542 The case related to an 
employee of the Nikon France Society, who was dismissed for serious misconduct 
particularly for using the company’s equipment for personal purposes – which was 
provided for him for professional purposes. The Court of Cassation – which granted 
employees an extremely (even too) favourable position1543 – affirmed that the employee 
has the right to respect for private life, especially to the secrecy of correspondence, even 
during working hours, at the workplace.1544  
The Court of Cassation held that that “the employee is entitled, even during work 
hours and at his/her workplace, to have the intimacy of his/her private life respected; that 
this implies in particular the secrecy of correspondence; that the employer may not 
therefore, without violating this fundamental freedom, examine personal e-mails sent and 
received by an employee through a computer provided as a work tool, and this applies 
even if the employer has forbidden the non-professional use of the computer[.]” Therefore, 
the Court of Cassation admitted the existence of an autonomous sphere reserved for the 
intimacies of private life, which must be respected even if the employer has prohibited 
personal use. However, through referring to Article L. 1121-1 of the FLC,1545 the decision 
maintains the possibility of limiting these rights, within the borders set by legislation.1546 
The essence of the decision is based on the protection of the employee’s private life within 
 
1540 Dupuis, M. (2001) ‘La vie privée à l’épreuve de l’Internet : quelques aspects nouveaux’, Revue Juridique 
Personnes et Famille, (12), p. 5. [Page number referring to the online version of the article downloaded from: 
https://lamyline-lamy-fr.bcujas-ezp.univ-
paris1.fr/Content/Document.aspx?params=H4sIAAAAAAAEAMtMSbF1CTEwMDC0MDM3MbFQK0stKs
7Mz7MNy0xPzStJVXNxDHG0LUkuj3T09Y4sKiyqyPV0dPKqKverzAMAsnFdMDwAAAA=WKE 
(Accessed: 15 August 2019)] 
1541 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 2 octobre 2001, n° 99-42.942 
1542 Although it relates to case law, due to the high importance of the Nikon case, it will be discussed in part 
(A) instead of part (C). 
1543 Gautier, P.-Y. (2001) ‘La preuve hors la loi ou comment, grâce aux nouvelles technologies, progresse “la 
vie privée” des salariés’, Recueil Dalloz Sirey, (39), p. 3150.  
1544 Kocher, M. (2013) ‘La protection des données des salariés : que reste-t-il de l’arrêt Nikon ?’, Legicom, 
(1), p. 129. 
1545 Back then Article L. 120-2 of the FLC. 
1546 Kocher, M. (2013) ‘La protection des données des salariés : que reste-t-il de l’arrêt Nikon ?’, Legicom, 
(1), p. 132. 
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the workplace.1547 However, recognizing such protection does not mean that the employer 
cannot ban or sanction abusive personal use.1548 
Thus, the Court of Cassation questioned the strict separation of professional and 
personal life, through acknowledging the respect of private life within the workplace.1549 
The decision had a great impact: while it was recognized that it made a huge step in 
recognizing employees’ right to respect to private life within the workplace,1550 it was also 
pointed out that potential abuses on the part of the employees might also take place.1551 
The decision might seem paradoxical insomuch as it put employers in a difficult position 
as, although they could order employees not to use equipment for private purposes, they 
were not allowed to lawfully open private letters, even if they violated the employer’s 
orders.1552 Later on, this principle became more nuanced through the adoption and 
application of the previously mentioned presumption of professional character of 
communication.1553 Even though the Nikon decision did not address whether employees’ 
have the right to use the employer’s equipment for personal purposes, it afforded 
protection to personal use, even if it took place contrary to the employer’s internal 
regulation. 
537. As regards the regulation of the personal use of the Internet and e-mails, the 
starting point is that as Internet connection and e-mails are perceived as a work tool 
necessary for the execution of work, the employer can regulate and control their use.1554 
However, according to the majority opinion, the total prohibition of the personal use of the 
Internet and e-mail would be considered illegitimate, as such a prohibition would be 
inconsistent with the principle of proportionality laid down in Article L1121-1 of the 
 
1547 Gautier, P.-Y. (2001) ‘La preuve hors la loi ou comment, grâce aux nouvelles technologies, progresse “la 
vie privée” des salariés’, Recueil Dalloz Sirey, (39), p. 3149. Its reasoning can be reduced to the following 
syllogism: everyone has the right to respect for private life, and more precisely to the secrecy of 
correspondence; private life can take place within the workplace; as a result, opening a communication 
addressed to the employee violates the employee’s rights. 
1548 Rapport de la Cour de Cassation 2001: A. Contrat de travail 1. Exécution. 
1549 Lyon-Caen, G. (2001) ‘Débat autour de l’arrêt Nikon France’, Semaine sociale Lamy, (1046) p. 10. 
1550 According to Jean Hauser, if private life flows into the workplace, it also raises the question of whether 
the work can flow into the private life of the employee. Source: Hauser, J. (2002) ‘Vie privée du salarié : E-
mail, domicile, sacs, bermudas et survêtement’, RTD Civ., (1), p. 72. 
1551 Kocher, M. (2013) ‘La protection des données des salariés : que reste-t-il de l’arrêt Nikon ?’, Legicom, 
(1), p. 130. 
1552 Vigneau, C. (2002) ‘Information Technology and Workers’ Privacy: the French Law’, Comparative 
Labor Law & Policy Journal, 23(2), p. 357. 
1553 This question will be further addressed in Section 2. 
1554 Féral-Schuhl, C. (2018) Cyberdroit. Le droit à l’épreuve de lInternet. 7th edn. Paris: Dalloz. p. 394. 
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FLC.1555, 1556 Personal use to a reasonable extent, for legitimate purposes such as urgent 
personal communication should be tolerated.1557 
Jean-Emmanuel Ray expresses that even though in theory the employer is entitled to 
completely ban the personal use,1558 in reality the situation is more nuanced, as in practice 
the enforcement of such a ban is not feasible. As in the 21st century ICT are part of 
everyday life, it would be disproportionate to sanction an employee for conducting simple, 
everyday activities such as for calling a family member in an urgent situation, or for 
buying plane tickets for his/her holiday during the work pause – if the activity did not 
constitute abuse.1559 Today, these simple everyday activities are often conducted through 
different SNSs. Jean Louis Denier expressed a similar opinion in 2003, arguing that 
although no legal constraint of providing "private" use of company equipment weighs on 
the employer, other factors, especially the blurred boundaries of professional and personal 
life make it more realistic to tolerate a certain personal use.1560 Then, the next step is to 
define the limits of tolerable personal use – which will be mostly curved out by the 
jurisprudence of French courts. 
538. Hungary. In Hungary, when assessing whether the employee committed 
misconduct, the starting point is that employers have the discretional right to decide 
whether they allow the personal use of the Internet or not.1561 This standpoint was further 
nuanced by the amendment of the HLC in 2019, explicitly determining at the statutory 
level that unless agreed otherwise, the employee should use the work equipment 
exclusively for professional purposes.1562 Prior to the amendment, the HLC stated that the 
employee’s private life cannot be subject to monitoring: instead of such a declaration 
 
1555 Grangé, J. and Froger, C. (2003) ‘Cyber-Monitoring in the French Workplace’, International Business 
Lawyer, 31(5), p. 216. 
1556 However, the contrary was expressed by Paul-Henri Antonmattei, who was of the opinion that the 
complete ban of non-professional use seems legally justified, as the employee has the right to respect to 
his/her personal life at the workplace, and not the right to personal life. Source: Antonmattei, P.-H. (2002) 
‘NTIC et vie personnelle au travail’, Droit social, (1), p. 39. 
1557 Grynbaum, L., Le Goffic, C. and Morlet-Haïdara, L. (2014) Droit des activités numériques. 1st edn. 
Paris: Dalloz. p. 888.; Cour de cassation (2006) Rapport annuel 2005. L’innovation technologique. La 
documentation française, Paris. pp. 111-112. 
1558 He also stated in another article that “[…] legally, access to the web at the workplace is not (yet) a right 
[…]”. Source: Ray, J.-E. (2011) ‘Facebook, le salarié et l’employeur’, Droit social, (2), p. 139. 
1559 Ray, J.-E. (2001) Le droit du travail à l’épreuve des NTIC. 2nd edn. Rueil-Malmaison: Liaisons. pp. 95-
97. 
1560 Denier, J.-L. (2003) ‘L’utilisation privative des NTIC d’entreprise’, Les cahiers du DRH, (89), p. 32. 
1561 Berke, Gy. and Kiss, Gy. (eds) (2014) Kommentár a munka törvénykönyvéhez: kommentár a munka 
törvénykönyvéről szóló 2012. évi I. törvényhez. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer. p. 62. 
1562 Subsection (2) of Section 11/A of the HLC  
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(especially with regard to the fact that other acts ensure the protection of the private life of 
the individual) emphasis is put on the employee being able to use work equipment solely 
for professional purposes.1563 
Such a formulation suggests that a complete ban of personal use is possible. As 
regards SNSs, according to the Commentary of the HLC, the employer can prohibit 
employees using SNSs during working hours.1564 Such a complete ban seems feasible, 
even accessing sites from the employees’ own device can be prohibited.1565 
539.  This position was already supported prior to the amendment by a number of 
scholars – although they usually added that despite the possibility of a complete ban, the 
employer should consider tolerating a certain use. They usually started their analysis by 
differentiating between whether the employer has authorized personal use or not, implying 
that it is his/her right to decide whether personal use is allowed. According to Janka 
Németh, the employer can choose from among three scenarios: banning the use of the 
Internet completely,1566 only banning the personal use of the Internet or not placing 
restrictions on the employees’ use of the Internet.1567, 1568 Then, the scale of monitoring is 
influenced by which scenario was chosen by the employer.1569 It is also important to 
consider the period when the banned activity takes place: during periods when the 
employee is not busy, or at the direct expense of his/her obligations (e.g. a salesperson 
ignoring customers and surfing on Facebook).1570 
Gábor Kártyás, Rita Répáczki and Gábor Takács add further nuances to this position 
and note that the employer is entitled to completely prohibit the personal use during 
 
1563 T/4479. számú törvényjavaslat az Európai Unió adatvédelmi reformjának végrehajtása érdekében 
szükséges törvénymódosításokról (2019). Előadó: Dr. Trócsányi László igazságügyi miniszter. Budapest, p. 
102. 
1564 Berke, Gy. and Kiss, Gy. (eds) (2014) Kommentár a munka törvénykönyvéhez: kommentár a munka 
törvénykönyvéről szóló 2012. évi I. törvényhez. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer. p. 62. 
1565 Kun, A. (2013) ‘Közösségi média és munkajog – avagy „online” munkaidőben és azon túl’, Munkaügyi 
Szemle, (3), p. 13. 
1566 Though she questions the efficacity of such a measure, as the Internet can be used for work as well. 
1567 Németh, J. (2013) ‘Internet és közösségi háló mint munkaeszköz’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (1), pp. 38-
39. 
1568 Or, as Edit Kajtár phrased it, the employer can choose between banning, restricting and regulating the 
use of the Internet. Kajtár, E. (2016) Dignity at Work: Employee’s Personality Rights in the 21st Century. 
Pécs: University of Pécs, Faculty of Law (PMJK Monographs 6). p. 119. 
1569 If the employer decided to allow the personal use of these sites, the employee cannot be sanctioned for 
using them in compliance with the rules, while the non-conform use can lead to legal consequences, 
especially if the banned use takes places during working hours and the content visited is compromising. 
Source: Kártyás, G. and Kozma-Fecske, I. (2016) ‘Szerelmes levelek a munkahelyi postafiókban’, HR & 
Munkajog, 7(3), p. 17. 
1570 Kun, A. (2013) ‘Közösségi média és munkajog – avagy „online” munkaidőben és azon túl’, Munkaügyi 
Szemle, (3), p. 13. 
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working hours: it is up to him/her to decide whether personal use is allowed and to what 
extent. However, they also note that in most of the jobs – jobs which do not require 
constant physical and mental presence – it is not counterproductive if the employee 
consults these sites for short periods from time to time. On the contrary, a complete ban 
might be counterproductive in these cases.1571 They also argue that with regard to the 
principle of mutual cooperation, in situations of major importance (e.g. the employee’s 
wife is about to give birth, etc.), the employer should try to make an exception from the 
ban.1572 In relation to communication, Edit Kajtár argued that even though the employer 
can decide what policy to adopt, the reasonable personal use of the professional e-mail 
account is usually tolerated.1573, 1574 In my opinion, these intermediate standpoints 
adequately take into consideration the realities of SNSs through allowing a certain 
tolerance relating to their personal use. 
(B) Position of the DPAs 
540. Position of the CNIL. The CNIL expressed on several occasions that 
although the employer can decide how to regulate the personal use of his/her equipment, it 
is recommended that a reasonable personal use is tolerated rather than applying a complete 
ban. In relation to the Internet, they stated that completely prohibiting the use of the 
Internet for non-professional reasons does not seem realistic in the information society and 
seems disproportionate in regards to the applicable legal provisions. They also add that a 
reasonable use, which is not likely to undermine the conditions of professional network 
access, does not question productivity and is usually socially accepted by most companies 
and administrations.1575 
 
1571 Kártyás, G., Répáczki, R. and Takács, G. (2016) A munkajog digitalizálása. A munkajog 
hozzáalkalmazása a digitális munkakörnyezethez és a változó munkavállalói kompetenciákhoz. Kutatási 
zárótanulmány. Budapest. pp. 77-78. 
1572 Kártyás, G., Répáczki, R. and Takács, G. (2016) A munkajog digitalizálása. A munkajog 
hozzáalkalmazása a digitális munkakörnyezethez és a változó munkavállalói kompetenciákhoz. Kutatási 
zárótanulmány. Budapest. pp. 78-79. 
1573 Kajtár, E. (2016) Dignity at Work: Employee’s Personality Rights in the 21st Century. Pécs: University 
of Pécs, Faculty of Law (PMJK Monographs 6). p. 122. 
1574 Although she did not address the question explicitly, Mariann Arany Tóth states that the complete ban of 
the personal use of the Internet realises interference with the right to freely develop one’s personality. 
(Source: Arany Tóth, M. (2011) ‘A munkavállaló emberi méltóságának védelme a 
munkaviszonyban’, Miskolci jogi szemle, 6(1), p. 144.) As such interference must meet certain – already 
presented – requirements, the legitimacy of a complete ban might be questioned. 
1575 Bouchet, H. (2004) La cybersurveillance sur les lieux de travail. Paris, la Documentation française: 
Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés. p. 23.; CNIL (2005) Guide pratique pour les 
employeurs. Les guides de la CNIL, p. 11.; CNIL (2010) Guide pour les employeurs et les salariés. Les 
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541. In relation to the personal use of the professional e-mail account, the CNIL 
stated that receiving and sending personal messages in reasonable1576 proportions is 
generally and socially accepted.1577 However, despite certain tolerance, the employer has 
several possibilities to regulate and impose limits on personal use, such as filtering 
unauthorized websites or forbidding the access to certain sites (e.g. pornographic sites) or 
the downloading of files or videos, or the access to chat or personal e-mail accounts.1578 
542. Position of the former Data Protection Commissioner and the NAIH. 
Neither the former Data Protection Commissioner, nor the NAIH has explicitly addressed 
the question of whether the complete prohibition of the personal use of the Internet and e-
mail is possible. The cases of the Data Protection Commissioner mainly dealt with the 
scope of monitoring,1579 and differentiated between the cases when the employer allowed 
personal use and when the use was only permitted for work purposes.1580 However, instead 
of addressing the extent of the regulation, these cases were focused on monitoring. One 
case1581 took a stand on whether a complete ban is advisable or not: it is advisable that the 
employer limits the use of the Internet to those websites which are necessary for the work, 
as due to the principle of data minimization, compliance can be better enforced with such a 
limitation during monitoring. 
543. The NAIH published two comprehensive documents in the field of 
employee monitoring: the already presented Recommendation on the basic requirements of 
 
guides de la CNIL, p. 18.; CNIL (2018) Les outils informatiques au travail. Fiches pratiques: Travail & 
données personnelles. 
1576 The CNIL provides examples of draft clauses for internal regulations relating to the personal use by 
stating that “only websites with a direct and necessary link to the professional activity are intended to be 
visited provided that connection time does not exceed a reasonable time and has utility in terms of the 
functions or mission to carry out. One-time consultations within reasonable limits for personal use regarding 
Internet pages that are not contrary to the public order and morality and do not incriminate the interests and 
the reputation of the organisation is tolerated.” Cited in: Duez-Ruff, V. (2012) ‘Impact des nouvelles 
technologies sur le droit du travail : un salarié appartient-il virtuellement à son employeur ?’, Lexbase Hebdo 
- Edition Sociale, (498), p. 6. [Page number referring to the online version of the article downloaded from: 
http://www.lexbase-academie.fr.bcujas-ezp.univ-paris1.fr/revues-juridiques/6837680-impact-des-nouvelles-
technologies-sur-le-droit-du-travail--un-salarie-appartient-il-virtuellement-a- (Accessed: 15 August 2019)]  
1577 Bouchet, H. (2004) La cybersurveillance sur les lieux de travail. Paris, la Documentation française: 
Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés, p. 25. 
1578 Féral-Schuhl, C. (2018) Cyberdroit. Le droit à l’épreuve de lInternet. 7th edn. Paris: Dalloz. p. 395. 
1579 On the summary of the Data Protection Commissioner’s and the NAIH’s activity see more in: Arany-
Tóth, M. (2016) Személyes adatok kezelése a munkaviszonyban. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer; Szőke, G. L. et 
al. (2012) Munkahelyi adatvédelem. Nemzeti jelentés – Magyarország. Available 
at: http://pawproject.eu/en/sites/default/files/page/web_national_report_hungary_hu.pdf (Accessed: 21 
October 2016). 
1580 ABI 570/A/2001, ABI 790/A/2001, ABI 866/A/2006-3., ABI 40/K/2006, ABI 1767/K/2006-3., ABI 
531/A/2004 
1581 ABI 800/K/2008-3. 
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electronic monitoring at the workplace (2013) and Information notice on the basic 
requirements on data processing at work (2016). However, the Recommendation governs 
electronic monitoring (and focuses mainly on CCTV surveillance) and it does not address 
the employer’s power to completely forbid personal use: it only refers to the employee’s 
obligation to work and to be at the employer’s disposal.1582 The Information notice states 
in relation to Internet and e-mail monitoring that, before implementing the monitoring, it is 
recommended that the employer adopts an internal policy in which he/she informs 
employees regarding the access to which sites is blocked/whether the employees can use 
their professional e-mail for personal purposes – without further investigating the 
legitimacy of a complete ban.1583 Neither of the documents refers explicitly to the use of 
SNSs during working hours. 
(C) Case law: abusive personal use and “Facebook firings” 
544. Case law. Case law has an important role in defining where the boundaries 
between abusive and reasonable personal use are. In France, courts have provided rich case 
law in this field. In contrast, Hungarian case law is minimal in the subject,1584 making it 
difficult to systematically compare the two jurisprudences, as it is difficult to find common 
grounds and criteria for comparison. As such, the analysis of the jurisprudence will be 
mainly based on French case law, with the aim of making de lege ferenda suggestions to 
the Hungarian law makers. 
French courts reflect the position of scholars and the CNIL, as courts usually tolerate 
the reasonable personal use of the employer’s equipment, but validate dismissals if the 
employee manifested an abuse while using these devices.1585 Their case law can contribute 
 
1582 NAIH (2013) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság ajánlása a munkahelyen 
alkalmazott elektronikus megfigyelőrendszer alapvető követelményeiről. NAIH-4001-6/2012/V. Budapest, p. 
2. 
1583 NAIH (2016) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi 
adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről. Budapest, p. 25, p. 30. 
1584 According to Máté Dániel Szabó and Iván Székely, those who were victims of privacy infringements 
usually do not turn to courts, but rather to the data protection authority. Therefore, the practice of the former 
Commissioner became case law supplementing the courts’ application of law. Source: Szabó, M. D. and 
Székely, I. (2005) ‘A privacy védelme a munkahelyen’, in Szabó, M. D. and Székely, I. (eds) Szabad adatok, 
védett adatok. Budapest: BME GTK ITM, p. 116. and p. 119. 
A 2012 report also stated the lack of case law in the field of employee monitoring. Source: Szőke, G. L.  et 
al. (2012) Munkahelyi adatvédelem. Nemzeti jelentés – Magyarország. Available 
at: http://pawproject.eu/en/sites/default/files/page/web_national_report_hungary_hu.pdf (Accessed: 21 
October 2016). 
1585 Grynbaum, L., Le Goffic, C. and Morlet-Haïdara, L. (2014) Droit des activités numériques. 1st edn. 
Paris: Dalloz. p. 888 
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to defining what use is considered to be abusive or reasonable. This question is important 
because employees can face various consequences if they use SNSs despite the ban, or 
contrary to the employer’s regulation: in serious cases they can even be dismissed from the 
workplace. 
545. France. The Court of Cassation and regular courts have already ruled on the 
personal use of the Internet/e-mail on several occasions. The following paragraphs will 
examine the French courts’ position on defining the limits of an abusive personal use. The 
length/number of connections were the criteria the most often referred to (time spent on 
these sites, number of pages visited, and amount of downloaded material), as using the 
employer’s equipment for personal purposes on a regular basis is not an acceptable 
behaviour.1586 However, the exact limits of such a use must be defined more precisely. 
Other, secondary criteria, such as the nature of the sites visited or making professional 
mistakes can also be of importance. 
546. The length/number of connections often played an important role in these 
cases: the Court of Appeal of Bordeaux ruled that using the Internet for personal purposes 
for one hour during a week is not abusive. In this case, the employee used the Internet 
connection – despite the ban set in the internal regulation – for personal purposes, for 6.5 
hours over a period of more than six weeks. The court ruled that this use cannot be 
considered excessive and in itself cannot serve as a basis of dismissal, considering that 
otherwise her behaviour was irreproachable, and the pages visited posed no threat to the 
employer.1587 In another case, between a hospital and a doctor, the Court of Appeal of 
Paris found that the dismissal reasoned by the permanent problem of ensuring the respect 
and the security of patients was not well-founded, as the doctor who accessed pornographic 
sites (without any paedophilic character) did it without any frequency – not daily, not 
weekly and not even monthly –, and for not a long time.1588 The length of connection is 
also significant as pointed out by the Court of Appeal of Paris, which stated that the 
presentation of a list of websites consulted by the employee is not sufficient to qualify as 
professional failure, as the proof of the time spent by the employee out of the professional 
field is ,missing.1589 
 
1586 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 14 mars 2000, n° 98-42.090 
1587 CA Bordeaux, Chambre sociale, section A, Arrêt du 15 janvier 2013 
1588 CA Paris, Pôle 6, 3ème ch., 15 novembre 2011, n˚ 09/09 398 
1589 CA Paris, Pôle 6, 6ème ch., 6 février 2013, n˚ 11/03 458 
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547. Dismissal was not well-founded in a case where a web manager was 
dismissed for publishing 1,336 non-professional tweets during working hours (over a 16-
month-long period), as the Court of Appeal of Chambéry found that supposing that the 
writing and the publication of one tweet takes one minute, the time spent with this activity 
does not exceed 5 minutes per day. In addition, the employee was not subject to any 
working hours and his job required him to be constantly connected to the Internet.1590 The 
Court of Appeal of Lyon held in a case where an employee used his work computer for 
personal purposes on six occasions (4 times during May and 2 times during June) – 
contrary to the explicit ban laid down in the internal policy – that although this conduct 
constitutes a violation his obligations arising from the employment contract, the dismissal 
was disproportionate compared to the violation committed.1591 The Court of Appeal of 
Basse-Terre found that contrary to the employer’s allegations – according to which the 
employee used her work computer for very personal purposes abusively and without 
authorization,– the employee’s conduct of creating nine personal files over a period of one 
year could not serve as a basis for dismissal. (Moreover, the internal regulation allowed 
personal use to a moderate extent, with the respect of the employee’s obligation of 
loyalty.)1592 The dismissal of an employee was without an actual and serious basis in a case 
at the Court of Cassation, in which an employee was dismissed for “illegal and repetitive 
downloading”, but in reality he visited a downloading site for two and a half minutes.1593, 
1594 
548. In contrast to these decisions, the Court of Cassation found the use abusive, 
and as such the dismissal justified for serious misconduct of the employee in a case when 
the employee spent 41 hours during the period of one month by surfing the Internet for 
personal purposes.1595 The Court of Cassation came to the same conclusion in a case in 
which an employee connected to not work-related sites – and among them to social media 
– more than 10,000 times during a period of 18 days.1596 The Court of Cassation held that 
an employee who violated his contractual obligations and the internal regulation’s ban on 
 
1590 CA Chambéry, 25 févr. 2016, RG n°15/01264 
1591 CA Lyon,18 novembre 2011, n° 11/01261 
1592 CA Basse-Terre, chambre sociale, 13 octobre 2014, N° de RG: 13/01046  
1593 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 29 octobre 2014, N° 13-18173 
1594 Although it should be added that besides the downloading the sites, the employee visited webpages for 
personal purposes on numerous occasions. However, as the reasoning of the dismissal only mentioned 
downloading, activity other than downloading from downloading sites fell beyond the scope of the case. 
1595 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 18 mars 2009, N° 07-44247 
1596 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 26 février 2013, N° 11-27372 
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the personal use of the Internet by sending one of his colleagues 178 e-mails accompanied 
by videos having sexual, humorous, political and sporty character from his work computer 
committed a breach of obligations, and his dismissal was therefore well-founded.1597 
The Court of Appeal of Nîmes stated the abusive nature of surfing on the web for 8.5 
hours over a period of less than 2 months – in this case the 8.5 hours was the minimal time 
spent surfing the web. It also found that the dismissal of the employee was justified, but in 
contrast to the previously cited case,1598 the employee made professional mistakes, which, 
in addition, could be related to the excessive personal use of the Internet.1599 The Court of 
Appeal of Pau stated that regular access to SNSs (e.g. Facebook), to a personal e-mail 
account (Hotmail), to dating sites and to a lingerie site (where the employee exercised 
commercial activity) during working hours resulted in her not being able to perform her 
work, therefore, the court confirmed the dismissal.1600 The Court of Appeal of Rennes also 
found that personal use during 20% of working time is abusive.1601 The Court of Appeal of 
Paris found the dismissal of an employee justified, who despite the ban laid down in the 
company’s internal regulation and a previous warning, used the Internet for personal 
purposes. The court affirmed that the digital consumption of 97 MB and 195 MB over the 
period of two days, exceeding the amount used by all other employees together, was 
abusive.1602 The Court of Appeal of Aix en Provence confirmed the dismissal of an 
employee who spent one hour per day surfing on the Internet for personal purposes, despite 
the ban of the internal regulation. On numerous occasions, the employee deliberately and 
repeatedly violated the internal regulation and connected to the Internet during working 
hours, at the expense of working time – as a result, the dismissal for gross misconduct was 
found valid.1603 
549. The nature of the content visited/sent might also be of importance: if the 
employee visits sites with rough content, it can serve as a criterion for assessing the 
abusive nature. The Court of Cassation held that unlawful conduct, such as the sending of 
 
1597 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 18 décembre 2013, nº 12-17.832 
1598 CA Bordeaux, chambre sociale, section A, Arrêt du 15 janvier 2013, where the court took into 
consideration that the employee’s behaviour was otherwise irreprochable, except for the personal use. 
1599 CA Nîmes, 2 avril 2013, n° 12/02146 
1600 CA Pau, chambre sociale, Arrêt du 13 juin 2013 
1601 CA Rennes, 7e chambre prud'homale, 20 novembre 2013, n° 12/03567 
1602 CA Paris, Pôle 6, 5ème ch., 19 janvier 2012, n˚ 10/04 071 
1603 CA d’Aix en Provence, 17eme chambre, arrêt au fond du 13 janvier 2015 
 317 
 
anti-Semitic messages can constitute a basis of dismissal.1604 In the already presented case 
of the Court of Appeal of Paris1605 between a hospital and a doctor, the court took into 
consideration that the pornographic sites that were visited did not have any paedophilic 
character – even though as a main rule, the Court of Cassation found that consultation and 
animation of pornographic sites on work equipment is not covered by the notion of private 
life.1606 In the case before the Court of Appeal of Pau,1607 the court also remarked that 
besides accessing SNSs and personal e-mail accounts, the employee also accessed a 
lingerie site, where, in addition, she exercised commercial activity.1608 Besides assessing 
the length of personal use, the Court of Appeal of Bordeaux1609 also took into consideration 
that the pages visited posed no threat to the employer. 
550. Professional mistakes as a result of being distracted due to the personal use 
can also have importance. When judging the use to be abusive, the Court of Appeal of 
Nîmes1610 considered that the employee made professional mistakes due to the excessive 
personal use of the Internet. In another case at the Court of Appeal of Bordeaux,1611 the 
absence of mistakes served as a ground for not establishing the abusive nature of personal 
use. 
551. The conclusion that can be drawn from these cases in relation to SNSs is 
that several factors can have a determining effect when judging the excessive nature of the 
use. Usually the length of the period spent on these sites is extremely important: if the 
employee spends a significant part of his/her working hours on Facebook, the abusive use 
might be established. Also, the frequency of the connections might be a decisive factor: if 
the employee uses SNSs for personal reasons on a regular basis, it will also be taken into 
account when assessing an abusive use. However, if he/she occasionally accesses these 
sites, or accesses them for short periods, the use is unlikely to be considered excessive. 
However, these observations are only valid if the employee’s performance is not affected 
 
1604 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, du 2 juin 2004, 03-45.269 and Castets-Renard, C. (2011) ‘Vie privée 
du salarié et TIC : attention à la violation de la charte informatique !’, Revue Lamy droit de l’immatériel, 
(69), p. 34. 
1605 CA Paris, Pôle 6, 3ème ch., 15 novembre 2011, n˚ 09/09 398 
1606 Cour de cassation, chambre criminelle, 19 mai 2004, N° 03-83953 However, it must be noted that in the 
given case the employee had a very extensive use connected to the consultation of pornographic sites, storing 
files and sending messages as well. 
1607 CA Pau, chambre sociale, Arrêt du 13 juin 2013 
1608 CA Pau, chambre sociale, Arrêt du 13 juin 2013 
1609 CABordeaux, chambre sociale, section A, Arrêt du 15 janvier 2013 
1610 CA Nîmes, 02 avril 2013, n° 12/02146 
1611 CA Bordeaux, chambre sociale, section A, Arrêt du 15 janvier 2013 
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in a negative way by the personal use: if the employee becomes distracted and commits 
professional mistakes, or as a direct consequence neglects or violates his/her other 
obligations (e.g. a bus driver checking Facebook while driving, or a cashier ignoring 
customers because of Facebook), the abusive nature might be more easily established. 
Also, the content accessed might be taken into consideration: for example, visiting 
Facebook pages containing questionable material (e.g. accessing homophobic, racist, 
paedophilic content, etc.) might affect the decision. These criteria can be useful when it 
comes to assessing whether the employee used SNSs to an abusive extent in the light of the 
given circumstances of a case.  
552. Hungarian case law. As it was already stated, in Hungary limited case law 
is available compared to France. Notably, one case1612 relating to the personal use of the 
Internet shall be mentioned, in which the Hungarian Supreme Court examined whether the 
personal use of the Internet and e-mail can constitute a basis for extraordinary termination. 
In this case the employee used his and also his colleague’s computer for personal purposes, 
mainly to visit pornographic sites. According to the court, it is the employee’s obligation to 
perform his/her work in a way that does not lead to the incorrect judgement of the 
employer or other persons – described in the HLC as well.1613 The employee, who had an 
important and confidential position, violated this essential obligation to a significant 
degree. The Hungarian Supreme Court ruled that infringing the employer’s restrictions and 
using another employee’s computer for this purpose constituted a serious breach of 
obligation, and the activity constituted legal ground for termination of employment.  
553. Another decision relating to being late for work can be mentioned, which 
can be indirectly relevant to the use of SNSs during working hours, as being late for work 
is also contrary to the employee’s obligation of appearing at work on time. Theoretically, 
being only a few minutes late constitutes a breach of obligation – although the 
consequences of this breach will depend on the length of being late.1614 The consequences 
of being late might also depend on the given job:1615 for example, being a few minutes late 
 
1612 BH2006.64 
1613 From such reasoning, Éva Pete drew the conclusion that the employer can legitimately impose the 
general prohibition on the personal use of the Internet. Source: Pete, É. (2018) ‘A munkavállaló és a 
munkáltató személyiségi jogainak védelme a munkaviszonyban’, in Mailáth György Tudományos Pályázat 
2017. Díjazott dolgozatok. Budapest: Országos Bírósági Hivatal, p. 782. 
1614 Kártyás, G. (2013) A késés öt szankciója, Adó Online. Available at: https://ado.hu/munkaugyek/a-keses-
ot-szankcioja/ (Accessed: 7 January 2020). 
1615 Pintér, M. (2019) A „csak még öt perc” munkajogi következményei, Adó Online. Available 
at: https://ado.hu/munkaugyek/a-csak-meg-ot-perc-munkajogi-kovetkezmenyei/ (Accessed: 7 January 2020). 
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might come with different implications for an airplane pilot or for a maid. Although 
arriving at work relatively little late but regularly for longer periods of time might 
constitute the reason for the termination of employment as it constitutes a breach of 
obligation,1616 the Supreme Court of Hungary ruled that the motivation of the termination 
shall not be considered reasonable if a long-term employee is dismissed because he/she 
arrived late at the workplace once.1617, 1618 
According to my opinion, this provision should adequately be applied to the case of 
using SNSs, and the exact circumstances of the case should be taken into consideration. By 
analogy, unless the employer allowed personal use, consulting SNSs on a regular basis 
even for short periods constitute a breach of the employee’s obligations and might serve as 
a reason for dismissal. However, it might be different if the employee infringes the 
employer’s instructions and checks Facebook one time, for 5 minutes. Also, there might be 
a difference if a newly hired employee does that on his/her first week or an employee who 
has worked there for years. Therefore, the exact consequence depends on the given 
context. 
554. (De lege ferenda) suggestion. Despite the lack of extensive case law in 
Hungary, the criteria identified from French case law might be of help when it comes to 
assessing whether personal use was abusive or not. As such, the length of the connection, 
its frequency and the content visited can play an important role in the assessement. Similar 
criteria were already taken into consideration in Hungary (e.g. length and frequency were 
considered when it came to assessing being late for the workplace, and content of the 
visited webpage was taken into consideration when it came to assessing whether consulting 
pornographic content was capable of leading to the incorrect judgement of the employer or 
other persons). The difference between the two countries is that France applied these 
criteria in a more systematic way, which might serve as an example for Hungary in the 
future. 
 
1616 Halmos, S. and Petrovics, Z. (2014) Munkajog. Budapest: Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem Közigazgatás-
tudományi Kar. Available at: http://m.ludita.uni-
nke.hu/repozitorium/bitstream/handle/11410/8585/Teljes%20sz%C3%B6veg%21?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
 (Accessed: 16 November 2018), p. 121. 
1617 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2013) Munkajog. 2nd edn. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, p. 200. 
1618 However, being late constituted a legitimate reason for termination of the employment contract in a case 
when the employee was away from the workplace for hours without permission – exceeding by hours the 
negotiated period for being away, as a result leaving co-workers with an increased amount of work and 
jeopardizing the safety of the service provided. (Source: 18/2018. számú munkaügyi elvi határozat) In this 
case, the Curia took into consideration that the employee was hours late, without giving reason for his 
absence, misinformed his superior, and it also considered the consequences of the behaviour. 
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555. Conclusions drawn from the national regulations. In France a certain 
tolerance towards the personal use of the Internet can be observed, as a complete ban 
seems to be incompatible with the principle of proportionality. On the other hand, in 
Hungary, the employer’s right to regulate and even prohibit personal use seems to be more 
prevailing, as the legality of a complete ban was not questioned especially due to the 
amendment of the HLC, but it was not questioned either by the majority of the doctrine, by 
the Data Protection Commissioner or the NAIH. As SNSs are Internet based platforms, 
these provisions should concern them as well. A common characteristic between the two 
countries is that according to the case law (much more abundant in France), the gravity of 
the employee’s breach of obligation is linked to the circumstances of the case. In such 
cases, even if the employee uses SNSs for personal reasons despite the ban of the 
employer, a dismissal or some other sanction might easily be considered disproportionate 
if the conduct lacks the abusive character. 
556. As a result, the key question to be answered is: when will the use be 
considered abusive or excessive? No universal solution can be provided to this question; 
however, it was determined what the circumstances that are usually taken into 
consideration are. The most decisive factor was the number of connections (Has the 
employee accessed SNSs once? Occasionally? Monthly? Weekly? Daily?) and the length 
of time spent on these sites (1 hour per day? 1 hour per week? 5 hours per day?). Then, as 
secondary criteria, courts also took into consideration other circumstances which could 
influence the decision: the content accessed (Does it pose a threat to the security of the 
network? Is it compromising?), or the eventual effects on the work of the employee (Was 
the employee distracted and committed mistakes as result of the social media use?). Then, 
if in consideration of the above criteria the use is not regarded to be excessive, the 
dismissal is not founded – even in cases when the internal regulation completely forbids 
the personal use. 
557. However, one important observation must be made in the light of the 
employees’ possibility to use work equipment for private purposes to a non-abusive extent, 
even if the employer had prohibited such use: in relation to social media, these 
observations do not lead to the existence of an explicit right to use social media during 
working hours. Although certain authors came to the conclusion that employees have the 
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right to use social media during working hours,1619 it is more appropriate to interpret these 
provisions as aiming to ensure certain kind of personal communication (and not being 
completely cut off from the outside world and being able, for example, to make an urgent 
personal call or e-mail), but not necessarily communication through social media.1620 In 
this context, employees’ right to privacy means that even at the workplace they do not 
cease to be human beings, and they can establish relationships with others. Therefore, the 
employer can decide to completely ban the use of SNS during working hours as long as 
other alternatives of communication (e.g. telephone, e-mail) are provided. 
Section 2. New challenges brought by social network sites 
The analysis so far was based on the regulation of Internet and e-mail use. However, 
SNSs present certain characteristics that are specific to them, compared to the traditional 
monitoring of e-mail and the Internet – which must be addressed in order to assess whether 
existing rules adequately regulate the matter or adjustments are needed. Besides the most 
traditional situation addressed in Section 1 (employees connecting to SNSs from the 
employer’s equipment, during working hours), SNSs add certain other criteria to the 
discussion that must be examined. §1 will analyse these characteristics, while §2 will 
enumerate that in the light of these challenges, how SNS use during working hours should 
be regulated. 
§1. Issues specific to SNSs 
In contrast to regulating the “default situation” – covering scenarios when the 
employee accesses SNSs from the work computer provided by the employer, during 
working hours, with the employer’s power to restrict SNS use – SNSs have certain 
characteristics that must be examined. Notably, SNSs are not only accessed from work 
computers, but due to the proliferation of mobile devices (such as smartphones, tablets or 
smart watches), employees can consult these sites from their own devices. So, first, it must 
be addressed whether it constitutes a substantial difference if the employee does not use the 
employer’s equipment, but his/her device to access SNSs? Second, it will be examined 
 
1619 For example, Blandine Allix interpreted the relevant provision of the FLC, the observations of the CNIL 
and the Nikon decision as giving the right to the employee to consult his/her Facebook account during 
working hours even if the employer prohibited such a use. Source: Allix, B. (2014) ‘L’employeur, le salarié 
et Facebook’, Feuillet Rapide Social F Lefebvre. 
1620 Baugard, D. (2015) ‘L’usage par les salariés des réseaux sociaux’, in Ndior, V. (ed.) Droit et réseaux 
sociaux. Issy-les-Moulineaux: Lextenso (Collection LEJEP), p. 77-78. 
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whether the time of consulting SNSs has importance: namely, the case of employees 
accessing these sites during work pauses will be addressed. Then, it will be highlighted 
how SNSs can become a means to reveal conducts breaching the employee’s obligation to 
work. 
(A) Using the employee’s device 
558. Employees’ or employer’s device? It is necessary to examine whether there 
is a difference if the employer aims to ban the use of SNSs during working hours from the 
employees’ own device? A challenge brought by technological development is that SNSs 
can be used not only on computers, but also on mobile devices such as smartphones, 
tablets or even smartwatches. These days more and more people have their own 
smartphones and other devices, which they take with themselves everywhere – to the 
workplace, too. It is also not uncommon that individuals have their own mobile Internet 
subscription, so the blocking of SNSs (e.g. through not providing Wi-Fi or blocking the 
access to SNSs) by the employer is not an option in these cases, as employees can access 
these sites from their own devices. Although the employer has the right to regulate and 
monitor the use of SNSs on his/her computer, it is necessary to examine whether the 
scenario will be different when the device constitutes the property of the employee. 
559. Delimitation from BYOD. First, in the case of BYOD, employees bring 
their own devices with the purpose of carrying out their jobs.1621 In the case of BYOD, the 
employer and the employee jointly agree that instead of the employer providing the 
necessary working conditions as required by labour law, the employee’s own device will 
be used for it. In such a case, it is obvious that personal use cannot be completely 
prohibited, and also during the monitoring the employer must pay increased attention to the 
employee’s right to privacy and right to data protection.1622  
560. Employee’s device. From the phenomenon of BYOD it must be 
differentiated when the employee uses his/her personal device for personal reasons – still 
with possible professional consequences. It was already established that in the case of the 
employer providing the device, he/she has the right to ban personal use and to monitor 
compliance with the regulation – the detailed rules relating to monitoring will be examined 
 
1621 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249, p. 16. 
1622 The HLC explicitly regulates this issue and states in Subsection (5) of Section 11/A that if the parties 
agreed that the employee is going to use his/her own equipment for work, the employer can only inspect 
information relating to the employment relationship. 
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in Chapter 2. However, if the employee uses his/her own device to access SNSs during 
working hours, these rules will be slightly different, especially in the field of monitoring 
compliance. 
Despite the employee being the owner of the device, the employer can still ban the 
personal use, as irrespective of who owns the device,1623 surfing on SNSs during working 
hours breaches the employee’s obligation to work and to be at the disposal of the 
employer.1624 Therefore, as such personal use still comes at the expense of working hours, 
it can be sanctioned.1625 However, their monitoring will be possible to a lesser extent 
compared to the use of the employer’s devices. 
(B) Work pauses 
561. Work pauses. The possible personal use during work pauses also has a close 
connection with the ownership of the device. When being the owner of the equipment, the 
employer is entitled to define the rules relating to the use of such devices and is even 
entitled to prohibit the employee to access SNSs from this equipment. As in this scenario 
the employer is the owner, this prohibition can be extended to work pauses as well. 
However, the situation might be different when the employee intends to access SNSs 
from his/her own equipment during work pauses. In Hungary, working pauses are not 
considered to be working time:1626 during these periods employees are free from 
performing work or be at the disposal of the employer, making personal use (on their own 
devices) possible.1627 In France, as a main rule, working pauses should not be considered as 
effective working time,1628 meaning that the employee is free to decide how to spend them. 
Also, when calculating time spent with personal activity, the already presented (French) 
cases relating to the personal use of the Internet did not take into consideration lunch 
breaks, implying that personal use during this period is not considered as a breach of 
 
1623 Kun, A. (2013) ‘Közösségi média és munkajog – avagy „online” munkaidőben és azon túl’, Munkaügyi 
Szemle, (3), p. 13. 
1624 Proskauer Rose LLP (2014) Social Media in the Workplace Around the World 3.0. 2013/14 Survey. 
Available at: http://www.proskauer.com/files/uploads/social-media-in-the-workplace-2014.pdf (Accessed: 3 
February 2017). pp. 7-8. 
1625 Ray, J.-E. (2018) Droit du travail: droit vivant. 26th edn. Paris: Wolters Kluwer France. p. 324. 
1626 Subsection (3) of Section 86 of the HLC 
1627 Kártyás, G., Répáczki, R. and Takács, G. (2016) A munkajog digitalizálása. A munkajog 
hozzáalkalmazása a digitális munkakörnyezethez és a változó munkavállalói kompetenciákhoz. Kutatási 
zárótanulmány. Budapest. p. 78. 
1628 Unless during these periods the employee stays at the employer’s disposal and complies with his/her 
guidelines, without being able to freely attend to his/her personal affairs. Article L3121-2 and Article L3121-
1 of the FLC. 
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obligation and that the employee is free to decide how to spend these pauses.1629 This 
means that theoretically, during work pauses the employee should be free to access and use 
social media from his/her device. 
562. However, Attila Kun provided a more nuanced picture of pauses and 
personal use of one’s own equipment. He pointed out that even if the use does not directly 
violate the employee’s obligation to work (e.g. checking Facebook during a pause), the use 
of social media can have an indirect effect on work, by impairing employees’ attention. It 
is one of the employees’ obligation to “appear at the place and time specified by the 
employer, in a condition fit for work.”1630 The employee is fit for work if he/she is well-
rested, is not under the effect of alcohol or drugs and can concentrate on working with all 
his/her senses, in the right physical and mental condition.1631 This condition traditionally 
concerned the consumption of drugs and alcohol and their possible effects on working – 
but in the 21st century the overuse of SNSs or being overexposed to screens constitute 
more recent cases. The mass of ever-changing information on social media might result in 
the fact that the employee receives more information than he/she can process, causing 
fatigue and reducing concentration, having a direct effect on work.1632, 1633 
563. As concerns the break time and the use of social media, it also has to be 
taken into consideration that the employer has the obligation to ensure safe working 
environment, and the employer has to monitor whether workplace safety rules are 
respected.1634 Different regulations1635 aim to ensure the protection of employees in the 
case of work with display screen equipment, requiring the employees to make pauses from 
staring at a screen. Therefore, if an employee works with a computer and spends his/her 
break looking at the screen of his/her smartphone surfing SNSs, the workplace safety 
regulations are infringed, as the employer has to ensure breaks for the employee from 
 
1629 See, for example: CA Nîmes, 2 avril 2013, n° 12/02146 
1630 Emphasis added by the author. Source: item a) of Subsection (1) of Section 52 of the HLC 
1631 Jónás, T. (2015) Mit jelent munkára képes állapotban lenni?, Jogászvilág. Available 
at: https://jogaszvilag.hu/cegvilag/mit-jelent-munkara-kepes-allapotban-lenni/ (Accessed: 7 January 2020). 
1632 Kun, A. (2013) ‘Közösségi média és munkajog – avagy „online” munkaidőben és azon túl’, Munkaügyi 
Szemle, (3), p. 13. 
1633 See the already presented case, in which the Court of Appeal of Nîmes established the connection 
between professional mistakes made by the employee and the excessive personal use of the Internet. Source: 
CA Nîmes, 2 avril 2013, n° 12/02146 
1634 Subsection (4) of Section 51 of the HLC and Article L4121-1 of the FLC 
1635 Article R4542-4 of the FLC and 50/1999. (XI. 3) decree of the Ministry of Health on the minimum health 
and safety requirements for work with display screen 
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staring at a screen.1636 If the employee works on a computer and then uses his/her pause to 
access social media from his/her smartphone, no pause will be ensured, resulting in the 
breach of labour law regulations. 
564. In conclusion, in addition to being able to regulate the personal use of the 
equipment provided by the employer, in theory the employer also has the possibility to 
prohibit such use from the employees’ own devices during working hours (and even during 
work pauses). The reason for this is that regardless of the ownership of the device, the 
employee must respect working hours, and must stay in a condition fit for work, along with 
respecting workplace safety regulations – which might be influenced by the use of SNSs. 
However, in practice, if the (reasonable) personal use does not come at the expense of the 
employee’s ability to work or does not lead to an extensive use of technology, the 
employer might consider allowing personal use on the employee’s device given the 
realities of being an employee in the 21st century. According to my opinion, even if the 
employer decides to adopt a strict, prohibitive policy, in most cases, it should not exclude 
the possibility for the employee to have a glance at social media from his/her own device. 
(C) SNSs as proof of unauthorized absences  
565. SNSs as proof. Besides surfing on SNSs during working hours, SNSs might 
also contribute to revealing other types of activities at the expense of working time: in 
several cases employees on sick leave are caught on social media being a picture of perfect 
health. However, this activity is not directly connected to the main subject of the thesis, but 
rather to the subject of social fraud; as in such a case the use of SNSs itself does not breach 
any employee obligation but rather reveals those breaches inadvertently. Still, due to the 
possible proliferation of such discoveries, this subject must be at least briefly addressed in 
the dissertation. 
566. In those cases the employee’s conduct comes at the expense of working 
hours – similarly to the already discussed scenario, at the workplace during working hours, 
when the employee surfs on Facebook instead of working – but outside the workplace. 
Such cases include employees reporting being sick, but in reality being in perfect health, or 
making false excuses in order to be able to skip work (e.g. funeral of a relative, etc.). Such 
 
1636 Németh, J. (2013) ‘Internet és közösségi háló mint munkaeszköz’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (1), p. 40. 
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behaviour existed before SNSs as well, however, due to these platforms, their 
discoverability have considerably changed, as SNSs sometimes can expose these conducts. 
Even before SNSs, it was possible to reveal that the employee was on vacation in 
spite of claiming to be on sick leave; SNS made it much easier to publish and to access 
such information. However, early examples of self-exposure from the pre-SNS era also 
exist: see, for example, the case of a French employee who – while being on sick leave – 
went abroad for vacation and sent a postcard to his employer from Yugoslavia. As a result 
of his act, he was dismissed, but the Court of Cassation stated that the dismissal was not 
justified, as the employee was in a period of suspension of his employment contract, thus 
the charges against him did not constitute a breach of the obligations under the 
employment contract as the employee had not committed an act of disloyalty.1637 
567. However, SNSs made a change in this field, and can highly contribute to 
revealing conducts breaching working hours, which is demonstrated by the growing 
number of cases arising. For example, see the case of a French employee who posted to an 
SNS when returning from sick leave: “after two weeks and three days of holiday it’s going 
to be very hard…”, suggesting that instead of being sick, he went on a holiday. However, 
the court found that as the employee could provide medical documentation for the 
concerned period, the absence was medically justified, therefore his act could not 
constitute a misconduct.1638, 1639  
 
1637 Cour de cassation du 16 juin 1998, n° 96-41558 
1638 CA Amiens, 21 mai 2013, n° 12/01638 
1639 Such cases are not only rising in France or in Hungary:  
Or see, for example, the case of Kevin Colvin, who was an intern at Anglo Irish Bank’ s North American arm 
and told his manager that he had to be absent from work because of a family emergency. However, photos of 
him posted to Facebook revealed to his supervisors that instead of a family emergency, he attended a 
Halloween party, dressed as a fairy. He was dismissed due to his action. Source: Funk, T. (2011) Social 
Media Playbook for Business. Reaching Your Online Community with Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, and 
More. Santa Barbara, Denver, Oxford: Praeger, p. 176 
In the case Gill v SAS Ground Services UK Limited Mrs. Gill worked as a customer services representative 
for SAS Ground Services, while in her free time she acted and modelled, and in relation to these activities 
possessed a Facebook account. She went on sick leave for reasons related to her health, but her Facebook 
entries and YouTube videos revealed that during this period she attended the London fashion week, where 
she auditioned 300 models and choreographed a fashion show. She was dismissed for gross misconduct. The 
tribunal held that this evidence was sufficient to state the misconduct. Source: In the employment tribunals: 
August 2010. Facebook entry and YouTube video led to amateur model’s dismissal (2010) XpertHR. 
Available at: https://www.xperthr.co.uk/law-reports/in-the-employment-tribunals-august-
2010/104153/#gill (Accessed: 20 September 2018). 
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568. Except for very special cases,1640 it is not the use of SNS itself that breaches 
the employees’ obligation in such a case; instead, social media serves as a tool revealing 
the breach of obligation. In such a scenario, the employee violates his/her obligation to 
work and to be at disposal, as exemption from these obligations is only possible under 
determined circumstances. Therefore, deceiving the employer through such conduct can 
even constitute the basis for dismissal.1641 However, when using such posts for decision-
making, attention should be paid to the enforcement of the data quality principles1642 
because information obtained from social media is often not reliable,1643 as it was already 
presented in relation to hiring. 
§2. Additional factors to be considered 
It was seen that from a legal point of view, the employer is entitled to decide how to 
regulate the personal use of SNSs: it is up to him/her to decide whether personal use is 
allowed or not and if yes, to what extent. However, in addition to this legal background, 
additional, non-legal arguments should also be considered when deciding whether to adopt 
a permissive or a more prohibitive regulation. 
569. Factors to consider. First of all, when deciding in relation to personal use, 
what should be taken into consideration is the exact job that the employee performs, as 
depending on the exact work tasks, the possibility of a permissive regulation might be 
automatically excluded. In jobs where constant attention is required (for example, a doctor 
performing an operation, a worker at a production line or a bus driver, etc.) using SNSs 
during work is not optional. The employer has the freedom of deciding what regulation to 
adopt mostly in the cases of employees performing clerical work. 
570. Advantages of banning personal use. As it was demonstrated by the 
examined case law, employees can be creative when abusing their “rights” and can spend a 
considerable amount of time on these platforms. This is contrary to the employer’s 
 
1640 Except for very special cases. See, for example, the case of a Swiss woman who said to her employer that 
she was sick, complaining to have migraine and that she needed to rest in a dark room without using any 
computer: then her colleagues reported her seen active on Facebook and changing her status. Source: Rácz, I. 
(2017) A közösségi média és a munkajog kereszttüzében. Available at: http://arsboni.hu/kozossegi-media-es-
munkajog-kereszttuzeben/ (Accessed: 27 February 2018). 
1641 Horváth, L. and Gelányi, A. (2011) ‘Lájkolni vagy nem lájkolni? A közösségi oldalak használatának 
munkajogi kérdései’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (2), p. 61. 
1642 NAIH/2016/4386/2/V.  
1643 For example, it is possible that the employee on sick leave uploads a holiday picture to Facebook – but 
taken months before. 
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legitimate interests, as he/she is lawfully entitled to expect employees to spend their 
working hours working. Checking SNSs during working hours is realised at the expense of 
working hours. Also, it can contribute to decreasing productivity, through fragmenting the 
attention of the employee, who might as a result commit professional mistakes. Also, as it 
was referred to, excessive use of such devices can have consequences on the health of the 
employees, which can result in them leaving on sick leave. Such use can also endanger 
network security, entails the risk of receiving viruses and also contributes to the 
deterioration of the device. 
The negative effects associated with the extensive use of technology are 
acknowledged by a growing number of individuals and organizations, encouraging 
initiatives such as organizing digital detoxes at workplaces. Instead of simply prohibiting 
SNS use, the employer can actively encourage employees to spend time away from screens 
by organizing a digital detox, which might turn out to be beneficial for both parties.1644 
571. Disadvantages of banning personal use. In spite of being free to decide 
whether employees can use social media at the workplace or not, it should be taken into 
account that in today’s information society it might be unrealistic to completely ban its 
personal use. Today – whether we accept it or not – it has become a reality that individuals, 
especially younger generations,1645 spend a considerable amount of time on SNSs and they 
would not like to be completely cut off from these sites during working hours. It has even 
become an expectation from employees not to be completely cut off from these platforms 
while being at work – and a strict prohibitive regulation can even deter young 
employees.1646 Checking these profiles occasionally for 5-10 minutes would not 
necessarily harm the employer, instead, it can even contribute to productivity.1647 Also, a 
 
1644 Such measures might include tech-free meetings, communicating to employees the importance of regular 
breaks, organizing screen-free activities (e.g. yoga class) setting up of a buddy system, etc. Source: May, T. 
(2018) 6 Ways to Introduce A Digital Detox to Your Employees (and Why it Could Boost Productivity), HR 
Daily Advisor. Available at: https://hrdailyadvisor.blr.com/2018/07/24/6-ways-introduce-digital-detox-
employees-boost-productivity/ (Accessed: 8 January 2020). 
1645 As Jean-Emmanuel Ray put it neatly, for young people born with the Internet, “Not being able to be 
connected is like working in an office without a window.” Source: Ray, J.-E. (2009) ‘Actualité des TIC (II). 
Rapports collectifs de travail’, Droit social, 1, p. 23. 
1646 Sanders, A. K. (2013) ‘Obscenity, Sexting, and Cyberbullying’, in Stewart, D. R. (ed.) Social Media and 
the Law. A Guidebook for Communication Students and professionals. New York, London: Routledge, p. 
170. 
1647 Long, M. C. (2018) How Social Media Actually Boosts Efficiency in an Office Environment, Adweek. 
Available at: https://www.adweek.com/digital/how-social-media-actually-boosts-efficiency-in-an-office-
environment/(Accessed: 27 July 2019).; Bizzi, L. (2018) Employees Who Use Social Media for Work Are 
More Engaged — but Also More Likely to Leave Their Jobs, Harvard Business Review. Available 
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more permissive regulation can promote trust between the parties, and therefore contribute 
to a better work environment 
572. Besides employees’ expectation, it might also be taken into consideration 
that the boundaries between work and private life are more and more blurred. As 
employees can receive a work-related e-mail during the weekend or can finish a task (from 
their own computer) at home in the evening, they might also wish to check their social 
media profiles during working hours, or just see on the newsfeed what happened to their 
contacts.1648 Employees might even consider these “Internet pauses” as a reward in 
exchange for the stress that they are subject to or in exchange for the overtime, when work 
invaded their personal lives.1649 Today it seems unreasonable to completely cut off 
employees from social media during working hours. 
573. The technical feasibility of a ban might also pose certain issues. Since a 
myriad of these platforms exists, the employer would probably be able to block only the 
most widely used ones (e.g. Facebook or Instagram), but not all of them – giving 
employees the possibility to bypass the ban and access sites that were not blocked. Also, a 
strict regulation might only urge employees to use their own devices to check SNSs – 
making it more difficult for the employer to monitor it.1650 
574. Conclusion of Chapter 1. In conclusion, it can be stated that primary 
expectation towards the employee is to work at the workplace, and employers both in 
Hungary and in France have extensive powers to define the extent of the personal use of 
the employer’s equipment. However, completely banning the personal use of the 
equipment might raise questions related to privacy as the right to privacy comprises the 
right to establish relationships with others – which is often done through different tools of 
ICT, such as SNSs. 
In France, regulation seems to be more permissive, as the majority of scholars state 
that a complete ban would be disproportionate: the right to privacy requires that the 
employee has certain ways of establishing relationships with others, completely forbidding 
 
at: https://hbr.org/2018/05/employees-who-use-social-media-for-work-are-more-engaged-but-also-more-
likely-to-leave-their-jobs (Accessed: 27 July 2019). 
1648 Kajtár, E. (2015) ‘Till Facebook Do Us Part? Social Networking Sites and the Employment 
Relationship’, Acta Juridica Hungarica, 56(4), p. 269. 
1649 Denier, J.-L. (2003) ‘L’utilisation privative des NTIC d’entreprise’, Les cahiers du DRH, (89), p. 32. 
1650 Krischer Goodman, C. (2011) Social Networks Test Companies’ Boundaries, The Miami Herald. 
Available at: http://www.pordesresidential.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/1-19-2011-miami-herald-
biz.pdf (Accessed: 10 March 2017). 
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every possibility for personal communication is not allowed. Meanwhile in Hungary, 
according to the major opinion, legally it seems possible that the employer completely bans 
the personal use of the employer’s equipment, even though several scholars have expressed 
their opinion – according to my view, correctly – according to which a complete ban would 
be unrealistic. 
575. It is also worth noting that even in cases when the employee uses the 
Internet/e-mails/SNSs for personal purposes despite the explicit ban imposed by the 
employer, the use is tolerated by courts if it stays reasonable and is not abusive. What is 
considered to be reasonable use depends on the exact circumstances: (French) courts 
usually took into consideration the time spent on these sites, the frequency of visiting them, 
their nature, whether they adversely affected the employee’s work performance. In relation 
to SNSs it means that an employee cannot be dismissed if he/she uses Facebook for 5 
minutes, even if personal use is contrary to the employer’s policy. 
576. In addition to the legal considerations, a complete ban faces technical 
difficulties due to the high number of SNSs and to the growing number of employees 
owning portable electronic devices. It would also be unrealistic in the 21st century. For all 
the above reasons, it might be more expedient for the employer to tolerate and allow 
personal use to a reasonable extent, under specific conditions set by him/her, tailored to the 
characteristics of the workplace. It is crucial that the employer clearly informs employees 
about the regulation that he/she chooses to apply and about the exact limits of what is 
considered to be reasonable personal use by him/her. 
577. The employer has the right to decide whether to allow personal use (and to 
what extent) or whether it is prohibited. When making and implementing this decision, 
first, the employer should decide how he/she would like to regulate the personal use of 
SNSs. In the light of the above, (in most cases) it is recommended that the employer opts 
for a more permissive regulation, but strictly lays down its condition in order to avoid 
abuses. If personal use is allowed, it is crucial that employees are aware of the exact rules 
of such regulation. Regularly informing and educating employees through meetings or 
trainings might be a good way to inform them about the employer’s expectations,1651 or the 
 
1651 Krischer Goodman, C. (2011) Social Networks Test Companies’ Boundaries, The Miami Herald. 
Available at: http://www.pordesresidential.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/1-19-2011-miami-herald-
biz.pdf (Accessed: 10 March 2017). 
 331 
 
employer can lay down the rules in an internal regulation or in a social media policy.1652 
Rules relating to personal use must be clearly established, so that employees can comply 
with them. Therefore, stating that a reasonable use is allowed is not enough, it is highly 
recommended that the employer sets the exact limits and time periods (e.g. 20 minutes 
daily, or only during pauses, etc.). 
Chapter 2: Employees’ right to data protection: monitoring employee use of 
SNSs during working hours 
578. The second aspect of the subject is that after imposing the rules on the 
personal use of SNSs, how can the employer monitor whether employees comply with the 
regulation? As information relating to the use of the Internet/e-mail is considered to be 
personal data, data protection requirements shall apply to the monitoring of the personal 
use of the Internet/SNSs.1653 When it comes to the monitoring of communication (e-mail or 
instant messaging services), an additional aspect has to be considered, namely that it is not 
solely the employee’s right to privacy/right to data protection which is affected by 
monitoring, but also the sender’s or recipient’s rights.1654 
While regulating the use of work facilities for personal purposes raised more 
privacy-related issues, a data protection approach is more emphatic in the case of 
monitoring compliance with the regulation. After determining that the employee’s right to 
privacy does not cease to exist within the workplace – even in the case of the prohibition of 
the personal use of work facilities –, the determination of the extent of monitoring can be 
better assessed through a data protection approach. The limits and conditions of such 
monitoring can be identified through the application of data protection principles, such as 
transparency, purpose limitation, necessity and proportionality. 
 
1652 See more on them in Chapter 2. 
1653 WP29 (2001) Opinion 8/2001 on the processing of personal data in the employment context. 
5062/01/EN/Final WP 48. p. 13.; Szőke, G. L. et al. (2012) Munkahelyi adatvédelem. Nemzeti jelentés – 
Magyarország. Available 
at: http://pawproject.eu/en/sites/default/files/page/web_national_report_hungary_hu.pdf (Accessed: 21 
October 2016). p. 28., p. 34.; CNIL (2010) Guide pour les employeurs et les salariés. Les guides de la CNIL. 
p. 2. 
1654 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 21. Szőke, G. L. et al. (2012) Munkahelyi adatvédelem. Nemzeti jelentés – 
Magyarország. Available 
at: http://pawproject.eu/en/sites/default/files/page/web_national_report_hungary_hu.pdf (Accessed: 21 
October 2016). p. 28.; Hegedűs, B. (2005) ‘A munkahelyi elektronikus levelezés ellenőrzésének nemzetközi 
gyakorlata’, Infokommunikáció és jog, 2(10), p. 186. 
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Chapter 2 will follow a similar structure as Chapter 1: first, the already elaborated 
rules on Internet and e-mail monitoring will be discussed, and then the specific 
characteristics of SNSs will be taken into consideration in relation to the existing legal 
framework. 
Section 1. Starting point: monitoring of the Internet and e-mail 
579. The right to monitor is inherent to the employment contract: its existence is 
unquestionable, though determining its lawful extent might pose certain questions.1655 
Although the employee is entitled to the right to respect for private life even within the 
workplace, it does not override the employer’s right to access work computers.1656 Again, 
similarly to what was already discussed in Chapter 1, (§1) first, the European framework 
will be examined, (§2) followed by the national regulations. 
§1. Outlook to European law 
When addressing the question of the monitoring of the use of the Internet/e-mails, 
observations are made as regards the extent and the exact rules relating to such monitoring, 
determining how data protection requirements should be respected. First, (a) the WP29’s 
documents and then the (b)ECtHR’s case law will be addressed in detail. 
(A) EU perspective: the WP29’s documents 
580. Overview of the WP29’s documents. Although the principles laid down in 
Opinion 8/20011657 are valid in the case of e-mail and Internet monitoring, it was the 2002 
Working document1658 in which the WP29 has addressed in detail the question of 
monitoring of e-mail and Internet use at the workplace. The Working document also points 
out the importance of the general data protection requirements, and then addresses the 
question of e-mail and Internet monitoring. In its Opinion 2/2017,1659 the WP29 
enumerates the most common data protection problems specific to the employment 
 
1655 Vigneau, C. (2002) ‘Information Technology and Workers’ Privacy: the French Law’, Comparative 
Labor Law & Policy Journal, 23(2), p. 355. 
1656 Contamine, A. (2013) ‘La surveillance du salarié’, Revue Le Lamy de la Concurrence, (37), p. 157. 
1657 WP29 (2001) Opinion 8/2001 on the processing of personal data in the employment context. 
5062/01/EN/Final WP 48. 
1658 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. 
1659 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249 
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context1660 and takes into account the technological development that occurred since the 
adoption of its previous documents, while stating that the conclusions laid down in the 
Working Document still remain valid.1661 Under the item “Processing operations resulting 
from monitoring ICT usage at the workplace”, Opinion 2/2017 expressively deals with e-
mail and Internet monitoring at the workplace. 
581. Prevention rather than detection. The WP29 emphasizes the importance of 
proportionality, transparency (e.g. by adopting policies).1662 The WP29’s general 
standpoint is that instead of monitoring and detection, the emphasis should be placed on 
preventing the misuse of the employer’s equipment.1663 This could be achieved by using 
programs that remind the employee of the misuse (e.g. warning windows, which pop up 
and alert the employee).1664, 1665 This can suffice to prevent the misuse and the employee’s 
visit to the website can be avoided. It follows from the requirement of subsidiarity that 
monitoring might not even be necessary, as the blocking of certain websites – for example, 
SNSs – can prevent employees from personal use.1666 
582. Principle of proportionality and data minimization. According to the 
principle of proportionality and data minimization, the least intrusion possible must be 
made, so it is advisable that the employer avoid automatic and constant monitoring, unless 
it is necessary to ensure the security of the system.1667 When monitoring becomes 
necessary, due to the principle of proportionality, it should be first limited to the 
monitoring of traffic (number of mails sent, types of attachments, etc.), instead of 
 
1660 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe (2018) Handbook on European 
data protection law: 2018 edition. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, p. 332. 
1661 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. p. 12. 
1662 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 14. 
1663 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 4., WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. 
p. 15. 
1664 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 5. 
1665 According to the EDPS, it is more useful to watch the indicators (for example, volume of data 
downloaded) than the visited websites themselves and to take further steps only when there is a strong 
suspicion of misuse. Source: Buttarelli, G. (2009) ‘Do you have a private life at your workplace? Privacy in 
the workplace in EC institutions and bodies’. 31st International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy, 
Madrid, 4-6 November. 
1666 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. p. 15. 
1667 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 17. 
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monitoring the content of the sites visited or the content of the messages sent.1668 Often, 
accessing the name of the sites visited is enough to detect the misuse of the computer (e.g. 
it is enough to know that despite a ban on personal use, the employee accessed the site 
www.facebook.com, it is not necessary to know exactly what content he/she looked for 
there) or, in several cases, a misuse can be detected by accessing traffic data (such as the 
participants and time of the communication) without accessing the content.1669 
583. Monitoring of communication. As concerns the monitoring of 
communication, it poses an additional challenge that two persons’ personal data are 
processed: the recipient’s and the sender’s. The privacy of both parties must be respected: 
in this regard, the respect of the rights of individuals outside the workplace might present a 
challenge.1670 However, in cases when the employee is given an e-mail account for purely 
personal use or is allowed access to a web-mail account, stricter rules apply: the 
monitoring of the content of messages is not legitimate (except for very limited cases – e.g. 
in relation to criminal activities), as the secrecy of correspondence outweighs the 
employer’s legitimate interests in monitoring.1671 
Often, the distinction between professional and personal communication is difficult 
(e.g. in the case when the employee uses his/her professional e-mail for personal purposes). 
However, compared to e-mail monitoring, a significant difference can be observed when it 
comes to SNS use: usually SNSs are used for personal purposes and only in exceptional 
cases for work. Therefore, as a main rule, communication taking place on SNSs is personal 
– and the conditions of monitoring should be more severe. 
584. Principle of transparency. The principle of transparency requires 
employees to be informed regarding workplace monitoring.1672 The WP29 also suggests 
 
1668 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. pp.4-5., p. 17-18. 
1669 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. pp. 17-18. 
1670 In the cases of these individuals the employer should make reasonable efforts to inform them of the 
monitoring taking place if they can be affected by it. A solution to achieving this might be to insert warning 
notices to the outbound messages. Source: WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic 
communications in the workplace. 5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. pp. 17-18. 
1671 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 21. 
1672 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. pp. 14-15. 
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that the employee is informed as soon as misuse of the equipment is detected, in order to 
prevent future misunderstandings.1673 
(B) CoE: the ECtHR’s case law 
585. Cases of Halford v. the UK and Copland v. the UK. Before addressing the 
more recent case law of the ECtHR, the Halford and Copland cases must briefly be 
mentioned, as both of them relate to the monitoring of employees. In the Halford v. the UK 
(1997) case the ECtHR ruled that phone calls made from business premises are covered by 
Article 8 of the ECHR and their interception constitutes an interference with Ms. Halford’s 
right to privacy.1674 The ECtHR emphasized the importance of transparency in relation to 
the contracting states providing clear information in their legal order on the terms and 
conditions of such a (secret) monitoring.1675 In the Halford case it was held that no 
adequate provision in domestic law existed, resulting in the violation of Article 8.1676 
586. In the Copland v. the UK case1677 Ms. Copland’s telephone, e-mail and 
Internet usage was subjected to monitoring, without informing the applicant about it. 
Again, the ECtHR held that such communications are covered by Article 8 of the ECHR 
and that such monitoring is not in accordance with the law, with regard to the lack of 
notification.1678 Transparency is crucial, but Ms. Copland has received no warning that her 
communication would be subject to monitoring,1679 resulting in the violation of Article 
8.1680 
(a) Case of Bărbulescu v. Romania 
587. ECtHR: Bărbulescu v. Romania. The Bărbulescu case defined the 
conditions that must be respected during employee monitoring.1681 Although the ECtHR’s 
Grand Chamber ruled that national authorities did not strike a faire balance between the 
 
1673 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 15. 
1674 ECtHR (1997) Halford v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 20605/92, 25 June, par. 44 and par. 48. 
1675 ECtHR (1997) Halford v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 20605/92, 25 June, par. 49. 
1676 ECtHR (1997) Halford v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 20605/92, 25 June, par. 51. 
1677 ECtHR (2007) Copland v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 62617/00, 3 April 
1678 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe (2018) Handbook on European 
data protection law: 2018 edition. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, p. 332. 
1679 ECtHR (2007) Copland v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 62617/00, 3 April, par. 42. 
1680 ECtHR (2007) Copland v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 62617/00, 3 April, par.44 
1681 Costes, L. (2017) ‘CEDH : surveillance des courriels d’un employé à son insu constitutive d’une 
violation du droit au respect de la vie privée et de la correspondance’, Revue Lamy droit de l’immatériel, 
(140), p. 35. 
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interests at stake and violated Article 8, not ensuring adequate protection of the applicant’s 
right to respect for his private life and correspondence,1682 the existence of the employer’s 
right to monitor remains uncontested. States have a broad margin of appreciation in 
determining the conditions of employee monitoring. However, such a monitoring cannot 
be limitless, proportionality and other safeguards are essential in order to make the 
monitoring lawful.1683 
588. One of the significances of the decision is that the ECtHR provided an 
evaluation grid1684 and, in paragraph 121 of the judgement, elaborated 6 criteria that should 
be taken into account when assessing whether employee monitoring was lawful or not. 
These are: 
- prior information: whether the employee has been notified of the possibility of 
monitoring correspondence and other communications, and of how this monitoring 
is implemented. The information should be provided prior to the processing and 
should be clear, 
- extent of monitoring: what is the extent of the monitoring and the degree of 
intrusion into the employee’s privacy? Distinction should be made between 
monitoring the content of communication or the flow of information. Also, it shall 
be assessed whether the monitoring’s scope was limited in time and space, the 
number of people having access to the results, and whether all communications 
were subject to monitoring or only a part of them, 
- employer’s legitimate interests: whether the employer has legitimate reasons to 
justify the monitoring and the access to their content, 
- less intrusiveness: whether the use of less intrusive methods would have been 
possible instead of accessing the content of communication, 
- consequences for the employee: the consequences of the monitoring and how the 
result of the monitoring will be used by the employer, 
- safeguards: whether the employee was provided adequate safeguards. 
 
1682 ECtHR (2017) Bărbulescu v. Romania, Application no. 61496/08, 5 September, par. 141. 
1683 Gheorghe, M. (2017) ‘Considerations on the conditions under which the employer may monitor their 
employees at the workplace’, Juridical Tribune, 7(2), p. 64. 
1684 Peyronnet, M. (2017) ‘CEDH : la protection réaffirmée de la vie privée du salarié sur internet. CEDH 5 
sept. 2017, Bărbulescu c. Roumanie, req. n° 61496/08.’, Dalloz actualité. 
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589. The case and the decision attracted considerable attention of the media,1685 
and it is an important milestone regarding employee monitoring. As the decisions of the 
ECtHR are binding for the contracting states, this decision has crucial importance with 
regard to the subject of the thesis. Especially two conclusions can be drawn: first, it was 
reinforced that the employee is entitled to the right to privacy: even in cases when he/she 
violates the ban on personal use, monitoring should be subject to strict conditions; and 
second, the ECtHR provided important criteria regarding what aspect shall be particularly 
assessed when it comes to the legitimacy of such monitoring. By this, the ECtHR struck a 
fair balance between employees’ rights and the employer’s legitimate interests.1686 
Although the adaptation of French law to this decision should not pose problems, as in the 
case law of the Court of Cassation the balance between these two sides is already ensured 
in its decisions,1687 as well as in Hungarian law – 1688 providing the criteria for the 
monitoring represents a significant guidance for both countries. 
(b) Case of Libert v. France 
590. ECtHR: Libert case. In the Libert v. France (2018) case1689 the ECtHR 
confirmed the French regulation by judging that the authorities struck a fair balance 
between the employee’s rights and the employer’s interest.1690 The ECtHR ruled that there 
 
1685 In Hungary, especially after the decision of 2016, news portals were publishing articles entitled “From 
now on your employer can read your e-mails” etc. Source: Kártyás, G. and Kozma-Fecske, I. (2016) 
‘Szerelmes levelek a munkahelyi postafiókban’, HR & Munkajog, 7(3), p. 16. 
1686 Andriantsimbazovina, J. (2017) ‘L’encadrement stricte du contrôle par l’employeur de l’usage de la 
messagerie électronique du salarié ; Note sous Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, grande Chambre, 5 
septembre 2017, Barbulescu c/ Roumanie, numéro 61496/08’, La Gazette du Palais, (41), p. 23. 
1687 Andriantsimbazovina, J. (2017) ‘L’encadrement stricte du contrôle par l’employeur de l’usage de la 
messagerie électronique du salarié ; Note sous Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, grande Chambre, 5 
septembre 2017, Barbulescu c/ Roumanie, numéro 61496/08’, La Gazette du Palais, (41), p. 23.; Ray, J.-E. 
(2018) Droit du travail: droit vivant. 26th edn. Paris: Wolters Kluwer France. 
However, according to Joël Colonna and Virginie Renaux-Personnic, while in the case of personal messages, 
French law is indeed compatible with the decision, it is not necessarily the case when it comes to the 
monitoring of professional mail. Source: Colonna, J. and Renaux-Personnic, V. (2017) ‘Vie privée et 
surveillance des communications du salarié : la position de la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme ; Note 
sous Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, grande Chambre, 5 septembre 2017, arrêt numéro 
61496/08’, La Gazette du Palais, (43), p. 45. 
1688 Rózsavölgyi, B. (2018) ‘Mikor lehet jogszerű a munkáltató ellenőrzése? – az Emberi Jogok Európai 
Bírósága Nagykamarája Bărbulescu kontra Románia ügyben hozott ítéletének iránymutatásai’, Munkajog, 
2(1), p. 48. 
1689 ECtHR (2018) Libert v. France, Application no. 588/13, 22 February 
1690 Loiseau, G. (2018) ‘La CEDH valide la jurisprudence de la Chambre sociale’, La Semaine Juridique 
Social, (12), p. 11. [Page number referring to the online version of the article downloaded from: 
https://www.lexis360.fr/Document/vie_privee_du_salarie_la_cedh_valide_la_jurisprudence_de_la_chambre_
sociale_/zyiP_3vLY_y5rVWLGA3TgdU3HoxJt_utRta5bm5vCvQ1?data=c0luZGV4PTEmckNvdW50PTgw
MiY=&rndNum=1282688306&tsid=search6_ (Accessed: 15 August 2019)] 
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was no violation of Article 8, as the authorities acted within the margin of appreciation 
provided to them. The ECtHR noted that a balance had to be found between the 
employee’s right to respect for private life and the employer’s right to ensure that 
employees use the equipment provided by him/her for executing their work in compliance 
with their contractual obligations and applicable regulation.1691 
591. The French courts applied the already elaborated rules in national 
jurisprudence, according to which employees’ files stored on equipment provided by the 
employer are presumed to be of professional nature, allowing the employer to access them 
– unless the employee explicitly marks them as personal.1692 The opening of personal files 
was only permitted in the case of a risk or a particular event, in the presence of the 
employee or if he/she has been properly notified of it.1693 
As soon as a computer is likely to be used for personal purposes, the monitoring of 
files potentially relating to the private life of the employee constitutes an interference in 
his/her private life, therefore, it must comply with the requirements making such an 
interference legitimate.1694 The ECtHR held that as French law described precisely in 
which circumstances and in which conditions such a measure was permissible, it complied 
with the requirements of Article 8, as it was in accordance with the law, pursued a 
legitimate aim in a democratic society.1695 The ECtHR was of the opinion that such a 
measure aimed to guarantee the rights of a third party, the employer, recognizing his/her 
legitimate interest in ensuring that employees use computer equipment that the employer 
provided them for work to execute their tasks, in accordance with their contractual 
obligations and with applicable regulation.1696 These measures were accompanied by 
adequate safeguards guaranteeing the respect of employees’ rights, as the opening of 
personal files was only permitted in limited circumstances – both prescribed by regulation 
 
1691 ECtHR (2018) Libert v. France, Application no. 588/13, 22 February, par. 46.  
1692 ECtHR (2018) Libert v. France, Application no. 588/13, 22 February par. 44. 
1693 ECtHR (2018) Libert v. France, Application no. 588/13, 22 February par. 44. 
1694 Marchadier, F. (2018) ‘La protection des données informatiques stockées sur l’ordinateur professionnel 
du salarié à titre du droit au respect de la vie privée’, JCP G Semaine Juridique (édition générale), (15), p. 7. 
[Page number referring to the online version of the article downloaded from: 
https://www.lexis360.fr/Document/droit_au_respect_de_la_vie_privee_la_protection_des_donnees_informati
ques_stockees_sur/vaS14U6Iwukx2jDaMX_gGIvPZpQXQbKfRC6B4fi9GSc1?data=c0luZGV4PTEmckNv
dW50PTEwOSY=&rndNum=1921247278&tsid=search7_ (Accessed: 15 August 2019)] 
1695 Nasom-Tissandier, H. (2018) ‘L’importance de la charte informatique dans la justification de mesures de 
surveillance des salariés’, Jurisprudence sociale Lamy, (451), p. 13. 
1696 ECtHR (2018) Libert v. France, Application no. 588/13, 22 February par. 46. 
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and through the application of the courts.1697 Therefore, the way in which courts addressed 
the case was in accordance with Article 8.1698 
592. The conclusion that can be drawn from the ECtHR’s relevant case law is 
that the employer is indeed entitled to monitor employees. However, such a monitoring 
cannot be limitless; it must respect employees’ rights.1699 It must meet the criteria such as 
being necessary, set by legal regulations, and the procedure must be transparent. With 
regard to SNSs, it means that the employer is entitled to monitor their use, however, only 
to a necessary extent, in order to achieve a legitimate purpose and only through giving 
detailed information to the employee. The scope of these criteria is further examined in 
national regulations. 
§2. Regulation at the national level: France and Hungary 
593. After examining what the “European norms” relating to monitoring are, it 
will be examined how France and Hungary regulate the question of monitoring SNS use at 
the workplace during working hours. The above-mentioned WP29 documents regulate the 
most important rules regarding the monitoring of employees’ Internet use, while the 
relevant ECtHR case law provided the most important principles. However, these general 
requirements and principles must be assessed in a more detailed way – which was achieved 
at the national level. 
First, it will be presented how France and Hungary decided to guarantee employees’ 
right to data protection, and then, how the data protection principles are enforced. As the 
general protection of employees’ rights has already been presented (principle of necessity, 
proportionality, transparency, etc.), here, focus will be put explicitly on the enforcement of 
these principles in the case of Internet and e-mail monitoring. 
(A) The outlines of regulation 
594. France. The FLC contains no direct provision in relation to the electronic 
monitoring of employees or their communication or Internet use. As it was already 
 
1697 Sipka, P. and Zaccaria, M. L. (2018) ‘A munkáltató ellenőrzési joga a munkavállaló munkahelyi 
számítógépén tárolt magánadatai fölött’, Munkajog, 2(2), p. 46. 
1698 ECtHR (2018) Libert v. France, Application no. 588/13, 22 February, par. 53. Also see: Loiseau, G. 
(2018) ‘La CEDH valide la jurisprudence de la Chambre sociale’, La Semaine Juridique Social, (12), pp. 30–
37. 
1699 Sipka, P. and Zaccaria, M. L. (2018) ‘A munkáltató ellenőrzési joga a munkavállaló munkahelyi 
számítógépén tárolt magánadatai fölött’, Munkajog, 2(2), p. 47. 
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addressed, in France, the Nikon decision laid down the principle that the employee has the 
right to respect for private life even while being at the workplace.1700 This protection was 
aimed at communication marked as personal,1701 resulting in a distinction between personal 
and professional communication.1702 However, this right is not without limits, the 
employer, as the person responsible for the functioning of the workplace, has the right to 
monitor employees.1703 In the workplace the employee is expected to work for his/her 
employer: therefore, the employer can access communication conducted at work, unless it 
is explicitly marked as personal.1704 In order to determine the nature of the communication, 
a presumption was established, according to which unless explicitly marked as personal, 
the communication is presumed to have a professional nature.1705 Then courts provided 
more guidance in relation to the application of this presumption. 
595. Jurisprudence in France. Employers are entitled to monitor employees’ 
activities during working hours, only their secret monitoring is prohibited.1706 Following 
from the rights and obligations of the parties, the employee’s activity performed on the 
employer’s equipment is presumed to have a professional character,1707 both e-mails1708 
and Internet1709 connections. E-mails can be opened without the presence of the employee, 
and Internet connections can be consulted. The exception is when the e-mail message is 
clearly marked as personal.1710 The employee can identify e-mail as personal, for example, 
by placing a “warning” into the subject of the message or by creating a separate, personal 
folder within the account. Correctly identifying personal mails is crucial for the employee, 
as stricter rules apply to them: the Court of Cassation stated that “[…] unless there is a risk 
or a particular event, the employer may only open messages stored on the hard drive of the 
 
1700 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 2 octobre 2001, n° 99-42.942 
1701 Ray, J.-E. and Bouchet, J.-P. (2010) ‘Vie professionnelle, vie personnelle et technologies d’information 
et de communication’, Droit social, (1), p. 47. 
1702 Kocher, M. (2013) ‘La protection des données des salariés : que reste-t-il de l’arrêt Nikon ?’, Legicom, 
(1), p. 131. 
1703 Michel, S. (2018) ‘TIC et protection de la vie privée du salarié’, Bulletin Joly Travail, (2), p. 1. [Page 
number referring to the online version of the article downloaded from: https://www-lextenso-fr.bcujas-
ezp.univ-paris1.fr/bulletin-joly-
travail/BJT110k3?em=TIC%20et%20protection%20de%20la%20vie%20priv%C3%A9e%20du%20salari%
C3%A9 (Accessed: 15 August 2019)] 
1704 Ray, J.-E. (2007) ‘Actualités des TIC’, Droit social, (9–10), p. 957. 
1705 Kocher, M. (2013) ‘La protection des données des salariés : que reste-t-il de l’arrêt Nikon ?’, Legicom, 
(1), p. 131. 
1706 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, du 14 mars 2000, n° 98-42.090 
1707 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale,26 févr. 2013, n° 11-27372 
1708 Cour de cassation, civile, chambre sociale, 16 mai 2013, n° 12-11.866 
1709 Cour de cassation, civile, chambre sociale, 9 février 2010, n° 08-45.253 
1710 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 11 juillet 2012, n˚ 11-22.972; Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 15 
décembre 2010, N° 08-42486; Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 16 mai 2013, N° 12-11866 
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computer identified as personal by the employee in the presence of the employee or if 
he/she has been properly notified of it [.]”1711 This requirement applies in the case of 
accessing the employee’s SNS account as well: according to different courts,1712 the 
employer can get to know the content of the employee’s Facebook account only in the 
presence of the employee – otherwise this proof will be considered unfair. 
Internet connections from the work computer during working hours are presumed to 
be of professional nature – without the possibility to identify them as personal –, so the 
employer can look into them for the purpose of identifying them, without the presence of 
the employee.1713 Therefore the employee does not have the opportunity to mark the 
connection to Facebook as personal – it will automatically be presumed professional. 
596. Standpoint of the CNIL. The CNIL also emphasized that employers are 
indeed entitled to limit and regulate how employees can use work devices and are entitled 
to monitor such a use,1714 through, for example, detecting viruses, filtering unauthorized 
sites, prohibiting downloading, monitoring the size of messages sent/received, etc.1715 It 
also confirmed that by default employees’ activities conducted on the employer’s 
equipment are presumed to be professional activity.1716 If messages are marked as personal 
(for example, in the subject of the message or registering the message in a specific folder), 
they are going to be protected by the secrecy of correspondence.1717 However, Internet 
connections and visited pages do not receive this protection, even if marked as favourites 
or added to certain bookmarks.1718 The CNIL also expressed more detailed 
recommendation in relation to the enforcement of the different data protection principles, 
such as transparency or necessity – which is going to be addressed in part (B). 
597. Existing regulation in Hungary. The amendment of the HLC in 2019 made 
a significant change in the electronic monitoring of employees. While prior to the 
 
1711 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 17 juin 2009, n° 08-40.274 
1712 CA Rouen, Chambre sociale, 10 février 2015, n° 14/03335; CA Caen, 1re chambre sociale, 27 janvier 
2017, n° 15/04417; CA Caen, 1re chambre sociale, 27 janvier 2017, n° 15/04402 
1713 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 9 juillet 2008, N° 06-45800; Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 9 
février 2010, N° 08-45253 
1714 CNIL (2018) Les outils informatiques au travail. Fiches pratiques: Travail & données personnelles. 
1715 CNIL (2010) Guide pour les employeurs et les salariés. Les guides de la CNIL, p. 18,; Bouchet, H. 
(2004) La cybersurveillance sur les lieux de travail. Paris, la Documentation française: Commission 
nationale de l’informatique et des libertés, p. 23. 
1716 CNIL (2010) Guide pour les employeurs et les salariés. Les guides de la CNIL, p. 19. 
1717 Bouchet, H. (2004) La cybersurveillance sur les lieux de travail. Paris, la Documentation française: 
Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés, p. 25. 
1718 CNIL (2018) Les outils informatiques au travail. Fiches pratiques: Travail & données personnelles. 
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amendment none of the provisions aimed explicitly at electronic monitoring, now Section 
11/A contains direct provisions on the monitoring of work equipment. Besides declaring 
that unless agreed otherwise, work equipment can only be used for professional 
purposes,1719 it adds that during monitoring, the employer can only consult data connected 
to the employment relationship.1720 The HLC specifies what is considered to be data 
connected to the employment relationship: data which is necessary to monitor in 
compliance with the established rules relating to the use of work equipment.1721 Therefore, 
the extent of monitoring will be influenced by whether the employer has authorized 
personal use: if personal use is allowed, the employer can only monitor whether the 
conditions of personal use are respected; and if personal use is prohibited, the employer 
can only consult data to an extent allowing him/her to assess whether the data relates to the 
personal life of the employee or to the professional life.1722 
598. Prior to the amendment, the extent of monitoring was also determined 
according to whether the employer has authorized the personal use or not.1723 In contrast to 
French regulation, protection is afforded not only to personal e-mails, but also to the 
authorised personal use of the Internet: if personal use was allowed, than it is not possible 
to monitor the use of the Internet.1724 I share the view of Mariann Arany-Tóth, who adds 
that despite the authorization of personal use, monitoring should be allowed to control 
whether employees comply with the rules imposed on personal use.1725 
599. Concerning e-mail monitoring, a distinction is made between personal and 
professional messages, and outgoing and incoming messages. However, as there is no 
established presumption created in order to establish whether the communication was 
professional or personal, the examination of the messages is conducted on a case-by-case 
basis. Also, in Hungarian regulation more attention is paid to the fact that individuals 
 
1719 Subsection (2) of Section 11/A of the HLC 
1720 Subsection (3) of Section 11/A of the HLC 
1721 Subsection (4) of Section 11/A of the HLC 
1722 T/4479. számú törvényjavaslat az Európai Unió adatvédelmi reformjának végrehajtása érdekében 
szükséges törvénymódosításokról (2019). Előadó: Dr. Trócsányi László igazságügyi miniszter. Budapest, p. 
102. 
1723 Kártyás, G., Répáczki, R. and Takács, G. (2016) A munkajog digitalizálása. A munkajog 
hozzáalkalmazása a digitális munkakörnyezethez és a változó munkavállalói kompetenciákhoz. Kutatási 
zárótanulmány. Budapest, p. 17. 
1724 Bankó, Z. and Szőke, G. L. (2016) Issues of the digital workplace - The situation in Hungary. Pécs: 
JurInfo, p. 65.; Pete, É. (2018) ‘A munkavállaló és a munkáltató személyiségi jogainak védelme a 
munkaviszonyban’, in Mailáth György Tudományos Pályázat 2017. Díjazott dolgozatok. Budapest: Országos 
Bírósági Hivatal, p. 782. See also: Data Protection Commissioner: 570/A/2001, 790/A/2001 
1725 Arany-Tóth, M. (2016) Személyes adatok kezelése a munkaviszonyban. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer. 
p. 111-112. 
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outside the organisation might be concerned by the monitoring, therefore their rights have 
to be respected as well: the extent of monitoring can be wider in the case of professional 
messages and outgoing messages.1726 
600. Practice of the NAIH. It was already referred to that in Hungary in the field 
of employee monitoring, the practice of the Hungarian data protection supervisory 
authority bears special significance, acting as veritable case law.1727 As it was already 
mentioned, the NAIH1728 issued two crucial documents in the field of employee 
monitoring: Recommendation on the basic requirements of electronic monitoring at the 
workplace (2013) and Information notice on the basic requirements on data processing at 
work (2016), among which the second contains detailed rules relating to the monitoring of 
Internet and e-mail use. 
601. In the information notice, first, the NAIH refined this position and stated 
that the employer is entitled to monitor whether employees comply with the internal 
regulation regarding the use of the equipment.1729 Then, it recommended certain best 
practices and drew attention to the data protection requirements that must be respected 
during such a monitoring (e.g. legal ground, necessity, transparency), and provided 
guidance in relation to how exactly the employer can comply with them. These 
requirements and the possible solutions given to them will be further addressed in part (B). 
(B) Data protection principles 
602. IP addresses, e-mail addresses, the websites visited all constitute personal 
data. As a consequence, their monitoring must comply with labour law legislation and data 
protection regulation as well. Both the French and the Hungarian data protection 
supervisory authorities already refined what data protection requirements must be 
respected during the monitoring and provided recommendations to comply with such 
 
1726 Bankó, Z. and Szőke, G. L. (2016) Issues of the digital workplace - The situation in Hungary. Pécs: 
JurInfo, p. 58. 
1727 Balogh, Zs. Gy. et al. (2012) ‘Privacy in the Workplace’, in Essays of Faculty of Law University of Pécs: 
Yearbook of 2012. Pécs: University of Pécs Faculty of Law, pp. 12-13. 
1728 On the case law established by the former Data Protection Commissioner see more in: Bankó, Z. and 
Szőke, G. L. (2016) Issues of the digital workplace - The situation in Hungary. Pécs: JurInfo and Szőke, G. 
L. et al. (2012) Munkahelyi adatvédelem. Nemzeti jelentés – Magyarország. Available 
at: http://pawproject.eu/en/sites/default/files/page/web_national_report_hungary_hu.pdf (Accessed: 21 
October 2016). 
1729 NAIH (2016) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi 
adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről. Budapest, p. 30. 
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requirements. Notably, the principle of transparency and the principle of 
proportionality/necessity must be examined in detail. 
(a) Principle of transparency 
603. Principle of transparency. The general principle of transparency is also 
applicable when it comes to the monitoring of Internet/e-mail/SNS use at work. Regarding 
this principle, there are no differences compared to what was already presented: the 
principle of transparency requires that employees are aware of the processing prior to its 
start, and it is enshrined both at the international level and in French and Hungarian law. 
The covert surveillance of employees’ activity on SNSs during working hours is not 
permitted.1730 
604. In accordance with the principle of transparency, the CNIL emphasized the 
importance of informing employees about monitoring on several occasions.1731 The CNIL 
also drew attention to the growing practice of adopting internal regulations, which can 
indeed be a good way of informing employees, raising awareness, reminding them what 
kind of behaviour can represent a risk for the workplace.1732 The NAIH also encourages 
the adoption of such regulations, as they can constitute an effective way of informing 
employees of their obligations and of the expectations of the employer relating to the 
personal use of workplace equipment, as well as the rules relating to monitoring.1733 
As regards informing employees, it is also said that prevention is more favourable 
than detection. Prior information on the use of SNSs at the workplace has key importance, 
as it would allow employees to be aware of the existing regulation in the workplace and to 
comply with it – which might make it possible to prevent monitoring1734 or misuses.1735 In 
the case of using social media for long periods, pop-up windows, or even applications 
analysing the time spent on the Internet can help employees to realize that they approached 
 
1730 See, for example, the cases ABI 1012/K/2005-3, ABI 1723/P/2008, ABI 800/K/2008, ABI 235/K/2008 
relating to the use of spyware, where the commissioner stated that the use of such a program is not 
compatible with the principle of proportionality and necessity. 
1731 CNIL (2010) Guide pour les employeurs et les salariés. Les guides de la CNIL, p. 18. 
1732 Bouchet, H. (2004) La cybersurveillance sur les lieux de travail. Paris, la Documentation française: 
Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés, p. 11. 
1733 NAIH (2016) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi 
adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről. Budapest, pp. 25-26. 
1734 NAIH (2016) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi 
adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről. Budapest, p. 25. 
1735 Kártyás, G., Répáczki, R. and Takács, G. (2016) A munkajog digitalizálása. A munkajog 
hozzáalkalmazása a digitális munkakörnyezethez és a változó munkavállalói kompetenciákhoz. Kutatási 
zárótanulmány. Budapest, p. 67. 
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or passed the time limit allowed by the employer. Regularly sending out reminders to 
employees regarding the rules on personal use can also be a recommended method.1736 
(b) Principle of proportionality 
605. Proportionality principle. Although the employer has the right to monitor, it 
should not be limitless: it is especially the proportionality principle that limits his/her rights 
during monitoring. 
606. In France, Article L1121-1 of the FLC aims to ensure that employee 
monitoring is proportionate to the aim sought and is not a means to discipline employees 
without any other purpose.1737 As Christiane Féral-Schuhl remarks, in accordance with the 
principle of proportionality, employers should only monitor employees if the employee is 
suspected of abusive use, for example, because of abnormally long connections or an 
unusually huge amount of downloaded files.1738 According to the CNIL, first, monitoring 
should be conducted retrospectively, at a global level (e.g. at the level of the whole 
workplace or a service), therefore the examination of individual connections of a certain 
employee could be avoided.1739 Also, the use of key logger programs, or receiving an 
automatic copy of all messages is to be avoided.1740 
607. In Hungary, the NAIH recommended the adoption of a staggered control 
system, where first looking at the subject and the sender can help to contribute to deciding 
whether the communication was of a professional or a personal nature – without having 
access to the content.1741 It is important that the employer cannot have access to the content 
of personal communication, or the pages visited – even if the employee violated the 
policies relating to personal use.1742, 1743 Having access to such content is allowed only if 
 
1736 NAIH (2016) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi 
adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről. Budapest, p. 26. 
1737 Grynbaum, L., Le Goffic, C. and Morlet-Haïdara, L. (2014) Droit des activités numériques. 1st edn. 
Paris: Dalloz. p. 896. 
1738 Féral-Schuhl, C. (2018) Cyberdroit. Le droit à l’épreuve de lInternet. 7th edn. Paris: Dalloz. p. 415. 
1739 CNIL (2005) Guide pratique pour les employeurs. Les guides de la CNIL. p. 11. 
1740 CNIL (2018) Les outils informatiques au travail. Fiches pratiques: Travail & données personnelles. 
1741 NAIH (2016) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi 
adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről. Budapest, p. 26. 
1742 NAIH (2016) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi 
adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről. Budapest, p. 27. 
1743 By stating that, the NAIH refined the previous practice, according to which the content of such a 
communication was accessible to the employer if he/she obtained the consent of both the sender and the 
recipient. (Source: Szőke, G. L. et al. (2012) Munkahelyi adatvédelem. Nemzeti jelentés – Magyarország. 
Available at: http://pawproject.eu/en/sites/default/files/page/web_national_report_hungary_hu.pdf 
(Accessed: 21 October 2016). p. 30.) As Szőke et. al. noted, inconsistencies could be found in the practice of 
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without that access it is not possible to establish whether the employee has breached the 
regulation related to personal use.1744, 1745 
608. After narrowing down the search to professional messages, the employer 
can process more detailed information; but even in this case proportionality shall be 
respected and – depending on the exact circumstances – searches should be limited (e.g. in 
time, only to messages with an attachment, etc.). The employer should only have access 
after narrowing down the search as much as possible.1746 As there is no presumption in 
Hungarian regulation, as a main rule, the presence of the employee is requested in order to 
avoid the possible confusion of professional and personal messages; the employee can then 
indicate if the message is personal, thus avoiding having access to the content of personal 
messages.1747 However, even though the content of communication is protected, in such a 
case the employee would still have to face the legal consequences of personal use.1748 
In relation to SNSs, this means that as a main rule, SNSs suppose personal use (in 
contrast to other Internet connections), employers should not access the content of these 
pages, as in most cases the purpose sought can be achieved by collecting data on the 
name/address of the sites visited (e.g. www.facebook.com), when they were accessed and 
for how long.1749 
609. Conclusions of Section 1. In conclusion, the employer has the right to 
monitor employees’ use of e-mail and the Internet in order to ascertain whether they have 
 
the Data Protection Commissioner, mostly due to the uncertainties relating to the legal ground of processing. 
(Source: Szőke, G. L. et al. (2012) Munkahelyi adatvédelem. Nemzeti jelentés – Magyarország. Available at: 
http://pawproject.eu/en/sites/default/files/page/web_national_report_hungary_hu.pdf (Accessed: 21 October 
2016). p. 28., p. 30.) However, since the establishment of the NAIH and the change of the legal environment 
in 2011-2012, one of the greatest changes in workplace data protection was the application of the legal 
ground of balancing interests – instead of the previously used consent. (Source: Bankó, Z. and Szőke, G. L. 
(2016) Issues of the digital workplace - The situation in Hungary. Pécs: JurInfo. p. 53.) 
1744 Kártyás, G., Répáczki, R. and Takács, G. (2016) A munkajog digitalizálása. A munkajog 
hozzáalkalmazása a digitális munkakörnyezethez és a változó munkavállalói kompetenciákhoz. Kutatási 
zárótanulmány. Budapest, p. 67. 
1745 Recently, it has also appeared in the practice of the NAIH that according to the principle of fairness, the 
presence of the employee (or a person appointed by the employee) should be ensured, unless the matter is 
urgent or the employee does not work at the employer anymore. However, even in these cases, the (former) 
employee should be informed of the measures taken. Source: NAIH/2019/51/11., p. 19. 
1746 NAIH (2016) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi 
adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről. Budapest, p. 27. 
1747 NAIH (2016) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi 
adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről. Budapest, p. 27. 
1748 Hegedűs, B. (2006) ‘A munkahelyi hagyományos és elektronikus levelezés ellenőrzése’, Munkaügyi 
szemle, 50(6), p. 49. 
1749 NAIH (2016) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi 
adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről. Budapest, p. 31. 
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complied with the rules relating to their use. However, courts (notably the ECtHR and 
national courts), as well as data protection supervisory authorities (WP29, CNIL, NAIH) 
emphasized the importance of the respect of data protection principles along with 
providing recommendations on how to comply with them. This regulation will be basically 
applicable to SNSs, however, the specific characteristics of these services must be taken 
into consideration. 
Section 2. New factors to be considered – highlighted by SNSs 
Section 1 focused on the already existing regulation which is applicable to the 
monitoring of Internet and e-mail use. Although what was said is adequately applicable to 
SNSs as well, SNSs possess certain characteristics that distinguish them from the Internet 
and e-mail. First, these (§1) characteristics will be examined, then (§2) it will be addressed 
how exactly employers should monitor employees’ SNS use in the light of the above-
presented legal regulations, considering the specificities of SNSs. The question that 
Section 2 aims to answer is that in consideration of the challenges brought by SNSs, how 
the employers should monitor the use of SNSs during working hours. 
§1. Specific issues raised by SNSs 
Despite their similarities to the Internet and e-mail, SNSs also have several specific 
characteristics, which raise new questions in relation to the application of the already 
established regulation. When discussing specific issues raised by SNSs, a difference must 
be made between two scenarios: SNS use constituting part of the employee’s job 
description and not. For the purposes of the dissertation it will be presumed that, as a main 
rule, SNS use is not part of the employee’s job, and the case when it is will be treated 
separately. 
610. Main difference in relation to SNSs. When it comes to the monitoring of 
the personal use of SNSs, the main difference that can be observed compared to the 
monitoring of the personal use of the Internet and e-mail is the lack of the possible 
confusion of personal and professional use. In the case of Internet and e-mail monitoring, 
the main privacy/data protection issue lies in the fact that both the Internet and e-mail can 
be used for professional and for personal purposes as well, therefore, the confusion 
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between professional and personal use is possible.1750 In contrast, in the case of SNSs, this 
confusion is not present, as SNSs are usually not used as a tool for work, but uniquely for 
personal purposes. 
611. It means that in the case of surfing SNSs, no special challenges arise, as the 
principle according to which every Internet connection is presumed to have a professional 
nature is clearly laid down in French law. Although these connections do not receive more 
intense protection – as they are presumed to be of professional nature, in contrast to their 
clearly personal nature –, through the effective application of the proportionality principle 
(e.g. consulting the name of the site, instead of the exact content) the employee’s right can 
be protected. In Hungary as well, the application of the proportionality principle ensures 
protection, despite the lack of such presumption. 
612.  However, the use of SNSs as messaging services might seem to be more 
problematic at first sight, especially in French law. In France, protection is afforded to 
personal correspondence when the employee marks the communication as personal. 
However, on instant chat messaging services on SNSs, users do not have appropriate 
means to identify the message as personal (as the field “subject” is missing) – which is a 
key criterion in order to trigger the protection afforded by the secrecy of 
correspondence.1751 In accordance with the existing legal framework, in the lack of 
identifying as such, the communication on SNSs is not presumed to be personal, despite 
the fact that SNSs are not even used for work. 
However, contrary to this established presumption of professional nature, in 2017 the 
Court of Cassation – in the light of the presumption of professional nature – rejected the 
employer’s arguments according to which accessing an employee’s Facebook account by 
obtaining access to the professional cellphone of another employee was acceptable.1752 
Instead, it ruled that regardless of the device used (even if it is the employer’s), SNSs are 
included in the right to respect for the employee’s private life – excluding the application 
 
1750 Féral-Schuhl, C. (2018) Cyberdroit. Le droit à l’épreuve de lInternet. 7th edn. Paris: Dalloz. p. 420. and 
Grynbaum, L., Le Goffic, C. and Morlet-Haïdara, L. (2014) Droit des activités numériques. 1st edn. Paris: 
Dalloz. p. 902.; NAIH (2016) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a 
munkahelyi adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről. Budapest, p. 25. 
1751 In the case of e-mails, it is recommended to identify the message as personal either by storing them in a 
directory entitled “personal” or “private”, or by indicating in the subject field “personal” or “private”. 
(Source: CNIL (2018) Les outils informatiques au travail. Fiches pratiques: Travail & données personnelles.) 
However, that is usually not an option when it comes to SNSs. A solution can be to place identification at the 
beginning of the message in order to appear in the preview of the message.  
1752 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 20 décembre 2017, N° 16-19609  
 349 
 
of the presumption in the case of SNSs. Although I welcome such a solution as it grants 
protection to communication conducted on SNSs, it is unfortunate that no further details 
were provided regarding the background of adopting this solution.1753 
613. All this means that in reality, corresponding through SNSs is more similar to 
the case of using a personal e-mail account. Naturally, as even personal e-mails 
received/sent through professional accounts are protected by the secrecy of 
correspondence, e-mails received/sent through a personal account should receive increased 
protection.1754 Employers cannot monitor e-mails from employees’ personal accounts, they 
are covered by the secrecy of correspondence – and they cannot be used during litigation 
either.1755, 1756 This restriction applies even if the employee accesses the personal account 
from the work computer,1757 however, if e-mails transferred from a personal e-mail account 
are stored on the hard drive of the work computer, they are not presumed to have a 
personal character.1758, 1759 
614. In Hungary, as there is no presumption, the employer should examine on a 
case-by-case basis whether the correspondence was professional or personal. As SNSs a 
priori suppose personal use, establishing that they have a personal nature should not 
constitute a specific problem, as due to the lack of presumption they are not presumed to 
be professional. 
615. Using SNSs as part of the job. Although most job descriptions do not 
include the use of SNSs as part of the job, in certain cases it is conceivable that employees 
might use those for work purposes. One obvious example is the operation of the 
company’s official social media account. In such cases accessing SNSs can be of 
professional nature: giving rise to possibly blurring personal and professional use.  
 
1753 Mayoux, S. (2018) ‘Licéité de la preuve recuillie sur Facebook par l’employeur’, Jurisprudence sociale 
Lamy, (449), p. 25. See more on the case in Title 3. 
1754 Lhernould, J.-P. (2016) ‘Statut des courriels provenant de la messagerie personnelle du 
salarié’, Jurisprudence sociale Lamy, (405), p. 11. 
1755 Cour de cassation, 26 janvier 2016, n° 14-15.360 
1756 Unless exceptional circumstances are present, and safeguards are guaranteed – e.g. involvement of a 
bailiff, research limited to the messages in relation to the litigation. (Cour de cassation, 1ère chambre civile, 
20 septembre 2017, n° 16-13082) The employer has to demonstrate to the judge the existence of a legitimate 
aim, and that a violation was already committed. Source: Griguer, M. (2010) ‘Les réseaux sociaux sous le 
contrôle des DSI’, Cahiers de droit de l’entreprise, (6), p. 63. 
1757 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 7 avril 2016, n° 14-27949 
1758 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 19 juin 2013, N° 12-12138 
1759 Just as in the case of storing personal files on a work computer, the employee should indicate that these 
messages are of personal nature. 
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616. In French law, in such cases, the confusion of personal and professional use 
becomes possible so – just like in the case of “traditional” Internet and e-mail monitoring – 
the rules elaborated to these monitorings shall be applied, which allow the employer to 
consult the sites visited as they are presumed to be of professional nature. A challenge 
involved in the use of the messaging functions of SNSs services is that, due to the lack of 
the field “subject”, it is not possible to indicate in the subject field that personal 
communication takes place. 
In this regard, the situation is similar to that of SMS messages, which are presumed 
to have a professional character, unless identified as personal:1760 however, technically it is 
not feasible to indicate the personal character of these messages, the employer has to 
access the content of the message to be able to know its personal nature.1761 Although this 
solution was proposed for SMSs, chat messages on SNSs have similar characteristics, 
making it possible to apply this method to them: the personal character can be signalled by 
placing identification at the beginning of the message (e.g. “!!!personal message!!!”) in 
order to appear in the preview of the message.1762 
617. In Hungarian law, it is also a problem that messages sent within SNSs 
cannot be easily identified as personal. Therefore, distinguishing professional and personal 
use can be challenging. However, those said in relation to French law can successfully be 
applied to Hungarian law as well: indicating in the preview of the message that it is 
personal can constitute an effective way of separating professional messages from private 
ones. Also, the name of the corresponding party can be revealing1763 and can contribute to 
excluding certain messages. Besides, by ensuring the presence of the employee it can be 
achieved that the employer successfully distinguishes between personal and professional 
messages and does not access personal communication. 
618. Employer’s device vs. employee’s device. It was already established that the 
employer is entitled to monitor the use of work equipment. However, it was already 
presented that the proliferation of mobile devices in everyday life raises specific questions 
 
1760 Cour de cassation, chambre commerciale, financière et économique, 10 février 2015, n° 13-14.779 
1761 Lhernould, J.-P. (2015) ‘Les SMS du salarié à la libre disposition de l’employeur ?’, Jurisprudence 
sociale Lamy, (385), p. 10. 
1762 Adam, P. (2015) ‘SMS, vie privée et portable professionnel : histoire (courte) d’un homme “sans 
territoire”’, Revue droit du travail Dalloz, (3), p. 193. 
1763 For example, Facebook allows giving nicknames to parties – which can constitute a way of showing the 
personal character of a message. 
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when employees use their own devices to access SNSs during working hours. Although 
regulating their use seemed to be possible, their monitoring can pose specific questions.1764  
619. In cases when the device is the employee’s property, the employer is limited 
in monitoring their use; he/she cannot have access to the content/pages visited on these 
devices.1765 However, even if the employee succeeds in escaping from the prying eyes of 
the employer through accessing SNSs from his/her own device, an excessive use of these 
sites would come at the expense of the performance of work tasks,1766 allowing the 
employer to eventually detect the abuse and take the necessary steps. 
Without the possibility to monitor personal devices, the activity of employees 
checking their Facebook can easily remain invisible. However, in certain exceptional cases 
the employer can still find out about such a use. One exception can be when the employee 
posts or likes something during working hours – despite the ban of social media use – and 
the time of the post or like reveals to the employer that the employee has infringed the 
limitation. Another exception can be manifested in the consequences of (abusive) personal 
use: if personal use has negative effects on working (e.g. committing mistakes, missing 
deadlines, etc.), the employer can sanction such behaviour in accordance with the relevant 
labour law regulations.1767 
620. In conclusion, one of the main differences between Internet/e-mail 
monitoring and the monitoring of SNSs is the lack of possible confusion of personal and 
professional use. While the Internet and e-mail can serve both as a tool for work 
(communicating with co-workers, clients, obtaining information) and a tool for amusement 
(e.g. playing online games, booking a holiday, purchasing products online, etc.), SNSs are 
by default used for personal (amusement) purposes in most cases. An exception is notably 
when the use of SNSs is included in the job description, in which case the confusion 
 
1764 Kun, A. (2013) ‘Közösségi média és munkajog – avagy „online” munkaidőben és azon túl’, Munkaügyi 
Szemle, (3), p. 13. 
1765 Proskauer Rose LLP (2014) Social Media in the Workplace Around the World 3.0. 2013/14 Survey. 
Available at: http://www.proskauer.com/files/uploads/social-media-in-the-workplace-2014.pdf (Accessed: 3 
February 2017), p. 3.; Kun, A. (2013) ‘Közösségi média és munkajog – avagy „online” munkaidőben és azon 
túl’, Munkaügyi Szemle, (3), p. 13 and Ray, J.-E. (2018) Droit du travail: droit vivant. 26th edn. Paris: 
Wolters Kluwer France. p. 324.) 
1766 Ray, J.-E. (2018) Droit du travail: droit vivant. 26th edn. Paris: Wolters Kluwer France. p. 324. 
1767 For example, an employee in Wales was dismissed in 2013 for accessing social network sites during 
working hours from his own device. Unfortunately, it was not documented how the employer became aware 
of such use. Source: Rudd, A. (2013) DVLA worker fired for using Facebook on his mobile phone during 
office hours, Mirror. Available at: https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/dvla-worker-fired-using-
facebook-1903697 (Accessed: 25 July 2019). 
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between accessing SNSs as part of the job or for personal reasons is present as well. 
Another difference is that on SNSs the absence of the “subject” field makes it complicated 
to mark the communication as personal. 
§2. Monitoring employees' SNS use 
It was already established on several occasions that the employer is entitled to 
monitor employees. Such a monitoring can include the monitoring of the use of the work 
equipment as well as the employee’s respect of working hours. In Section 1 it was found 
that the employer is free to decide whether the personal use of work equipment is 
authorized or not and is entitled to monitor compliance with the established regulation. The 
following paragraphs contain recommendations regarding how employers should monitor 
whether employees respect the rules set up and what they should take into consideration 
when establishing monitoring. First, (A) it will be discussed what rules should be 
established, then (B) how they should be communicated to employees. 
(A) Rules of employee monitoring 
621. Prevention. As regards enforcing that employees comply with the rules of 
personal SNS use set by the employer, it is recommended that emphasis is put on 
prevention. If employees are aware of the rules (either it is a complete ban or a more 
permissive regulation), the emergence of several issues can be prevented. This can be 
achieved by informing them: raising their awareness through regularly reminding them of 
the rules or organizing trainings can be effective ways to achieve this goal. 
Another way of prevention is to make it impossible for employees to engage in the 
prohibited behaviour. The most obvious means is to ban the access to SNSs. However, 
when opting for such a solution, employers should take the weak points into consideration: 
that it is not possible to prohibit access to all social media and SNS platforms, only to the 
most popular ones (e.g. Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Twitter). Also, such a ban can 
only be put on the employer’s equipment. Employees would still have the possibility to 
access these sites from their own devices. 
622. Setting a reminder. If the employee tries to access a prohibited site despite 
the restrictions imposed on such a use, he/she should be reminded of the rules. For 
example, alerts and pop-up windows should be employed, which can remind the employee 
that he/she wants to access a prohibited page, or in the case of a more permissive 
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regulation that he/she is approaching/exceeded the authorized time limit.1768 Such a 
measure can also contribute to enhancing compliance with the regulation and also to 
preventing misuse through raising employee awareness. 
623. Monitoring SNSs. As a main rule, the employer should not gain access to 
the exact content visited or communication held in either countries with regard to the fact 
that SNSs are used for personal purposes, both in the case of surfing on them or using them 
as a means of communication. In accordance with the data protection principles, instead of 
accessing the content, the employer should settle for having access to the different 
indicators of the use (e.g. time spent on SNSs, or data traffic), as through that information 
he/she is perfectly capable of ascertaining whether personal use has taken place or not, or 
whether it has exceeded the allowed amount.1769 
624. Distinguishing personal and professional use. In cases when the employer 
is in need of determining whether the use was personal or professional, it can be 
recommended to encourage employees who use SNSs as part of their jobs to indicate at the 
beginning of the message if it is personal in order to avoid confusion (e.g. “PERSONAL 
MESSAGE”).1770 The presence of the employee can also contribute to the protection of 
private life and data protection rights.1771 
(B) Social media policies 
625. Social media policies. It is not uncommon for employers to regulate the 
question of SNS use at the workplace in internal social media policies and it is a 
recommended practice by different organizations.1772 Usually, these policies aim to 
regulate behaviour both within and outside the workplace, and also the possible 
 
1768 WP29 (2002) Working document on the surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace. 
5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. p. 5. 
1769 Buttarelli, G. (2009) ‘Do you have a private life at your workplace? Privacy in the workplace in EC 
institutions and bodies’. 31st International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy, Madrid, 4-6 
November. 
1770 Information Commissioner’s Office (2011) The employment practices code. Available 
at: https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1064/the_employment_practices_code.pdf 
(Accessed: 8 October 2018), p. 70. 
1771 French law even requires it: Cour de cassation, civile, chambre sociale, 17 juin 2009, 08-40.274 
1772 See, for example, the survey conducted by Proskauer on social media in the workplace or the ICO’s code 
of practice. Source: Proskauer Rose LLP (2014) Social Media in the Workplace Around the World 3.0. 
2013/14 Survey. Available at: http://www.proskauer.com/files/uploads/social-media-in-the-workplace-
2014.pdf (Accessed: 3 February 2017) p. 23; Information Commissioner’s Office (2011) The employment 
practices code. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1064/the_employment_practices_code.pdf (Accessed: 8 October 2018). p. 66. 
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disciplinary sanctions that can be given in case of breach of the policy.1773 According to 
Teresa Coelho Moreira, the adoption of “rules of good conduct” or a “charter of 
informatics” is the most appropriate way to enhance the principle of transparency and to 
comply with legal obligations.1774 In a recommendation in 2013, the NAIH also held that 
the employer should adopt detailed internal policies relating to monitoring, guaranteeing 
the enforcement of the requirements set in the HDPA and the HLC.1775 The CNIL also 
pleaded in favour of adopting such documents.1776, 1777 
626. The FLC and internal regulations and charters. In France two types of 
these documents exist: these guidelines can either serve as a guidance regarding what 
conduct employees should adopt when it comes to the personal use of SNSs during 
working hours, or they can be part of the employer’s internal regulation.1778 In the first 
case, these documents have informative roles, while in the second case they are considered 
supplements to the internal regulation and are binding both for the employee and for the 
employer.1779 However, it is important to note that it is not the existence of such a charter 
that qualifies the employees’ actions as violation: even when there exists no such 
document, the breach of duty of the employee is established (e.g. obligation of work and 
being at the disposal of the employer).1780 
627. The HLC and internal policies. According to the HLC, the employer can 
draft internal policies,1781 allowing the employer to unilaterally define obligations to be 
respected by employees.1782, 1783 Such a policy can relate to the use of SNSs.1784 However, 
 
1773 Thornthwaite, L. (2016) ‘Chilling times: social media policies, labour law and employment 
relations’, Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources, 54(3), p. 334.  
1774 Moreira, T. C. (2016) ‘The Electronic Control of the Employer in Portugal’, Labour & Law Issues, 2(1), 
p. 23. 
1775 NAIH (2013) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság ajánlása a munkahelyen 
alkalmazott elektronikus megfigyelőrendszer alapvető követelményeiről. NAIH-4001-6/2012/V. Budapest, p. 
3. and NAIH/2019/51/11. p. 16. 
1776 Bouchet, H. (2004) La cybersurveillance sur les lieux de travail. Paris, la Documentation française: 
Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés, p. 11. 
1777 Even though the formal rules relating to the adoption of such policies are also important, as they do not 
substantially concern the limits of employees’ personal lives, the analysis will rather concentrate on the 
content of such policies. 
1778 Niel, S. (2007) ‘Elaborer une charte informatique’, Les cahiers du DRH, (130), pp. 37-38. 
1779 Kocher, M. (2013) ‘La protection des données des salariés : que reste-t-il de l’arrêt Nikon ?’, Legicom, 
(1), p. 133. 
1780 Nivelles, V. (2014) ‘Les entreprises à l’épreuve des réseaux sociaux’, Jurisprudence Sociale Lamy, (377–
378), p. 11. 
1781 Section 17 of the HLC 
1782 Section 15 of the HLC 
1783 Although it should be noted that according to Subsection (1) of Section 264 of the HLC “[e]mployers 
shall consult the works council prior to passing a decision in respect of any plans for actions and adopting 
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the wide adoption of social media policies is not (yet?) a common phenomenon in 
Hungary.1785 However, certain exceptions can be mentioned, such as the social media 
policy of the Hungarian National Health Service1786 or the Hungarian National Savings 
Bank’s policy.1787 
628. Recommended content. The employer has extensive powers in setting the 
limits on personal use. A paper entitled “Social media and labour law – dismissal for 
Facebook posts in the light of Hungarian and international jurisprudence”1788 written by 
József Hajdú, Adrienn Lukács, Viktória Lechner and Attila Turi – amongst other matters – 
examined the possibilities lying in internal social media guidelines in relation to social 
media. Although the research primarily focused of off-duty conducts on SNSs,1789 certain 
factors have relevancy when it comes to SNS use during working hours as well. It is 
crucial to emphasize that there exists no one-size-fits-all solution: the suggestions to be 
presented serve as a point of reference, which need to be tailored to the particularities of 
the specific work environment. 
629. First, fundamental provisions should be laid down. In order to avoid 
misunderstandings, the definition of social media should be clarified. As the exhaustive 
enumeration of every SNS is not possible, it is recommended that the employer indicates a 
general definition of social media/SNSs and then by way of example specifies the most 
frequently used sites, known to most employees. The personal scope of the regulation is 
also crucial: the employer should clearly indicate to whom the regulation is applicable (e.g. 
a group of employees, all employees). 
 
regulations affecting a large number of employees[,]” raising the question of the possible role of social 
partners in the process. In France the social and economic council of the workplace must be consulted for its 
opinion if the policy is adopted as part of the employer’s internal regulation.  
1784 Rácz, I. (2015) ‘A közösségi média használatának árnyoldalai a munkaviszonyban’, in Deres, P. and 
Grad-Gyenge, A. (eds) Acta Iuvenum Caroliensia VII. Budapest: Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem Állam- 
és Jogtudományi Kar, p. 295. 
1785 Kártyás, G., Répáczki, R. and Takács, G. (2016) A munkajog digitalizálása. A munkajog 
hozzáalkalmazása a digitális munkakörnyezethez és a változó munkavállalói kompetenciákhoz. Kutatási 
zárótanulmány. Budapest, p. 67. 
1786 Rácz, I. (2017) A közösségi média és a munkajog kereszttüzében. Available 
at: http://arsboni.hu/kozossegi-media-es-munkajog-kereszttuzeben/ (Accessed: 27 February 2018). 
1787 Szilágyi, K. (2013) Facebook-szabályzat: beleszólhat- a munkáltató?, Adó Online. Available 
at: https://ado.hu/munkaugyek/facebook-szabalyzat-beleszolhat-a-munkaltato/ (Accessed: 15 November 
2018). 
1788 Közösségi média és munkajog – különös tekintettel a Facebook-ra alapított felmondásokra a hazai 
szabályozás és a nemzetközi joggyakorlat tükrében. A tanulmány az Igazságügyi Minisztérium jogászképzés 
színvonalának emelését célzó programjai keretében került megírásra. 
1789 It will be presented later in Title 3. 
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630. Then, general rules of conduct should be laid down. Employees should be 
reminded of their obligations – notably the obligation to work – and that even though a 
reasonable personal use is tolerated, equipment should primarily be used for professional 
purposes, and working hours should be spent working and not surfing on SNSs. 
631. Rules relating to the personal use of SNSs should clearly detail what kind of 
activity is permissible – the employer has extensive powers to regulate this matter. He/she 
can impose limitations regarding the sites visited, the time spent on them and the period 
when they can be used. He/she can define what SNSs can or cannot be accessed during 
working hours and can even block access to sites. If personal use is permitted, time 
limitations can still be imposed on their use – e.g. 20 minutes of use is permitted daily. It 
might also be useful if the employer defines the period during which these sites can be 
accessed (e.g. as a sort of a “warming up” in the morning after arriving at the workplace). 
It is important to emphasize that even if personal use is tolerated to a certain extent, it 
should not in any case come at the expense of executing a task (e.g. when an employee 
should deal with customers). 
632. Internal regulations can play an important role in French law when it comes 
to the presumption of professional nature of correspondence. The internal regulation can 
contain refinements as regards how exactly messages should be identified as personal: in 
such cases if the employee does not identify them as personal as required by the regulation, 
the employer can open them.1790 In the exceptional cases when employees might also use 
SNSs for professional purposes, therefore personal and professional use can mingle, the 
internal regulation can contain provisions regarding how employees should indicate that 
the communication on SNSs is private. Although compared to e-mails, in the case of SNSs 
it is considerably more difficult to identify the message as personal, it was demonstrated 
that certain measures might still be conceivable. The internal regulation can also restrict 
the employer’s right to access the content of these messages1791 (e.g. only in the presence 
of the employee).1792 
633. Such policies should also contain information on how exactly monitoring 
will be conducted in order to verify whether the employee complies with the rules made 
 
1790 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 4 juillet 2012, N° 11-12502  
1791 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 26 juin 2012, n° 11-15310 
1792 Kocher, M. (2013) ‘La protection des données des salariés : que reste-t-il de l’arrêt Nikon ?’, Legicom, 
(1), pp. 129–140. p. 133. 
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regarding personal use. As presented before, emphasis should be put on prevention, and the 
monitoring of traffic data should be preferred to the monitoring of the actual 
content/communication, while accessing the content of personal communication is not 
possible. If the policy is adopted as part of the internal regulation, breaching its provisions 
can result in applying disciplinary sanctions against the employee.1793 Therefore, these 
policies should remind employees that in the case of violating them and breaching 
obligations, sanctions can be applied. 
Conclusions of Title 2 
634. Regulation and monitoring. Employers lawfully expect employees to spend 
their working hours performing work – which is one of the employee’s main obligations. 
However, in the 21st century, as a result of the proliferation of ICT, employees can waste a 
considerable amount of their working time surfing on the Internet, writing personal 
messages, watching pictures, playing games, planning their holidays, comparing prices, 
watching news, etc. or – most importantly for the dissertation – consulting SNSs. The 
employer is entitled to regulate the use of work equipment and to monitor whether 
employees have complied with such regulation. However, the employer is not limitless in 
determining these rules: he/she must respect employees’ right to privacy and right to data 
protection. 
635. It was found that privacy and data protection can play shifting roles: 
regulation can be better assessed through a privacy angle, while monitoring through a data 
protection angle. When deciding how to regulate (prohibit or allow) the personal use of 
SNSs, it must be taken into consideration that the right to privacy comprises the right to 
establish relationships with others – for which the main place is one’s workplace. As SNSs 
constitute one of the main forms of contemporary communications, this question was 
examined from this angle. When the employer monitors respect of the rules, privacy can be 
concerned as well (through the secrecy of correspondence), however, the rules of 
monitoring can be better determined by taking a more emphatic data protection approach, 
paying attention to the data protection principles such as necessity, proportionality and 
transparency. 
 
1793 Niel, S. (2007) ‘Elaborer une charte informatique’, Les cahiers du DRH, (130), p. 40. 
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636. Possibility of a complete ban. It was found that employees have no “right to 
social media” during working hours: the employer can opt for the complete ban of such 
use. However, this position must be nuanced since according to the existing EU regulation, 
employees have the right to communication; they cannot be completely cut off from the 
outside world (e.g. in cases of family emergency). However, as long as employers ensure 
other ways of communication for employees (e.g. making a phone call or writing an e-
mail), they can freely decide to ban the use of SNSs. 
637. Despite the possibility of such a ban, today it does not always seem 
reasonable to impose such a ban. On the one hand, this position is confirmed by the 
majority of scholars,1794 by the CNIL, and courts also demonstrated tolerance if the use 
was not abusive.1795 As such, determining the limits of abusive use has key importance. As 
a suggestion, the dissertation holds that when identifying whether personal use was 
abusive, the criteria identified from the analysis of French case law (number/length of 
connections, content visited, possible distraction) can serve as guiding criteria also for 
Hungary. On the other hand, the proliferation of portable devices makes it increasingly 
difficult to detect their (mis)use during working hours, which will pose questions in 
relation to the monitoring of such prohibition. 
638. How to monitor? As a starting point of the analysis, the already existing 
regulations relating to the use of Internet and e-mails were examined: the question is 
already regulated both in France and in Hungary. While currently in Hungary some 
relevant provisions are to be found in the HLC, in France the FLC does not contain such 
provisions, and the detailed rules were crystallised by case law. In France this relevant case 
law is quite abundant, in contrast to Hungary, where instead of courts, the national DPA 
played an important role in determining the exact rules of prohibition and monitoring. 
639.  It was also held that SNSs combine the characteristics of the Internet and e-
mail: they allow users to search and surf (e.g. looking for a page on Facebook or browsing 
the news feed), send messages (e.g. Facebook Messenger or Instagram Direct), not to 
mention that they are web-based services. Therefore, the rules established for the 
 
1794 See, for example: Ray, J.-E. (2001) Le droit du travail à l’épreuve des NTIC. 2nd edn. Rueil-Malmaison: 
Liaisons. pp. 95-97.; Denier, J.-L. (2003) ‘L’utilisation privative des NTIC d’entreprise’, Les cahiers du 
DRH, (89), p. 32.; Kártyás, G., Répáczki, R. and Takács, G. (2016) A munkajog digitalizálása. A munkajog 
hozzáalkalmazása a digitális munkakörnyezethez és a változó munkavállalói kompetenciákhoz. Kutatási 
zárótanulmány. Budapest. pp. 77-78. 
1795 Especially in French case law, where more cases were found compared to Hungary. 
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monitoring of the employees’ use of the Internet and e-mail are essentially applied to SNSs 
as well. However, SNSs have certain characteristics that must be taken into consideration 
in contrast to the Internet and e-mail. 
First, as a main rule, the use of SNSs supposes personal activity: as opposed to the 
Internet and e-mails, which both could serve as a working tool as well as personal 
entertainment, making it possible to create confusion when distinguishing personal and 
professional use. However, when a job comes with the use of SNSs, the confusion 
becomes possible again in the field of communication, and in such a case it is difficult to 
enforce the existing (French) regulation according to which messages are presumed to have 
a professional nature unless they are marked as personal. In the case of SNSs the issue is 
that in contrast to e-mails, instant messaging services incorporated in SNSs do not have a 
“subject” field, where employees can usually mark the message as personal.1796 Second, 
due to the proliferation of mobile devices, it is quite common that employees own their 
own device (e.g. smartphones), as well as a mobile Internet connection – which was not 
such a common phenomenon when the original rules were adopted. However, even despite 
these SNS specific challenges, the already established rules are capable of adequately 
addressing the personal use of SNSs. 
640. Recommendations. As it was already elaborated throughout Title 2, the first 
recommendation is that – unless required by the specific features of the given job or the 
workplace –, a complete ban of personal use is not recommended. Considering that SNSs 
play a huge role in everyday life and that the enforcement of such a prohibition involves 
technical difficulties because of the ease with which they can be accessed, a more 
permissive regulation seems to be more productive. Second, it is crucial that the exact 
limits of such a use are clearly determined and communicated to the employees and are 
consistently enforced as well. Then the monitoring of whether employees respect these 
rules must be in accordance with the legal requirements set in the relevant labour law and 
data protection law regulations. Recommendations relating to how this monitoring should 
be conducted are to be found in the last part of Title 2. 
 
1796 Although in Hungarian law such a presumption does not exist, the subject field could still be used to 
enforce the principle of proportionality and sign that the message is personal. 
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Title 3: Employees’ engaging in social network sites with special 
regard to off-duty conduct 
641. During working hours, it follows from the employee’s obligation to work 
that he/she can be limited in the use of SNSs. However, beyond working hours there is no 
such obligation to work, and as a result, it must be examined what other obligations the 
employee has that can justify the limitations in the use of SNSs during that period. Just as 
personal life flows into professional life, professional life flows into the personal life of the 
employee. As employees do not leave their rights at the doorsteps of the workplace every 
morning, they do not cease to be employees when they leave the workplace: they are still 
subject to certain obligations originating from the employment relationship.1797 On the one 
hand, employees are subject notably to the duty of loyalty, which can restrict the 
employee’s freedom of action and interfere with his/her personal life by restricting 
employees’ off-duty conduct to a certain extent. On the other hand, questions regarding the 
right to data protection also arise, in relation to employers who decide to monitor and/or to 
process employees’ personal data obtained from SNSs. 
642. Topicality of the subject. Criticising or complaining about the employer, 
making disparaging comments about the workplace or colleagues, or making “pranks” at 
the workplace have always existed. However, while earlier these statements did rarely 
leave the employees’ close environment (e.g. gossiping around the coffee machine or 
criticizing the employer in a pub on Friday night or at a friends’/family gathering during 
the weekend), the advent of social media brought certain changes. Nowadays – as various 
examples will illustrate throughout Title 3 – it is not uncommon that employees let off 
steam on SNSs, which can even result in the termination of their employment. Compared 
to the “traditional” way of expressing negative opinion, SNSs pose new challenges. 
Notably, social media and SNSs brought a change of paradigm regarding especially the 
publicity of the statements or content. Depending on the chosen privacy settings, such 
 
1797 Apart from the freedom of thought, all freedoms of the employee can bear some limitations in relation to 
the employment relationship. Waquet, P. (2002) ‘Retour sur l’arrêt Nikon’, Semaine sociale Lamy, (1065), p. 
4. [Page number referring to the online version of the article downloaded from: https://lamyline-lamy-
fr.bcujas-ezp.univ-
paris1.fr/Content/Document.aspx?params=H4sIAAAAAAAEAMtMSbF1CTEwMDC0MDY0MTNSK0stKs
7Mz7MNy0xPzStJVXNxDHG0LUkuj3T09Y4sKiyqyPV0dPKqKverzAMAvrJ6HTwAAAA=WKE 
(Accessed: 15 August 2019)] 
 361 
 
communication might take place in front of a considerably bigger, often public 
audience,1798 giving increased importance to the protection of employer’s rights. 
As a response, employers restrict more and more often what an employee can post or 
cannot post in social media (in internal social media policies, for example) or sanction 
employees for their conduct on SNSs in order to protect their business. It is increasingly 
common that employees’ behaviour on SNSs exceeding the limits of freedom of 
expression results in the termination of employment.1799 This growing number of news1800 
and cases1801 relating to “Facebook firings” manifests that employees are often not aware 
that their activity can result in dismissal and do not realize that even though the activity 
takes place within their personal lives, they could still suffer legal consequences. 
643. Starting point. The starting point of Title 3 is that the examined conducts 
usually (although not always) take place outside the workplace, beyond working hours, by 
using the employees’ own equipment, therefore in the course of employees’ personal life, 
where employees are free to act as they wish. However, ensuing from the labour law 
regulation, this freedom is not limitless: employees are subject to certain obligations, 
which results in professional life flowing into personal life through imposing certain 
limitations on the employees’ freedom of action. In French labour law, the case law 
relating to the termination of employment established exceptions to the main rule, namely 
that the dismissal cannot be based on the employee’s personal life, unless certain 
conditions are met.1802 Through these exceptions, the boundaries of personal and 
professional life are outlined. In contrast, in Hungarian labour law, the HLC contains 
 
1798 For example, if the privacy settings are not used, the content can reach up to several hundreds of users, 
which is a change of paradigm compared to the few people who might have overheard a conversation in a 
pub at the next table. 
1799 Kun, A. (2018) ‘A digitalizáció kihívásai a munkajogban’, in Homicskó, Á. O. (ed.) Egyes modern 
technológiák etikai, jogi és szabályozási kihívásai. Budapest: Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem Állam- és 
Jogtudományi Kar (Acta Caroliensia Conventorum Scientiarum Iuridico-Politicarum, XXII), p 133. 
1800 A simple Google search (e.g. “fired for Facebook”, “Facebook-os felmondás”, “licenciement Facebook”) 
reveals a myriad of cases as regards employees whose employment relationship was terminated due to their 
use of Facebook. Or see, for example, the blog entitled “The Facebook Fired” where a compilation of 
Facebook firings is present. Source: The Facebook Fired. Available 
at: https://thefacebookfired.wordpress.com/(Accessed: 7 August 2019). 
1801 See, for example: CA Reims, chambre sociale, 9 juin 2010, n° 09/03205, CA Besançon, chambre sociale, 
15 novembre 2011, n° 10/02642, CA Reims, chambre sociale, 15 Novembre 2017, n° 16/02786, CPH 
Boulogne-Billancourt (Section Encadrement), 19 novembre 2010, n° 09/00343, Cour de cassation, chambre 
sociale, 20 déc. 2017, n°16-19609, Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 12 sept. 2018, n°16-11.690, Taylor v 
Somerfield Stores Ltd. Case no: S/107487/07 Held at Aberdeen on 24 July 2007, Konop v. Hawaian Airlines, 
Konop v. Hawaian airlines ügy (United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 236 F.3d 1035.), 
Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group ügy (United States District Court, District of New Jersey, No. 06-
05754.), LAG Hamm Urteil (vom 10. Oktober 2012 Az. 3 Sa 644/12), etc. 
1802 Different for disciplinary and for non-disciplinary dismissal, as it will be presented in detail. 
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provisions1803 which explicitly address employees’ off-duty conduct, imposing certain 
limitation on them. The overarching question is how the existing regulation/case law 
should be applied to SNSs. 
644. Main questions to be answered. Title 3 intends to determine the boundaries 
between personal and public activities in relation to employees’ off-duty conduct on SNSs. 
In the light of the obligations incumbent on employees, first it should be determined 
whether using these platforms falls under private or personal life, or whether they rather 
constitute a public forum. Then it should be determined where exactly the boundaries of 
employees’ freedom to act lie: this raises the question to what extent employers can restrict 
and sanction employees’ conduct that took place outside their professional life – not in the 
workplace, during non-working hours, and with the help of the employee’s device. Title 3 
intends to answer with regard to the blurred boundaries: to what extent can professional 
life flow into the personal life of the employee? Are SNSs considered to be public or 
private platforms? Can SNSs constitute a reason for the termination of employment? Can 
the use of SNSs beyond working hours be prohibited? In what regards can the employee’s 
online behaviour be limited? 
645. Hypothesis. The hypothesis of Title 3 is that with respect to employees’ 
activities on SNSs, in the light of the intensification that SNSs brought to the collision of 
rights, employers have found themselves in an even more vulnerable position. (Hypothesis 
4). Traditionally, the hierarchal relationship between the parties in the employment 
relationship puts the employee in a more vulnerable position.1804 However, due to the 
changes brought by SNSs, the question of reversed vulnerability between the parties arises 
when it comes to employees’ presence on SNSs.1805 Thus, Title 3 will examine the changes 
brought about by SNSs and whether they necessitate tilting the balance towards the 
protection of employer’s rights – while at the same time the respect of employees’ rights 
remains a crucial issue. 
 
1803 See Section 8 and notably Subsection (2) of Section 8 of the HLC. 
1804 WP29 (2001) Opinion 8/2001 on the processing of personal data in the employment context. 
5062/01/EN/Final WP 48. p. 23., WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. 
p. 23.; Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2017) Munkajog. ELTE Eötvös Kiadó. Budapest. p. 34. 
1805 See, for example: Kajtár, E. (2015) ‘Európai ügyek a Facebook sötét oldaláról - A munkavállalók 
közösségi oldalakon tanúsított kötelezettségszegő magatartása’, in Horváth, I. (ed.) Tisztelgés: ünnepi 
tanulmányok Dr. Hágelmayer Istvánné születésnapjára. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, p. 199.; Balogh, Zs. 
Gy. et al. (2012) ‘Munkahelyi adatvédelem a gyakorlatban’, Infokommunikáció és Jog, 9(3), pp. 96-97. 
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646. Matters to be examined and structure of Title 3. Employees’ activity on 
SNSs can jeopardize the employer’s rights in several ways – among which the form of the 
activity and the subject of the activity were chosen in the dissertation as main assessment 
criteria. The form of the activity can take different shapes. Either it can be an expression of 
opinion (typically manifested in posts or comments), or it can take other forms (e.g. video, 
photo) not containing explicit statements. Regarding the subject of the activity, it can either 
be connected directly to the workplace (e.g. criticizing the employer), or it can relate to a 
matter that has no direct connection to the workplace (e.g. publishing anti-Semitic 
comments under an article). 
Chapter 1 will address the boundaries of employees’ personal life and off-duty 
conduct by examining in what regard employees can be restricted while using SNSs and 
expressing themselves on these platforms. Chapter 2 will deal with enforcing these 
restrictions and will examine the possibilities that employers have for the enforcement of 
their rights, and the conditions (notably data protection) that they must respect when 
controlling employees’ off-duty conduct on SNSs. 
Chapter 1: Off-duty conduct and private/personal life 
Theoretically, the employee’s professional life and personal life are meant to be 
separated: into professional life, connected to the workplace; and into personal life, 
independent of the workplace, where the employee is free to act as he/she wishes. 
However, it was already demonstrated that due to the technological development, the 
boundaries of work and personal life are more and more blurred – which is increasingly 
true in the case of social media.1806 This is the reason why it is important to determine the 
boundaries between these two spheres in relation to SNSs and off-duty conduct, namely: to 
what extent can limitations be imposed on the employee’s personal life? National 
regulations already addressed the question: in French law through the rules and 
jurisprudence relating to dismissal, while in Hungarian labour law, Section 8 of the HLC 
contains specific provisions on the employee’s conduct outside working hours. Prior to 
addressing the specific questions raised by SNSs, the general rules in relation to dismissals 
will be presented. 
 
1806 Ellickson, D. and Atkinson, M. (2013) ‘When Can Your Employer “Unlike” You? Just Cause for 
Dismissal and Social Media’, in The Law Society of Upper Canada, Employment Law and the New 
Workplace in the Social Media Age. Toronto: Irwin Law, p. 261. 
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647. Off-duty conduct and private/personal life: principle. In French labour law 
the protection of employees’ personal life appears through the rules relating to dismissal, 
as personal life must be respected during the decision-making. Differentiation is made 
between dismissal on personal and on economic grounds1807 – among which the former is 
relevant regarding the subject of the dissertation.1808 In the case of dismissal based on 
personal grounds, the reason for the dismissal is based on the person of the employee: the 
reason can either be disciplinary (supposing the sanctioning of the employee for his/her 
misconduct – “faute”, e.g. breaching an obligation arising from the employment 
relationship) or non-disciplinary (e.g., professional incompetence, disagreement between 
the employee and the employer, etc.).1809 
648. Although in the case of dismissal on personal grounds the reason for 
dismissal lies in the person of the employee, as a main rule, when dismissing an employee, 
the employer must respect the employee’s personal (and private) life. According to the 
main principle set by French courts, the personal life of the employee is protected; 
dismissal cannot be based on the personal life.1810 However, it does not mean that the 
employee is completely free to do anything outside the workplace without eventual 
consequences, as there are exceptions when the employer may pronounce a disciplinary 
and a non-disciplinary dismissal – based on the personal life of the employee. 
649. While in French law the starting point is that the dismissal should not be 
based on the personal life of the employee, and then the jurisprudence establishes certain 
exceptions, in Hungarian labour law, limitations are a priori imposed on employees’ off-
duty conduct and courts examine whether employees acted in respect with these 
provisions. Sections 6-8 of the HLC contain provisions relating to common rules of 
conduct, determining how the parties should behave. Among these provisions Subsection 
(2) of Section 8 imposes limitation on employees’ conduct during and outside working 
hours, while Subsection (3) regulates specifically the question of employees’ freedom of 
 
1807 Title 3 of Book II of Part I of the FLC 
1808 In the case of dismissal based on economic grounds, the dismissal is made by the employer for reasons 
not related to the employee himself/herself. In such a case, dismissal is motivated by economic reasons, 
originating either from the deletion or transformation of the employment of the employee concerned, or from 
a modification of an essential element of the employment contract which the employee refused. Paragraph 1 
of Article L1233-3 of the FLC. 
1809 Grandguillot, D. (2016) L’essentiel du Droit du travail. 16th edn. Issy-les-Moulinaux: Gualino: Lextenso 
Éditions, p. 67. 
1810 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 20 nov. 1991, n° 89-44.605; Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 14 
mai 1997, N° 94-45473 
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expression. These provisions aim to determine the legitimate extent to which employees 
can be bound to respect certain limitations imposed on their personal lives. In addition, 
Subsection (1) contains provisions on the protection of the employer’s legitimate economic 
interests, while Subsection (4) on the protection of the employer’s business secrets. 
650. Exceptions: dismissal based on the personal life of the employee. In 
French labour law, the termination of the employment relationship based on the personal 
life of the employee can be either disciplinary or non-disciplinary. When it comes to 
disciplinary dismissals, in which case the dismissal is grounded on the misconduct of the 
employee, an element pertaining to the personal life can only justify a dismissal if it 
constitutes a breach of duty or obligations resulting from the employment contract.1811, 1812 
Through this statement, the Court of Cassation adopted a position similar to the one of the 
State Council’s, which also expressed that an act of the employee realized outside the 
execution of the employment contract cannot be a reason for dismissal for misconduct, 
unless it constitutes an infringement of an obligation arising from the employment 
contract.1813 Although it is not perfectly clear the breach of which obligations can ground a 
disciplinary dismissal,1814 in relation to social media, the employee’s obligation of loyalty 
will gain special importance. 
In the case of a non-disciplinary dismissal, the reason for dismissal is not the 
misconduct arising from the breach of obligations, but is connected to the person of the 
employee.1815 In this case, the element of personal life justifies a dismissal if it causes a 
“characterised serious disorder” (“trouble objectif caractérisé”) in the organization and the 
 
1811 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 23 juin 2009, N° 07-45256.; Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 3 
mai 2011, N° 09-67464 
1812 Or it must be connected to the professional life of the employee (e.g. committed in the workplace, or by 
using the employer’s equipment). Source: Beyneix, I. and Rovinski, J. (2016) ‘L’emprise de la vie 
professionnelle sur la vie personnelle’, JCP S (édition sociale), (37), p. 37. ; Casaux-Labrunée, L. (2012) 
‘Vie privée des salariés et vie de l’entreprise’, Droit social, (4), p. 339. and Icard, J. (2014) ‘Faits commis en 
dehors des temps et lieu de travail mais rattachés à la vie de l’entreprise’, Bulletin du travail (ancien nom 
Cahiers sociaux du barreau de Paris), (268), p. 642. The Court of Cassation referred to the criteria of 
connecting to the corporate life of the undertaking to confirm dismissal notably in its judgments of Cour de 
cassation, chambre sociale, 2 décembre 2003, N° 01-43227 (withdrawal of a driver’s driving licence because 
of driving in a state of drunkenness – even beyond working hours), or Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 17 
novembre 2011, N° 10-17950 (an employee benefiting from his functions as a guard in a castle stored and 
illegally manufactured alcohol in the castle).  
1813 Conseil d'État (2010): N° 316856, 4ème et 5ème sous-sections réunies, 15 décembre 
1814 Casaux-Labrunée, L. (2012) ‘Vie privée des salariés et vie de l’entreprise’, Droit social, (4), p. 340. and 
Loiseau, G. (2011) ‘Vie personnelle et licenciement disciplinaire’, Recueil Dalloz Sirey, (23), p. 1569. 
1815 See, for example, the homosexuality of a priest, a Renault employee buying a Peugeot car, a security 
agent committing shoplifting or a driver losing his driving licence in the course of his personal life – existing 
examples from French cases that are to be presented in the forthcoming footnotes. 
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functioning of the workplace (taking into consideration the function and purpose of the 
workplace).1816 In the latter case it is not the element pertaining to the employee’s personal 
life which in itself creates the disorder and results in the dismissal, but its repercussions on 
the functioning of the workplace – taking into consideration the employee’s position.1817, 
1818 It is important that as there is no breach of an obligation arising from the employment, 
the dismissal for disorder can only constitute a non-disciplinary dismissal.1819, 1820 
651. In Hungarian law if the employee breached his/her obligations arising from 
the employment contract and did not act in accordance with the requirements set by the 
HLC, the employer is entitled to terminate the employment relationship. In Hungarian law 
as well, it is possible to dismiss the employee based on his/her breach of obligations, but 
also due to other personal features not constituting a breach – however, the appellation of 
these dismissals is different than in French labour law. In Hungarian labour law, a 
difference is made between termination by notice and dismissal without notice.1821 
652. According to Subsection (2) of Section 66 of the HLC on termination by 
notice, “[a]n employee may be dismissed only for reasons in connection with his/her 
behaviour in relation to the employment relationship, with his/her ability or in connection 
 
1816 Principle posed by the Painsecq case in 1991. In this case the Court of Cassation ruled that the dismissal 
of an assistant sacristan based on his homosexuality could only constitute a reason for dismissal if it caused a 
characterised serious disorder in the functioning of the undertaking. (Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 17 
avril 1991, N° 90-42636 ) This principle was reinforced by the decisions of Cour de cassation, chambre 
sociale, 22 janvier 1992, N° 90-42517 (a Renault employee bought a Peugeot car: the Court of Cassation 
ruled that in his private life the employee is free to buy the product of his choice and the simple acquisition of 
the car did not cause a characterised serious disorder); Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 16 décembre 
1998, N° 96-43540 
1817 Waquet, P. (2006) ‘Le “trouble objectif dans l’entreprise” : une notion à redéfinir’, Revue droit du travail 
Dalloz, (5), p. 307. 
1818 For example, the Court of Cassation held that an employee, who worked as a security agent and outside 
of working hours committed shoplifting from one of the clients of the enterprise, discredited the employer 
and caused a disorder. (Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 20 nov. 1991, n° 89-44.605) The same 
conclusion was reached in a case when a sales agent stole an article from a hypermarket that belonged to his 
sector and the client threatened to never work again with the employer. (Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 
3 déc. 2002, n° 00-44.321) 
1819 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 23 juin 2009, N° 07-45256.; Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 9 
mars 2011, N° 09-42150  
1820 See more on private/personal life and dismissals in: Loiseau, G. (2011) ‘Vie personnelle et licenciement 
disciplinaire’, Recueil Dalloz Sirey, (23), pp. 1568–1569.; Richard de la Tour, J. (1999) La vie personnelle du 
salarié. Étude sur la jurisprudence récente de la Chambre sociale de la Cour de cassation. Cour de 
cassation. Available 
at: https://www.courdecassation.fr/publications_26/rapport_annuel_36/rapport_1999_91/etudes_documents_
93/jean_richard_5796.html(Accessed: 12 July 2017); Casaux-Labrunée, L. (2012) ‘Vie privée des salariés et 
vie de l’entreprise’, Droit social, (4), pp. 339-342. See more on objective disorder in : Waquet, P. (2006) ‘Le 
“trouble objectif dans l’entreprise” : une notion à redéfinir’, Revue droit du travail Dalloz, (5), pp. 304–310. 
1821 Subsection (1) of Section 64 of the HLC 
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with the employer’s operations.”1822 Among these three cases, behaviour in relation to the 
employment relationship is important for the purposes of the dissertation. The employee’s 
behaviour in connection with the employment relationship primarily consists of cases 
when the employee culpably violates obligations arising from the employment 
relationship.1823 Employees expressing their opinion on SNSs or public behaviour can be 
covered by this Section, and therefore can serve as reason for the termination of the 
employment.1824 
653. Termination without notice is possible when the employee either “willfully 
or by gross negligence commits a grave violation of any substantive obligations arising 
from the employment relationship;”1825 or “otherwise engages in conduct that would 
render the employment relationship impossible.”1826 The first case supposes a serious 
breach of duty1827 (basically being the equivalent to the French disciplinary dismissal), 
while in the second case maintaining the employment relationship becomes objectively 
impossible, with the lack of serious breach of duties1828 (similar to the French non-
disciplinary dismissal, where the breach of duty is missing). Usually behaviour which is 
capable of shaking the trust between the parties can serve as a basis,1829 typically including 
cases connected to the employee’s behaviour outside work making it impossible to 
maintain the employer relationship.1830 For example, a Facebook post might result in a loss 
of trust,1831 serving as a ground for termination without notice.1832 
 
1822 Emphasis added by the author. 
1823 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2013) Munkajog. 2nd edn. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó. p. 202. 
E.g. refusing to comply with the employer’s legitimate orders without valid grounds (BH1996. 286.), 
consuming alcohol during working hours or appearing at work being under the effects of alcohol 
consumption (BH1986. 384.), the development of conflict due to not respecting working hours and due to the 
behaviour of the employee (Csongrád Megyei Bíróság 2. Mf. 20. 566/1997.). 
1824 Zaccaria, M. L. (2016) ‘Munkavállalók a világhálón - “Megosztani ér?”’, HR & Munkajog, 7(10), p. 16. 
1825 Item a) of Subsection (1) of Section 78 of the HLC 
1826 Item b) of Subsection (1) of Section 78 of the HLC 
1827 E.g. revealing business secrets (Mfv. I. 10.264/2002/2.), consuming alcohol during working hours at a 
dangerous workplace (Szegedi Munkaügyi Bíróság 4. M. 1159/1994.), leaving the workplace on several 
occasions without authorization (BH 2008. 132.) 
1828 Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2012) Munkajog. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, p. 216. 
1829 Hajdú, J. and Kun, A. (eds) (2014) Munkajog. Budapest: Patrocinium, p. 167. E.g. he/she engages in 
conduct unworthy of his/her job by leading a lifestyle of revelry and alcoholism, substantiated suspicion of 
committing a serious criminal offence.  
1830 Cséffán, J. (2016) A Munka Törvénykönyve és magyarázata. Szeged: Szegedi Rendezvényszervező Kft, 
p. 309., Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2012) Munkajog. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, p. 216. 
1831 Kozma, A. (2013) ‘Mire köteles a munkavállaló?’, HR & Munkajog, 4(10), p. 10. 
1832 Mfv.I.10.469/2013/4 Cited in: Cséffán, J. (2016) A Munka Törvénykönyve és magyarázata. Szeged: 
Szegedi Rendezvényszervező Kft, p. 311.  
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654. As such, both in France and in Hungary personal life is protected during the 
termination of employment. However, it does not mean that personal life can never 
constitute a reason for terminating the employment relationship: in the light of the 
obligations of the employee, both countries provide exceptions to this general rule, as well 
as the case when there is no breach of obligation, but the behaviour still has serious 
repercussions on the employment. In France, the limits of these exceptions were elaborated 
by case law, while in Hungary, Section 8 of the HLC itself already limits employees’ 
behaviour in the course of their personal lives. 
655. Structure of Chapter 1. After reviewing the general legal framework 
regulating dismissal, the specific features of SNSs must be addressed. Employees’ off-duty 
conducts on SNSs can take several forms and can constitute a ground for disciplinary and 
non-disciplinary dismissal (France), as well as for termination by notice and without notice 
(Hungary). In order to exhaustively present these conducts, the differentiation proposed by 
certain scholars1833 will be followed, according to which the employee’s conduct can 
relate, on the one hand, directly to the workplace (e.g. the content of activity relates to the 
workplace) or on the other hand, it can indirectly relate to the workplace (where the 
content of the activity is independent of the employment, the only connection to the 
workplace is the user’s person, who is the employee). First, in Section 1 employees’ 
behaviour directly connected to the employment will be examined, followed by 
employees’ behaviour not directly connected to the employment in Section 2. 
Section 1. Online activity with direct connection to the employment 
656. Employees’ SNS activity can relate to the employment in several ways: 
from complaining of the employer on a colleague’s Facebook wall,1834 through liking the 
competition’s Facebook page,1835 till sharing information relating to the clients of the 
employer1836… and the list goes on. Although the subject will be discussed from the angle 
 
1833 Pók, L. (2012) ‘Lájkolni szabad? Munkavállalói véleménynyilvánítás az új Munka Törvénykönyve 
tükrében’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (4), p. 160.; Zaccaria, M. L. (2016) ‘Munkavállalók a világhálón - 
“Megosztani ér?”’, HR & Munkajog, 7(10), p. 16. 
1834 CA Reims, chambre sociale, 9 juin 2010, n° 09/03205 
1835 USA: District court for the Eastern District of Virginia: Bland v. Roberts, 4-11cv45 (E.D. Va.; Apr. 24, 
2012) 
1836 Banktitkot sértett egy magyar mikroblog (2012) Index. Available 
at: https://index.hu/tech/2012/01/04/banktitkot_sertett_egy_magyar_mikroblogger/(Accessed: 7 September 
2018). 
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of French and Hungarian law, as the phenomenon is universal, reference and examples will 
be often taken from other jurisdictions as well, in order to illustrate certain matters. 
657. During the research, the question of determining the boundaries of 
employees’ personal lives was most often raised in relation to their (A) freedom of 
expression on SNSs – where the question to be answered is whether and to what extent 
employees can express themselves outside of the workplace, a priori in the course of their 
personal lives. Nevertheless, freedom of expression is not the only conduct that can 
directly relate to the employment: employees have (B) other ways that take place beyond 
the working hours but still have a direct connection to the employment. Such conduct can 
be, for example, the revealing of business secrets on SNSs or carrying out whistleblowing 
on SNSs. However, as a preliminary point, it should be observed that these “other” ways 
do not substantially challenge the boundaries of work and personal life and seem to raise 
specific issues in relation to employees’ personal life to a lesser extent.1837 
§1. Employees expressing themselves on social network sites 
658. Employee expression and SNSs. As the growing number of news in media 
and litigations in courts demonstrate it, on SNSs employees often criticize employers, 
colleagues, clients in very harsh style, using offensive vocabulary – resulting in their 
dismissal.1838 An employee criticizing1839 the employer is not a new phenomenon,1840 but 
social media brought considerable changes in this field, raising the question whether the 
previously established rules are adequately applicable to this new situation, or whether 
 
1837 Pók, L. (2012) ‘A közösség hálójában – Közösségi oldalak munkajogi vonatkozásai’, Infokommunikáció 
és jog, (1), p. 13. 
1838 See, for example: Love, D. (2014) 17 People Who Were Fired For Using Facebook, Business Insider. 
Available at: https://www.businessinsider.com/17-people-who-were-fired-for-using-facebook-2014-
7 (Accessed: 30 July 2019).; 14 Times People Got Fired For Posting On Facebook (no date) Awesome 
Inventions. Available at: https://www.awesomeinventions.com/fired-posting-on-facebook/(Accessed: 30 July 
2019). 
1839 However, in some cases the employee can go even further than mere criticism and can deliberately harm 
the employer’s reputation. See, for example, the case of an employee who directly encouraged people not to 
support the employer, as it “ripped off a bunch [of people].” Source: Ellickson, D. and Atkinson, M. (2013) 
‘When Can Your Employer “Unlike” You? Just Cause for Dismissal and Social Media’, in The Law Society 
of Upper Canada, Employment Law and the New Workplace in the Social Media Age. Toronto: Irwin Law, p. 
264. 
1840 For example, employees expressing their opinion in relation to the employer through the publication of a 
book (BH2000. 267.), or through wearing a placard on the work uniform (BAG 2 AZR 620/80 1982. cited in: 
Jónás, T. (2010) ‘Véleménynyilvánítási szabadság a munkaviszonyban’, Pécsi Munkajogi Közlemények, 
3(2), p. 38.) or through publishing an article containing the employee’s negative opinion (1050/2004. számú 
munkaügyi elvi határozat). 
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they should be modified. These changes concern particularly their publicity, permanence, 
style and the possible identification of the employer. 
Regarding publicity, while earlier these statements did rarely leave the employees’ 
close environment (e.g. gossiping around the coffee machine or criticizing the employer at 
a friends’/family gathering during the weekend), with the advent of social media they take 
place in front of a considerably bigger, often public audience – making it also easier to be 
discovered by the employer. Also, while criticising the employer orally was less 
discoverable and clearly less reproducible, on SNSs communication/content stays 
permanently, as it is not feasible to completely remove a content once it was published.1841 
Another change is the style of communication: on the Internet users often use vocabulary 
that is different compared to what they would use face-to-face.1842 SNSs also facilitate 
identifying the employer of the author of the post,1843 creating a link between the 
employee’s post and the employment. These observations suggest that the employee can 
cause increased damage to the employer, in contrast to statements made prior to the 
proliferation of SNSs. 
659. France: obligation of good faith and employees’ freedom of expression. 
First, the obligation of good faith (“obligation de loyauté”) must be addressed, which 
imposes limitations on the employee’s freedom of action. The obligation of good faith can 
also enter into collision with the employee’s freedom of expression, making it necessary to 
address the specific limitations on freedom of expression. The employee’s obligation of 
good faith originates from the Civil Code’s (former) Article 1134,1844 stating that contracts 
shall be executed in good faith – a principle that applies to the parties of the employment 
relationship as well.1845 According to the obligation of good faith, the employee must 
refrain from disloyal conducts and notably has the duty of loyalty, duty of non-concurrence 
and duty of confidentiality – and more importantly for the subject of the thesis: exercising 
the freedom of expression in an abusive manner can constitute the violation of the 
 
1841 As Jean-Emmanuel Ray referred to the classic proverb: “Words fly away, writings remain.” underlying 
that once something was published on an SNS, it can be retrieved by a third party and used even years later. 
Source: Ray, J.-E. (2011) ‘Facebook, le salarié et l’employeur’, Droit social, (2), p. 133. 
1842 It is enough to take a look at the comment section under an article, where often complete strangers are at 
each other’s throats and insult people using extremely offensive vocabulary – what most of them probably 
would not do during a face-to-face encounter. 
1843 E.g. especially if the employee identified his/her employer in the “bio” part, but a simple Google search 
on the user’s name might reveal the employer’s identity in a few seconds, or even other users can reveal it. 
1844 Today, Article 1104 of the Civil Code. 
1845 Article L1222-1 of the FLC: “Employment contracts must be performed in good faith.” 
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obligation of good faith.1846 The Court of Cassation also associated an obligation of probity 
with the obligation of good faith,1847 and an obligation of morality considering the 
functions of the employee.1848 This obligation of probity can be more specific in the case of 
ideologically or faith-oriented enterprises1849 (“entreprise de tendance”).1850  
660. Such an obligation of good faith can collide with employees’ freedom of 
expression: employees are entitled to the freedom of expression within and outside the 
workplace as well.1851 However, exercising this freedom cannot be limitless, the main 
obligation arising from the employment contract – notably the duty of loyalty – must be 
respected even beyond working hours.1852 The Court of Cassation formulated the principle 
of employees’ freedom of expression in 1999, when it stated that “except in the case of 
abuse, the employee enjoys the freedom of expression within the workplace and outside of 
it; which can only be restricted by a restriction justified by the nature of the task to be 
performed and proportionate to the aim sought.” 1853 This means that the employee is 
entitled to express his/her opinion as he/she wishes, including subjects relating to the 
employment,1854 even to criticise the employer, as long as these expressions are not 
insulting, defamatory or excessive.1855 If the employee oversteps the limits of the freedom 
of expression, he/she can be sanctioned for it – and in the most serious cases can be 
dismissed.1856 
661. As regards SNSs and assessing whether employees can be sanctioned for 
expressing themselves on social media, it must be examined whether the expression 
constituted an abuse. However, prior to examining the abuse, first, (a) it must be examined 
 
1846 Richard de la Tour, J. (1999) La vie personnelle du salarié. Étude sur la jurisprudence récente de la 
Chambre sociale de la Cour de cassation. Cour de cassation. Available 
at: https://www.courdecassation.fr/publications_26/rapport_annuel_36/rapport_1999_91/etudes_documents_
93/jean_richard_5796.html(Accessed: 12 July 2017). 
1847 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 25 févr. 2003, n° 00-42.031 
1848 Corrignan-Carsin, D. (2011) ‘Vie personnelle - vie professionnelle : la cloison est-elle étanche ?’, JCP S 
(édition sociale), (26), p. 40. 
1849 An ideologically oriented enterprise is an enterprise which has a particular orientation, which can be 
syndical, political or religious. 
1850 Corrignan-Carsin, D. (2011) ‘Vie personnelle - vie professionnelle : la cloison est-elle étanche ?’, JCP S 
(édition sociale), (26), p. 40. 
1851 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 14 décembre 1999, N° 97-41995 
1852 Beyneix, I. and Rovinski, J. (2016) ‘L’emprise de la vie professionnelle sur la vie personnelle’, JCP S 
(édition sociale), (37), p. 39. 
1853 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 14 décembre 1999, N° 97-41995 
1854 Waquet, P., Struillou, Y. and Pécaut-Rivolier, L. (2014) Pouvoirs du chef d’entreprise et libertés du 
salarié: du salarié-citoyen au citoyen-salarié. Rueil-Malmaison: ÉdLiaisons (Droit vivant). p. 299. 
1855 Le Cohu, P. (2018) ‘Un salarié peut-il critiquer son employeur sans être sanctionné ?’, La Gazette du 
Palais, (10), p. 58. 
1856 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 25 janvier 2000, N° 97-45044  
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whether the content was publicly accessible (the private or public nature of SNSs): did the 
employee’s act belong within his/her private life? Then, (b) if the remarks are considered 
to be public and they were obtained lawfully, it can be examined whether they are of an 
abusive nature or not.1857 
662. Freedom of expression in the HLC. Just like the FLC, the HLC also 
contains a declaration on good faith (and mutual cooperation) through stating that “[i]n 
exercising rights and discharging obligations, the parties involved shall act in the manner 
consistent with the principle of good faith and fair dealing, they shall be required to 
cooperate with one another, and they shall not engage in any conduct to breach the rights 
or legitimate interests of the other party.”1858 However, in contrast to the FLC, in Section 
8, it is explicitly defined what the duties of the employee are when it comes to respecting 
the employer’s rights and legitimate business interests. 
Among these provisions Subsection (2)1859 of Section 8 imposes limitation on 
employees’ conduct during and outside working hours, while Subsection (3)1860 regulates 
specifically the question of employees’ freedom of expression. These provisions aim to 
determine the legitimate extent to which employees can be bound to respect certain 
limitations imposed on their personal lives. In addition, Subsection (1)1861 contains 
provisions on the protection of the employer’s legitimate economic interests, while 
Subsection (4)1862 on the protection of the employer’s business secrets. 
 
1857 Grégoire, F. (2018) ‘L’usage immodéré de Facebook peut conduire directement à Pôle emploi’, JCP G 
Semaine Juridique (édition générale), (9), p. 437. 
1858 Subsection (2) of Section 6 of the HLC 
1859 Subsection (2) of Section 8 of the HLC: “Workers may not engage in any conduct during or outside their 
paid working hours that - stemming from the worker’s job or position in the employer’s hierarchy - directly 
and factually has the potential to damage the employer’s reputation, legitimate economic interest or the 
intended purpose of the employment relationship. The actions of workers may be controlled as defined in 
Subsection (2) of Section 9. When exercising such control, the workers affected shall be informed in writing 
in advance.” 
1860 Subsection (3) of Section 8 of the HLC: “Workers may not exercise the right to express their opinion in a 
way where it may lead to causing serious harm or damage to the employer’s reputation or legitimate 
economic and organizational interests.” 
1861 Subsection (1) of Section 8 of the HLC: “During the life of the employment relationship, workers shall 
not engage in any conduct by which to jeopardize the legitimate economic interests of the employer, unless 
so authorized by the relevant legislation.” 
1862 Subsection (4) of Section 8 of the HLC “Workers shall maintain confidentiality in relation to business 
secrets obtained in the course of their work. Moreover, workers shall not disclose to unauthorized persons 
any data learned in connection with their activities that, if revealed, would result in detrimental 
consequences for the employer or other persons. The requirement of confidentiality shall not apply to any 
information that is declared by specific other legislation to be treated as information of public interest or 
public information and as such is rendered subject to disclosure requirement.” 
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663. The first problem that is encountered is that it is not evident how 
Subsections (1)-(3) of Section 8 relate to each other.1863 Although Subsection (1) relates to 
the jeopardizing of the employer’s legitimate interest, and primarily covers competing 
activities, it is not unimaginable that judicial case law will add to this category employees’ 
freedom of expression on the Internet, with regard to the frequent occurrence of such 
conducts.1864 Subsection (2) relates to employee behaviour outside working hours, while 
Subsection (3) deals with employees’ freedom of expression: which is at the same time an 
activity conducted outside working hours. The stakes are high, as the different Subsections 
lay down different requirements towards the employee, against the different interests of the 
employer, and as a consequence they sanction different conducts (See Table 5 below). 
Table 5: Assessment of Section 8 of the Hungarian Labour Code1865 
 What conduct? Against what 
rights/legitimate 
interests?1866 
How? 
S
u
b
se
c
ti
o
n
 
(1) jeopardize - the legitimate economic 
interests of the employer 
- during the life of the 
employment relationship, 
- unless so authorized by the 
relevant legislation 
(2) directly and factually 
has the potential to 
jeopardize 
- the employer’s reputation, 
- legitimate economic 
interest, 
- the intended purpose of the 
employment relationship 
- during or outside their paid 
working hours, 
- stemming from the worker’s 
job or position in the 
employer’s hierarchy 
(3) may lead to causing 
serious harm or 
jeopardize 
- the employer’s reputation, 
- legitimate economic and 
organizational interests 
 
Source: the author’s own summary 
 
Although Subsection (1) of Section 8 sets forth a general rule of conduct that can be 
applied to behaviour outside working hours as well, it will be examined separately in part 
(B), for the reason that this provision mainly relates to competing activities, and not to 
freedom of expression. Compared to this general requirement, Subsection (2) of Section 8 
narrows down the respect of the employer’s legitimate interest with regard to the 
 
1863 Pók, L. (2012) ‘Lájkolni szabad? Munkavállalói véleménynyilvánítás az új Munka Törvénykönyve 
tükrében’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (4), p. 162. 
1864 Pók, L. (2012) ‘Lájkolni szabad? Munkavállalói véleménynyilvánítás az új Munka Törvénykönyve 
tükrében’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (4), p. 163. 
1865 Except for Subsection (4), which does not raise specific questions as regards the boundaries of personal 
and professional life. 
1866 The wording of the HLC employs the expression “legitimate economic interest” of the employer, instead 
of using the expression “rights”. 
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employee’s job or position in the employer’s hierarchy, therefore such a restriction could 
be applied in exceptional situations. Also, instead of simple jeopardizing, Subsection (2) of 
Section 8 requires the behaviour to have the potential to directly and factually jeopardize 
not only the employer’s legitimate economic interests, but also the employer’s reputation 
or the intended purpose of the employment relationship. It is not obvious whether this 
more detailed formulation has real content or simply constitutes a wordier formulation.1867 
Moreover, Subsection (2) of Section 8 also refers to Section 9 on the restriction of 
employees’ personality rights, requiring the same conditions to be applied when it comes 
to restricting personality rights.1868 
664. Subsection (3) of Section 8 of the HLC contains a provision explicitly 
aiming to regulate freedom of expression through stating that: “[e]mployees may not 
exercise the right to express their opinion in a way where it may lead to causing serious 
harm or jeopardizing the employer’s reputation or legitimate economic and organizational 
interests[,]”1869 but it is not specified whether it relates to behaviour during or outside 
working hours, or to expression relating directly or indirectly to the employment. When 
assessing expression connected to the employment, jurisprudence has already elaborated 
the limits of employees’ freedom of expression, through posing three criteria. First, it must 
be taken into account whether the expression is indeed capable of jeopardizing or 
influencing the functioning and the efficiency of the employer; second, whether the 
employee has respected the obligation of moderation (regardless of whether the content 
was true or false) and third, regardless of whether the recipients can be identified or 
not.1870, 1871 
(A) Facebook: private or public space? 
665. It was already referred to that both in France and in Hungary as a main rule, 
the dismissal cannot be based on employees’ personal life. It will be presented in the 
 
1867 Pók, L. (2012) ‘Lájkolni szabad? Munkavállalói véleménynyilvánítás az új Munka Törvénykönyve 
tükrében’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (4), p. 162. 
1868 Subsection (2) of Section 8 will be further presented in Section 2. 
1869 Subsection (3) of Section 8 of the HLC 
1870 Conclusions drawn from BH2009.255. cited in Pók, L. (2012) ‘Lájkolni szabad? Munkavállalói 
véleménynyilvánítás az új Munka Törvénykönyve tükrében’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (4), p. 162. 
1871 As these requirements were already clarified by the case law under the previous HLC, László Pók raises 
the question what the relations between Subsections (1), (2) and (3) are, whether specifying these three 
scenarios are substantially necessary. See more in: Pók, L. (2012) ‘Lájkolni szabad? Munkavállalói 
véleménynyilvánítás az új Munka Törvénykönyve tükrében’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (4), p. 162-163. 
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following paragraphs that employees often allege that as they published the contested 
content in the course of their private life, it does not constitute a valid basis for dismissal. 
While it is true that in this case employees usually publish the questionable matter during 
non-working hours, from their own devices, from a place other than the employer’s 
premises, it is not evident whether these communications have a private or a public nature. 
Determining whether SNSs are private or public spheres has importance in both 
examined countries. (a) In French labour law if the employee expressed himself/herself in 
the course of a private correspondence, then he/she cannot be sanctioned based on the 
content with regards to the protection ensured by the right to respect for private life.1872 
The boundaries of public and private were determined by jurisprudence, ruling on several 
occasions on the nature of SNSs. (b) In Hungarian labour law, prior to the amendment in 
2019, Subsection (1) of Section 11 of the HLC stipulated that the “[t]he private life of 
workers may not be violated[,]”1873 requiring the protection of employees’ private lives. 
This is the reason why it is important to determine whether SNSs are considered to be a 
public or a private sphere, as it will influence the monitoring. 
a) Jurisprudence of French courts 
666. Importance of public or private communication. Regarding the criterion of 
constituting a private or public sphere, in a private sphere, each individual is entitled to 
express himself/herself as he/she wishes: in such a case, even using excessive language is 
acceptable. However, this protection ends when the individual leaves this private sphere – 
the limits of which were set by case law.1874 If the employee expressed himself/herself in 
the course of a private correspondence, then he/she cannot be sanctioned based on the 
content with regards to the protection ensured by the right to respect for private life.1875 
However, if the expression did not take place during a private correspondence, the case has 
to be assessed on the grounds of the freedom of expression (and it has to be examined 
 
1872 Cour de cassation, chambre mixte, 18 mai 2007, N° 05-40803 
1873 Although the reasoning of the amendment argued that even without explicitly stating the prohibition of 
monitoring employees’ private life, the existence of it is derived from the Fundamental Law and from the 
Civil Code. Source: T/4479. számú törvényjavaslat az Európai Unió adatvédelmi reformjának végrehajtása 
érdekében szükséges törvénymódosításokról (2019). Előadó: Dr. Trócsányi László igazságügyi miniszter. 
Budapest. p. 102. 
1874 Caron, M. (2018) ‘Les limites à la liberté d’expression d’un salarié sur Facebook’, Les Cahiers Sociaux, 
(305), p. 131. 
1875 Cour de cassation, chambre mixte, 18 mai 2007, N° 05-40803 
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whether abuse is present).1876 In sum, if the expression took place during a private 
conversation, the case should be examined from the angle of the right to respect for private 
life, meaning that the employee cannot be sanctioned, even if the expression was abusive. 
However, if the expression did not take place during a private conversation, the affair will 
be examined from the angle of freedom of expression, where abusive remarks can be 
sanctioned by the employer.1877 
667. Therefore, it is of crucial importance to determine whether SNSs are 
considered to be private or public space. Usually private correspondence takes place if the 
message is exclusively destined to one or several natural or legal persons who are 
determined or individualized.1878 According to the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 
correspondence is protected if the content is exclusively destined by a defined person to 
another defined individual, in contrast to messages made available to the public.1879 
Therefore, courts had to deal with the question of whether communication taking place on 
SNSs are covered by the notion of private correspondence. Especially the use of privacy 
settings – when access to the content is limited and maybe accessible only to the friends of 
the employee – raised questions regarding the nature of SNSs. (α) Courts already 
addressed this question; however, their rulings were not always uniform. (β) Finally, the 
Court of Cassation clarified the issue; notably, through its Civil Chamber in 2013, and 
finally the Social Chamber in two decisions from 2017 and 2018. 
(α) Assessment of the courts 
668. During the last few years lower courts received several cases in relation to 
“Facebook firings”. Generally, it can be said that these cases concerned employees who 
were dismissed because they published remarks on SNSs (typically on Facebook), relating 
to the workplace, employer or colleagues, which the employer found abusive. Employees 
pleaded that these matters took place in the course of a private 
 
1876 Corrignan-Carsin, D. (2018) ‘Tenir des propos injurieux sur Facebook au sein d’un groupe fermé ne 
justifie pas un licenciement’, JCP G Semaine Juridique (édition générale), (40), p. 1762. 
1877 Loiseau, G. (2018) ‘Réseaux sociaux et abus de la liberté d’expression : l’exception de cercle privé’, La 
Semaine Juridique Social, (41), p. 23. and Corrignan-Carsin, D. (2018) ‘Tenir des propos injurieux sur 
Facebook au sein d’un groupe fermé ne justifie pas un licenciement’, JCP G Semaine Juridique (édition 
générale), (40), p. 1762. 
1878 TI Puteaux, 28 sept. 1999. Cited in: Lepage, A. (2000) ‘Pas d’échelle de responsabilité sur Internet en 
matière de diffamation’, Communication Commerce Électronique, (2), p. 25. 
1879 TGI Paris, 17e ch., 2 nov. 2000, n°9725223011 cited in: Bitan, F. (2011) ‘Fasc. 4740 : Courrier 
électronique’, JurisClasseur Communication. 
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conversation/correspondence; therefore, as they are entitled to the right to respect for 
private life, their dismissal could not legally be based on these remarks. 
The decisions of the courts were not always coherent1880 regarding the private or 
public nature: though the exact circumstances could influence the decision, in some of 
them it was held that Facebook is a public sphere,1881 therefore the employer could take 
these remarks into consideration; while other decisions stated that the communication 
remained in the private sphere, therefore it was protected by the right to respect for private 
life.1882 However, several factors can influence the decision, such as the exact place where 
the content was published (e.g. on someone’s own profile, on someone else’s profile, in a 
private message, etc.), whether privacy settings were used (and if yes, exactly which 
settings were chosen) or whether the use of privacy settings could be proved. 
669. Publishing content to the wall. One of the main factors to be considered is 
whether the employee published the content to his/her own wall or to another user’s wall. 
In the case of publishing content to another user’s wall, the employee loses control over the 
information, as it is subjected to the privacy settings chosen by the other user. In one case 
at the Court of Appeal of Reims,1883 the employee contested the warning for misconduct 
that, as the employer alleged, he received for abusing his freedom of expression and 
breaching his duty of loyalty by posting insulting and defamatory remarks against his 
supervisor. The remarks were published to the wall of another employee and were 
available to everyone: the employer argued that Facebook is a public space, while the 
employee argued that Facebook is rather similar to an e-mail account and is considered as 
private correspondence. The Court of Appeal of Reims recalled that it cannot be ignored 
that Facebook, which is accessible through a simple Internet access, does not always 
guarantee the necessary confidentiality. According to it, posting a remark to the wall of 
another user potentially exposes the content to the public – depending on the privacy 
settings chosen by the other party, the use of which was not proved in the case. In addition, 
 
1880 As an illustrative example: on the very same day in cases relating to a dismissal based on the use of 
Facebook, the Court of Appeal of Besançon (CA Besançon, chambre sociale, 15 novembre 2011, n° 
10/02642) ruled that Facebook is considered to be public, while the Court of Appeal of Rouen (CA Rouen, 
chambre sociale, 15 novembre 2011, N° 11/01827) ruled that is private.  
1881 E.g. CA Reims, chambre sociale, 9 juin 2010, n° 09/03205; CA Besançon, chambre sociale, 15 novembre 
2011, n° 10/02642; CPH Boulogne-Billancourt (Section Encadrement), 19 novembre 2010, n° 09/00343 
1882 E.g.: CA Rouen, chambre sociale, 15 novembre 2011, n° 11/01827 and CA Rouen, 15 novembre 2011, 
N° 11/01830; CA Bordeaux, chambre sociale, section A, 12 février 2013, n°12/01832; CA Rennes, 8e 
chambre prud'homale, 2 mars 2018, n° 16/07806  
1883 CA Reims, chambre sociale, 9 juin 2010, n° 09/03205 
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a private correspondence supposes that a message should not be read by someone to whom 
it was not destined: in order to have a private conversation, the employee should have sent 
a private message through the messaging service of Facebook.1884 Therefore, the secrecy of 
correspondence was not violated by the employer. 
The Court of Appeal of Besançon1885 had to rule in a case relating to the dismissal of 
an employee who had a discussion on the wall of a former employee abusing the freedom 
of expression. The employee held that the discussion was a private conversation, as it took 
place on the wall of the former employee, available only to his Facebook contacts. In 
contrast, the employer held that the conversation was public as it could have been available 
to every user and if the employee wanted to have a private conversation, he should have 
used the function of sending private messages. The Court of Appeal stated that the aim of 
Facebook is to display and create a network of contacts between different users, supposed 
to grow in an exponential way through the application of the principle “the contacts of my 
contacts become my contacts”. Also, to a conversation taking place on the wall of a user, 
everyone could have access unless the user applied the privacy settings. It is the 
employee’s responsibility to either use the alternatives offered by the site or, in the case of 
publishing content to another user’s wall, to make sure prior to the publication that this 
user restricted access to his/her wall. Therefore, considering the basic nature and aim of the 
site and the fact that the employee had alternatives to ensure the private nature of the 
communication (through sending a private message), such conversation taking place on the 
wall is to be considered public.  
670. However, when it comes to publishing content to the “wall”, sometimes 
courts seem to ignore the functioning of Facebook. This is supported by the use of different 
terminology (e.g. publishing content to the “wall”1886 or to the “public wall”1887). The word 
wall is particularly misused when a court stated that Facebook is considered to be a public 
space by its nature, unless the user takes precaution and creates “a wall” to prevent free 
access to the site.1888 The Court of Appeal of Pau1889 held that publishing content to the 
 
1884 The Court of Appeal of Rouen held that the private messaging system of Facebook is considered to be of 
private nature. Source: CA Rouen, chambre sociale, 10 février 2015, n° 14/03335 and CA Rouen, chambre 
sociale, 15 mars 2018, n° 15/06042 
1885 CA Besançon, chambre sociale, 15 novembre 2011, n° 10/02642 
1886 CA Montpellier, 4e chambre sociale, section A, 14 mars 2018, n°14/09173 
1887 CA Lyon, chambre sociale B, 22 novembre 2012, n° 11/05140 
1888 CA Fort-de-France, Chambre sociale, 21 décembre 2012, n° 12/00053. In Facebook, a “wall” is not 
created: if the user decides to post something to his/her profile, it will go to the wall, where access can be 
restrained through the use of privacy settings. 
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“private and public walls” without being able to prove that only the employee’s contacts 
had access to the content on the “private wall” is considered to be public communication. 
Using the expression “private and public walls” is extremely confusing, as it is not clear 
what the Court of Appeal meant by that expression. In reality, every user has one “wall”, 
which can be either public, private or customized depending on the chosen privacy 
settings.  
671. Commenting. In another case at Court of Appeal of Reims,1890 an employee 
of the supermarket Cora was dismissed for a comment that he posted under a Facebook 
article of a journal, discussing the opening of the supermarket of Sundays. In his comment 
he encouraged customers to boycott the opening on Sundays and not to come to the 
supermarket on Sundays. The court of appeal started its analysis by pointing out that the 
employee is entitled to the freedom of expression both inside and outside the workplace. 
Then, it recalled that the expression constitutes an abuse if offensive, excessive or 
defamatory terms are employed.1891 According to the court of appeal, the language used 
was excessive. As regards the public/private nature of the expression, the court of appeal 
found that such a comment goes beyond the 12 users who liked the comment, as the 
journal itself had 112,000 followers, and the article received 453 likes; therefore, the 
comment could potentially have been read by numerous users. As a result, such an abuse 
on the part of the employee constituted the breach of the obligation of good faith, making it 
impossible to maintain his employment relationship. 
672. Use of privacy settings. Usually, the use of privacy settings has crucial 
importance.1892 Employees often argue that content available to a limited audience such as 
“friends” or “friends and friends of friends” is considered to be private communication. 
Allowing access to friends and friends of friends is considered to be public: in 2011 the 
Court of Appeal of Rouen1893 held that depending on the use of the privacy settings, 
 
1889 CA Pau, chambre sociale, 6 septembre 2018, n° 17/01648  
1890 CA Reims, chambre sociale, 15 novembre 2017, n° 16/02786 
1891 Also, the employee used the expression “we”, making it obvious that he was an employee of the 
concerned workplace. The court of appeal also took into consideration that the comments were posted only 2 
days before the opening.  
1892 As a reminder, before introducing customizable privacy settings, Facebook offered the choice of 
available only to friends, to friends and friends of friends, to every Facebook user and to everyone. 
1893 CA Rouen, chambre sociale, 15 novembre 2011, n° 11/01827 and CA Rouen, chambre sociale, 15 
novembre 2011, N° 11/01830 
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Facebook can be considered either a private space or a public space.1894 In the given case it 
was not proved whether the privacy settings chosen allowed access to an undetermined 
number of users (e.g. providing access to friends of friends), in a way that would make the 
conversation lose its private character. In addition, it was unknown how the employer had 
access to the content: it cannot be excluded that one of the participating users made him 
aware of the conversation. The Court of Appeal of Paris1895 reached a similar conclusion in 
relation to a case where an employee limited the access to the content (only available to 
friends), and though the employee had 449 friends, the employer could not prove that 
members of the management or clients were amongst these friends, and the only fact that a 
colleague transferred the page to the management is not enough to establish the public 
nature of the wall. 
673. The employment tribunal (“conseil de prud’hommes”) of Boulogne 
Billancourt1896 had to rule1897 in a case where an employee who worked as a recruitment 
officer at the Société Alten Sir was dismissed for serious misconduct for sharing remarks 
that were inciting to rebellion and were denigrating on one of her colleague’s Facebook 
wall. The employment tribunal stated that this colleague chose the privacy settings of 
sharing the content with “friends and their friends”, as such ensuring a public access to the 
remarks, with the possibility especially for colleagues and former colleagues to access 
them. Such an access exceeds the private sphere, therefore the content is a legitimate proof, 
and the employer did not violate the employee’s right to respect for private life.1898 Such 
reasoning reflects common sense and is in line with the functioning of SNSs,1899 but still 
 
1894 In contrast, the Court of Appeal of Douai held that participating in a social network site excludes 
confidentiality. Source: CA Douai, ch. soc., 26 janv. 2018, n° 16/0068 referred to in: Caprioli, É. A. (2018) 
‘Licenciement : obtention loyale de la preuve sur le réseau social Facebook afin de caractériser une faute 
grave’, Communication Commerce Électronique, (6), p. 43. 
1895 CA Paris, Pôle 6, chambre 5, 20 septembre 2018, n° 14/04515 
1896 CPH Boulogne-Billancourt (Section Encadrement), 19 novembre 2010, n° 09/00343  
1897 This case is quite significant and received much attention as it was the first decision in France addressing 
the private or public character of SNSs. Source: Sordet, E. (2010) ‘Facebook, néfaste pour la vie privée (des 
salariés) ?’, JCP G Semaine Juridique (édition générale), (48), p. 2228. 
1898 The tribunal then assessed whether the expressions used were abusive – which subject will be treated in 
part (b). 
1899 Hardouin, R. (2011) ‘Facebook ou l’établissement de la frontière entre espace public et sphère 
privée’, Revue Lamy droit de l’immatériel ex Lamy droit de l’informatique, (67), p. 55.; Ray, J.-E. (2010) 
‘Little Brothers are watching you’, Semaine sociale Lamy, 1470, p. 12. 
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ensures the possibility that if the appropriate steps are taken and limited access is set, it can 
be a private space.1900 
674. Not limiting access will cause that the communication will take place in a 
public space. According to the Court of Appeal of Fort-de-France, Facebook is considered 
to be a public space by its nature, unless the user takes precaution and creates “a wall” to 
prevent free access to the site.1901 Courts held that publishing content to the “wall”1902 or to 
the “public wall”,1903 or “to the wall without using privacy settings to allow access only to 
the authorized persons”,1904 to “the wall to which every Facebook user had access”,1905 or 
to “a Facebook page without limiting the audience in any way”1906 is considered to be 
public communication. The Court of Appeal of Pau1907 held that publishing content to the 
“private and public walls” without being able to prove that only the employee’s contacts 
had access to the content on the “private wall” is considered to be public communication. 
However, by stating that it is a public space because the employee was not able to prove 
that only his contacts had access to the content assumes that if only his contacts (which can 
mean a number up to several hundreds of users) had had access, the content would have 
been considered private. 
675. The Court of Appeal of Bordeaux1908 stated that the public nature of the 
conversation could not be proved, as there was no available information relating to the 
number of friends of the employee, or to the chosen privacy settings. However, earlier the 
court of appeal held that the user can choose between different privacy settings, such as 
allowing access to friends, to friends of friends or to every Facebook user – where the 
latter would make the conversation lose its nature of private correspondence. This could be 
interpreted as meaning that if friends and friends of friends had access, then – according to 
the court – the private nature of the communication would be established. The Court of 
 
1900 Picq, M. (2011) ‘Facebook et les salariés : vie privée, liberté d’expression et humour’, Revue des droits et 
libertés fondamentaux, (11), p. 2. [Page number referring to the online version of the article downloaded 
from: http://www.revuedlf.com/droit-social/facebook-et-les-salaries/# (Accessed: 15 August 2019)] 
1901 CA Fort-de-France, chambre sociale, 21 décembre 2012, n° 12/00053 
1902 CA Montpellier, 4e chambre sociale, section A, 14 mars 2018, n°14/09173 
1903 CA Lyon, chambre sociale B, 22 novembre 2012, n° 11/05140 
1904 CA Aix-en-Provence, 9e chambre A, 27 mars 2015, n° 13/20847 
1905 CA Versailles, 17e chambre, 4 octobre 2017, n° 15/03872 and CA Aix-en-Provence, 17e chambre B, 4 
février 2016, n° 14/13125 
1906 CA Lyon, chambre sociale A, 13 mars 2013, n° 12/05390 
1907 CA Pau, chambre sociale, 6 septembre 2018, n° 17/01648  
1908 CA Bordeaux, chambre sociale, section A, 12 février 2013, n°12/01832 
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Appeal of Rennes1909 held that the bailiff stated that the employee’s Facebook wall was 
accessible and therefore public, so communication on it was not considered as 
conversation between friends. However, it was not proven that the remarks were published 
on the wall. Therefore, they were reserved to friends and took place in a private setting. 
Thus, it is of great importance to define in a uniform matter whether SNSs are presumed to 
have a public or private nature as, if they are presumed to be public, the employee shall 
prove that despite all, the remarks were private, while if they are presumed to be private, 
the employer shall rebut the presumption by proving their public character.1910  
676. Private messages. Communicating within the private messaging system 
usually does not pose challenge, as it is usually recognized by courts that sending messages 
through the instant messaging service is considered to be private communication. The 
Court of Appeal of Reims held that as private correspondence supposes that a message 
should not be read by someone to whom it was not destined to, in order to have a private 
conversation, the employee should have sent a private message through the messaging 
service of Facebook.1911 The Court of Appeal of Rouen1912 held that the private messaging 
system of Facebook is considered to be of private nature, while the Court of Appeal of 
Besançon remarked that sending private message within Facebook constitutes a solution to 
ensuring the private nature of communication on this primarily public sphere.1913 
677. Forgetting to sign out. However, employees need to be cautious when 
accessing SNSs from their work computers as in certain cases private communication can 
lose its nature and protection. In a case in front of the Court of Appeal of Toulouse,1914 the 
court found that the conversation of an employee who forgot to disconnect from her 
Facebook account when accessing this site from her work computer, which therefore was 
visible on the screen of the computer by anyone present in the workplace, lost its private 
nature. In another case at the Court of Appeal of Caen1915 an employee accidentally 
accessed her colleague’s Facebook account when typing Facebook into Google – as the 
 
1909 CA Rennes, 8e chambre prud'homale, 2 mars 2018, n° 16/07806 
1910 Inforeg (2015) ‘Pouvoir disciplinaire : vie personnelle, vie professionnelle et Facebook’, Cahiers de droit 
de l’entreprise, (6), p. 68. 
1911 CA Reims, chambre sociale, 9 juin 2010, n° 09/03205 
1912 CA Rouen, chambre sociale, 10 février 2015, n° 14/03335 and CA Rouen, chambre sociale, 15 mars 
2018, n° 15/06042 
1913 CA Besançon, chambre sociale, 15 novembre 2011, n° 10/02642 
1914 CA Toulouse, 4e chambre sociale, 2e section, 2 février 2018, n° 16/04882 
1915 CA Caen, 1re chambre sociale, 27 janvier 2017, n° 15/04417 and CA Caen, 1re chambre sociale, 27 
janvier 2017, n° 15/04402 
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latter forgot to sign out. There she saw her colleague’s conversation that she found 
degrading, humiliating and violent, and reported it to the employer. However, when 
examining the documents provided by the parties, the court noted that when the employee 
accidentally accessed the Facebook account of the employee, she could have accessed the 
messaging system only after clicking on the button “messages” and then on this particular 
conversation. As such, the employer took into consideration messages that were identified 
as private (and without the presence of the employee) in irregular circumstances, not 
making it possible to rely on their content. 
678. Conclusions. In sum, it is not unambiguous from courts’ case law what 
exact conditions are necessary to be met in order to qualify the content on SNS as private – 
and ensure the protection of the right to respect for private life to it: in the light of the 
circumstances of the given cases, courts either found that Facebook was a public 
sphere,1916 or a private one.1917 
In most cases, courts – according to my opinion, correctly – ruled that Facebook is 
by nature a public sphere, except for the case of sending a private message, which was 
considered the most prominent example of ensuring private communication in this mainly 
public space. However, what is not clear is to what extent access should be limited, as 
courts mainly held that the content was deemed to be public because the user did not limit 
the access, but often stayed quiet regarding to what extent access should be limited. 
Although it seems accepted that a certain kind of limitation should be necessary in order to 
be qualified as private, for example, it is not clear whether access to friends is enough 
(also, such a concept is highly dependent on the number of friends as well). While the 
settings “friends and friends of friends” was deemed to provide access to an undetermined 
number of users and therefore was considered to be public, the formulation of other 
decisions suggested that only the “public” setting does not merit protection. In addition, 
questions of proof might constitute difficulties when addressing the private/public nature 
 
1916 CA Reims, chambre sociale, 9 juin 2010, n° 09/03205; CPH Boulogne-Billancourt (Section 
Encadrement), 19 novembre 2010, n° 09/00343; CA Besançon, chambre sociale, 15 novembre 2011, n° 
10/02642; CA Reims, chambre sociale, 15 novembre 2017, n° 16/02786; CA Montpellier, 4e chambre 
sociale, section A, 14 mars 2018, n°14/09173, CA Lyon, chambre sociale B, 22 novembre 2012, n° 
11/05140; CA Aix-en-Provence, 9e chambre A, 27 mars 2015, n° 13/20847; CA Versailles, 17e chambre, 4 
octobre 2017, n° 15/03872 and CA Aix-en-Provence, 17e chambre B, 4 février 2016, n° 14/13125, CA Lyon, 
chambre sociale A, 13 mars 2013, n° 12/05390 
1917 CA Rouen, chambre sociale, 15 novembre 2011, n° 11/01827 and CA Rouen, chambre sociale, 15 
novembre 2011, N° 11/01830; CA Bordeaux, chambre sociale, section A, 12 février 2013, n°12/01832; CA 
Rennes, 8e chambre prud'homale, 2 mars 2018, n° 16/07806; CA Versailles, 17e chambre, 7 février 2018, n° 
15/05739 
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of SNSs, when it could not be proved with certainty who had access to the content. 
Because of the lack of clarity, it was much needed that the Court of Cassation pronounces 
on this question – which luckily happened during the last years. 
(β) Decisions of the Court of Cassation 
679. The Court of Cassation addressed the subject of private or public nature of 
SNSs notably in three cases. The first one was held by the Civil Chamber in 2013,1918 
which contributed to unifying the divergent practice of lower courts. Then, in 20171919 
finally the Social Chamber issued a judgement in the subject – although it was heavily 
criticized by several authors.1920 Finally, in 2018,1921 the Social Chamber pronounced 
another judgement, which contains important guidance when it comes to assessing the 
nature of employees’ communication on SNSs. 
680. Court of Cassation: Civ. 1re, 10 avr. 2013, n°11-19530. In this case, the 
main question to be decided was whether the content published by an employee of Agence 
du Palais was considered as public or as non-public insults. The employee, the author of 
the remarks, posted content such as “should pass an act for exterminating pain-in-the-ass 
managers, like mine !!!” or “exterminating pain-in-the-ass managers” and “eliminate our 
bosses and especially uptight bosses [using a feminine noun in French language] who are 
ruining our lives!!!” She posted these matters to the sites Facebook and MSN, in a way that 
it was only available to a determined number of users (a group with 14 members), who she 
personally allowed to access the content. 
681. Regarding the decision itself and its significance, in this case, the Cour de 
cassation ruled the first time1922 that “[i]t is not a public insult if it is published on a social 
network account accessible only to authorized persons, in a very limited number by the 
author of the insults and who together form a community of interest.” In order to be 
qualified as non-public insult, the following three conditions must be meet: limited number 
 
1918 Cour de cassation, chambre civile 1, 10 avril 2013, N° 11-19530 
1919 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 20 décembre 2017, N° 16-19609  
1920 See notably the analysis provided by Grégoire Loiseau and Sébastien Mayoux. To be presented when 
analysing the decision. 
1921 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 12 septembre 2018, N° 16-11.690 
1922 Pierroux, E. (2015) ‘Facebook, Twitter et autres résaux sociaux: petites injures entres “amis”’, La Gazette 
du Palais, (336–337), p. 5. 
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of users has access, the owner of the profile has authorized them to participate in the 
conversation and they form a community of interest.1923 
Regarding the limited number of users, it becomes clear that using the privacy 
settings “friends of friends” – the majority of user profiles – will not be included in this 
case.1924 However, an important question arises: how many friends are acceptable? 
Qualifying them as persona grata does not cover cases when the employee accepts (maybe 
several hundreds of) friend requests, but refers to a more personalized authorization when 
the user is truly aware to whom he/she has granted access, cases where “only” the 
“friends” of the user have access without further distinction, should not be qualified non-
public.1925 
When determining whether the participating individuals form a community of 
interest,1926 judges adopt a casuistic and intuitive approach through examining the in 
concreto aspects of the case,1927 as the exact notion of community of interest is yet to be 
determined.1928 According to the decision itself, a community of interest consists of 
persons bound by a common membership, shared inspirations or objectives.1929 In the light 
of this definition, a closed Facebook group assembling employees from the same 
workplace in order to discuss a specific matter or subject would be considered as a 
community of interest.1930 
 
1923 Since this decision, lower courts also adopted the same approach, e.g. the Court of Appeal of Versailles 
recalled that it cannot be stated that Facebook is a public space if it is not contested that it was only limited to 
the “friends” of the employee who formed a community of interest and was only available only to those 
persons in a limited number, authorized by the employee. Source: CA Versailles, 17e chambre, 7 février 
2018, n° 15/05739 
1924 Ray, J.-E. (2013) ‘Facebook, espace public plus que privé. A propos de l’arrêt de la 1 ère Chambre civile 
du 10 avril 2013’, Semaine sociale Lamy, (1599), p. 17. 
1925 Of course, the case is different if the user has 6 friends (15? 31?) or 873 friends. 
1926 Through the concept of “community of interest” it is acknowledged that individuals usually address a 
specific group composed of several individuals – without the intention of reaching people outside of this 
circle. Source: Cassart, A. (2013) ‘L’extension de la notion de communauté d’intérêts aux réseaux 
sociaux’, Revue du Droit des Technologies de l’Information, (52), p. 102. 
1927 Pierroux, E. (2015) ‘Facebook, Twitter et autres résaux sociaux: petites injures entres “amis”’, La Gazette 
du Palais, (336–337), p. 6. 
1928 See the definitions and approaches presented by Ronan Hardouin in: Hardouin, R. (2011) ‘Facebook ou 
l’établissement de la frontière entre espace public et sphère privée’, Revue Lamy droit de l’immatériel ex 
Lamy droit de l’informatique, (67), p. 55. 
1929 This definition is very similar to the one proposed by professor Yves Mayaud. He defined community of 
interest as “common membership, shared inspirations or objectives […] of persons who form an entity closed 
enough for not to be perceived as involving third parties in relation to the author of the remarks.” Source: 
Mayaud, Y. (1998) ‘De la mise en cause diffamatoire d’une gestion municipale : l’enjeu de publicité’, Revue 
de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé, (1), p. 104. 
1930 Ray, J.-E. (2013) ‘Facebook, espace public plus que privé. A propos de l’arrêt de la 1 ère Chambre civile 
du 10 avril 2013’, Semaine sociale Lamy, (1599), p. 16. 
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Although today Facebook allows users to use differentiated and customized privacy 
settings (making it possible to easily grant access to members of the community of 
interest), several other sites (e.g. Twitter or Instagram) opt for the all or nothing approach, 
not making the use of tailored privacy settings possible. 
682. Court of Cassation: Soc., 20 déc. 2017, n°16-19609. The employee, who 
worked at a foodservice company, was successively the victim of physical aggression 
when leaving the workplace and the victim of an attempted armed robbery within the 
workplace. The day after the attempted robbery, she was on leave because of her 
depressive state, and the employer made her sign a new employment contract. In order to 
declare the contract void due to the defect in consent, she provided proof establishing that 
even before the attempt she had been taking antidepressants and her state got worse due to 
the attack. In order to contest this argument, the employer produced as evidence 
information obtained from the work cellphone of (not the employee who contested the 
contract but) another employee.1931 
683. The Court of Cassation ruled that “having noted that the minutes of the 
bailiff’s report […] requested by the company [...], relating to information extracted from 
the Facebook account of the employee, obtained from the work cellphone of another 
employee, information reserved to authorized persons, […] the employer could not have 
access to them without posing a disproportionate and unlawful interference in the private 
life of the employee.” In its reasoning by using both the expressions “disproportionate” and 
“unlawful”, the Court of Cassation referred to two separate matters.1932 Grégoire Loiseau 
notes that this judgement was particularly wrongly reasoned, as it mixed the separate 
questions of the ways of obtaining proof (question of legality of proof) and tracing the 
private or public nature of SNSs (question of right to respect for private life). Therefore, 
according to him, this decision failed to make a significant contribution.1933 
According to Sébastien Mayoux, it is important to note that it was the first time that 
the Social Chamber ever ruled in relation to Facebook, still, the decision is far from being 
 
1931 Péronne, G. and Daoud, E. (2018) ‘Accès par l’employeur au compte Facebook du salarié et droit à la vie 
privée’, Dalloz IP/IT, (5), p. 315. 
1932 Ray, J.-E. (2018) ‘Des “licenciements Facebook” à la sanction d’un “Like” ?’, Semaine sociale Lamy, 
(1830), p. 11. 
1933 Loiseau, G. (2018) ‘Réseaux sociaux et abus de la liberté d’expression : l’exception de cercle privé’, La 
Semaine Juridique Social, (41), p. 23. 
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satisfying despite its importance and reveals a multitude of unanswered questions.1934 For 
the subject of the dissertation notably the (interconnected) questions of the way of 
obtaining access through the other employee and the question of when and whether these 
private matters can become public are relevant. 
The decision is contrary to the previously established practice of courts according to 
which if the access to the content was restricted, the employer could not rely on it, and the 
same applied if he/she succeeded in obtaining it through a surreptitious way. However, if 
an individual who was originally granted access to the content decides to extract the 
information and to transmit it outside of the restricted access, it becomes public in a way 
that the employer can rely on it as proof.1935 However, the Court of Cassation did not state 
precisely the way the employer obtained access through the other employee: did the 
employee voluntarily shared the information with the employer or did the employer 
accessed the information through exercising his/her right to monitor the use of professional 
equipment?1936 
The Court of Cassation also stays silent regarding when such private content might 
become public. In addition, if the decision is interpreted extensively, it can lead to the re-
examination of the existing practice, as it would make quasi impossible for the employee 
to reveal those matters to the employer.1937 Besides, it was not specified what exactly is 
meant by information reserved to authorized persons.1938 
In sum, although the Social Chamber of the Court of Cassation finally ruled in the 
case of Facebook, the decision did not really help to establish a clear practice, as it mixed 
two distinct areas: the protection of the private life of the employee and the way of 
obtaining proof. Besides, the decision also lacked precision. Therefore, it was still 
necessary that the Social Chamber pronounces a decision in which it establishes the legal 
 
1934 Mayoux, S. (2018) ‘Licéité de la preuve recuillie sur Facebook par l’employeur’, Jurisprudence sociale 
Lamy, (449), pp. 24-25. 
1935 Mayoux, S. (2018) ‘Licéité de la preuve recuillie sur Facebook par l’employeur’, Jurisprudence sociale 
Lamy, (449), p. 24. 
1936 Mayoux, S. (2018) ‘Licéité de la preuve recuillie sur Facebook par l’employeur’, Jurisprudence sociale 
Lamy, (449), p. 24. 
1937 Mayoux, S. (2018) ‘Licéité de la preuve recuillie sur Facebook par l’employeur’, Jurisprudence sociale 
Lamy, (449), p. 25. 
1938 Icard, J. (2018) ‘De l’incidence de la source d’une communication d’un salarié sur sa nature et sur son 
régime’, Cahiers sociaux du Barreau de Paris, (304), p. 85. 
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framework applicable to the exercising employees’ freedom of expression on SNSs. 
Luckily, this happened in the decision of 18 September 2018.1939 
684. Court of Cassation: Soc., 12 sept. 2018, n°16-11.690. In this case, the 
Court of Cassation had to rule again in a case concerning an employee of Agence du 
Palais, for exchanging remarks eerily similar to those in the 2013 case of the Civil 
Chamber. The employee was member in a Facebook group entitled “Exterminating pain-
in-the-ass managers”, where she published insulting and offensive remarks relating to her 
employer. These remarks were only accessible to a closed group of 14 persons, authorized 
to have access by the owner of the account. As a result of her comments, she was 
dismissed for serious misconduct.1940 
685. The Social Chamber held that “the disputed remarks do not constitute a 
serious misconduct if published on a Facebook account created by the employee, 
accessible only to persons authorized by him/her composing a closed group of fourteen 
people, as such comments constitute a conversation of private nature.” By this, instead of 
referring to the wider notion of community of interest applied by the Civil Chamber in 
2013, the Social Chamber applies the concept of private circle (“cercle privé”) to 
determine the conditions of being qualified as private communication. Originating from 
copyright law, private circle in the context of social media and employment should refer to 
the circle of family and also to persons beyond family with whom private relations are 
usually maintained, designating a closed community or a network limited to close contacts 
who have close relations with each other or at least with one person from the group.1941 In 
relation to SNSs, it is important to evoke that the Court of Cassation already stated that the 
term “friend” used in the context of SNSs referring to contacts within these sites is not 
identical to the term friend used to describe relationships in the traditional sense of the 
term.1942 Therefore the private circle should not be merged with the online “friends” of the 
individual, as in order to be qualified as private communication, the determination of the 
 
1939 Loiseau, G. (2018) ‘Réseaux sociaux et abus de la liberté d’expression : l’exception de cercle privé’, La 
Semaine Juridique Social, (41), p. 23. 
1940 CA Paris, Pôle 6, chambre 8, 3 décembre 2015, n° 13/01716 
1941 Loiseau, G. (2018) ‘Réseaux sociaux et abus de la liberté d’expression : l’exception de cercle privé’, La 
Semaine Juridique Social, (41), p. 24. 
1942 Cour de cassation, chambre civile 2, 5 janvier 2017, N° 16-12394 
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persons who have access to the remarks is also necessary.1943 Also, the number of persons 
having access to the content should be limited. 
Besides this close relation between the participants in the conversation, there are two 
other important conditions that have to be met in order to qualify the communication as 
private: the number of persons having access and the determination of the persons who 
have access to the remarks. Regarding the number of users, it should be low: therefore, the 
question arises what is considered to be a low number in this context? As it is impossible 
to give a precise answer adequate to all situations, it will be the trial judge’s task to 
determine these boundaries.1944, 1945 
686. Conclusions drawn from the decisions of the Court of Cassation. In sum, 
the use of privacy settings in itself (opting for the use of “private” profile, which in reality 
rather means “not public”) does not automatically qualify the information as private. The 
use of privacy settings making content available only to “friends” is considered public in 
the age when users often have several hundreds of contacts on these sites. Having a limited 
number of contacts (although it is not evident what is considered to be limited number) in 
itself is still not enough: persons having access to the communication have to be part of a 
private circle, meaning that they must have some kind of close relationship with each 
other. In addition, they cannot have automatic access, their access has to be determined by 
the individual owning the account. For example, a small group of colleagues discussing 
work-related matters would fall under this category. 
In the context of Facebook, it means that creating, for example, a private group, or 
customizing the privacy settings of the posts to only share content with the members of the 
private circle would be a way to ensure the private nature of communication. On other 
SNSs – which do not allow the use of customized privacy settings –, creating chat rooms 
(instead of discussing those matters on the profile of the individual) for those few, chosen 
persons (colleagues in the context of the dissertation) can be a way to ensure that the 
communication has a private nature. 
b) Activities beyond working hours: the Hungarian Labour Code 
 
1943 Corrignan-Carsin, D. (2018) ‘Tenir des propos injurieux sur Facebook au sein d’un groupe fermé ne 
justifie pas un licenciement’, JCP G Semaine Juridique (édition générale), (40), p. 1762. 
1944 Loiseau, G. (2018) ‘Réseaux sociaux et abus de la liberté d’expression : l’exception de cercle privé’, La 
Semaine Juridique Social, (41), p. 25. 
1945 For example, the Court of Appeal of Aix-en-Province held in a case that having 179 friends does not 
constitute a private space for exchange. Source: CA Aix-en-Provence, 5 février 2016, n° 14/13717 
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687. Lack of Hungarian jurisprudence. In contrast to France, in Hungary, there 
is no abundant jurisprudence in relation to labour law and SNSs,1946 as such it should be 
examined whether conclusions drawn from the French case law can serve as a guidance for 
Hungary as well. In Hungary notably the following cases should be mentioned. 
In 2013 the Curia ruled in the case of an employee who was dismissed due to his 
Facebook activity.1947 With the statements used in the post, the employee threatened and 
insulted the employer and encouraged the fellow employees to get organized against the 
employer. The court of first instance held that the post was available to anyone, thus it was 
a public post and its content was able to cause the misjudgment of the employer.1948 It also 
observed that the employee identified himself on his Facebook profile as an employee of 
the given employer – thus it was unquestionable who the post related to. The second 
instance court upheld this judgement and added that the post indeed could not be 
considered private and the language used overstepped the limits of the freedom of 
expression. The Curia affirmed this decision and argued that with the post in question the 
employee indeed breached his obligations, thus the dismissal was lawful. 
Another case in Hungary related to a prosecutor, in which case the prosecutor’s 
employment relationship was terminated due to the use of SNSs. The reason for 
termination was that the prosecutor shared three posts with political content during the 
election campaign in 2018. As a reaction to these posts, the prosecutor’s office initiated 
disciplinary proceedings, and finally terminated the employment relationship of the 
prosecutor.1949 The prosecutor turned to court, which held at the first instance that two 
posts were protected by the prosecutor’s freedom of speech, and only the third one 
constituted a disciplinary offence.1950 However, the court held that the sanction was 
 
1946 Kardkovács, K. (ed.) (2016) A Munka Törvénykönyvének magyarázata. 3rd edn. Budapest: HVG-ORAC 
Lap- és Könyvkiadó, p. 47. 
1947 Mfv. 10.469/2013/4. 
1948 It is important to note that the decision was based on the previous HLC, more precisely on its item c of 
Subsection (1) of Section 103 stating that emplyoees shall “cooperate with their co-workers and perform 
work, and otherwise proceed in a manner without endangering the health and safety of others, without 
disturbing their work and causing financial detriment or damaging their reputation;”  
1949 Pert nyert az ügyész, akit három Facebook-posztja miatt rúgtak ki (2019) Adózóna. Available 
at: https://adozona.hu/munkajog/Pert_nyert_az_ugyesz_akit_harom_Facebookpos_RUXHRH (Accessed: 9 
January 2020). 
1950 The first post was uploaded on 15th of March (a national celebration day in Hungary), a picture of a flock 
of sheep where the prosecutor wrote the caption “this is all that I am going to remember about the celebration 
of today. I stayed at home, sleeping, watching movies, reading. I hope that this time next year I will have the 
mood to go out.” On this day the political opposition held protests and also a peaceful march was organized. 
According to the court, this post did not constitute political activity and did not have an effect on the work of 
the prosecutor or an impact on the independency of the prosecutor’s office. 
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excessive, and instead of the termination of the employment relationship, it ordered to 
decrease the payment category of the prosecutor.1951 The prosecutor’s office appealed the 
decision, but in November 2019 the second instance court took the same position.1952 
688. “Facebook firings” and the media. In the media a growing number of news 
can be observed, reporting the case of employees who were sanctioned or dismissed based 
on their activities. For example, in 2009 a telecommunication employee was dismissed for 
publishing a post on his Twitter account (although on the official and not his personal one) 
in relation to the temporary shutdown of a competitor service provider. Albeit the post was 
intended to be humorous, the employer found it unprofessional and contrary to fair 
competition.1953 In 2016, an employee was dismissed for a Facebook post, in which he 
complained about the Sunday work that was ordered by the employer. Even though the 
post did not contain the employer’s name, other employees commented it, and the 
employer found that by publicly questioning his measures, the employee discredited the 
employer and adversely influenced work ambiance.1954, 1955 Despite the fact that it is indeed 
 
The second post was sharing a picture from the page “those who have been banned from the page of Orbán” 
(This is a reference to Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary). In the picture uniting hands were seen, 
with a logo of the opposing parties on them and with the text: “If 1 million users share this picture, there will 
be cooperation! Now is the time, now or never!”. The court held that it belonged to the freedom of expression 
of the prosecutor to share such a post, as it did not cause direct disadvantage for the image of the prosecutor’s 
office. 
The third post was the most problematic one. The prosecutor shared an article on a political person who 
might have participated in a fraud affair. The prosecutor wrote the caption “well, every ‘accused’ can choose 
his/her defense, we will laugh at him/her at most. Good luck… yeah, and 8th of April.” (8th of April 2018 
being the date of the then upcoming elections.) According to the court, from the circle of friends it was 
revealed that he worked as a prosecutor and as such, the post indeed endangered the prestige of the 
prosecutor’s profession. 
1951 Német, T. (2019) Pert nyert az ügyész, akit három Facebook-posztja miatt rúgtak ki, Index. Available 
at: https://index.hu/belfold/2019/05/10/facebook_per_ugyesz_ugyeszseg_kirugas_itelet/ (Accessed: 9 
January 2020). 
1952 Német, T. (2019) Jogerős: vissza kell venni a Facebook-posztjai miatt kirúgott ügyészt, Index. Available 
at: https://index.hu/belfold/2019/12/23/jogeros_vissza_kell_venni_a_facebook-
posztjai_miatt_kirugott_ugyeszt/ (Accessed: 9 January 2020). 
1953 Kirúgták a twitterező Vodafonost (2009) Index. Available 
at: https://index.hu/tech/cellanaplo/2009/12/09/kirugtak_a_twitterezo_vodafonost/(Accessed: 5 November 
2018). 
1954 Kirúgták, mert a Facebookon azt írta: Jó irányba halad a szekér? (2016) Index. Available 
at: https://index.hu/belfold/2016/10/15/az_allasaba_kerult_hogy_a_facebookon_azt_irta_jo_iranyba_halad_a
_szeker/(Accessed: 15 November 2018). 
1955 Or see, for example, the case of a chancellor of a university resigning as a result of a scandal after posting 
pictures of refugees (Lemondott Devecz Miklós, a szegedi egyetem kancellárja (2015) Index. Available at: 
https://index.hu/belfold/2015/09/28/lemondott_devecz_miklos_a_szegedi_egyetem_kancellarja/(Accessed: 3 
May 2018).), a teacher posting about Nazi propaganda (Kirúgták a tanítónőt, aki két Hitler-kép között üzent a 
tankönyvekről a Facebookon (2015) 444. Available at: https://444.hu/2015/09/10/kirugtak-a-tanitonot-aki-
ket-hitler-kep-kozott-uzent-a-tankonyvekrol-a-facebookon/ (Accessed: 15 November 2018).) - all being 
referred to througout the Title. 
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a growing phenomenon in Hungary, the reliability of such news should be treated with 
caution.1956 
689. Doctrine. As the examination of Hungarian case law does not provide 
answer to the private-public nature of SNSs, attention should be paid to the doctrine. 
However, the arising challenge is that, compared to French doctrine, the number of 
Hungarian authors dealing with this subject is more limited. Moreover, the question of the 
private-public nature of SNSs is raised in a different context. When examining Subsection 
(2) of Section 8 of the HLC, it is likely that this Subsection can be applied to the off-duty 
SNS use of employees1957 – naturally, if other requirements are met. It was in relation to 
(former) Section 111958 prohibiting the monitoring of employees’ private lives that the 
question of whether off-duty SNS use falls under “private life” was raised. 
690. At first sight, Section 8 and the protection of employees’ private life might 
seem contradictory, as Section 8 seemingly authorizes the employer to monitor the private 
life of the employee, while former Section 11 stipulated that the employee’s private life 
cannot be subjected to monitoring. Gábor Mélypataki and Zoltán Rácz resolve this 
contradiction by reasoning that difference should be made between the right to control 
(Section 8) and the right to monitor (Section 11). Namely, while Section 11 provides the 
employer a true power to monitor the employee (direct monitoring), Section 8 does not 
necessarily grant the right to monitor employees’ behaviour outside working hours, but 
rather ensures the possibility to sanction the behaviour of the employee, as an indirect form 
of monitoring.1959 
691. According to László Pók, although Section 8 authorizes the employer to 
restrict employees’ behaviour outside working hours, the monitoring of such behaviour 
 
1956 Such as the cases which were only available on the site “www.mindennapi.hu”: one of them related to a 
Hungarian editorial enterprise whose employee published disparaging comments on the readers and cited 
from young girls’ unpublished reader’s letters – while the logo of the workplace was clearly visible in the 
blog posts. Source: Takács, G. (2011) Facebook-mánia: sokan a munkahelyüket is kockára 
teszik, mindennapi. Available at: http://www.mindennapi.hu/cikk/eletmod/facebook-mania-sokan-a-
munkahelyuket-is-kockara-teszik/2011-07-09/4869 (Accessed: 1 August 2019). 
1957 Pók, L. (2012) ‘A közösség hálójában – Közösségi oldalak munkajogi vonatkozásai’, Infokommunikáció 
és jog, (1), p. 15. 
1958 It must be emphasized that despite without explicitly stating the prohibition of monitoring employees’ 
private life, the protection of employees’ private life is still derived from the Fundamental Law and from the 
Civil Code. Source: T/4479. számú törvényjavaslat az Európai Unió adatvédelmi reformjának végrehajtása 
érdekében szükséges törvénymódosításokról (2019). Előadó: Dr. Trócsányi László igazságügyi miniszter. 
Budapest. p. 102. 
1959 Source: Mélypataki, G. and Rácz, Z. (2018) ‘A személyiségi jogok védelmének ütközése a 
munkajogban’, in Auer, Á. et al. (eds) Ünnepi kötet a 65 éves Kiss György tiszteletére - Liber Amicorum in 
honorem Georgii Kiss aetatis suae LXV. Budapest: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, p. 679., p. 682. 
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seems to be problematic, as it would be hard not to qualify behaviour outside working 
hours as pertaining to the private life of the employee. According to him, it is hardly 
acceptable to monitor employees’ online SNS activity, conducted outside working hours 
and with the use of their own devices.1960 In contrast to this position, Edit Kajtár expresses 
a more nuanced opinion and recalls that the formulation of Section 11 allows the employer 
to monitor the behaviour of workers to the extent pertaining to the employment 
relationship, implying that the monitoring per se is not forbidden: if requirements are met, 
the employer might be allowed to monitor off-duty conducts as well.1961 Ildikó Rácz joins 
this position and argues that with regard to Section 8, although only to a limited extent, the 
employee’s off-duty online behaviour can be subject to monitoring.1962 
692. According to my opinion, it is correct to interpret the HLC’s provisions as 
allowing the employer to monitor off-duty SNS use. However, this monitoring cannot be 
unlimited: as in Hungarian law as well the concept of private life is associated with 
concealment, and protection is afforded against intrusion into the private life of the 
individual. According to Gábor Mélypataki and Zoltán Rácz, the arising legal question is 
whether an SNS post can be qualified as private secret. According to them, through a 
background check, the employer might gain access to information which can be qualified 
as private secret.1963 However, they do not specify what scenario they mean by conducting 
background checks: the employer systematically going through the publicly available data 
on employees or the employer using stratagems to access data that the employee tried to 
seal from him/her?1964 Neither do they define what exactly is understood under private 
secret in this context, and as a result, it is difficult to assess what they understand by 
 
1960 Pók, L. (2012) ‘Lájkolni szabad? Munkavállalói véleménynyilvánítás az új Munka Törvénykönyve 
tükrében’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (4), p. 164. 
1961 Kajtár, E. (2015) ‘Európai ügyek a Facebook sötét oldaláról - A munkavállalók közösségi oldalakon 
tanúsított kötelezettségszegő magatartása’, in Horváth, I. (ed.) Tisztelgés: ünnepi tanulmányok Dr. 
Hágelmayer Istvánné születésnapjára. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, p. 203. 
Kajtár also interprets the HLC as it only forbids to violate employees’ private life and does not forbid it to be 
the subject of monitoring. Although in my opinion this conclusion does not obviously follow from the 
wording of the HLC in Hungarian, it is indeed reflected in its official English translation. 
1962 Rácz, I. (2015) ‘A közösségi média használatának árnyoldalai a munkaviszonyban’, in Deres, P. and 
Grad-Gyenge, A. (eds) Acta Iuvenum Caroliensia VII.Budapest: Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem Állam- 
és Jogtudományi Kar, p. 285. 
1963 Mélypataki, G. and Rácz, Z. (2018) ‘A személyiségi jogok védelmének ütközése a munkajogban’, in 
Auer, Á. et al. (eds) Ünnepi kötet a 65 éves Kiss György tiszteletére - Liber Amicorum in honorem Georgii 
Kiss aetatis suae LXV. Budapest: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, p. 682. 
1964 Although they argue that the application of a “snitch regime” through encouraging employees in internal 
policies to report their colleagues in case they detect a questionable SNS post is considered illegitimate. 
Mélypataki, G. and Rácz, Z. (2018) ‘A személyiségi jogok védelmének ütközése a munkajogban’, in Auer, 
Á. et al. (eds) Ünnepi kötet a 65 éves Kiss György tiszteletére - Liber Amicorum in honorem Georgii Kiss 
aetatis suae LXV. Budapest: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, p. 682. 
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private secret in the context of SNSs (Accessing private messages somehow? A closed 
group? A profile accessible only to contacts?).  
According to civil law, the concept of “private secret” refers to any data, information 
or knowledge the keeping or isolation of which the owner of the secret is interested in1965 – 
however, as it was addressed in Part I., privacy is a concept going beyond mere secrecy. 
With regard to the expressions “keep” or “isolate” the given information from the outside 
world, it is unlikely that the protection afforded to private secrets would apply to cases 
where the individual voluntarily decided to ignore the existence of privacy settings and to 
share the information publicly in social media. However, this concept can be evoked when 
the employer bypasses the employee’s efforts to conceal the information, and somehow 
gains access to it; the consideration of SNSs as per se private spaces would constitute the 
complete ignorance of the basic functioning and nature of SNSs. It would be unreasonable 
to expect the employer not to look at the information which the employee voluntarily 
shared with the public. Of course, the situation might be different when the employee 
applied the privacy settings or made other steps to conceal the information from the public. 
Also, acknowledging the public character of such sites would not leave the employee 
without any protection, as data protection requirements must be met regardless of the 
public-private nature of SNSs.1966 According to my opinion, French jurisprudence found 
the balance (even though it still needs to be refined in certain detail) – and therefore could 
serve as an example for Hungary as well –, according to which SNSs are considered to be 
public spaces unless the employee restricted the access to a considerable extent. French 
courts have already identified important criteria that should be taken into consideration at 
the decision-making, such as the use of privacy settings, the nature of the people who can 
have access to the post, etc. – which might serve as a guidance for Hungarian courts as 
well when they decide in similar cases.  
(B) Criticising the employer? 
 
1965 ‘A magántitokhoz való jog és a know-how’ (no date) Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció, 8(5), p. 15. 
1966 The NAIH already addressed the question from a data protection point of view: though it made 
statements in relation to the recruitment phase, these statements can be adequately applied to the case of 
employees’ off-duty conduct and SNSs. According to the NAIH, it would be unrealistic to expect employers 
not to consult all these freely available information on prospective employees. Source: NAIH (2016) A 
Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi adatkezelések alapvető 
követelményeiről. Budapest, p. 19. 
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693. In France, employees’ freedom of expression comprises the right to criticize 
the employer or the workplace.1967 However, the limit of this freedom is abuse: abuse is 
clearly identified in cases when freedom of expression no longer serves the freedom of 
expressing opinions and impart information objectively presenting a link with the 
professional activity, but rather constitutes a way of incriminating the morality or integrity 
of the employer or one of the managers, denigrating a supervisor or jeopardizing the 
employer’s reputation or image.1968 In Hungarian law as well, it was already elaborated 
that although the employee has the right to freedom of expression, including that he/she 
can criticize the employer, it does not mean that he/she can express his/her opinion in a 
way contrary to the economic and organizational interests of the employer, harming or 
jeopardizing them, ignoring the requirement of moderation.1969 
694. In relation to SNSs it is not uncommon that the posts serving as a basis for 
dismissal contained excessive expressions and abused the employee’s freedom of 
expression. As a result, it must be examined what the limits of such freedom are on SNSs. 
First (a) French case law will be addressed, (b) followed by Hungarian regulation.  
a) Abusing freedom of expression: France 
695. The employee’s expression constitutes an abuse if he/she uses insulting, 
defamatory or excessive remarks.1970 The limits of defamation and insults are defined by 
the Act on the freedom of press,1971 while defining what constitutes an excessive remark 
depends on the context.1972 It can be determining, for example, if the remark has left the 
workplace and has become available to exterior persons, such as, for example, to 
clients.1973 The position of the employee is also important: naturally, when it comes to 
expression on social media, the expectations are also higher towards someone who is in a 
 
1967 For example, the Court of Cassation found that – amongst others – the employee has the right to criticize 
the employer’s commercial policy, or a project of the undertaking, or has the right to hand out flyers 
questioning managerial practices at the exit of the workplace. Source: Loiseau, G. (2014) ‘Le liberté 
d’expression du salarié’, Revue droit du travail Dalloz, (6), p. 396. 
1968 Loiseau, G. (2014) ‘Le liberté d’expression du salarié’, Revue droit du travail Dalloz, (6), pp. 400-401. 
1969 1050/2004. számú munkaügyi elvi határozat  
1970 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 30 octobre 2002, N° 00-40868 
1971 Article 29 of the Act of 29 July 1881 on the freedom of press: “any allegation or attribution of an act that 
damages the honour or reputation of the person or entity against which the allegation or attribution is made 
constitutes defamation[,]” and “[a]ny offensive expression, term of contempt or invective which does not 
contain a specific allegation constitutes an insult”. 
1972 Caron, M. (2018) ‘Les limites à la liberté d’expression d’un salarié sur Facebook’, Les Cahiers Sociaux, 
(305), p. 132. 
1973 Caron, M. (2018) ‘Les limites à la liberté d’expression d’un salarié sur Facebook’, Les Cahiers Sociaux, 
(305), p. 132. 
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higher position or is professionally recognized. 1974, 1975 Particularly three aspects of the 
subject will be examined: first, what kind of expressions are considered to be excessive, 
second, can humour or the use of smileys make the remarks lose their serious nature, and 
third, what importance the identification of the workplace/employer can have. 
696. Use of excessive expressions. French courts already had to address the 
question of abuse in relation to expression on SNSs. The severity of the employee’s acts 
was also well-founded in a case1976 in which an employee published a comment under a 
grotesque picture representing the effigy in wax of an obese Louis X. having crutches as 
the king of gout – in which he compared this king to his manager in an injuring way. 
During the preceding year, the manager had to wear crutches for months, as she had 
broken her leg. The comment said that “anyway, he seriously reminds me of a manager 
that I knew” and it was publicly available for months. According to the court, the 
conjunction of the reported facts results in the impossibility of the employment 
relationship. 
For example, courts held that an employee who consoled a former employee who 
had recently been dismissed, stating on the wall of the latter that “yes, it is clear, this 
company disgusts me” and “yes, it is certain that you are going to find something, it will 
enable you to see other horizons, but it still sucks the way they did it, they deserve to have 
the shitty workplace set on fire” was violent and excessive.1977 In another case,1978 the 
employee acted in an disrespectful way and it constituted a serious misconduct when she 
qualified her colleagues as “piece of trash” or wished her colleague “a nice day with the 
fools”, approved of calling her boss a “stupid fat asshole” who is “disgusting with [her] but 
she’s not gonna get far with her enterprise”, adding that “she works with big pussies”. 
Also, an employee’s comment in relation to the opening of the supermarket on Sundays 
using the expression “bunch of assholes”1979 was considered to be an excessive term.1980 In 
 
1974 Ray, J.-E. (2011) ‘Facebook, le salarié et l’employeur’, Droit social, (2), p. 136. 
1975 That was the case when a recruitment officer – who is in contact with job applicants and prospective 
employees – published excessive remarks relating to the workplace in a public discussion. Source: CPH 
Boulogne-Billancourt (Section Encadrement), 19 novembre 2010, n° 09/00343 
1976 CA Orléans, 28 février 2013, N° 12/01717 
1977 CA Besançon, chambre sociale, 15 novembre 2011, N° 10/02642 
1978 CA Toulouse, 4e chambre sociale, 2e section, 2 février 2018, n° 16/04882 
1979 He stated that “Goin there n workin on Sundays bunch of asshole its not you who wake up and who hav a 
family life do not piss us of by goin there Sundayy !!!!!!!” 
1980 CA Reims, chambre sociale, 15 novembre 2017, n° 16/02786 
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another case,1981 the court found the severity of the acts established when the employee 
posted a picture of a woman pointing a gun towards the lenses of the camera, with the 
description “feeling of the day” and repeated death threats against the personnel of the 
workplace. According to the court, as these remarks were not destined to a specific person, 
they did not constitute a death threat in a criminal law way; however, they had an extreme 
nature, as she alluded to committing a violent act against a part of the personnel. 
697. Use of smileys. Today, it is part of popular culture that users use different 
smileys during online written communication, especially on informal sites such as 
Facebook. Smileys can “express” different feelings such as happiness, sadness, anger, etc. 
However, the exact meaning of smileys is harder to be interpreted than interpreting their 
equivalent feelings in the offline world. Therefore, employees might try to reason that due 
to the use of smileys, their remarks were not serious, but had a funny or humorous1982 
nature instead of being excessive.1983 
In the case of Barbera v. Société Alten Sir,1984 where employees participated in a 
conversation on one of their colleague’s Facebook wall, the employee argued that the 
remarks that she wrote were only jokes and should not be taken seriously. She supported 
this statement by recalling that at the end of the remark she added “ha-ha-ha” (encouraging 
a colleague to join the local ritual and “piss [the manager] off” the “whole day without her 
noticing it” and then “make her life impossible for months, ha-ha-ha”), which therefore 
made the content humorous. However, the employment tribunal found that in this context 
these remarks ending with the phrase “ha-ha-ha” could not be interpreted in a humorous 
way and they were able to damage the employer’s reputation and therefore the dismissal 
was well-founded. 
The humorous character of the remarks was not established by the Court of Appeal of 
Paris1985 in a case where the employee, a professor posted certain incriminating remarks in 
the Facebook group of his year. He made exchanges of particularly displaced familiarity 
with his students: he teased and taunted certain of them and said, amongst others, regarding 
 
1981 CAVersailles, 17e chambre, 7 février 2018, n° 15/05739 
1982 According to the Court of Cassation, the use of a humorous style can be considered as an attenuating 
circumstance. Source: Dabosville, B. (2012) ‘Les contours de l’abus d’expression du salarié’, Revue droit du 
travail Dalloz, (5), p. 276. referring to Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 2 février 2011, N° 09-69351  
1983 Picq, M. (2011) ‘Facebook et les salariés : vie privée, liberté d’expression et humour’, Revue des droits et 
libertés fondamentaux, (11). 
1984 CPH Boulogne-Billancourt (Section Encadrement), 19 novembre 2010, n° 09/00343 
1985 CA Paris, Pôle 6, chambre 9, 3 décembre 2015, n° 15/04533 
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the upcoming oral exams that “formal attire is required […] the one who comes dressed as 
Jabba the Hutt, I will give him/her 20 out of 20,1986” or alluded to the fact that he could be 
bribed: “OK I admit, 10 euros for a bonus point, I give in”. He defended himself by stating 
that he was not abusing his freedom of expression, as these remarks were humorous, they 
were taken out of their original context. However, according to the court, a professor 
engaging in such conduct of teasing his students and of adopting such familiarity, even if 
the students are of age, constitutes a wrongful conduct and an abuse of his freedom of 
expression. From these cases it seems that the excessive nature of the content does not 
seem to be affected by the use of smileys. 
698. Identifying the subject of the expression of opinion. Being able to identify 
who is concerned in these posts can have an importance. Employees regularly argued that 
these remarks did not relate to the employer/workplace, and therefore they did not 
constitute a breach of their obligation arising from the employment contract. 
699. In a case at the Court of Appeal of Besançon,1987 the employee took part in a 
discussion taking place on the wall of a former colleague and defended herself by arguing 
that she never named the employer in the discussion: the employer’s identity was revealed 
later by another employee, after she had logged out from the site. However, according to 
the court of appeal, although the employee did not identify the employer, still, the latter 
was identified and the lack of intent of the employee to identify the employer had no effect 
as long as her imprudent conduct led to the same result – even if she had logged out from 
the site. 
In another case at the Court of Appeal of Rennes,1988 the employee cited the lyrics of 
a song stating “the bosses, the bosses, they are like pigs”1989 and argued that it was not 
established that it related to the employer. However, the court noted that he posted this text 
as a response to an employee’s post, which clearly related to the employer and all 
happened two days after there was a misunderstanding at the workplace in relation to 
premiums. From this context it was unquestionable that the text related to the employer. In 
the case1990 where the employee complained in an excessive comment regarding the 
 
1986 20 is the highest mark that a student can have in the French educational system. 
1987 CA Besançon, chambre sociale, 15 novembre 2011, N° 10/02642 
1988 CA Rennes, 8e chambre prud'homale, 2 mars 2018, n° 16/07806 
1989 Song of Les sales majestés entitled Les patrons. In French the original lyrics was “les patrons, c’est 
comme les cochons”. 
1990 CA Reims, chambre sociale, 15 novembre 2017, n° 16/02786 
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opening of the workplace (a supermarket) on Sundays, the fact that he used the expression 
“us”1991 made it obvious that the comment came from an employee of the supermarket – 
contributing to establishing the existence of the abusive nature of the remarks. 
At the Court of Appeal of Fort-de-France1992 the employee did not contest the 
insulting nature of her remarks,1993 but argued that the remarks were not relating to her 
supervisors, but to a third person who was a manager in an association where she did 
voluntary work. The Court of Appeal did not accept this reasoning, as according to it, this 
phrase spoke for itself, especially because it was published in a particularly tense 
atmosphere, as the day before a meeting was organised, where the management – 
composed of women originating from the French mainland – confronted the employees 
over a previous incident. 
700. However, the Court of Appeal of Reims1994 did not find the link established 
between the employer and the employee’s remarks in a case where the employee stated 
“our boss, he is really autistic, do you know a special centre where she could be treated?”. 
The court remarked that on the one hand, no one was named in the text, and the expression 
boss (“chef” in French) is used not only to designate the professional relationship within 
the employment context. Also, even the employer itself was not certain who was targeted 
by this text (he hesitated between a colleague and a member of the management). 
Therefore, it was not unambiguous who this text was about, as consequence, it did not 
constitute a breach of the employee’s obligation. 
701. In conclusion, the criteria that can help French courts in assessing whether 
the expression used was excessive is the style used (which is not alleviated by smileys) and 
also the identifiability of the employer. French courts typically found that the use of 
excessive expressions is present when the employees expressed themselves through 
employing typically vulgar expressions or through serious content, such as death threats. 
Although employees might try to argue that these expressions were only humorous due to, 
for example, the use of smileys, such argumentation is not accepted by courts. Also, being 
able to identify the employer or the workplace can have an importance: without explicitly 
 
1991 “Goin there n workin on Sundays bunch of asshole its not you who wake up and who hav a family life do 
not piss us of by goin there Sundayy !!!!!!!” 
1992 CA Fort-de-France, chambre sociale, 21 décembre 2012, n°12/00053 
1993 “but when your management treats you like a last piece of shit, you can flip out, especially when it’s a 
White who comes to make rules in your country” 
1994 CA Reims, chambre sociale, 9 juin 2010, N° 09/03205 
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naming the person/company to whom the remarks are destined, courts often establish the 
link between the remarks and the workplace from the context. 
b) Freedom of expression: Hungary 
702. In Hungarian law the employee can express his/her critical opinion towards 
a supervisor or a colleague without being sanctioned/reprimanded for it if it is based on 
real facts and states nothing which is capable of disturbing the order and discipline at work 
or discredit or insult the employer. Therefore, an employee can express his/her opinion in a 
“neutral”, not insulting way, without aiming to influence other employees, while the use of 
harsh words and unspeakable forms is not permissible.1995, 1996 Although criticizing the 
employer is comprised in the right to freedom of expression, the employee cannot exercise 
this right by ignoring the requirement of moderation and jeopardizing the employer’s 
interests, as that would constitute the infringement of the obligation of cooperation.1997 
He/she cannot exercise this right by making any possible shortcomings public in the press, 
in a way detrimental or harmful to the economic and organizational interests of the 
employer.1998, 1999 
703. When it comes to restricting employees’ off-duty behaviour, Subsection (2) 
of Section 8 refers to the conditions set in Subsection (2) of Section 9, namely that such a 
restriction shall be strictly necessary for reasons directly relating to the intended purpose of 
the employment relationship and shall be proportionate for achieving its objective. 
Therefore, completely prohibiting employees to express their opinion in relation to the 
 
1995 BH 1991/47. 
1996 For example, it is not considered to be the breach of the duty of cooperation if the employee – through 
exercising the freedom of expression – summarizes and presents information that was already said in a public 
hearing from the employees’ point of view.  
1997 1050/2004. számú munkaügyi elvi határozat 
1998 1050/2004. számú munkaügyi elvi határozat  
1999 However, the following case should be mentioned, which did not take place in social media or did not 
involve the use of excessive expression, yet it resulted in the breach of Section 8. In the case the employee, 
who worked as a teacher in the very school attended by his child as well, signed a petition as a parent with 
the aim to achieve that the same teachers teach the pupils for a certain period of time. As a result, the 
employer asked him to provide a report containing what he would propose as a solution to the situation and 
also why he took a position against the school. According to the employee, asking for such a report is 
contrary to the freedom of expression. 
The Curia noted that the letter was then intended to be forwarded to supervisory institutions as well and 
contained a statement that “we believe that the change would influence the educational and mental 
development of our children in a negative way.” According to the Curia, the content of the letter was capable 
of questioning the legality and appropriateness of the employer’s measure – as a result, the employer’s 
request of a report did not breach the right to freedom of expression. Source: Kúria, Mfv.II.10.609/2017, par. 
25. 
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employment seems contrary to the principle of proportionality, while it is legitimate to 
impose limitations on the way they do it.  
704. Employers are not the only target of employees’ posts: they can also aim at 
colleagues. According to a decision2000 relating to sexual harassment, it was held that the 
obligation of cooperation comprises mutual respect and conduct taking into consideration 
the dignity of the other employees, therefore any conduct infringing these requirements can 
be sanctioned. However, the employee can express his/her opinion on the behaviour or 
professional conduct of a colleague in a way which is not offensive and does not influence 
other employees.2001  
Thus, the employee cannot post on SNSs content which would be disparaging, 
smearing, degrading or offensive in relation to his/her employer. The publication of such 
matters is considered as a breach of obligation.2002 However, what was stated in relation to 
French law is adequately applicable to Hungarian law as well: the boundaries of expressing 
opinion in an excessive way are already established, SNSs do not fundamentally change 
these boundaries, they rather favour the use of more excessive expressions, which an 
employee/user normally would not use in an offline, face-to-face communication. 
705. The Constitutional Court provided more criteria as regards the limits of 
employees’ freedom of expression in Decision No. 14/2017. (VI. 30.). In this decision the 
Constitutional Court examined the limits of employees’ freedom of expression,2003 and 
draw attention to the already existing criteria in this field. Among them it must be 
examined (1) whether the content has a connection to public life or professional life,2004 (2) 
whether it is composed of facts or rather constitutes a value judgement,2005 (3) whether the 
 
2000 BH 2006.201. 
2001 BH 1991. 47. 
2002 Kun, A. (2013) ‘Közösségi média és munkajog – avagy „online” munkaidőben és azon túl’, Munkaügyi 
Szemle, (3), p. 15. 
2003 The original case related to an employee who worked as a human resources management specialist at the 
employer. In his free time he published blog entries to a blog dealing with HR questions, with the aim of 
sharing knowledge, identifying himself as an expert in the field. The employer found out about the blog, and 
terminated the employment relationship with the reason that the employee jeopardized the employer’s 
legitimate interests and breached his obligation of confidentiality through posting blog entries in a field and 
in a subject where he was directly involved in his workplace. Source: Mfv. 10.655/2013/6. 
2004 In the present case the Constitutional Court held that publishing the blog entries belonged to the 
professional life and did not constitute a public affair (“közügy”), as such they were not afforded protection 
as a fundamental right, suggesting that the expression is protected to an increased extent if it relates to the 
discussion of public affairs. Source: Decision No. 14/2017. (VI. 30.) of the Constitutional Court, par. 40. 
2005 The Constitutional Court held that opinions expressing value judgment require greater tolerance, whereas 
as regards statements expressing facts or rumors, greater care can be required from the employee (both when 
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expression caused damage, (4) whether the employee acted in good faith2006 and (5) what 
sanctions were applied by the employer.2007 
706. In conclusion, different factors should be taken into consideration when 
assessing whether an expression on SNSs is included in employees’ freedom of expression: 
the criteria that can determine the easiest way is whether the expression was excessive – 
which can notably be determined through the style used. However, the existence of other 
criteria might be more challenging, such as whether it was a public expression or not,2008 
whether it related to a public affair, etc.  
c) Is a “like” considered as expressing opinion? 
707. Is a “like” considered to be an expression of opinion? An expression can 
take several shapes, such as posting, commenting, writing a blog entry (supposing the user 
actively creates content), etc. Although the presented cases mostly concerned expression as 
a post or a comment, the question still arises whether – in contrast to creating content – 
simply “liking” an already existing content on social media can be considered as an 
expression of the employee’s opinion? 
708. Different solutions appeared to address this question: a US and a Belgian 
case will be addressed briefly, as they relate directly to this matter and might serve as an 
example to France and Hungary in similar cases. In 2012, in the US in a case relating to 
whether a “like” is considered to be a manifestation of free speech (and therefore entitled 
to legal protection under the first amendment) adverse decisions were adopted by the 
district court and the court of appeal. The case related to six employees who, during the 
campaign of the re-election of the sheriff, liked Facebook pages supporting the sheriff’s 
opponent. After the re-election of the sheriff, they alleged that they were not reappointed 
because of exercising their freedom of expression and contested the decision. The district 
court held that simply liking a Facebook page is insufficient to merit constitutional 
 
the opinion relates to a public affair or when it is not). Source: Decision No. 13/2014. (IV. 18.) of the 
Constitutional Court, par. 41. 
2006 The expression should not receive protection if it merely or intentionally aims to damage the employer’s 
reputation or to insult the employer/supervisor/etc. Source: Decision No. 14/2017. (VI. 30.) of the 
Constitutional Court, par. 33.  
2007 Decision No. 14/2017. (VI. 30.) of the Constitutional Court, par. 34. 
2008 To determine this, the analysis of French case law and the above-drawn conclusions from it might 
constitute a guiding point. 
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protection, as no actual statements were made through liking.2009 However, the court of 
appeal ruled that by liking the content, the employees unmistakably approved of the 
opponent’s candidacy, and added that from a constitutional point of view there was no 
difference between liking the page, or expressing the same support through typing a 
supportive message. According to the court of appeal, liking the opponent’s Facebook page 
is to be deemed equivalent to displaying a political sign in one’s front yard – which is 
accepted as substantive speech.2010 
In Belgium, the labour court of Liège had to rule in a case where an employee was 
dismissed for liking controversial content relating to “quenelle”, which can be interpreted 
as a disputable sense of humour, with publicly known anti-Semitic connotation. The 
antecedents were that in 2013 the employee posted links to his Facebook wall, relating to 
“quenelle”. Following these posts, the employer organised a meeting and made the 
employee sign a written commitment, stating that in the future he is not going to post such 
controversial content, as it can influence other employees and might put him and his posts 
in false light. However, in 2014 he liked content relating to “quenelle” and was dismissed 
as a result. The labour court of Liège held that a “like” can be understood as a sign of 
interest, but also as an approval, and in the light of the commitment that he had signed, it 
constituted the expression of the employee’s opinion and validated the dismissal.2011, 2012 
709. However, “likes” might not always mean that the given individual truly 
likes or approves of the content. Meanings of likes are not always unambiguous, as was 
pointed out by Emmanuel Netter. He underlined that over a thousand people “liked” an 
article which appeared in Le Monde entitled “Argentina: several French killed after a 
collision of helicopters”. At that time pressing the like button was the only way to rapidly 
express “emotion”, besides writing a comment or clicking on the “neutral” share button. 
So, what does “like” mean in this context? Did users like the fact that they were rapidly 
informed of the event? Or the style of the article? Did they express their support to the 
 
2009 United States: District court for the Eastern District of Virginia: Bland v. Roberts, 4-11cv45 (E.D. Va.; 
Apr. 24, 2012) 
2010 United States: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: Bland v. Roberts, No. 12-1671, Filed: September 
23, 2013 
2011 Cour du travail de Liège (3e ch.) – Arrêt du 24 mars 2017 – Rôle n° 2016-AL-94 
2012 In Switzerland a user was fined for liking defamatory posts written by a third party that accused an 
animal rights activist of anti-Semitism, racism and fascism. The court held that by liking the content, he 
endorsed and further distributed the comments. Source: Riley, C. (2017) Man fined $4,000 for ‘liking’ 
defamatory posts on Facebook, CNN. Available at: https://money.cnn.com/2017/05/31/technology/facebook-
like-defamation-switzerland/ (Accessed: 15 October 2018). 
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victims’ families? Did they truly like what happened? The signification of the use of a 
simple like button can often be ambiguous; therefore one must be careful before drawing 
conclusions from it.2013 According to László Pók, considering a “like” as expressing 
opinion would lead to an exaggerated, unrealistic approach, which would unnecessarily 
restrict employees’ possibilities to use SNSs. According to him, a like does not necessarily 
express the employee’s endorsement, but rather raises attention to a matter, making it 
unreasonable to draw far-reaching conclusions.2014  
710. However, it should be mentioned that ever since Facebook introduced the 
so-called “reaction” buttons in 2016, more nuanced reactions can be expressed than a 
simple like, such as “like”, “love”, “ha-ha”, “wow”, “sad” and “angry”. Although this 
function gives users the possibility to express other types of feelings, in line with the 
above-mentioned doubts relating to the meaning of “like”, a simple “reaction” should not 
necessarily be treated as the user’s substantive attitude towards a matter. 
711. To summarize, different views exist regarding whether a like constitutes 
freedom of expression or not. These views illustrate that it is challenging to provide an 
answer to this matter valid under all circumstances. Thus, circumstances of the specific 
case should be taken into consideration (such as whether liking was a one-time activity or 
it is regular, existence of a previous warning) as they can be determinant when assessing a 
case. First, it is even possible to accidentally hit the like button (either from a computer, 
but especially from the small screen of a smartphone), therefore far-reaching conclusions 
should not be drawn from a few likes. Naturally, the situation is different if the employee 
systematically likes content that can place the employer into a disadvantageous situation or 
be otherwise compromising. Second, special circumstances can justify the strict 
appreciation of likes, such as previous warnings addressed to the employee. That was the 
case in the previously presented labour court of Liège’s decision, where raising awareness 
and warning the employee were determining factors in judging the dismissal to be lawful. 
 
2013 Netter, E. (2015) ‘La liberté d’expression sur les réseaux sociaux en droit français’, in Ndior, V. 
(ed.) Droit et réseaux sociaux. Issy-les-Moulineaux: Lextenso (Collection LEJEP), p. 54. 
2014 Pók, L. (2012) ‘Lájkolni szabad? Munkavállalói véleménynyilvánítás az új Munka Törvénykönyve 
tükrében’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (4), p. 163. 
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Nothing indicated that the court would have arrived at the same conclusion if the employee 
had not been explicitly warned before.2015 
(§2) Other conducts 
Employees might – intentionally or negligently – jeopardize the employer’s 
legitimate interests and rights in other ways than by expressing their opinion. Notably, the 
cases of (A) revealing confidential information and business secrets and (B) jeopardizing 
the employer’s legitimate economic interests through working for the competition must be 
mentioned. However, these cases seem to raise specific privacy issues to a lesser extent,2016 
compared to freedom of expression on SNSs. In my opinion, revealing confidential 
information or business secrets on SNSs or engaging in a competing activity does not 
substantially raise questions in relation to the personal life of the employee and to the 
established/blurred boundaries of personal and professional life. As the focus of the thesis 
is on employees’ personal life, these cases will be presented only briefly in the following 
paragraphs. Also, through social media and SNSs, employees can eternalise and share (C) 
various pranks with the public, which might jeopardize or damage the employer’s 
reputation. 
(A) Business secrets 
712. Protection of the employer’s business secrets. In France employees are 
required not to reveal information that they obtained during exercising their functions.2017 
Some, such as union representatives, employee advisors, the delegation of the members of 
the personnel of the social and economic committee2018 are bound by the professional 
secret and obligation of discretion. Similarly to French regulation, Subsection (4) of 
Section 8 of the Hungarian Labour Code states that employees have the obligation to 
respect confidentiality and the employer’s business secrets.2019 Although through the 
advent of social media the possible disclosure of business secrets on these platforms is a 
 
2015 Wery, E. (2018) Perdre son emploi à cause d’un “J’aime” ? C’est possible, Droit & Technologies. 
Available at: https://www.droit-technologie.org/actualites/perdre-emploi-a-cause-dun-jaime-cest-
possible/ (Accessed: 15 October 2018). 
2016 Pók, L. (2012) ‘A közösség hálójában – Közösségi oldalak munkajogi vonatkozásai’, Infokommunikáció 
és jog, (1), p. 13. 
2017 Lahalle, T. (2016) Droits et obligations des parties. JurisClasseur Travail Traité Fasc. 18-1, par. 146. 
2018 Article L2143-21, Article L1232-13, Article L2315-3 of the FLC 
2019 Subsection (4) of Section 8 of the HLC 
More detailed regulation is to be found in Act LIV of 2018 on the protection of business secrets. 
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growing issue due to the ease of using these platforms and the lack of awareness of 
employees2020 (especially the use of professional SNSs, such as LinkedIn can raise 
problems),2021 the examination of these questions is beyond the scope of the dissertation as 
they primarily relate to the employer’s personality rights and not to the personality rights 
of the employees. 
713. Business secrets and SNSs. SNSs can serve as a means to reveal 
confidential information.2022 As the advent of social media made it easier to commit abuses 
and to discover them, in the case of employees’ expression, the discoverability or revealing 
business secrets either intentionally or negligently is higher as well. In one of the French 
cases, although it related to the public sphere, a police officer’s employment was 
terminated for revealing confidential information on SNSs. The officer was substituting 
someone at the municipal police as a technical assistant and a disciplinary dismissal was 
given for breaching his professional obligations, which consisted in revealing SNS pictures 
and other information relating to the organisation of the municipal police, and especially to 
the video surveillance system applied in the municipality.2023 
Hungarian media reported the case in which the employee, who was chief legal 
counsel at a bank, sent a message to his girlfriend, stating that he is investigating 
someone’s case. Although he did not identify the client – who was a well-known actor –, 
he used his monograms, and added that as the case seems to be problematic, now he can 
have revenge for a certain Hungarian television show. As he named the show, the client 
became identifiable through his monograms. His girlfriend shared this message and 
commented it as “[t]hat’s how things go when one’s boyfriend is a chief legal counsel at a 
 
2020 Warren, M. and Pedowitz, A. (2011) ‘Social Media, Trade Secrets, Duties of Loyalty, Restrictive 
Covenants and Yes, the Sky is Falling’, Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, 29(1), p. 100. 
2021 Németh, J. (2013) A közösségi média használata munkáltatói szemmel, Jogászvilág. Available 
at: https://jogaszvilag.hu/szakma/a-kozossegi-media-hasznalata-munkaltatoi-szemmel/ (Accessed: 6 
September 2018). 
2022 For example, one employer in Canada terminated the employment relationship of a maintenance 
employee for reasons of breaching confidentiality, who – after a patient committed suicide – posted two 
pictures of the scene to social media. Source: Maier, J. (2013) ‘Cause for Termination in the Age of Social 
Media’, in Law Society of Upper Canada, Employment law and the new workplace in the social media age. 
Toronto: Irwin Law, p. 297. 
2023 Conseil d'État (2017): N° 393320 (ECLI:FR:CECHR:2017:393320.20170320), 3ème - 8ème chambres 
réunies, 20 mars 
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big Hungarian bank!” On the ground of sharing bank secrets, his employment was 
terminated.2024, 2025 
714. Whistleblowing. In relation to restricting employees as regards revealing 
information that they learned during the exercise of their functions, the phenomenon of 
whistleblowing should be mentioned.2026 Employees can benefit from the publicity of 
SNSs and can also use them as platforms to realize whistleblowing, and to raise the 
public’s attention to illegal acts, abuses or misdeeds taking place within the workplace.2027 
Technically, in these cases the employee commits a breach of obligation (as revealing 
illegal acts of the employer will damage the employer’s reputation, and/or will consist of 
revealing confidential information that would have otherwise stayed hidden). For several 
reasons2028 SNSs might constitute a forum to reveal those illegal acts – in which case the 
employee’s online activity on SNSs will realize the breach. Even though whistleblowing 
 
2024 Banktitkot sértett egy magyar mikroblog (2012) Index. Available 
at: https://index.hu/tech/2012/01/04/banktitkot_sertett_egy_magyar_mikroblogger/(Accessed: 7 September 
2018). 
2025 An Austrian court held the violation of bank secret in the case where the employee, who was a cashier in 
a bank, engaged in a conversation on his Facebook wall, relating to the reappearance of – previously missing 
– 15,000 euros. Source: Kajtár, E. (2016) Dignity at Work: Employee’s Personality Rights in the 21st 
Century. Pécs: University of Pécs, Faculty of Law (PMJK Monographs 6). p. 161. 
2026 Both in France (Act N. 2016-1691 of 9 December 2016 on transparency, the fight against corruption and 
the modernization of the economy) and in Hungary (Act CLXV of 2013 on Complaints and Public Interest 
Disclosures) a whistleblowing act regulates these matters. Also, the EU’s new whistleblowing directive 
[Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the 
protection of persons who report breaches of Union law] regulates the question at an EU-wide level. 
2027 For example, in 2006, Michael De Kort, who worked as a project manager at the global company 
Lockheed Martin in the aerospace, defence, security, and technologies industry. In 2004 he became aware of 
certain security risks in relation to ships that were sold to the US coastguard. He repeatedly reported those 
security risks to his supervisors, who did not react to this. Then, he uploaded a 10-minute-long video to 
YouTube, in which he presented these security risks in detail. Source: Original-See other copy if this version 
is frozen (2006) YouTube. Available 
at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qd3VV8Za04g&t=316s (Accessed: 16 April 2018). 
Brandon Huber worked at the Golden Corral restaurant, where he noticed that the meat that was to be 
prepared was stored outside the restaurant, directly next to the rubbish bins, in not acceptably hygienic 
conditions. According to him, after he reported this to the management, they did nothing to solve the 
situation. In response, he made a video, in which he showed how meat was stored and uploaded it to 
YouTube. Source: Golden Corral food stored by dumpster so health inspector won’t see it, employee says 
(2013) YouTube. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yb0yrdDOy0g (Accessed: 16 April 
2018). 
Johannes Izak Beaurain worked as a nurse in the Groote Schuur Hospital in the Republic of South-Africa. On 
several occasions he reported different abuses, which were investigated, but finally were not found well-
established. He did not agree with the outcome of the investigations, and he revealed the alleged abuses to the 
public in a Facebook post. He was dismissed for his actions, and he challenged the decision at court. 
However, the court held that Mr. Beaurain’s allegations were not well-established. Source: Ngake, P. 
(2016) Whistle-blowing on Social Media. Available at: http://www.seesa.co.za/whistle-blowing-on-social-
media/ (Accessed: 22 April 2018). 
2028 E.g. rapidity, ease, size of the audience that might be reached, etc. 
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through SNSs raises several challenges,2029 in my opinion such conduct does not 
substantially concern the boundaries of employees’ personal lives, as it reveals something 
that the employer committed, instead of revealing a part of the employee’s personal life. 
For this reason, it will not be addressed in detail in the dissertation. 
(B) Employer’s legitimate economic interests and rights and competition 
715. Protection of the employer’s legitimate economic interests and rights. 
According to Subsection (1) of Section 8 of the HLC, “during the existence of the 
employment relationship, employees shall not engage in any conduct which would 
jeopardize the legitimate economic interests of the employer, unless so authorized by the 
relevant legislation.” This provision requires employees to refrain from such conduct.2030 
There exists no exhaustive list enumerating what conducts are capable of jeopardizing the 
employer’s legitimate economic interest and therefore what limitations can be imposed on 
employees: particularly, performing work for another employer should be mentioned, but 
limitations on employees’ freedom of expression or the obligation to respect the 
employer’s business secrets also fall into these categories2031 – the latter two are regulated 
by specific provisions. 
Under Subsection (1) it is already elaborated what conducts the employee should 
refrain from, such as, for example, the employee performing work for another employer, 
creating competition under any legal relationship, contributing to the activity of a 
competing business, etc.2032 In this regard, social media does not represent a substantial 
challenge, as its use does not affect the freedom of action and through it the boundaries 
between personal and professional life; instead, it can contribute to the discoverability of 
the possible infringement. 
 
2029 See more on whistleblowing and social media in: Hajdú, J. and Lukács, A. (2018) Whistleblowing és a 
közösségi média szerepe a korrupció elleni fellépésben. Budapest: Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem. 
2030 T/4786. számú törvényjavaslat a Munka Törvénykönyvéről (2011). Előadó: Dr. Matolcsy György 
nemzetgazdasági miniszter. Budapest. 
2031 Kardkovács, K. (ed.) (2016) A Munka Törvénykönyvének magyarázata. 3rd edn. Budapest: HVG-ORAC 
Lap- és Könyvkiadó, p. 44. 
2032 See more on the subject and on the relevant case law in: Kardkovács, K. (ed.) (2016) A Munka 
Törvénykönyvének magyarázata. 3rd edn. Budapest: HVG-ORAC Lap- és Könyvkiadó pp. 44-45.; Ember, A. 
(2015) ‘A munkáltató jogos gazdasági érdekének a védelme’, in Lajkó, D. and Varga, N. (eds) Alapelvek és 
alapjogok. Szeged: Szegedi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Doktori Iskola, pp. 115-119.; 
Szladovnyik, K. and Horváth, I. (2016) ‘A munkáltató jogos gazdasági érdekeinek védelme’, Adó, 30(14), 
pp. 92–96. 
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716. French labour law contains similar provisions in order to protect the 
employer’s legitimate economic interest. Naturally, employees are subject to a non-
compete obligation:2033 in the light of the duty of loyalty, they should not engage in 
competing activity.2034 For example, the Court of Cassation held that the following 
employees violated the duty of loyalty: an employee having a high position, who during 
his paid leave engaged in an identical activity at a directly competing company, in the 
same geographic zone;2035 or an employee, who worked as a mechanic, and during his sick 
leave had a vehicle repaired by asking another employee to help, but on his own behalf;2036 
or the fact that an employee took part in a training at the employer’s competitor constituted 
the breach of the duty of loyalty.2037 
717. Posterior to the employment relationship. Similar challenges may arise not 
only during the existence of the employment relationship but after the employment 
relationship as well. According to French labour law, following from the fundamental 
principle of free exercise of a professional activity and Article L. 1121-1 of the FLC,2038 
the parties can conclude that after the termination of the employment relationship, the 
employee should refrain from engaging in the same sector of activity as the employer.2039, 
2040 The exclusivity clause should also be mentioned here: although it does not concern the 
time period after the employment, in my opinion for the subject of the present dissertation 
it raises challenges similar to the ones encountered in the non-competition agreement. An 
exclusivity clause forbids the employee to engage in any other professional activity – even 
if the activity would not have a competing nature.2041 
718. The HLC states that the employer and the employee can decide to conclude 
a non-competition agreement, in which they state that the employee shall not engage in any 
conduct – for up to two years following the termination of the employment relationship – 
 
2033 Ray, J.-E. (2018) Droit du travail: droit vivant. 26th edn. Paris: Wolters Kluwer France. p. 443. 
2034 Waquet, P., Struillou, Y. and Pécaut-Rivolier, L. (2014) Pouvoirs du chef d’entreprise et libertés du 
salarié: du salarié-citoyen au citoyen-salarié. Rueil-Malmaison: ÉdLiaisons (Droit vivant). p. 71, p. 311. 
2035 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 5 juillet 2017, N° 16-15623 
2036 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 21 octobre 2003, N° 01-43943  
2037 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 10 mai 2001, N° 99-40584  
2038 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 10 juillet 2002, N° 00-45135 
2039 Waquet, P., Struillou, Y. and Pécaut-Rivolier, L. (2014) Pouvoirs du chef d’entreprise et libertés du 
salarié: du salarié-citoyen au citoyen-salarié. Rueil-Malmaison: ÉdLiaisons (Droit vivant). p. 309. 
2040 The detailed conditions (being indispensable for the protection of the legitimate interest of the employer, 
limited in time, limited in space, providing financial counter value, taking into consideration the functions of 
the employee) were laid down by the Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 10 juillet 2002, N° 00-45135 
2041 Waquet, P., Struillou, Y. and Pécaut-Rivolier, L. (2014) Pouvoirs du chef d’entreprise et libertés du 
salarié: du salarié-citoyen au citoyen-salarié. Rueil-Malmaison: ÉdLiaisons (Droit vivant). pp. 73-74., p. 
313. 
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by which he/she would infringe upon or jeopardize the rightful economic interests of the 
employer.2042 Usually these agreements pertain to future employment at the competition; 
however, they might as well stipulate that the employee should refrain from certain acts in 
social media.2043 Nonetheless, even in the absence of a non-compete agreement, general 
provisions laid down in civil and penal regulations will provide protection to the employer. 
719. SNSs and non-compete agreements. SNSs do not only serve to keep in 
touch with friends and family, but employees also use these services to forge online 
relationships with colleagues, clients or customers (especially professional SNSs such as 
LinkedIn). Therefore, their use might constitute the violation of a non-compete agreement. 
Differentiation should be made particularly between two scenarios. First, while the use 
itself might not constitute a violation, SNSs can serve as evidence of violation, such as 
when former employees update their professional status, revealing their new position.2044 
Second, SNS use itself might be considered as a violation when it comes to restraining 
from certain conduct: several questions arise, such as: does “friending” constitute a 
violation? Or accepting a friend request? How to prove who initiated the contact? Do 
concerned employees have to unfriend existing contacts with clients? Who has ownership 
of a LinkedIn account?2045 
(C) Employee “pranks” 
 
2042 Subsection (1) of Section 228 of the HLC 
2043 Pók, L. (2012) ‘A közösség hálójában – Közösségi oldalak munkajogi vonatkozásai’, Infokommunikáció 
és jog, (1), p. 15. 
2044 For example, in the cases Cour d'appel, Paris, Pôle 1, chambre 3, 28 Mai 2013 – n° 13/06055 and Cour 
d'appel, Saint-Denis (Réunion), Chambre commerciale, 15 Juillet 2013 – n° 12/01321 both employees who 
allegedly violated their non-compete agreements updated their professional status on LinkedIn. Source: 
Nivelles, V. (2014) ‘Les entreprises à l’épreuve des réseaux sociaux’, Jurisprudence Sociale Lamy, (377–
378), p. 12. 
Another example is the case of Kelly Services, Inc. v. Marzullo in the US, in which the employer found out 
about the violation of the non-compete agreement through information posted on the employee’s LinkedIn 
profile commenting on his new position. Source: Anderson, D. R. (2011) ‘Restricting Social Graces: The 
Implications of Social Media for Restrictive Covenants in Employment Contracts’, Ohio State Law Journal, 
72(4), p. 896. 
2045 See more on the arising questions and the answers that can be possibly given to them in: Anderson, D. R. 
(2011) ‘Restricting Social Graces: The Implications of Social Media for Restrictive Covenants in 
Employment Contracts’, Ohio State Law Journal, 72(4), pp. 881–908.; Warren, M. and Pedowitz, A. (2011) 
‘Social Media, Trade Secrets, Duties of Loyalty, Restrictive Covenants and Yes, the Sky is Falling’, Hofstra 
Labor and Employment Law Journal, 29(1), pp. 99–114.; Mooney, J. A. (2013) ‘Locked Out on LinkedIn: 
LinkedIn Account Belongs to Employee, not Employer’, Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal, 
25(6), pp. 16–18. 
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720. Damaging the employer’s reputation. Employees can also jeopardize the 
employer’s reputation in more “creative” ways, notably through different “pranks”.2046 
According to the HLC and French labour law as well, the employee must respect the 
employer’s reputation.2047 The issue is that in some cases these activities can be directly 
linked to the workplace, e.g. due to a uniform, taking place on the premises of the 
workplace etc., thus having possible consequences on the employee’s employment 
relationship and/or on the employer’s reputation. 
721. Often, such behaviour also constitutes the violation of workplace rules (e.g. 
safety, health, hygiene). Examples include the US case, where the prank made by two 
employees of a restaurant chain seriously compromised the company’s reputation in a few 
days. The two employees made a video and uploaded it to YouTube, in which one of them 
prepared food for delivery completely violating health-code standards (e.g. by putting 
cheese up his nose or nasal mucus on the sandwiches). Although the employees alleged 
that the food was never delivered, the video was seen by more than a million Internet users 
and caused a true crisis for the restaurant.2048 Similar examples include restaurant 
employees who bathed in the utility sink and eternalized this moment in social media.2049 
Another case is the Taylor v Somerfield Stores Ltd case from the UK. The case 
related to the termination of employment in a case where the employee uploaded a video to 
YouTube in which his colleagues during working hours, on the premises of the workplace, 
wearing the employer’s uniform, hit him on the head with a plastic bag full of plastic bags. 
The employer found that the publication of such a video jeopardized its reputation. 
However, the employment tribunal ruled that the termination was unlawful, as there was 
no obvious connection between the video and the employer (the name of the employer was 
not visible on the uniform, only its colours could have given away its identity, while the 
video was recorded in a storage room, anonymous to an outsider). In addition, the video 
 
2046 Besides jeopardizing the employer’s reputation, such posts can also serve as evidence of breaching 
requirements of hygiene or workplace safety. 
2047 Subsection (2) of Section 8 of the HLC and the duty of loyalty (obligation de loyauté). 
2048 Clifford, S. (2009) Video Prank at Domino’s Taints Brand, The New York Times. Available 
at: https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/business/media/16dominos.html(Accessed: 3 May 2018). 
2049 Burger King worker fired for bathing in sink (2008) NBC News. Available 
at: http://www.nbcnews.com/id/26167371/ns/us_news-life/t/burger-king-worker-fired-bathing-
sink/#.XUgxoo4zbct (Accessed: 5 August 2019) or Solé, E. (2019) Wendy’s employee fired after taking a 
bubble bath in restaurant sink: ‘It is obviously totally unacceptable’, Yahoo. Available at: shorturl.at/bcuwG 
(Accessed: 5 August 2019). 
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was only available for three days and was viewed by eight persons (three of them were 
managers at the company).2050 
Sometimes such conduct can go beyond being a simple prank: in 2018 the employees 
of a well-known low-cost airline company made a “prank” by publishing a fake photo that 
later caught considerable media attention. They published a picture to Twitter, after a tense 
period due to repeated strikes, in which the employees were lying in their uniform on the 
floor and creating the impression that they were forced to sleep on the floor. However, the 
photo was staged as was revealed by the security footage published by the company. The 
company dismissed the employees for gross misconduct.2051 
722. The circumstances that gained importance in the above cases – and which 
might be used in the future when assessing similar situations – were the following: the 
nature of the activity (Does the act itself relate to the workplace? The nature of the 
behaviour: does the act qualify as a breach of workplace safety rule, or is it ill-intentioned 
– or is it rather a harmless prank?), as well as the identifiability of the employer (Could the 
behaviour be linked to the employer? Did the employee wear a uniform? Or was the 
employer identifiable in another way?).  
723. Conclusions of the Section. In conclusion, direct connection between the 
workplace and the employee’s activity on SNSs can be established in several ways: the 
content can directly relate to the workplace/employer/colleagues (e.g. publishing negative 
opinion), it can take place at the workplace (e.g. bathing in restaurant sinks) or the 
employee can wear the employer’s uniform in a picture. The most common form of 
possibly questionable content relates to the employees’ expression and not to other 
conducts, such as pranks. 
In the course of their personal life employees often think that they are free to do 
anything, including expressing themselves in social media – as it is demonstrated by the 
growing case law of “Facebook firings”. Although both in France and in Hungary 
employees are entitled to the freedom of expression, which can even include the right to 
criticize the employer, this right is not unlimited: expressing themselves in an abusive 
 
2050 Taylor v Somerfield Stores Ltd. Case no: S/107487/07 Held at Aberdeen on 24 July 2007 
2051 Jolly, J. (2018) Ryanair sacks six cabin crew after ‘staged’ photo sleeping on airport floor, The 
Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/nov/07/ryanair-sacks-six-cabin-crew-
after-staged-photo-sleeping-on-malaga-airport-floor (Accessed: 19 November 2018). 
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way2052 can result in the termination of their employment relationship. Even though the 
personal lives of the employees are protected, the majority of case law and scholars – 
correctly – found that expressing oneself on SNSs goes beyond the personal sphere, unless 
strict precautions are taken and the access is limited to a few other users who are in a close 
relationship. However, the existence of these criteria must be assessed on a case-to-case 
basis as no universal rule can be established. 
The presented case law and media cases illustrated that on SNSs employees tend to 
use extreme or vulgar expressions, a harsh, insulting style. Combining this with the fact 
that these expressions are often available to the public (due to either not using the privacy 
settings or letting a big audience access it), and with the increased possibility to identify 
the employer, employees’ off-duty behaviour on SNSs can cause considerable harm to the 
employer’s reputation. This will be taken into account when the dissertation aims to 
establish the balance between the employees’ and employer’s rights. 
Section 2. Off-duty conduct without direct connection to the employment 
724. Posts independent of the employment. Although most articles dealing with 
off-duty conduct and SNSs focused on the limits of the employees’ freedom of expression 
in relation to the employment, it is also important to address the question of employees’ 
behaviour independent of the workplace: employees’ posts on SNSs can relate not only to 
the workplace but also to other subjects, without a direct connection with the employment. 
As a preliminary point it should be noted that in such cases, the possible intrusion into the 
employees’ private life is more intense, therefore if the application of a restriction or legal 
consequences is possible, it must meet even stricter requirements and safeguards than in 
the case of behaviour with a direct connection to the employment. 
725. What was understood by direct connection to employment is expression 
explicitly aimed at the workplace/employer/colleagues or content recorded in a uniform or 
on the workplace premises. Indirect connection refers to cases other than direct connection: 
here, no link can be established with the workplace at first sight. However, such behaviour, 
too, can have consequences for the employment or can reflect badly on the employer: 
employees might express themselves in a way that can result in jeopardizing the 
employer’s legitimate interests through especially inciting public outcry. This is notably 
 
2052 E.g. by using insulting or vulgar expressions. 
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the case of expressing political opinion,2053 opinion in relation to current events,2054 news, 
religion, science (e.g. “flat Earth believers”, antivaccination, esoteric, etc.) etc.2055 Besides 
freedom of expression, employees’ lifestyles can also raise the question of whether such 
conduct can jeopardize the employer’s legitimate interests, and if yes, what requirements 
should such behaviour fulfil? Such behaviour might be connected to revealing employee’s 
lifestyles, such as the consumption of alcohol,2056 cigarettes, drugs,2057, 2058 or leading a 
promiscuous lifestyle – and documenting it on social media. Although it takes place purely 
in the course of the employees’ private lives, employers might not be enthusiastic about 
employees documenting on Facebook their wild Saturday nights or the details of their love 
 
2053 Although in the following case it was not the employee who decided to upload the content in question, 
SNSs still functioned as a channel for publicity: an employee got dismissed after the wide publication of a 
photograph of her in social media, where she is seen showing her middle finger towards the President of the 
US’s motorcade. Source: Dvorak, P. (2017) Flipping off President Trump has changed Juli Briskman’s life 
— and exposed our divisions, The Washington Post. Available 
at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/flipping-off-president-trump-has-changed-juli-briskmans-life--
and-exposed-our-divisions/2017/11/07/19efab02-c3f6-11e7-afe9-4f60b5a6c4a0_story.html (Accessed: 14 
August 2019). 
2054 See, for example, the case of a paramedic employee who, after an 88-year-old man opened fire in a 
museum, was injured but was finally saved by paramedics, expressed his disagreement and stated that it was 
the paramedics’ chance to make a difference, and also suggested that the other guards should go to target 
practice. Source: Mgrditchian, G. (2015) ‘Employment and Social Media Privacy: Employer Justifications 
for Access to “Private” Material’, Rutgers Computer & Technology Law Journal, 41(1), pp. 117-118. 
Another example is the case of Justin Hutchings from London, Ontario, who was fired in 2012 because he 
published offensive content to a memorial website of a teenager who committed suicide after being a victim 
of bullying for years (“Thank God this B---- is Dead”). Mr. Hutchings identified his employer in his profile, 
and one of the users easily “tracked him down” from that information and reported his behaviour to his 
employer. Source: Sarin, P. (2012) Employees beware: The perils of posting on Facebook, rabble.ca. 
Available at: http://rabble.ca/columnists/2012/10/employees-beware-perils-posting-facebook (Accessed: 11 
May 2018). 
2055 An example can be mentioned from Canada, where Christopher Maximillian Sandau, then hockey coach 
was fired for content on his Facebook profile, promoting Nazi propaganda. Parents and officials discovered 
the content. Source: Delta hockey coach Christopher Sandau fired over Nazi posts on Facebook (2014) CBC 
News. Available at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/delta-hockey-coach-christopher-
sandau-fired-over-nazi-posts-on-facebook-1.2825623 (Accessed: 3 May 2018). 
2056 See, for example, the already presented case of Ashley Payne, an American high school teacher, who was 
dismissed for posting pictures of herself holding a pint of beer and a glass of wine in her hand during her trip 
to Europe. Source: Oppenheim, R. (2013) High School Teacher Files an Appeal in Case of Social Media 
Related Resignation, California Business Litigation Blog. Available 
at: https://www.californiabusinesslitigation.com/2013/05/high_school_teacher_files_an_a.html (Accessed: 3 
May 2018). 
2057 It is notably the case in the US, where in the absence of legislation guaranteeing such protection, 
employers can prohibit certain lawful off-duty conducts (e.g. smoking, dating). Source: Smith-Butler, L. 
(2009) ‘Workplace Privacy: We’ll Be Watching You’, Ohio Northern University Law Review, 35(1), p. 76. 
2058 However, a strict separation is not possible between personal and professional life: although as a main 
rule these activities take place in the course of the employee’s personal life, they can have an effect on his/her 
health resulting in labour law consequences as well (e.g. sick leave).  
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(or even sexual) lives – especially if the individual can be linked to the workplace as an 
employee.2059 
726. To such cases (§1) in French law a different set of rules is to be applied – 
that of non-disciplinary dismissals – where it is not a breach of obligation that serves as a 
basis for the termination of employment but the existence of a so-called characterised 
serious disorder. In contrast, (§2) in Hungarian labour law the same, already-presented 
provisions (Section 8) are applicable, with the difference that they should be interpreted in 
a stricter way, as employees’ “purely” private lives are at stake. Also, in Hungarian law, it 
is possible to terminate the employment relationship without notice in cases when the 
employee did not commit a serious breach of duties but engaged in behaviour to shake the 
trust between the parties,2060 typically including cases connected to the employee’s 
behaviour outside work, making it impossible to maintain the employment relationship.2061 
For example, a Facebook post might result in a loss of trust,2062 serving as a ground for 
termination without notice.2063 
(§1) Non-disciplinary dismissals and characterised serious disorder 
727. Non-disciplinary dismissals. In French law according to the main principle, 
an element pertaining to the personal life of the employee cannot constitute misconduct.2064 
As it was demonstrated, in order to pronounce a disciplinary dismissal, the employee must 
breach an obligation arising from the employment contract. However, the employer can 
still apply non-disciplinary dismissal2065 if the employee’s actions realised in the course of 
 
2059 This was the case when an employee had a blog where he shared his otherwise inappropriate opinion in a 
context where he did not criticise the employer, only mentioned him. In his blog, he identified himself as an 
employee and also shared pictures of himself taken at the workplace. The issue was that in the same blog, he 
also shared his admiration for Hitler and shared racist and violent content. Source: Ellickson, D. and 
Atkinson, M. (2013) ‘When Can Your Employer “Unlike” You? Just Cause for Dismissal and Social Media’, 
in The Law Society of Upper Canada, Employment Law and the New Workplace in the Social Media Age. 
Toronto: Irwin Law, p. 265. 
2060 Hajdú, J. and Kun, A. (eds) (2014) Munkajog. Budapest: Patrocinium, p. 167. E.g. he/she engages in 
conduct unworthy of his/her job by leading a lifestyle of revelry and alcoholism, substantiated suspicion of 
committing a serious criminal offence.  
2061 Cséffán, J. (2016) A Munka Törvénykönyve és magyarázata. Szeged: Szegedi Rendezvényszervező Kft, 
p. 309.; Gyulavári, T. (ed.) (2012) Munkajog. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, p. 216. 
2062 Kozma, A. (2013) ‘Mire köteles a munkavállaló?’, HR & Munkajog, 4(10), p. 10. 
2063 Mfv.I.10.469/2013/4 Cited in: Cséffán, J. (2016) A Munka Törvénykönyve és magyarázata. Szeged: 
Szegedi Rendezvényszervező Kft, p. 311.  
2064 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 16 déc. 1997, n° 95-41.326 
2065 It cannot be emphasized enough that regardless of the consequences that this act caused to the workplace, 
such a characterised serious disorder does not allow in itself to apply a disciplinary sanction against the 
employee. Source: Cour de cassation, chambre mixte, 18 mai 2007, N° 05-40803 
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his/her personal life caused a (A) characterised serious disorder in the functioning of the 
workplace.2066 In such a scenario, it is not the employee’s actions themselves that justify 
the dismissal, but rather the disruption in the functioning of the workplace:2067 the 
characterised serious disorder that is caused. (B) Such a characterised disorder can appear 
not only in the offline world, but on SNSs as well. 
(A) Characterised serious disorder 
728. Characterised serious disorder. In contrast to disciplinary dismissals, where 
the breach of obligation justifies the dismissal, in the case of a characterised serious 
disorder it is the sufficiently serious consequences of the employee’s conduct for the 
functioning of the workplace which allow the employer to terminate the employment 
contract,2068 as the behaviour of the employee affects the functioning of the workplace to 
such an extent that it is not possible to continue to employ the employee without causing 
damage to the workplace.2069, 2070 
729. When assessing the severity of the caused trouble, the judges take into 
consideration the nature of the duties of the employee, the company’s purposes and the 
effects of the employee’s behaviour outside and inside of the workplace.2071 Regarding the 
company’s purposes, this requirement initially aimed ideologically oriented enterprises or 
faith oriented enterprises (“entreprise de tendance”),2072, 2073 where the specific orientation 
 
2066 The two regimes cannot be mixed: if the employer issues a disciplinary dismissal against an employee for 
causing a characterised serious disorder, courts will qualify the dismissal unjustified. Source: Baugard, D. 
(2015) ‘L’usage par les salariés des réseaux sociaux’, in Ndior, V. (ed.) Droit et réseaux sociaux. Issy-les-
Moulineaux: Lextenso (Collection LEJEP), p. 87. 
2067 Gillier, H. (2009) ‘Vie personnelle et licenciement disciplinaire’, Bulletin du travail (ancien nom Cahiers 
sociaux du barreau de Paris), (213), p. 213. 
2068 Inforeg (2015) ‘Pouvoir disciplinaire : vie personnelle, vie professionnelle et Facebook’, Cahiers de droit 
de l’entreprise, (6), p. 68. 
2069 Antonmattei, P.-H. (2012) ‘Le licenciement pour trouble objectif’, Droit social, (1), p. 10. 
2070 For example, the existence of a characterised serious disorder was established in a case when a director of 
a centre hosting protected persons was accused of sexual molestation of a minor (Cour de cassation, chambre 
sociale, du 21 mai 2002, 00-41.128), or in a case when an employee deliberately hit his girlfriend, herself an 
employee of the workplace as well, in the close proximity of the workplace and the incident gave rise to 
reactions from the stuff. (Source: Richard de la Tour, J. (1999) La vie personnelle du salarié. Étude sur la 
jurisprudence récente de la Chambre sociale de la Cour de cassation. Cour de cassation. Available 
at: https://www.courdecassation.fr/publications_26/rapport_annuel_36/rapport_1999_91/etudes_documents_
93/jean_richard_5796.html (Accessed: 12 July 2017).)  
2071 Inforeg (2015) ‘Pouvoir disciplinaire : vie personnelle, vie professionnelle et Facebook’, Cahiers de droit 
de l’entreprise, (6), p. 68. 
2072 Jacquelet, C. (2008) La vie privée du salarié à l’épreuve des relations de travail. Aix-en-Provence: 
Presses universitaires d’Aix-Marseille. pp. 270-271. 
2073 An ideologically oriented enterprise is an enterprise which has a particular orientation, which can be 
syndical, political or religious. 
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of the workplace can have an effect on the expectations towards the behaviour of an 
employee in the course of his/her personal life.2074 Later, it was extended to “everyday” 
workplaces not having a particular orientation, and the Court of Cassation acknowledged 
that even these enterprises can have such a purpose that can justify the dismissal of an 
employee based on his/her private live.2075 However, as such a dismissal should meet very 
strict requirements, it is rare that an ordinary enterprise can rely on a characterised serious 
disorder.2076 When it comes to the functions of the employee, it can be stated in general that 
the higher the position is, the more exemplary behaviour can be expected from the 
employee.2077 
730. Characterized and serious. When it comes to the characterised serious 
disorder itself, it is important to state that not any disorder can be qualified as such: as the 
denomination itself suggests, it has to be characterised and serious, implying that the 
disorder has to be sufficiently perceivable and obviously disturbing so that a third person 
could consider them as such.2078 It is not only the employer who should perceive the 
employee’s acts as disturbing, but they have to be objectively qualified as disturbing for 
the functioning of the workplace.2079 Such a disorder must be more than a simple 
inconvenience created for the employer, and must be truly harmful for the employer.2080 
The disorder should also be characterised, meaning that a slight disorder is not 
sufficient: it must be serious and persistent.2081 What needs to be assessed is whether the 
employee’s actions have discredited the workplace, resulted in negative reactions from 
 
2074 E.g. it can be reasonably expected that an employee working for political party A does not actively and 
publicly support political party B on his/her SNSs. 
2075 Jacquelet, C. (2008) La vie privée du salarié à l’épreuve des relations de travail. Aix-en-Provence: 
Presses universitaires d’Aix-Marseille. p. 272. 
2076 Perraki, P. (2015) La protection de la vie personnelle du salarié en droit comparé et européen : étude 
comparative des droits français, hellénique, britannique et européen. Paris: l’Harmattan. p. 438. 
2077 Jacquelet, C. (2008) La vie privée du salarié à l’épreuve des relations de travail. Aix-en-Provence: 
Presses universitaires d’Aix-Marseille. p. 509. 
2078 Jacquelet, C. (2008) La vie privée du salarié à l’épreuve des relations de travail. Aix-en-Provence: 
Presses universitaires d’Aix-Marseille. p. 276. 
2079 Perraki, P. (2015) La protection de la vie personnelle du salarié en droit comparé et européen : étude 
comparative des droits français, hellénique, britannique et européen. Paris: l’Harmattan. p. 440. 
2080 Aubert-Monpeyssen, T. (2007) ‘“Trouble objectif dans l’entreprise” et libertés collectives du 
salarié’, Revue droit du travail Dalloz, (10), p. 588. 
2081 Perraki, P. (2015) La protection de la vie personnelle du salarié en droit comparé et européen : étude 
comparative des droits français, hellénique, britannique et européen. Paris: l’Harmattan. p. 440 
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clients, from the public or from employees, or have jeopardized the employer’s interests 
considering its functions, responsibilities, its size, its sector of activity, reputation.2082, 2083  
(B) Characterised serious disorder and social network sites 
731. Disorder and SNSs. Just like their behaviour in the offline world, 
employees’ behaviour on SNSs can also result in a serious characterized disorder. Such 
might be the case when the employee posts an offensive content which results in public 
outcry and other users reporting the case to the employer. The advent of SNSs gains 
importance in two regards when it comes to non-disciplinary dismissal: on the one hand, it 
facilitates the discoverability of employees’ behaviour and on the other hand, it can 
facilitate proving the existence of a disorder. 
732. Discoverability. First, in order that a dismissal to be lawful on the ground of 
causing a characterised serious disorder, strict requirements must be met, as the purpose of 
the workplace and the functions of the employee must be considered in addition to 
determining the existence of a characterised serious disorder. What social media notably 
changed is the discoverability of such conducts: a possibly reprehensible conduct (e.g. 
buying a Peugeot car while working for Renault, being interested in swinger parties, 
practising psychic activity while being a doctor’s assistant2084) can be widely “advertised” 
by users.2085 Due to the publicity of content published or activities taking place in social 
media, it is more probable that the reprehensible conduct of the employee becomes known 
 
2082 Corrignan-Carsin, D. (2009) ‘La Chambre sociale fixe les limites du pouvoir disciplinaire de 
l’employeur’, JCP E Semaine Juridique (édition entreprise), (40), p. 46. 
2083 On the characterised serious disorder see more in: Waquet, P. (2006) ‘Le “trouble objectif dans 
l’entreprise” : une notion à redéfinir’, Revue droit du travail Dalloz, (5), pp. 304–310.; Perraki, P. (2015) La 
protection de la vie personnelle du salarié en droit comparé et européen : étude comparative des droits 
français, hellénique, britannique et européen. Paris: l’Harmattan. pp. 435-447.; Jacquelet, C. (2008) La vie 
privée du salarié à l’épreuve des relations de travail. Aix-en-Provence: Presses universitaires d’Aix-
Marseille. pp. 266-280. ; Antonmattei, P.-H. (2012) ‘Le licenciement pour trouble objectif’, Droit social, (1), 
pp. 10–13. 
2084 These are references to the cases: Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 22 janvier 1992, N° 90-42517; 
Cour de cassation, chambre mixte, 18 mai 2007, N° 05-40803 and Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 21 
oct. 2003, n° 00‐45.291. Although these conducts did not take place on SNSs, in my opinion they could have 
resulted in a characterised serious disorder if they had taken place on SNSs. 
2085 Though the example does not relate to the employment, the scandal of a low-cost airline in 2019 can 
illustrate how widespread a simple post can become: after boarding, a passenger found that the woman seated 
next to him had a chair with no back. He took a picture of it and posted it to Twitter. The tweet soon went 
viral: it received more than 6,000 re-tweets, and appeared in the headlines of several news portals – while in 
reality the passenger was reassigned the seat and no one was sitting on the backless chair. In the pre-SNS age 
a similar story might have stayed within the circle of the passenger’s friends and family. Source: Picheta, R. 
(2019) EasyJet was criticized for making passengers fly in backless seats -- except it didn’t, CNN. Available 
at: https://edition.cnn.com/travel/article/easyjet-backless-seats-scli-gbr-intl/index.html (Accessed: 7 August 
2019). 
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by interested parties (e.g. clients, employees or the public) – while before, their 
discoverability by the employer remained more incidental. 
733. Proof. Second, SNSs can highly facilitate proving the existence of an 
objective disorder, as the characterised disorder can be manifested also in negative 
reactions from clients, from the public or from employees. While earlier, in the pre-SNS 
era it required more time and effort to submit a complaint (e.g. buying an envelope, writing 
a letter, addressing and sending it), today e-mail and the official Facebook pages dedicated 
to a company have made it considerably easier and faster to express dissatisfaction or 
indignation relating to the conduct of an employee. As a result, possibly more people are 
keen to express their dissatisfaction on SNSs than in the offline world. It is another change 
that usually the style of these online complaints is also less official and more 
overheated2086 – making it more plausible to establish indignation from these people. 
734. Consequently, in such cases, the SNS post itself cannot be enough to 
establish the existence of a characterized serious disorder: its effects as well must be taken 
into consideration. However, SNSs made it easier to detect the public’s indignation 
because if a post goes viral, it might result more easily in public outcry (e.g. messages sent 
to the employer, public comments under the post or under the shared post, its appearance 
in news portals): thus it is able to constitute the basis of a non-disciplinary dismissal. 
(§2) Off-duty conduct and the Hungarian Labour Code 
735. Compared to French law, in Hungarian regulation there is no such 
differentiation between disciplinary and non-disciplinary dismissals:2087 if the conditions 
required are met, Section 8 applies as well to off-duty behaviour not directly relating to the 
employment. More precisely, Subsection (2) on behaviour outside of working hours and 
Subsection (3) on employees’ expression are of particular importance with regard to the 
subject. Although professional articles usually focus on the employees’ freedom of 
expression, this question includes wider matters: besides expression, employees’ behaviour 
(e.g. photo or video) should also be examined. 
 
2086 Ray, J.-E. (2018) ‘Des “licenciements Facebook” à la sanction d’un “Like” ?’, Semaine sociale Lamy, 
(1830), p. 12. 
2087 Even though such categories do not exist in Hungarian law as the cases of dismissal are regrouped 
according to a different logic, it was already presented that in Hungarian law as well it is possible to dismiss 
an employee without the breach of obligations. 
 420 
 
736. In the case when the content published to SNS directly relates to the 
employment, the legal basis is provided by the employee’s duty of loyalty, which means 
that the employee must not harm the employer’s reputation. Although every employee is 
entitled to the freedom of expression, it was determined that following from their status as 
employees, this freedom is not limitless. In the case of content (or behaviour) not directly 
relating to the employment, stricter conditions must be met in order to be able to sanction 
the employee. Due to the visibility/publicity of SNS posts, a possibly compromising 
content can easily go viral and result in the other users’ indignation – making it easier, 
compared to the pre-SNS age, to sanction the employee for behaviour committed solely in 
the course of his/her personal life. 
(A) Behaviour outside of working hours 
737. HLC and employee’s conduct outside working hours. Although in the 
public sector it is accepted that public employees are bound by certain restrictions even 
outside working hours, it was questioned whether such restrictions can be applied to the 
employees of the private sector.2088 In Decision No. 56/1994 (XI. 10.), the Constitutional 
Court laid down important ground rules relating to public employees’ behaviour outside 
working hours, and later the substance of it inspired Subsection (2) of Section 8.2089 Since 
the adoption of the HLC, as a new provision, it imposes restrictions on the behaviour of 
employees outside working hours, by stating that “[w]orkers may not engage in any 
conduct during or outside their paid working hours that – stemming from the worker’s job 
or position in the employer’s hierarchy – directly and factually has the potential to damage 
the employer’s reputation, legitimate economic interest or the intended purpose of the 
employment relationship.”2090 
738. Decision No. 56/1994 (XI. 10.). Although Decision No. 56/1994 (XI. 10.) 
relates to public servants (“közalkalmazott”), it provides a point of interpretation for 
restricting private employees’ behaviour.2091 In this decision, the Constitutional Court 
 
2088 See more on the subject and on the relevant case law in: Kardkovács, K. (ed.) (2016) A Munka 
Törvénykönyvének magyarázata. 3rd edn. Budapest: HVG-ORAC Lap- és Könyvkiadó p. 45. 
2089 See more on the subject and on the relevant case law in: Kardkovács, K. (ed.) (2016) A Munka 
Törvénykönyvének magyarázata. 3rd edn. Budapest: HVG-ORAC Lap- és Könyvkiadó p. 45. 
2090 Subsection (2) of Section 8 of the HLC 
2091 Pók, L. (2012) ‘Lájkolni szabad? Munkavállalói véleménynyilvánítás az új Munka Törvénykönyve 
tükrében’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (4), p. 161. 
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examined a provision of the Act on the Legal Status of Public Servants,2092 stating that 
public employees shall behave in a way worthy of a public employee, taken into 
consideration his/her job and position, even outside the workplace.2093 Although the 
Constitutional Court did not find this provision unconstitutional, it identified the conditions 
of the application of such a rule. It highlighted that even within the public sphere 
differentiation must be made between public employees, as public servants bear public 
functions to a lesser extent than civil servants. In the case of the latter, the general 
underlying public interest is not present in the case of every public servant, and as a 
consequence, such a restriction should be subjected to the strict requirement of 
proportionality and necessity. Therefore, restricting public employees’ behaviour outside 
the workplace is only necessary and proportionate if the behaviour is unworthy with regard 
to the job or position of the public employee and has a substantial and real, direct effect on 
it and causes the harm of the employer’s interests.2094 However, in the case of private 
employees public functions are completely absent: here, the employer’s private interests 
face employees’ fundamental rights.2095 
739. Subsection (2) of Section 8 (on employees’ conduct during or outside paid 
working hours) of the HLC is connected to the obligation of cooperation incumbent upon 
the employer and the employee. The employment relationship is a long-term, trust-based 
relationship, which affects not only the parties’ conduct during the performance of rights 
and obligations, but to a certain extent also the private life of the employee. This 
requirement is also enshrined among the employees’ obligation, namely, that the employee 
shall perform work in such a way that demonstrates the trust vested in him/her for the job 
in question.2096 This means that the employee cannot behave in a way, even outside the 
workplace, that would influence maintaining his/her employment. Demonstrating trust 
vested in him/her for the job in question does not relate to the non-respect of the 
employees’ obligations, but rather to circumstances making it impossible to maintain the 
employment. Naturally, the position of the employee within the hierarchy of the employer 
has importance when assessing the questioned behaviour.2097, 2098 
 
2092 Act XXXIII of 1992 on the Legal Status of Public Servants 
2093 Subsection (2) of Section 39 of Act XXXIII of 1992 on the Legal Status of Public Servants 
2094 Decision No. 56/1994 (XI. 10.) of the Constitutional Court 
2095 Pók, L. (2012) ‘Lájkolni szabad? Munkavállalói véleménynyilvánítás az új Munka Törvénykönyve 
tükrében’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (4), p. 160. 
2096 Item d) of Subsection (1) of Section 52 of the HLC 
2097 Kozma, A. (2013) ‘Mire köteles a munkavállaló?’, HR & Munkajog, 4(10), p. 9. 
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740. However, the restriction of employees’ conduct outside working hours is 
influenced by two circumstances according to Subsection (2) of Section 8: by the 
employee’s job or position within the employer’s organisation and by the effects of the 
conduct.2099 Following from the requirement of what can normally be expected in the given 
circumstances, an employee’s conduct is weighed differently according to his/her job or 
position within the hierarchy of the employer. According to László Lórodi, the nature of 
the employer should also be considered when judging, as there is a difference whether a 
factory worker out of thousands of workers publishes, for example, a sexually explicit 
content on social media, or if a teacher does that.2100 Regarding the effects of such conduct, 
the HLC regulates what kind of behaviours are capable of harming the employer’s 
interests: the conduct must present a direct and factual potential to damage the employer’s 
specified interests.2101, 2102 
741. Right to restrict. According to Subsection (2) of Section 8, it is possible to 
restrict employees’ conduct, but a restriction is only permissible if it meets the 
requirements set in Subsection (1) of Section 9 relating to the restriction of personality 
rights. Namely, it must be deemed strictly necessary for reasons directly related to the 
intended purpose of the employment relationship and proportionate for achieving its 
objective. Subsection (2) also adds that when the employer exercises such control, the 
employees affected shall be informed in writing in advance. 
742. Application to SNSs. These provisions laid down in Subsection (2) of 
Section 8 are applicable and therefore impose limits on the employees’ online behaviour 
on SNSs. However, these limits must be interpreted very strictly: they depend on the 
position of the employee, and can only relate to behaviours which have the potential to 
directly and factually damage the employer’s different interests.2103 Especially with regard 
to the absence of the public function in private sector employment law, such a restriction 
 
2098 For example, the reason for terminating the relationship of trust can be the employees’ expression of 
political opinion, or a content published on social media if it affects his/her employment. Source: Kozma, A. 
(2013) ‘Mire köteles a munkavállaló?’, HR & Munkajog, 4(10), p. 10. 
2099 T/4786. számú törvényjavaslat a Munka Törvénykönyvéről (2011). Előadó: Dr. Matolcsy György 
nemzetgazdasági miniszter. Budapest. pp. 99-100. 
2100 Lórodi, L. (2013) Mik azok a munkajogi alapelvek és mire valók? (1. rész), Munkajog Portál. Available 
at: http://munkajogportal.hu/mik-azok-a-munkajogi-alapelvek-es-mire-valok/ (Accessed: 6 September 2018). 
2101 Subsection (2) of Section 8 of the HLC 
2102 This is a stricter requirement compared to Subsection (1) of Section 8, which requires simple 
jeopardizing. 
2103 Kun, A. (2013) ‘Közösségi média és munkajog – avagy „online” munkaidőben és azon túl’, Munkaügyi 
Szemle, (3), p. 14. 
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should be limited to a narrow circle and to exceptional cases, to the case of severe harm of 
the employer’s legitimate interests, when the possible harm exceptionally, in a well-
defined way outweighs the employees’ right to privacy.2104 
743. Regarding the categories of persons, it is likely that executive employees2105 
are primarily concerned by these provisions, requiring them to act according to more 
severe expectations.2106 On a case-by-case basis, not only executive employees, but those 
who have an outstanding importance in the functioning of the employer or who occupy a 
position of trust might be concerned as well.2107 Regarding the content of the behaviour, 
one picture taken in a bar seems to be tolerable, while a video showing an employee in a 
nearly unconscious drunken state might be proven problematic. 
744. The criteria set for the case of behaviour having a direct connection with the 
employment (e.g. identifiability of the employer) can accordingly play a guiding role in the 
case of not having a direct connection. In addition, with regard to the lack of public 
function, limiting employees’ behaviour and expression must be an exceptional measure. 
Its application might depend on the position of the employee, and should not be broadly 
interpreted.2108 
(B) Freedom of expression 
745. Expressing opinion not relating to the employment. In relation to 
Subsection (3), the reasoning of the HLC clearly states that the employees’ freedom of 
expression cannot be restricted if the opinion is not connected to the employment.2109 I 
understand these provisions, according to which the employees’ expression cannot be 
restricted on the grounds of Subsection (3), however, in the light of Subsection (2) such an 
expression might be capable of directly and factually damaging the employer’s reputation, 
legitimate economic interest or the intended purpose of the employment relationship. (In 
 
2104 Pók, L. (2012) ‘Lájkolni szabad? Munkavállalói véleménynyilvánítás az új Munka Törvénykönyve 
tükrében’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (4), p. 161. 
2105 Subsection (1) of Section 208 of the HLC: “‘Executive employee’ shall mean the employer’s director, 
and any other person under his or her direct supervision and authorized – in part or in whole – to act as the 
director’s deputy.” 
2106 For example, different behaviour is expected from a secretary or from a CEO. 
2107 Pók, L. (2012) ‘Lájkolni szabad? Munkavállalói véleménynyilvánítás az új Munka Törvénykönyve 
tükrében’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (4), p. 163. 
2108 For example, to cases when the employee is shown during an illegal activity (e.g. consuming drugs or 
violating other rules) or in a state of excessive consumption of alcohol. 
2109 T/4786. számú törvényjavaslat a Munka Törvénykönyvéről (2011). Előadó: Dr. Matolcsy György 
nemzetgazdasági miniszter. Budapest. p. 99. 
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extreme cases) expression on SNSs can fall under Subsection (2). For example, it is 
enough to think of cases relating to the promotion of Nazi propaganda or racist comments. 
746. Even though they did not reach courts, certain cases were publicized: in 
2013, a journalist was dismissed for an offensive comment, blaming the victim of a 
rape,2110 while in 2016 another journalist was dismissed for posting an excessive comment 
in a case related to sexual abuse.2111 Although the following two cases are not from the 
private sector, they are worth mentioning in order to portray the growing topicality of the 
subject: in 2015 investigations were initiated against a primary school teacher who used 
her Facebook profile to inform parents and at the same time to share anti-Semitic posts.2112 
The second case relates to the chancellor of a Hungarian university (the second highest 
position at the university), who posted a picture to Facebook – in a period when the whole 
Hungarian media was reporting about refugees arriving – in which there were 14 naked 
women in a boat. In the picture it was written: “finally, welcome refugees!” On his profile, 
the chancellor identified that he worked at the University and (more seriously) his profile 
picture was the logo of the University. The case resulted in a public outcry. The chancellor 
claimed he was not the author of the content but was a victim of a cyber-attack and finally 
gave in his resignation in order to spare the University from more humiliation.2113 
747. In conclusion, different factors should be considered to determine whether 
the employees’ expression not directly relating to the employment damaged/jeopardized 
the employer’s reputation or legitimate economic interest. As in private employment 
employees do not have a public function, limiting their expressions (or sanctioning them) 
must relate to exceptional cases. First of all, the subject of the expression should be 
examined: expressions relating to subjects judged by public perceptions (e.g. promoting 
Nazi propaganda, hate speeches) might become subjects of such restrictions. The style can 
 
2110 Kirúgta munkatársát a Blikk, aki a Facebookon sértegette a megerőszakolt lányt (2013) HVG. Available 
at: https://hvg.hu/itthon/20130727_blikk_kirugas (Accessed: 22 November 2018). 
2111 Kirúgták Facebook-posztja miatt Aczél Endrét (2016) Népszava. Available 
at: https://nepszava.hu/1090759_kirugtak-facebook-posztja-miatt-aczel-endret (Accessed: 15 November 
2018). 
2112 Kúria (2019) Kúria tájékoztatója a Kúria M.I. tanácsa által tárgyaláson kívül elbírált Mfv.I.10.098/2019. 
számú ügyről. The Curia held that it is incompatible with the profession of teacher to post on a Facebook 
profile racist, exclusionary or extreme content. In its reasoning the court drew attention to the specific 
responsibilities teachers have, and their effects on teachers’ expected behaviour outside the workplace. As 
teachers have increased responsibility in educating children, these expectations are higher towards them than 
towards a private sector employee. 
2113 Lemondott Devecz Miklós, a szegedi egyetem kancellárja (2015) Index. Available 
at:https://index.hu/belfold/2015/09/28/lemondott_devecz_miklos_a_szegedi_egyetem_kancellarja/ 
(Accessed: 3 May 2018). 
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also play a role: the use of excessive expressions (potentially constituting slander or 
defamation) or expressions representing heated feelings such as aggression or hate2114 
might make the expression lose the protection. Finally, the position of the employee is 
important, as greater care is required from employees working in higher positions with 
increased responsibility. From among the above, these are the elements that should be 
analysed during the assessment of the expression in a given case. 
748. Conclusions of Chapter 1. While employees’ freedom of expression or 
behaviour outside working hours is already regulated both in France and in Hungary, SNSs 
put these already existing conducts into new perspective, through being platforms where 
employees often express themselves in an abusive and excessive way, possibly to a wide 
audience, with the increased possibility to identify the employer. This is true both in the 
case of expression/behaviour with a direct connection to the workplace and in the case of 
expression/behaviour with an indirect connection to the workplace. 
749. While both in France and in Hungary the employee has the right to express 
himself/herself, even including the expression of a negative opinion towards the employer, 
this expression cannot constitute an abuse. In the case of an activity indirectly having a 
connection with the employment relationship, even stricter conditions must be met, as the 
activity is more closely connected to the personal life of the employee. Throughout 
Chapter 1 different criteria were identified (position of the employee, nature of the 
expression, public or private nature, etc.), which can help establish whether the employee 
overstepped the limits of his/her freedom of action granted by the relevant regulations. 
 
2114 See, for example, the case of Justin Hutchings from London, Ontario who was fired in 2012 because he 
published offensive content (“It’s about time this b**** died”) to a memorial website of a teenager who 
committed suicide after being a victim of bullying for years. Mr. Hutchings identified his employer in his 
profile, and one of the users easily “tracked him down” from that information and reported his behaviour to 
his employer. Source: Sarin, P. (2012) Employees beware: The perils of posting on Facebook, rabble.ca. 
Available at: http://rabble.ca/columnists/2012/10/employees-beware-perils-posting-facebook (Accessed: 11 
May 2018). 
Or, see the case of an intern at a car factory who commented a picture in which firefighters sprinkled Syrian 
children with water in the summer heat. It was obvious from the picture that the children were having a good 
time. However, the intern commented that instead of water, a flamethrower would have been a better option. 
The employer was identifiable from the intern’s Facebook profile, and outraged users reported the comment 
to the employer – who in response terminated the internship. Source: Goda, M. (2015) Felmondhatunk a 
munkavállalónak egy facebook bejegyzés miatt?, Munkajog Portál. Available 
at: http://munkajogportal.hu/felmondhatunk-a-munkavallalonak-egy-facebook-bejegyzes-miatt/ (Accessed: 
27 May 2017). 
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Chapter 2: Regulating and monitoring employees’ presence on SNSs 
750. In addition to determining the boundaries of employees’ personal life when 
it comes to off-duty conduct and social media, Section 1 will examine this question from 
the employer’s perspective: namely, how exactly monitoring and imposing restrictions on 
employees’ behaviour can and should take place. In this regard, the employer’s role and 
responsibility are crucial, as within a specific workplace he/she is the key actor when it 
comes to planning the conditions of monitoring and defining the limits of how employees 
should behave while using SNSs. 
751. However, challenges relating to the use of SNSs go beyond the workplace, 
therefore, it is not only the employer’s responsibility to solve the uncertainties and to 
prompt employees to adopt a more responsible conduct through drafting and implementing 
an internal social media policy. Rather, it is a complex matter, where the interaction of 
different actors in different fields is required – as it will be seen in Section 2. Outside the 
workplace, technological solutions and awareness raising can contribute to a more 
conscious use of SNSs (not only by employees but also by users in general), which in my 
opinion can highly contribute to preventing arising challenges with respect to the 
misconceptions surrounding the public-private nature and the general functioning of SNSs. 
Section 1. What can employers do? 
Employers’ roles are crucial, as within the framework of the legal regulations, they 
can determine the exact behavioural requirements that employees must comply with, and 
they can also take a huge responsibility in raising awareness among employees. Under 
Section 1, it will be discussed what legal rules employers must respect during the 
monitoring and the regulation of employees’ online activities. While assessing whether 
SNSs are of public or private nature, the privacy approach was dominant, when it comes to 
how the monitoring of employees’ behaviour is possible, a data protection approach 
provides more answers. First, (§1) it will be examined whether the employer can 
completely prohibit the use of SNSs – with regard to the increased harm employees can 
cause, then (§2) it will be addressed what rules must be respected during monitoring 
employees’ online activities. 
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(§1) Prohibiting the use of SNS? 
752. Reversed vulnerability? In relation to employee monitoring usually the 
employees’ more vulnerable position is evoked, in contrast to the employer abusing his/her 
powers in monitoring employees (playing a local Big Brother by installing cameras 
everywhere, monitoring every keystroke employees make, recording every meter they 
drive in the company car, etc.). Gábor Mélypataki and Zoltán Rácz argued that although 
the employee can jeopardize the employer’s legitimate interests through off-duty SNS 
behaviour, it is still the employee who is in the more vulnerable position.2115 However, 
other authors argue – in my opinion, correctly – in favour of the existence of a reversed 
vulnerability between the parties. Edit Kajtár argued that in contrast to these premises, 
when it comes to using SNSs, tables have turned, and it is the employer who is in need of 
an increased protection against employees’ wrongful conduct.2116 The development of ICT 
has a huge impact on enforcing the employer’s rights and legitimate interests,2117 resulting 
in the reversed vulnerability of the employer.2118 In the social media era it is true that it has 
never been easier for a few persons to cause huge damage to the employer’s fragile 
reputation. On SNSs an ill-intentioned content – that is extremely easy to publish, only 
Internet connection and a few minutes are needed – can rapidly go viral, causing damage, 
which a simple employee could not easily do in the pre-Facebook age.2119 This “new” 
vulnerability has to be taken into consideration when establishing the balance between the 
employees’ and the employer’s rights. 
753. Can an employer completely prohibit the use of SNS? From the employer’s 
perspective, the most straightforward solution might seem to be the prohibition of the use 
of SNSs, preventing all the possible challenges. However, from a legal point of view,2120 
 
2115 Mélypataki, G. and Rácz, Z. (2018) ‘A személyiségi jogok védelmének ütközése a munkajogban’, in 
Auer, Á. et al. (eds) Ünnepi kötet a 65 éves Kiss György tiszteletére - Liber Amicorum in honorem Georgii 
Kiss aetatis suae LXV. Budapest: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, p. 683. 
2116 Kajtár, E. (2015) ‘Európai ügyek a Facebook sötét oldaláról - A munkavállalók közösségi oldalakon 
tanúsított kötelezettségszegő magatartása’, in Horváth, I. (ed.) Tisztelgés: ünnepi tanulmányok Dr. 
Hágelmayer Istvánné születésnapjára. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, p. 199. 
2117 Majtényi, L. (2006) Az információs szabadságok: adatvédelem és a közérdekű adatok nyilvánossága. 
Budapest: Complex. p. 333. 
2118 Balogh, Zs. Gy. et al. (2012) ‘Munkahelyi adatvédelem a gyakorlatban’, Infokommunikáció és Jog, 9(3), 
pp. 96-97. 
2119 Ray, J.-E. (2010) ‘Little Brothers are watching you’, Semaine sociale Lamy, (1470), p. 10. and Ray, J.-E. 
(2018) ‘Des “licenciements Facebook” à la sanction d’un “Like” ?’, Semaine sociale Lamy, (1830), p. 11. 
2120 Also, from a practical point of view, such a prohibition would only lead to the creation of profiles under 
fake names or pseudonyms. 
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even taking into account the employer’s increased vulnerability, this solution would raise 
several problems.  
754. According to the former UN’s Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, “[t]he Internet has become 
one of the most important vehicles by which individuals exercise their right to freedom of 
opinion and expression, and it can play an important role to promote human rights, 
democratic participation, accountability, transparency and economic development. 
[…]”2121 Access to the Internet does not only comprise exercising freedom of expression, 
but is also a means to exercise other rights, such as the right to education, the right to 
freedom of association, the right to full participation in social, cultural and political life and 
the right to social and economic development.2122 As SNSs are an important part of 
everyday life, the UN Special Rapporteur’s words apply to their case as well. SNSs are 
more than simply a way of entertainment; they are important platforms of self-expression 
and communication. Besides, they also represent a way of collecting information, as they 
are one of the main platforms of learning about events of not only friends and 
acquaintances, but also of the world. Completely prohibiting employees to use them would 
constitute a very extreme measure, especially considering that they do not even hold public 
functions.2123 Proskauer Rose LLP, in its third annual global survey about social media use 
analysing the jurisdiction of sixteen countries from all over the world,2124 concluded that in 
none of the examined jurisdictions did the employer have the right to prohibit the use of 
social media per se.2125  
755. As it was already discussed, both the FLC and the HLC require 
proportionality when it comes to restricting employees’ rights – and although there exists 
no explicit right to social media, given its role in the 21st century, completely prohibiting 
their use seems to constitute a disproportionate limitation of the employees’ right to 
 
2121 La Rue, F. (2011) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression. UN General Assembly Sixty-sixth session. Promotion and protection of 
human rights. A/66/290. United Nations. par. 78. 
2122 La Rue, F. (2011) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression. UN General Assembly Sixty-sixth session. Promotion and protection of 
human rights. A/66/290. United Nations. par. 61. 
2123 Pók, L. (2012) ‘Lájkolni szabad? Munkavállalói véleménynyilvánítás az új Munka Törvénykönyve 
tükrében’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (4), p. 161. 
2124 The jurisdictions covered were Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong 
Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Spain, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
2125 Proskauer Rose LLP (2014) Social Media in the Workplace Around the World 3.0. 2013/14 Survey. 
Available at: http://www.proskauer.com/files/uploads/social-media-in-the-workplace-2014.pdf (Accessed: 3 
February 2017). p. 10. 
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privacy. As regards France, Jean-Emmanuel Ray expressed that prohibiting the use of 
SNSs from the employees’ home seems to be problematic.2126 In Hungary, Edit Kajtár 
reached the same conclusion, stating that completely prohibiting employees from using 
social media would be extremely disproportionate.2127 Although limited to the expression 
of employees, Márton Leó Zaccaria likewise held that completely prohibiting the 
employee from expressing his/her opinion on SNSs would not be acceptable.2128 Based on 
the above views, I am of the opinion that in accordance with the requirements laid down in 
national regulations, complete prohibition is not possible;2129 instead, the employer should 
only restrict the use of SNSs – the increased harm possibly caused by employees should be 
taken into consideration when determining the limits of such restriction. As a result, the 
employer is entitled to impose limitations on employees’ conduct on SNSs – its suggested 
limits will be addressed in Section 2. 
(§2) Employee monitoring and data protection 
When it comes to determining in detail the employer’s available means in relation to 
controlling off-duty conduct on SNSs, in addition to the privacy approach (namely the 
public or private nature of these platforms), the assessment from a data protection point of 
view is needed in order to ensure the protection of employees’ rights. First, parallel to the 
private-public nature of SNSs, as a preliminary question it should be assessed whether the 
systematic monitoring of these platforms is possible. Then, as the employer has several 
ways to access data, it should be examined (A) what ways of access are considered to be 
lawful. Finally, (B) the specific challenges relating to the enforcement of data protection 
requirements will be addressed. 
756. Monitoring2130 and data protection. In addition to the privacy approach (the 
assessment of the public or private nature of SNSs), the matter can also be viewed from a 
data protection angle, meaning that it should be examined whether it is possible for the 
 
2126 Ray, J.-E. (2011) ‘Facebook, le salarié et l’employeur’, Droit social, (2), pp. 138-139. 
2127 Kajtár, E. (2016) Dignity at Work: Employee’s Personality Rights in the 21st Century. Pécs: University 
of Pécs, Faculty of Law (PMJK Monographs 6). p. 174. 
2128 Zaccaria, M. L. (2016) ‘Munkavállalók a világhálón - “Megosztani ér?”’, HR & Munkajog, 7(10), p. 16. 
2129 Except for a very few cases – e.g. for individuals working in high positions in the military, in national 
security, etc.  
2130 In practice, usually three scenarios are employed: 1) no monitoring at all, 2) ad hoc monitoring (e.g. 
when managers and employees are connected on an SNS), 3) systematic, well-planned monitoring . Source: 7 
Ways Employee Privacy Laws Impact Social Media in the Workplace (2018) Pryme Group. Available 
at: https://allpryme.com/employee-privacy-laws/employee-privacy-laws/ (Accessed: 14 August 2019). 
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employer to systematically monitor the employees’ online behaviour and presence. As it 
was already established, although usually it is the individual who decides to share the 
content on his/her profile, even if it is done without the use of the privacy settings, it does 
not mean that the employer can process the personal data in any way he/she wishes, 
without any limitations. The data protection requirements still have to be respected.2131 
757. Can the employer monitor SNSs? In France, the monitoring of the publicly 
available information is possible.2132 If the employer monitors such a public content, the 
violation of the employee’s right to respect for private life is not raised,2133 as it was the 
employee himself/herself who chose to publish the given content. However, it does not 
mean that such a control is exempt from legal requirements: data protection requirements, 
such as prior information, purpose limitation, proportionality, necessity, data quality, etc. 
are still going to be applicable.2134 
758. As it was already pointed out, in Hungary, László Pók argued that as it 
would be hard not to qualify employees’ behaviour outside of working hours as pertaining 
to their personal life, in the light of the HLC’s provision on prohibiting the monitoring of 
employees’ private lives, it is hardly acceptable to monitor employees’ activity (beyond 
working hours, by using their own devices) on SNSs. This would leave the employer the 
possibility to discover the employee’s expression only incidentally.2135 However, Edit 
Kajtár – in my opinion, correctly – argues that on the one hand, the HLC states that the 
employee can only be monitored to the extent pertaining to the employment relationship 
(and not during working hours). Therefore, if there is a connection between SNS use and 
the employment relationship, the monitoring per se is not forbidden. On the other hand, 
she also interprets the HLC as it only forbids to violate employees’ private life and does 
not forbid it to be the subject of monitoring.2136 Therefore, the systematic monitoring of the 
 
2131 Fel, C. and Sordet, E. (2010) ‘L’utilisation des réseaux sociaux par l’entreprise et ses 
collaborateurs’, JCP S (édition sociale), (29), p. 22.; NAIH/2016/4386/2/V. 
2132 Griguer, M. (2010) ‘Les réseaux sociaux sous le contrôle des DSI’, Cahiers de droit de l’entreprise, (6), 
p. 64.  
2133 Fel, C. and Sordet, E. (2010) ‘L’utilisation des réseaux sociaux par l’entreprise et ses 
collaborateurs’, JCP S (édition sociale), (29), p. 22. 
2134 Caprioli, É. A. (2012) ‘Les propos tenus par une salarié sur Facebook peuvent justifier son 
licenciement’, Communication Commerce Électronique, (4), p. 39. 
2135 Pók, L. (2012) ‘Lájkolni szabad? Munkavállalói véleménynyilvánítás az új Munka Törvénykönyve 
tükrében’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (4), p. 164. 
2136 Kajtár, E. (2015) ‘Európai ügyek a Facebook sötét oldaláról - A munkavállalók közösségi oldalakon 
tanúsított kötelezettségszegő magatartása’, in Horváth, I. (ed.) Tisztelgés: ünnepi tanulmányok Dr. 
Hágelmayer Istvánné születésnapjára. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, p. 203. 
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employee’s SNS activities is legitimate, provided that the employer respects other (data 
protection) requirements.2137 
(A) Access 
In practice, employers have several ways to access or to gain knowledge of 
employees’ off-duty SNS conduct. It was already addressed in the frame of the present 
thesis that employers are allowed to consult the publicly available content posted by the 
employee. Even though this is the most obvious way of gaining access due to the lack of 
the use of privacy settings, other scenarios must also be examined, such as using schemes, 
friending an employee, and the case of receiving screenshots. 
759. Schemes. Besides constituting an intrusion into the employee’s personal 
life, the use of schemes would also be contrary to the data protection principle of fair 
processing. The employer cannot use schemes in order to obtain access to the content the 
employee shared. For example, a colleague cannot be asked to send a friend request to an 
employee in order to be able to provide screenshots in the case of the publication of a 
“suspicious” content.2138 It is also forbidden for the employer to ask another employee, 
member in a closed group, to report on the activity of other employees2139 or to use a 
pseudonym in order to trick the employee into accepting a friend request.2140 Creating a 
modern-day “snitch regime” through encouraging the employees to report on each other’s 
online activities would be unlawful according to Mélypataki and Rácz.2141 This is in line 
with the data protection requirements, such as the fairness and the transparency of 
processing. 
760. Friending an employee. In contrast to using a pseudonym or fake name 
when sending a friend request, friending an employee while using the employer’s real 
name might reveal different issues. According to Julien Le Clainche, if the employer 
 
2137 Rácz, I. (2015) ‘A közösségi média használatának árnyoldalai a munkaviszonyban’, in Deres, P. and 
Grad-Gyenge, A. (eds) Acta Iuvenum Caroliensia VII.Budapest: Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem Állam- 
és Jogtudományi Kar, p. 285. 
2138 Ray, J.-E. (2018) ‘Des “licenciements Facebook” à la sanction d’un “Like” ?’, Semaine sociale Lamy, 
(1830), p. 11. 
2139 NAIH (2016) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a munkahelyi 
adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről. Budapest, p. 19. 
2140 Le Clainche, J. (2012) ‘Expression des salariés sur internet : attention aux « faux amis »’, Revue Lamy 
droit de l’immatériel ex Lamy droit de l’informatique, (81), p. 48. 
2141 Mélypataki, G. and Rácz, Z. (2018) ‘A személyiségi jogok védelmének ütközése a munkajogban’, in 
Auer, Á. et al. (eds) Ünnepi kötet a 65 éves Kiss György tiszteletére - Liber Amicorum in honorem Georgii 
Kiss aetatis suae LXV. Budapest: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, p. 682. 
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makes part of a “careless employee’s” contact list, the employer having access to the 
disparaging remarks would be considered lawful.2142 Nevertheless, according to my 
opinion, the picture is more nuanced, especially when the employer sends a friend request 
to an employee.2143 Although it is true that in this scenario the employer does not apply any 
schemes, the voluntary nature of consenting to letting the employer access this online 
profile reserved for friends (because if it were set to public, the employer would not need 
to send a request) can be highly questionable.2144 Can an employee decline such a request 
without fearing the possible consequences?2145 
761. As a reference, the CoE’s and the WP29’s already presented documents 
should be recalled. According to the CoE’s 2015 Recommendation,2146 “[e]mployers 
should refrain from requiring or asking an employee […] access to information that he or 
she shares with others online, notably through social networking.” The explanatory 
memorandum states that when an employee decides to restrict access to his/her account, 
his/her will should be respected, and employers do not have the right to ask for access to 
the profile.2147, 2148 Although the explanatory memorandum refers to the example of the 
employer asking for login credentials, sending a friend request to an employee – even if it 
is far from being as serious as an employer asking for username and password – constitutes 
requiring access to information as well. Such an interpretation is consistent with the 
WP29’s viewpoint, which noted that “[t]here is no legal ground for an employer to 
require potential employees to ‘friend’ the potential employer, or in other ways provide 
 
2142 Le Clainche, J. (2012) ‘Expression des salariés sur internet : attention aux « faux amis »’, Revue Lamy 
droit de l’immatériel ex Lamy droit de l’informatique, (81), p. 48. 
2143 In the case when the employee initiates the act, in my opinion, no special legal challenges arise from a 
legal view. 
2144 However, in contrast to this opinion, Jean-Emmanuel Ray notes that it is exceptional that an employee 
accepts a friend request coming from the employer. Source: Ray, J.-E. (2013) ‘Facebook, espace public plus 
que privé. A propos de l’arrêt de la 1 ère Chambre civile du 10 avril 2013’, Semaine sociale Lamy, (1599), p. 
18. 
2145 Although as certain sites, such as Facebook, enable users to apply customized privacy settings, the 
employee could grant a very limited access to the employer without the latter realizing that he/she is among 
the “acquaintances” – therefore the employee can have his/her cake and eat it. However, this is not a 
satisfying solution, as in the case of SNSs with all or nothing privacy settings (e.g. Instagram), the employee 
cannot have recourse to this solution. 
2146 Council of Europe (2015) Recommendation CM/Rec(2015)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
States on the processing of personal data in the context of employment. 
2147 Council of Europe (2015) Explanatory memorandum to Recommendation CM/Rec(2015)5 of the 
Committee of Ministers to member States on the processing of personal data in the context of employment. 
par. 46. 
2148 The explanatory memorandum also recalls that employers should not obtain access to employees’ profile 
without their knowledge, using an intermediary, or using a fake name or a pseudonym. par. 45. 
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access to the contents of their profiles.”2149 Although this provision refers to prospective 
employees, in my opinion it is adequately applicable to the case of employees as well, 
meaning that the employer should refrain from friending employees. 
762. “Betrayal” of a colleague: receiving screenshots. In the presented French 
cases, it was quite frequent that the employer became aware of the disparaging remarks 
through another employee who had access to them and decided to let the employer know 
as well, typically by providing screenshots.2150 The employment tribunal of Boulogne-
Billancourt held that such a practice does not violate the employee’s right to respect for 
private life.2151 According to the practice previously established by courts,2152 if an 
individual who was originally granted access to the content decides to extract the 
information and to transmit it outside of the restricted access (to the employer in this case), 
the employer can rely on it as proof.2153 As it was already presented, the Court of Cassation 
went against this already established practice in its 2017 decision,2154 extensively limiting 
employer’s possibilities to obtain proof from SNSs. According to this decision, the 
employer can obtain proof if he/she is amongst the friends of the employee or if the 
employee’s profile is set to fully public.2155 
 (B) Data protection principles 
After determining that the existence of a systematic monitoring system can be 
legitimate, and the ways of access in which employers can obtain personal data, it is 
necessary to address the question of the enforcement of other data protection principles. It 
cannot be emphasized enough that just because the employee made the information freely 
available by not applying the privacy settings, it does not mean that the general data 
 
2149 WP29 (2017) Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 17/EN WP 249. p. 11. 
2150 For example, this was the case in: CPH Boulogne-Billancourt (Section Encadrement), 19 novembre 2010, 
n° 09/00343; CA Rouen, 26 avril 2016, n°14/03517; Cour de cassation, Civ. 1re, 10 avr. 2013, n°11-19530; 
Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 12 sept. 2018, n°16-11.690 
2151 CPH Boulogne-Billancourt (Section Encadrement), 19 novembre 2010, n° 09/00343 
2152 See, for example: CA Rouen, 26 avril 2016, n° 14/03517; CA Paris, Pôle 6, chambre 5, 20 septembre 
2018, n° 14/04515. The Court of Appeal of Paris adopted a similar position in a case where the remarks were 
made in a Facebook group, where one of the participants invited the employer. Source: CA Paris, Pôle 6, 
chambre 9, 3 décembre 2015, n° 15/04533 
2153 Mayoux, S. (2018) ‘Licéité de la preuve recuillie sur Facebook par l’employeur’, Jurisprudence sociale 
Lamy, (449), p. 24. 
2154 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 20 déc. 2017, n°16-19609 
2155 Source: Mayoux, S. (2018) ‘Licéité de la preuve recuillie sur Facebook par l’employeur’, Jurisprudence 
sociale Lamy, (449), p. 25. 
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protection requirements would cease to apply.2156 In the following paragraphs the specific 
aspects in relation to monitoring off-duty conduct will be addressed, such as (a) purpose 
limitation, necessity, proportionality, (b) prior information and (c) data quality. 
(a) Purpose limitation, necessity and proportionality 
763. Purpose limitation and necessity. Ensuring the employer’s reputation, 
legitimate economic interests and protection of business secrets and confidential 
information are purposes that can justify the existence of monitoring, as online presence 
and reputation are of crucial importance in the 21st century and an incriminating post might 
go viral in an extremely short time. In order to ascertain whether employees’ online 
behaviour infringes these interests, it is necessary to monitor their public posts. 
764. Principle of proportionality. Proportionality can be twofold: first, it can 
relate to the content of the monitoring and second, to the scope of the data processing 
operations. Regarding the first aspect, the employer can decide to look for certain 
keywords (e.g. the name of the employer) or to monitor the activity of certain employees 
(e.g. managers).2157 Second, as regards data processing operations, the employer is not 
empowered to store and analyse information relating to employees’ public posts: in the 
light of the above-mentioned requirements, their storing is only possible if the content is 
compromising and the employer needs to obtain evidence of such conduct. 
(b) Prior information 
765. Prior information. Both in France and in Hungary, the employer is subject 
to the obligation of informing employees regarding the limitations of their rights, and the 
processing of their personal data. In relation to SNSs and off-duty conduct it means that 
although the employer can monitor the public posts/activity of the employee, employees 
must be informed of this practice, notably through internal regulations.2158, 2159 This 
 
2156 Fel, C. and Sordet, E. (2010) ‘L’utilisation des réseaux sociaux par l’entreprise et ses 
collaborateurs’, JCP S (édition sociale), (29), p. 22.; NAIH/2016/4386/2/V. 
Attila Kun made a similar statement, though in relation to discrimination, that the existence of discrimination 
cannot be excluded just because the individual shared the personal data. Source: Kun, A. (2013) ‘Közösségi 
média és munkajog – avagy „online” munkaidőben és azon túl’, Munkaügyi Szemle, (3), p. 16. 
2157 However, it is important that the determination of the personal scope of monitoring cannot be arbitrary or 
discriminative. 
2158 Griguer, M. (2010) ‘Les réseaux sociaux sous le contrôle des DSI’, Cahiers de droit de l’entreprise, (6), 
p. 64. 
 435 
 
obligation of prior information only applies to cases where the employer decided to 
systematically monitor employees’ online presence in order to verify compliance, and 
naturally does not apply to cases where a third person (e.g. another employee, client, etc.) 
informed the employer about the employee’s online behaviour.2160 
(c) Principle of data quality 
766. Liability of screenshots. Data quality issues might arise in relation to the 
reliability of personal data obtained from SNSs. In a case at the Court of Appeal of 
Lyon,2161 when the employer learned about the remarks of the employee, he did not provide 
a bailiff’s report, therefore only screenshots provided by other employees were available to 
support his statement – and the court of appeal held that, in contrast to a bailiff’s report, 
they were not sufficient to support certain allegations of the employer. Copying a 
conversation might also be insufficient, as courts already ruled that copying and pasting a 
conversation – instead of a print screen – is insufficient proof, as from them, the 
accessibility of the account could not be assessed,2162 suggesting that a print screen might 
have been considered acceptable. This observation is also in line with the data quality 
principles. In Hungarian law as well, several practical questions arise in relation to the 
reliability of such proof. As there is no “Facebook firings” case law,2163 these questions are 
yet to be answered by courts. 
767. Identifying the author of the remarks. Not only identifying to whom the 
remarks relate can be challenging, but also identifying the author of the remarks: the use of 
pseudonyms, usernames might hide the true identity of the post’s author. In a case at the 
Court of Appeal of Pau,2164 the employee published the remarks to Facebook under a 
pseudonym. However, the text itself that he published contained enough elements to 
identify the place of employment, the name of his colleagues, information relating to his 
 
2159 NAIH/2016/4386/2/V. and NAIH (2016) A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság 
tájékoztatója a munkahelyi adatkezelések alapvető követelményeiről. Budapest, p. 19. 
2160 However, following this act he/she has the obligation to inform the employee regarding the further 
processing. 
2161 CA Lyon, chambre sociale A, 24 mars 2014, n° 13-03463 
2162 Baugard, D. (2015) ‘L’usage par les salariés des réseaux sociaux’, in Ndior, V. (ed.) Droit et réseaux 
sociaux. Issy-les-Moulineaux: Lextenso (Collection LEJEP), p. 86. 
2163 Pók, L. (2012) ‘A közösség hálójában – Közösségi oldalak munkajogi vonatkozásai’, Infokommunikáció 
és jog, (1), p. 13. 
2164 CA Pau, chambre sociale, 6 septembre 2018, n° 17/01648 
 436 
 
private and professional life, and the use of his real first name by other users who reacted 
to the text. 
It is also possible that someone – especially with a common first name and family 
name – is mistaken for another user having the same name, therefore their online activities 
might be confused. However, while this might raise more heated issues in relation to 
recruitment (where the job applicant is an unknown person to the employer), during the 
course of the employment relationship several clues (e.g. having photos of himself/herself 
uploaded, indicating the place of employment, having several of other employees amongst 
his/her contacts, etc.) can indicate that the user is indeed an employee of the given 
employer – decreasing the possibility that such data quality questions arise. 
768. Preliminary interviews and data quality. In relation to accuracy and 
reliability, the institution of preliminary interview might be of importance. In French law, 
when an employer considers terminating the employment, he/she must summon the 
employee to a preliminary interview before taking any decision.2165 During this 
preliminary interview, the employer presents the reasons for the proposed decision and 
listens to the explanations of the employee.2166 This interview is supposed to serve the 
protection of the employee, by giving him/her the possibility to provide an explanation to 
the allegations. Theoretically, such an interview could contribute to the effective 
enforcement of the data quality principles. However, in my opinion the cases where the 
data quality principles might be threatened regarding off-duty conducts and SNSs are very 
limited in practice. Such extreme cases might include hacking the employee’s account 
(therefore he/she is not the author of the compromising content) or mistaking someone 
else’s online activity for the employee’s (e.g. through bearing the same name). A 
difference between the two countries is that in Hungarian labour law there is no such 
interview where the employee could explain himself/herself. However, as regards the rarity 
of the mentioned cases, such a preliminary interview in itself would not represent a 
solution to the arising challenges. 
769. Conclusions of Section 1. In conclusion, with regard to the importance of 
SNSs nowadays, a complete prohibition of their use outside the workplace does not seem 
legally acceptable. However, as employees are bound by certain obligations outside the 
workplace, their use of SNSs can be restricted in accordance with the labour law and data 
 
2165 Paragraph 1 of Article L1232-2 of the FLC 
2166 Article L1232-3 of the FLC 
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protection requirements. Such a restriction is always dependent on the given 
circumstances, such as the position of the employee or the nature of the workplace, also the 
assessment of the activity must be based on a case-by-case basis. The employer has the 
right to monitor employees’ activity on SNSs and whether they have complied with 
restrictions. However, during such a monitoring, data protection requirements must be 
respected. Notably regarding access, the employer can only process personal data that was 
publicly available (either for every Internet user or for every user of the given SNS) or that 
he/she has become aware of through another employee/user who voluntarily decided to 
share the given information with the employer. Prior information must also be given to 
employees, and efforts should be made to avoid possible issues arising with respect to the 
enforcement of the principle of data quality. 
Section 2. Best practices and recommendations 
Section 2 will enumerate what steps and measures can be taken in order to find a 
balance between the rights of the two parties and to avoid the emergence of issues related 
to the use of SNSs outside the workplace. First, (§1) it will address what can be done 
within the workplace, aiming to examine the measures that might be adopted by 
employers. Then (§2) it will discuss what other factors can play a role beyond the 
workplace. 
§1. Inside the workplace 
As every workplace is different, it is impossible to provide a universal regulation 
applicable to all enterprises. Therefore, providing rules at the level of the workplace is 
crucial. For example, the employer can provide trainings or distribute informational 
materials in order to remind employees of their obligations and of the restrictions relating 
to their online behaviour. However, it is a more common solution to adopt social media 
policies – which will be presented in the following paragraphs. 
(A) Adopting internal social media policies 
770. In accordance with what was already stated in relation to internal social 
media policies regarding the use of SNSs during working hours, internal social media 
policies can constitute an effective way to clarify what behaviour employees can adopt on 
SNSs. Through laying down the good examples and the forbidden use of SNSs, such an 
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internal policy can often be an effective way to prevent employees from abusing their 
freedom of expression.2167 When it comes to determining the content of such a policy,2168 it 
must be emphasized that it is not possible to draft a universal policy that could be 
applicable at every employer without changes. Due to the diversity of legal relationships, 
job descriptions and workplaces, what might be tolerable at one workplace might violate 
the reputation at another. During the drafting of such a document several factors shall be 
taken into consideration (e.g. the type of the workplace, its size, its place, etc.). Those 
stated here represent a point of reference, but they must be adjusted to the characteristics of 
the given workplace, such as the workplace environment, the nature of the work, level of 
employees’ education, etc. There exists no one-size-fits-all solution.2169 
771. Despite its advantages, in Hungary it is not a common practice for 
employers to adopt such documents.2170 However, in my opinion, with the growing number 
of employees (allegedly) abusing their rights, more and more employers will tend toward 
adopting an internal social media policy. One particular case happened within the National 
Ambulance Service, where an internal social media policy was created in response to 
paramedics taking pictures of unconscious patients and commenting them on Facebook.2171 
Other employers also started to regulate these matters through adopting different 
 
2167 Griguer, M. (2010) ‘Les réseaux sociaux sous le contrôle des DSI’, Cahiers de droit de l’entreprise, (6), 
p. 64. ; Pók, L. (2012) ‘A közösség hálójában – Közösségi oldalak munkajogi 
vonatkozásai’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (1), p. 15. 
2168 The present part is highly based on the results of a research project conducted by József Hajdú, Adrienn 
Lukács, Viktória Lechner and Attila Turi between 2016-2017 entitled “Data protection challenges arising 
during the use of social network sites in the context of employment” (“A közösségi oldalak használata során 
felmerülő adatvédelmi jogi problémák a munkajog kontextusában”) financed by the Ministry of Justice of 
Hungary. (In the meantime the research was supplemented as it progressed.) The main result of the research 
was a paper entitled “Social media and labour law – dismissal for Facebook posts in the light of Hungarian 
and international jurisprudence” (“Közösségi média és munkajog – különös tekintettel a Facebook-ra 
alapított felmondásokra a hazai szabályozás és a nemzetközi joggyakorlat tükrében”). (To be published in De 
iurisprudentia et iure publico). In the frame of the research, we analysed several internal social media 
policies in order to establish the best practices that can be drawn from them. 
In the research the following social media policies were analysed: Canada: Via Rail Canada, Red Cross; 
USA: Department of the Interior, Food and Drug Administration; Australia: Equestrian Australia, Volleyball 
Australia, National Library of Australia; UK: BBC; France: IUT de Rennes, Orange; Global: DELL, 
NVIDIA. 
2169 Hajdú, J. et al. (forthcoming) ‘Közösségi média és munkajog – különös tekintettel a Facebook-ra alapított 
felmondásokra a hazai szabályozás és a nemzetközi joggyakorlat tükrében’, De iurisprudentia et iure publico 
(DIEIP) 
2170 Klausz, M. (2013) Megosztok, tehát vagyok: A közösségi média és az Internet szép új világa. Veszprém: 
Magánkiadás. p. 144.; Rácz, I. (2015) ‘A közösségi média használatának árnyoldalai a munkaviszonyban’, in 
Deres, P. and Grad-Gyenge, A. (eds) Acta Iuvenum Caroliensia VII.Budapest: Károli Gáspár Református 
Egyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar, p. 295. 
2171 Facebook-szabályzat a mentőknél - van apropója (2012). Available 
at: https://www.hrportal.hu/c/facebook-szabalyzat-a-mentoknel-van-apropoja-20120116.html (Accessed: 15 
November 2018). 
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measures.2172 In the absence of case law it is the employer’s duty, and therefore it plays a 
gap-filling role, to draft and consistently implement internal social media policies in order 
to provide guidance to employees on the use of SNSs.2173, 2174 
772. While keeping in mind the impossibility of creating uniform policies 
applicable to every workplace, the following paragraphs will aim to draw attention to the 
most important elements of such a policy. It is recommended that employers include the 
following parts: the aim of the policy, fundamental definitions, scope, common rules of 
conduct, examples of conducts to be followed or avoided, monitoring of compliance (data 
protection), sanctions and references. 
(B) Recommended content of the policy 
773. The aim of the policy. Within this part, it is recommended that the employer 
declares the overall aim that he/she wants to reach by adopting the policy and to raise 
attention to the arising legal (privacy and data protection) challenges. In this part the 
employer could state that the policy’s aim is to determine the conditions and requirements 
that employees shall respect during the use of SNSs. The policy’s main aim is to establish 
a balance between the employer’s rights and legitimate interests and the employees’ right, 
through determining the boundaries of the employees’ freedom of expression. The 
employer should emphasize that although in this scenario employees use SNSs outside the 
workplace, beyond working hours, from their own equipment, they are still bound by 
labour law regulation, meaning that they cannot say anything on these forums without 
facing the possible legal consequences for their employment relationship. Therefore, 
employees should use SNSs in a way that does not infringe the employer’s or other users’ 
rights. 
774. Definitions. When it comes to definitions, it is recommended to provide a 
general definition of social media and SNSs, to provide certain examples of the most 
commonly used platforms – as the exhaustive enumeration of existing SNSs is not 
 
2172 Szilágyi, K. (2013) Facebook-szabályzat: beleszólhat- a munkáltató?, Adó Online. Available 
at: https://ado.hu/munkaugyek/facebook-szabalyzat-beleszolhat-a-munkaltato/ (Accessed: 15 November 
2018). 
2173 Németh, J. (2013) A közösségi média használata munkáltatói szemmel, Jogászvilág. Available 
at: https://jogaszvilag.hu/szakma/a-kozossegi-media-hasznalata-munkaltatoi-szemmel/ (Accessed: 6 
September 2018). 
2174 It is especially the case in Hungary, where there is no elaborated case law in the field – in contrast to 
France. 
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possible. It is also advisable to remind employees that any kind of content can constitute an 
infringement: not only texts (e.g. post, comment), but also photos or videos.2175 
775. In policies, differentiation should be made between official and non-official 
use. Official use (professional use) is when the employee either handles the official account 
of the workplace or acts as the official representative of the employer. Only those 
employees can act as such who were pre-authorized to do so. Non-official use (personal 
use) occurs when the employee uses his/her own profile as a private person (or as an 
employee), and not as the representative of the employer. Such a use can relate to matters 
connected to the workplace (e.g. expressing opinion in relation to professional questions, 
often as an employee of the given workplace) or to matters completely independent of the 
workplace. 
776. Scope. The employer should define the scope of the policy. Regarding the 
personal scope, the employer should clearly state which employees (every employee, a 
group of them, etc.) the policy is applicable to. Amongst the material scope, it is advisable 
to differentiate between official and non-official use of SNSs and state that the present 
policy aims to regulate questions relating to non-official use. As non-official use raises the 
question of the boundaries of professional and personal life, this matter will be examined 
in detail.2176 It should also be emphasized that the policy applies to the off-duty use of 
SNSs (when at first sight no connection is present with the employment, as the employee 
does not use the employer’s device, is outside of the workplace, beyond working hours), 
while specific provisions aim to regulate the use of SNSs during working hours. Amongst 
the temporal scope, employers should clearly indicate when the policy was adopted, and if 
it was updated, when it occurred. 
777. Common rules of conduct. In addition to laying down the explicit rules and 
the restrictions applying to employees, internal regulations should also serve as a guidance 
as regards responsible use of SNSs.2177 The policy can constitute a good way to raise 
 
2175 Equestrian Australia (2012) Social Media Policy. Available 
at: http://www.equestrian.org.au/sites/default/files/Social%20Media%20Policy.pdf (Accessed: 19 March 
2017). p. 3. 
2176 In contrast, while official use should also be regulated, it does not raise specific privacy/data protection 
challenges, as such a use is basically part of the work. 
2177 Németh, J. (2013) ‘Az internet nem felejt – közösségi media-használatra alapított munkáltatói és 
munkavállalói felmondások’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (2), p. 98. 
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awareness amongst employees regarding their responsibilities while using SNSs.2178 It is 
important to emphasize that SNSs are not terra nullius, and their use is subjected to the 
legal requirements. Employees should be made aware that nowadays the boundaries of 
work and personal life are blurred, and social media does not constitute an exception from 
this phenomenon. Therefore, the employee must respect the employer’s legitimate interests 
even while using SNSs in the course of his/her personal life. This means that employees 
can register and use these sites, they can express their opinion, however, but they are not 
completely free to post anything without any restriction:2179 obligations arising from the 
employment contract are binding in the case of SNSs as well. But how exactly can an 
employee express his/her opinion on SNSs? It is important to emphasize that employees 
have the right to express themselves in matters relating to the workplace, but they have to 
respect their other obligations (e.g. duty of loyalty) arising from the employment 
relationship. Therefore, the employer can restrict employees’ behaviour on SNSs, but this 
restriction cannot be limitless (e.g. the employer can prohibit the infringement of his/her 
reputation, but he cannot state that the employee is not allowed to criticise the employer at 
all).2180 The boundaries of these restrictions are going to be further addressed in the part 
“examples”. It is even recommended that the employer provides an indicative list, 
determining which conducts in general are factually capable of damaging or jeopardizing 
the employer’s legitimate interests.2181 
Employees should also be reminded of general conducts to be adopted while using 
SNSs. Such conducts would include staying courteous and polite while using SNSs,2182 or 
being honest and accurate.2183 They should also be aware that in extreme cases, non-
 
2178 Fel, C. and Sordet, E. (2010) ‘L’utilisation des réseaux sociaux par l’entreprise et ses 
collaborateurs’, JCP S (édition sociale), (29), p. 22. 
2179 See, for example: Department of the Interior (2010) Social Media Policy. Available 
at: https://edit.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/notices/upload/DOI-Social-Media-Policy-Final-
Redacted.pdf (Accessed: 19 March 2017). p. 4.; Volleyball Australia Board (2012) Volleyball Australia 
Social Media Policy. Available 
at: http://www.volleyballaustralia.org.au/_literature_152757/Social_Media_Policy (Accessed: 19 March 
2017). p. 2. 
2180 NVIDIA (no date) Social Media Policy. Available at: http://www.nvidia.co.uk/object/social-media-
guidelines-uk.html (Accessed: 23 March 2017). 
2181 Rácz, I. (2015) ‘A közösségi média használatának árnyoldalai a munkaviszonyban’, in Deres, P. and 
Grad-Gyenge, A. (eds) Acta Iuvenum Caroliensia VII.Budapest: Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem Állam- 
és Jogtudományi Kar, p. 301. 
2182 Orange (no date) Social Media Guidelines. Available 
at: https://www.orange.com/sirius/smg/FR_Guides_Medias_Sociaux.pdf (Accessed: 22 March 2017). 
2183 See Walmart’s social media policy, which by the way was considered as a perfect policy by the National 
Labor Relations Board in the US in 2012. The policy is available on the last three pages of the report of Lafe 
E. Solomon, general counsel: Solomon, L. E. (2012) Memorandum OM 12-59. Office of the General Counsel 
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appropriate use of SNSs can be qualified as a punishable act according to penal law 
regulation (e.g. libel, defamation). 
778. It is also recommended that attention is drawn to the basic functioning of 
SNSs. Employees should be reminded that SNSs are essentially public forums, and a 
content might easily become available to a larger audience than originally intended by the 
employee. Therefore, the use of privacy settings is highly recommended. In the meantime, 
even when such settings are applied, caution should still be exercised, as it is still possible 
that the content will become available to a larger audience. Amongst other challenges, on 
the Internet the perception of anonymity might be deceiving, information can be easily 
misinterpreted as it can be taken out of its context and the Internet does not forget. For 
these reasons, it is strongly recommended that employees think over what they post to 
these sites, and they should keep in mind that they should only post content that they 
would feel comfortable with if it was broadcasted in the news, told to his/her mother or 
transferred to his/her supervisor.2184 
779. Providing examples. In order to be truly helpful, SNS policies should 
provide concrete examples telling employees what they can and what they cannot do, 
providing real substance to the above-presented common rules of conducts (e.g. in what 
forms the employee can express his/her opinion, the use of what expressions indicates the 
existence of an abuse, etc.). As such, it can contribute to making employees understand 
exactly what expectations the employer has towards them when using SNSs. 
780. During the use of SNSs employees should not suggest that they act as the 
representative of the employer. Therefore, the configuration (e.g. registering with the work 
e-mail address, using the logo of the employer, identifying the employer, etc.) of the user 
profile has key importance.2185 In order to achieve this separation of professional and 
 
Division of Operations-Management. Available 
at: http://www.rc.com/documents/OM1259ActingGeneralCounselReportConcerningSocialMediaCases.pdf 
(Accessed: 30 November 2018). 
2184 See, for example: Canadian Red Cross (no date) Social Media Guidelines for Canadian Red Cross Staff 
and Volunteers. Available at: http://www.redcross.ca/crc/documents/What-We-Do/Violence-
Bullying/partners/social-media-guidelines-2013.pdf (Accessed: 19 March 2017). p. 3., 4., 5. and DELL (no 
date) Global Social Media Policy. Available at: http://www.dell.com/learn/uk/en/ukcorp1/corp-comm/social-
media-policy?c=uk&l=en&s=corp (Accessed: 23 March 2017). 
2185 IUT de Rennes (no date) Charte d’utilisation des réseaux/médias sociaux numériques IUT de Rennes. 
Available at: http://partages.univ-
rennes1.fr/files/partages/Services/IUT_administration/Internet/doc/IUTrennesCharteRSN.pdf (Accessed: 21 
March 2017), pp. 3-4. and Orange (no date) Social Media Guidelines. Available 
at: https://www.orange.com/sirius/smg/FR_Guides_Medias_Sociaux.pdf (Accessed: 22 March 2017).#4 
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personal life, employers can prohibit registering to SNSs using the professional e-mail 
address, or referring to the workplace or to the position of the employee in the user name 
or in the name. Regarding the use of the company’s logo: the employer can completely 
prohibit its use, and it is especially recommended to prohibit its use as profile or cover 
picture.2186 However, indicating amongst the biographic data that the employee works at 
the given company should be allowed. 
In order to prevent any confusion between official and non-official use, several 
policies suggested using a disclaimer indicating that the employee’s remark does not 
reflect the employer’s position.2187 However, the effectiveness of such a disclaimer is 
debated, as it might just draw unnecessary attention to the identity of the employer.2188 
781. Even when the employee does not reveal the identity of his/her employer in 
the biographic information, there is no guarantee that this information will stay concealed. 
A comment originating from another user, or a simple Google search might easily reveal 
the identity of the user’s employer. Therefore, during any use of SNSs, against any other 
user, employees should respect the other users’ dignity and should not use excessive, 
insulting or defamatory expressions: employees should refrain themselves from 
committing libel or defamation, or inciting hatred. The publication of vulgar, humiliating 
jokes or content should be avoided. It is also forbidden to harass or attack competitors (e.g. 
through sending SPAM). Employees should publish an appropriate and respectful content, 
while staying honest and accurate. The publishing of misinformation should be quickly 
corrected.2189 
782. In addition to these general requirements, employees should respect the 
employer’s reputation and cannot publish content that violates the reputation. The 
employee can still express his/her opinion (even if it is a negative one), however, it cannot 
constitute abuse or be seriously detrimental to or threaten the good reputation, legitimate 
 
2186 See the already presented case of the university chancellor and the post that made him resign. 
2187 Walmart’s policy in: Solomon, L. E. (2012) Memorandum OM 12-59. Office of the General Counsel 
Division of Operations-Management. Available 
at: http://www.rc.com/documents/OM1259ActingGeneralCounselReportConcerningSocialMediaCases.pdf 
(Accessed: 30 November 2018). 
2188 Kajtár, E. (2015) ‘Európai ügyek a Facebook sötét oldaláról - A munkavállalók közösségi oldalakon 
tanúsított kötelezettségszegő magatartása’, in Horváth, I. (ed.) Tisztelgés: ünnepi tanulmányok Dr. 
Hágelmayer Istvánné születésnapjára. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, p. 211. 
2189 Walmart policy in: Solomon, L. E. (2012) Memorandum OM 12-59. Office of the General Counsel 
Division of Operations-Management. Available 
at: http://www.rc.com/documents/OM1259ActingGeneralCounselReportConcerningSocialMediaCases.pdf 
(Accessed: 30 November 2018). 
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economic and organizational interests of the employer. The position of the employee is 
also important: the higher the position occupied is, the more loyal the employee should be. 
The use of language has key importance, vulgar, insulting, excessive expressions should be 
avoided, and the opinion should be of a neutral nature (even though it can even criticise the 
employer). 
783. The employee should respect the employer’s business secrets: confidential 
information cannot be shared on these sites. The same goes for the personal data of clients, 
sharing information relating to upcoming products, etc. 
784. Monitoring of compliance. Besides regulating employees’ conducts, 
employers can also monitor compliance with the rules set by the policy. However – in 
accordance with the general requirement of transparency laid down both by data protection 
and labour law regulations –, if the IT section starts to systematically monitor employees’ 
online publicly available actions, they must be informed of these measures prior to the 
monitoring. It cannot be stressed enough that the employer can only monitor the public 
posts/activity of the employee (without using any schemes in order to gain access). Also, 
the requirement of prior information persists in spite of the fact that it is the employee who 
made the content public.2190 
785. If the employer opts for monitoring, privacy and data protection matters are 
separated. If the employer monitors such a public content, the violation of the employee’s 
right to respect for private life is not raised,2191 as it was the employee himself/herself who 
chose to publish the given content. However, it does not mean that such a control could be 
exempt from legal requirements: data protection requirements, such as prior purpose 
limitation, proportionality, necessity, data quality, etc. are still going to be applicable.2192 
786. Sanctions. In the part “sanctions” employees’ attention should be drawn to 
the fact that in the case of the non-respect of the regulation what (especially labour law 
related) legal consequences might be applied (e.g. issuing warnings, or even terminating 
the employment relationship). 
 
2190 Griguer, M. (2010) ‘Les réseaux sociaux sous le contrôle des DSI’, Cahiers de droit de l’entreprise, (6), 
p. 64. 
2191 Fel, C. and Sordet, E. (2010) ‘L’utilisation des réseaux sociaux par l’entreprise et ses 
collaborateurs’, JCP S (édition sociale), (29), p. 22. 
2192 Caprioli, É. A. (2012) ‘Les propos tenus par une salarié sur Facebook peuvent justifier son 
licenciement’, Communication Commerce Électronique, (4), p. 39. 
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787. References. Finally, among references it is recommended that the employer 
refers to the legal basis of the policy (labour code, data protection act, etc.), to the other 
existing policies (e.g. code of ethics, code of conduct, etc.) and notes where the employee 
can obtain more information relating to the subject (both within the organisation, for 
example, from the HR team, and outside of it, for example, from a DPA). 
§2. Outside the workplace 
Albeit regulating and raising awareness internally is a crucial step towards 
preventing employee misuse of SNSs, other factors external to the workplace can also 
contribute to achieving this result. First, (A) the development of different technological 
features can empower users to use SNSs in a more privacy-friendly way, while (B) 
educating users at a societal level can contribute to adapting a more conscious attitude 
towards SNSs.2193 
(A) Technology 
788. From a technological point of view, SNS service providers can contribute to 
helping to establish the balance between the employer’s legitimate interests and the 
employees’ rights through the adoption of built-in privacy and data protection features. 
Although the documents examined during the research mainly aim to ensure enhanced 
privacy protection on SNSs in general2194 and do not focus specifically on challenges 
related to employment, their findings can be useful in the employment context as well. 
Here, those elements will be presented that have special significance when it comes to the 
use of SNSs and off-duty conducts. 
789. Developing privacy settings. Through developing more customizable 
privacy settings (instead of the often used all or nothing approach), users would have the 
 
2193 It must be emphasized that these recommendations, such as technological developments and raising 
awareness/educating users, are crucial not only as regards off-duty conducts and SNSs but are also extremely 
important during all phases of employment: during the course of hiring and SNS use during working hours. 
Therefore, the findings of the following paragraphs can adequately be applied to other phases of the 
employment relationship as well. 
2194 See, for example: 30th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners 
Strasbourg, 17 October 2008 Resolution on Privacy Protection in Social Network Services; Council of 
Europe (2012) ‘Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the 
protection of human rights with regard to social networking services’., WP29 (2009) Opinion 5/2009 on 
online social networking. 01189/09/EN WP 163., International Working Group on Data Protection in 
Telecommunications (2008) Report and Guidance on Privacy in Social Network Services - ”Rome 
Memorandum” -. 675.36.5. Rome. 
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possibility to exercise their right to informational self-determination and carefully 
determine what audiences can have access to what kind of content. Also, privacy setting 
should be by default enabled (therefore the user should decide not to use them, and not the 
other way around).2195 In several cases, the remarks were considered to be public because 
of the lack of use of the privacy settings, so this measure would contribute to decreasing 
the number of cases when the employee abuses his/her freedom of expression.2196 
790. Using pseudonyms. The possibility to use pseudonyms is considered to be a 
way to contribute to better protecting privacy on SNSs.2197, 2198 Although indeed it is a way 
to establish more effective privacy protection, it should be emphasized that it does not 
mean that employees are free or encouraged to state anything while hiding under 
pseudonyms. Regardless of the chosen username – whether it is the real name of the 
employee, a fake name, or a pseudonym – the employee’s conduct should not overstep the 
limits of freedom of expression, as the limits drawn by labour law are still valid. In this 
regard, pseudonyms (if they are well-chosen) can contribute to making it more difficult to 
identify the link between the given content and the employer, through masking the true 
identity of the author of the content. However, as it could be seen from the case law, even 
pseudonyms do not guarantee 100 % anonymity, as the identity of the author or of the 
subject of the remarks can be later identified by third persons (e.g. in a comment). 
791. Protection against impulsive (or drunk) posting. Jean-Emmanuel Ray 
points to an application that can contribute to preventing employees from sending 
compromising e-mails while being under the influence of alcohol.2199 An application called 
Goggles allows users to practice self-control through verifying that the user indeed 
possesses his/her mental capacities. During certain previously set periods (e.g. from 
Saturday 21h to Sunday 13h), if the user wants to send an e-mail, he/she has to solve 
 
2195 WP29 (2009) Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking. 01189/09/EN WP 163, p. 7. and International 
Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications (2008) Report and Guidance on Privacy in Social 
Network Services - ”Rome Memorandum” -. 675.36.5. Rome, p. 6. 
2196 Although Article 25 of the GDPR on the requirement of data protection by default is a huge step ahead. 
2197 30th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners (2008) Resolution on 
Privacy Protection in Social Network Services. Strasbourg; International Working Group on Data Protection 
in Telecommunications (2008) Report and Guidance on Privacy in Social Network Services - ”Rome 
Memorandum” -. 675.36.5. Rome, p. 5. 
2198 For example, Facebook’s Terms of Service states that users must “use the same name that [they] use in 
everyday life”, rejecting the possibility to use pseudonyms. 
2199 For example, in the already discussed case of Taylor v Somerfield Stores Ltd., the employee posted the 
“incriminating” video to YouTube after having a few drinks with his colleagues and admitted that he 
probably would not have uploaded the video if he had been sober. Source: Taylor v Somerfield Stores Ltd. 
Case no: S/107487/07 Held at Aberdeen on 24 July 2007, par. 11. 
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certain mental calculations, and if the solution is not found during one minute, the e-mail is 
not going to be sent.2200 
Although this method was established for e-mails and would not prevent employees 
from exercising freedom of expression in an excessive way, with certain modifications it 
might contribute to decreasing the number of such remarks. A solution might be the 
development of an algorithm that would detect when a user posts a content containing 
excessive, extremely insulting expressions. Then after hitting the post button, a warning 
message might appear, informing the employee that insulting expressions were detected 
and asking the user’s confirmation that despite the content, he/she still wishes to publish 
it.2201 
(B) Raising awareness and educating 
792. Raising awareness has a crucial importance in order to contribute to the 
promotion of a more conscious SNS use and the prevention of the occurrence of labour law 
issues related to the use of SNSs. Awareness raising can take place at several levels, such 
as educating users in general, educating employees or even at the level of the 
legislator/judges. 
793. It often seems that users (and amongst them, employees) do not even realize 
that they are not free to post anything to SNSs without bearing the consequences, or what 
they post to SNSs is not of private nature. When using such platforms, users should be 
aware of whether the information they share has public or private character and they 
should be aware of the consequences of choosing to share an information publicly.2202 
Employees should be educated that their acts might abuse their freedom of expression – 
even outside the workplace and beyond working hours. This could contribute to preventing 
 
2200 Ray, J.-E. (2009) ‘Actualité des TIC (II). Rapports collectifs de travail’, Droit social, (1), p. 34. 
2201 A similar idea was raised by Jay Parikh, a vice-president of Facebook, in relation to posting children’s 
photos to Facebook. He said the service was considering setting up a system to notify parents who put 
photographs of children online without restricting their privacy settings. If a parent wanted to accidentally 
share a picture of his/her child with everyone, the system would notify this person that a child is in the 
picture, and ask whether he/she truly intended to share it publicly, instead of sending it in a message only 
destined to the members of the family. Source: Chazan, D. (2016) French parents ‘could be jailed’ for 
posting children’s photos online, The Telegraph. Available 
at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/12179584/French-parents-could-be-jailed-
for-posting-childrens-photos-online.html (Accessed: 30 November 2018). 
2202 Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the protection of 
human rights with regard to social networking services (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 4 April 
2012 at the 1139th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies), Appendix 
 448 
 
abuses of freedom of expression, as employees would be more aware regarding how social 
media works and by what legal rules and how they are bound. 
794. Raising awareness is a complex matter, where several actors might have 
roles. Even though the employer can highly contribute to preventing these issues by laying 
down the rules to be respected through adopting internal social media policies, awareness 
raising at a more general, societal level would also be welcomed. This could be realised, 
for example, with the participation of DPAs2203 and with different state actions. Finally, as 
employees are not only passive actors waiting to be saved by DPAs or the state, their role 
and responsibility has crucial importance as well. 
795. Role of the state. The state should take active steps in order to fight against 
“analphabetism”2204 and to educate users regarding the challenges of protecting private life 
in the age of ICT. Younger users’ (under 15 years old) “civic-digital” education should be 
reinforced by raising their awareness relating to intimacy and identity.2205 Also, informing 
them on the privacy risks related to Internet use should be part of the education system, 
while steps should be taken to educate older users as well (e.g. developing online 
materials).2206 
796. SNS providers. The different documents all emphasized2207 the SNS 
provider’s responsibility as regards providing enough information and education to users 
regarding how they should use these sites, how privacy settings are used, what possible 
legal consequences SNS can have, how they can delete content, etc. Besides raising 
awareness, their role is crucial in determining the technical functioning of SNSs, for 
example, by establishing what types of data protection rules can be applied, whether it is 
possible to use pseudonyms, etc. 
 
2203 What was already said in the case of prospective employees in Title 1 should apply accordingly. 
2204 Expression used by Jean-Emmanuel Ray in: Ray, J.-E. (2011) ‘Facebook, le salarié et 
l’employeur’, Droit social, (2), p. 133. 
2205 Türk, A. (2011) La vie privée en péril: des citoyens sous contrôle. Paris: OJacob. p. 148. 
2206 Mendel, T. et al. (2013) Étude mondiale sur le respect de la vie privée sur l’Internet et la liberté 
d’expression. Paris: Éditions Unesco (Collection Unesco sur la liberté de l’Internet). pp. 131-132. 
2207 Council of Europe (2012) ‘Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
States on the protection of human rights with regard to social networking services’, Appendix.; WP29 
(2009) Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking. 01189/09/EN WP 163, p. 7.; International Working 
Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications (2008) Report and Guidance on Privacy in Social Network 
Services - ”Rome Memorandum” -. 675.36.5. Rome, p. 5.; ENISA (2007) Security Issues and 
Recommendations for Online Social Networks. Position Paper. p. 3.; 30th International Conference of Data 
Protection and Privacy Commissioners (2008) Resolution on Privacy Protection in Social Network Services. 
Strasbourg, p. 4. 
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797. The employee. No matter how complex and well-structured a state’s 
educational programme on the Internet and privacy is if users do not take steps to ensure 
their own protection.2208 Individuals as well should recognize that they have to play an 
active role in protecting their own privacy in the information society.2209 The already 
presented “Grandmother rule”2210 should also apply in the case of employees, and not only 
prospective employees. Employees should recognize that SNSs do not always guarantee 
the desired level of confidentiality, and a content published can become available to a 
larger audience than originally intended to. As a response to these uncertainties relating to 
SNSs, Patrik Polefkó even suggests users should be a little paranoid, which means they 
have to keep in mind that on SNSs not everything is as it seems.2211 
798. According to certain authors, such as for example Vanessa Nivelles,2212 or 
the Liga Szakszervezet (Liga Trade Union),2213 the best solution would be to refrain from 
any discussion relating to the workplace. However, according to my opinion, such conduct 
– although it would indeed eliminate the problem of employees abusing their freedom of 
expression – would self-restrict employees in a disproportionate way. According to the 
regulation, it is not forbidden to discuss work related matters or to express opinion in 
relation to the employment. What is forbidden is to do so in an excessive way. Ian 
Byrnside expresses his similar opinion (although in relation to prospective employees) 
arguing that job applicants should not erase their SNS profiles, but rather learn how to post 
according to the nature of these sites and keep in mind the possible consequences.2214 
799. Educating the legislator and judges. However, it is not only employees 
who need to be educated on the functioning of the Internet and SNSs. It is an additional 
 
2208 Mendel, T. et al. (2013) Étude mondiale sur le respect de la vie privée sur l’Internet et la liberté 
d’expression. Paris: Éditions Unesco (Collection Unesco sur la liberté de l’Internet). pp. 131-132. 
2209 Székely, I. (2010) ‘Kukkoló társadalom – avagy van-e még függöny virtuális ablakunkon?’, in Talyigás, 
J. (ed.) Az internet a kockázatok és a mellékhatások tekintetében. Budapest: Scolar Kiadó, p. 119. 
2210 Byrnside, I. (2008) ‘Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using Social 
Networking Sites to Research Applicants’, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, 10(2), 
p. 474. 
2211 Polefkó, P. (2011) ‘Barátok és bizonytalanságok közt (5. rész) : avagy a közösségi oldalakról adatvédelmi 
szemszögből’, Infokommunikáció és jog, (44), p. 109. 
2212 Nivelles, V. (2014) ‘Les entreprises à l’épreuve des réseaux sociaux’, Jurisprudence Sociale Lamy, (377–
378), p. 13. 
2213 Szilágyi, K. (2013) Facebook-szabályzat: beleszólhat- a munkáltató?, Adó Online. Available 
at: https://ado.hu/munkaugyek/facebook-szabalyzat-beleszolhat-a-munkaltato/ (Accessed: 15 November 
2018). 
2214 Byrnside, I. (2008) ‘Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using Social 
Networking Sites to Research Applicants’, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, 
10(2), p. 473. 
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problem that sometimes even lawmakers or judges are not aware of the functioning of 
social media and other Internet-based platforms. 
An illustrative example is Facebook founder and CEO, Marc Zuckerberg’s two days 
of testimony before the US Senate in 2018, following the Cambridge Analytica scandal, 
where he received certain questions, which demonstrated complete ignorance of the basic 
functioning of these online services. Such questions included “Is Twitter the same as what 
you do?” (Twitter is a different platform), “If I'm email — if I'm mailing — emailing 
within WhatsApp […]” (WhatsApp is a chat messaging system that is not capable of 
sending e-mails) and “Well, if [there will always be a version of Facebook that is free], 
how do you sustain a business model in which users don't pay for your service?” (by 
running ads).2215 
Judges might not always fully understand the functioning of SNSs. Another example 
is pointed out by Marie-Claire Pottecher and Zartoshte Bakhtiari, who brought attention to 
the judge’s observation in a case relating to the use of Twitter during working hours, 
according to which it takes one minute to make a tweet. However, according to the authors, 
the judge did not take into account how Twitter works in reality: constructing a tweet 
requires more time and attention than the one minute that it technically takes to write down 
140 characters.2216 Another example is the already mentioned observation of the Court of 
Appeal of Pau’s,2217 in which the court referred to the “private and public walls” of the 
user, applying quite confusing vocabulary, which can hardly be interpreted in the light of 
the true functioning of Facebook, as every user possess one “wall”. 
Naturally, in order to be able to adopt up-to-date legislation in the field of ICT or 
SNSs, it is crucial that lawmakers understand the functioning of these services that they 
aim to regulate. Also, judges must know and understand the functioning of these sites in 
order to make judgements correctly. If these actors are not aware of the most basic 
technical aspects of SNSs, the adoption and the application of laws might become 
problematic. 
 
2215 See the transcript of the hearing at: Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate hearing (2018) The 
Washington Post. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/10/transcript-
of-mark-zuckerbergs-senate-hearing/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2547f6e741d5 (Accessed: 15 October 
2018). 
2216 Pottecher, M.-C. and Bakhtiari, Z. (2016) ‘Travailler ou tweeter, le salarié n’a pas (forcément) à 
choisir’, Cahiers sociaux du Barreau de Paris, (285), p. 234. 
2217 CA Pau, chambre sociale, 6 septembre 2018, n° 17/01648 
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800. Conclusions of Section 2. In conclusion, in order to successfully address the 
question of employees’ use of SNSs outside the workplace, a complex approach should be 
adopted, taking measures at several levels: the employer, the state, SNS providers and the 
individual. 
As there exists no one-size-fits-all solution, the employer’s role is of particular 
importance within the workplace: the employer is the person who – taking into account the 
specificities of the workplace – can determine what exactly the rules to be followed are. It 
is recommended that these rules are laid down in internal social media policies, providing 
detailed guidance for employees and raising awareness among them regarding the use of 
SNSs and its possible (legal) consequences. Such policies can be means to adopt the 
general provisions laid down in the FLC and the HLC to the specific requirements of the 
given workplace.  
At a more general level, raising awareness amongst the individuals has key 
importance, as it can influence or even make them more conscious while engaging in 
SNSs. The state itself can play a huge part by drawing attention to the data protection 
challenges through its different institutions. Also, the state might even “interfere” earlier 
through integrating the use of SNSs (and challenges relating to it) into public education 
courses, from a young age. It is also important that SNS providers develop technical 
features making it possible to effectively enhance privacy/data protection – therefore they 
determine the whole framework which is later going to be used by individuals. Also, they 
can play a role by providing general information to the public. Last but not least, the 
individual’s role must be taken into account: in the first place, it is the individual who 
should engage in a responsible use of SNSs. Individuals have the greatest impact on the 
functioning of SNSs as they fuel these services with their personal data. They choose the 
content that they post, like or share, decide whether to use the privacy settings – thus are 
central actors in influencing the possible labour law consequences of their online 
behaviour. 
Conclusions of Title 3 
801. Change of paradigm. The number of terminations of employment is 
growing due to the extremities on the part of employees and employers as well – making it 
urgent to adequately regulate such matters. Despite the fact that employees could damage 
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the employer’s reputation through various conducts in the offline world as well, SNSs 
brought a change of paradigm, as they do not only blur the boundary of personal and 
professional life, but also facilitate sharing (even false) content impulsively and instantly 
(often resulting in the use of excessive expressions), increase their discoverability (as SNSs 
are often available to colleagues, clients, supervisors, etc.) and contribute to creating a link 
between the user and his/her employer (either through naming the employer or through 
indicating the employer on the profile). The hypothesis of Title 3 related to the possible 
existence of a reversed vulnerability between the employer and the employee when it 
comes to the collision of rights and interests: the dissertation holds that due to the 
presented features of SNSs, employees can potentially jeopardize/harm the employer’s 
rights to an increased extent, tilting the balance towards the employer. 
802. Throughout Title 3 the main differentiation was established between 
behaviour/content directly or indirectly relating to the workplace, and within these two 
categories between expressing opinion and other conducts (e.g. uploading photos or 
videos). Especially in relation to expressing their opinion, employees often use SNSs as a 
platform to release their anger or tension, forgetting that although they indeed act in their 
personal lives, they do not cease to be bound by certain obligations originating from their 
employment relationship. It is very important to note that even despite the changes that 
SNSs brought to employees’ expression, they still have the right – within the limits set by 
regulation – to criticise their employer. The same goes for prohibiting the use of SNSs: a 
complete prohibition would seem disproportionate, while imposing limitations on their use 
is legitimate. 
803. Privacy and data protection. As far as off-duty conduct and SNSs are 
concerned, challenges relating both to privacy and to data protection arise. Data protection 
questions might especially arise when the employer decides to systematically monitor 
employees’ off-duty conduct on SNSs. However, the application of data protection 
principles gives rise to fewer doubts than in other phases of the employment (e.g. 
recruitment). In relation to privacy, it must be established where the balance should be 
found between the protection of the employee’s personal life and the employer’s rights. 
The main question to be answered was whether these platforms constitute a private or a 
public forum, as although it is not contested that these conducts take place in the course of 
the employees’ personal life, an SNS post can reach an extremely large audience, which 
excludes the private character of such content. 
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French courts, especially after the Social Chamber of the Court of Cassation ruled in 
the matter, came to the conclusion – according my opinion, correctly –, that as a main rule, 
SNSs are public platforms unless the user applies strict settings and considerably limits the 
circle of people who can access the content, both regarding their number and their 
relationship with each other. Even though in Hungary courts have not (yet) addressed this 
question, French jurisprudence can serve as an example when it comes to defining the 
nature of these sites. 
804. Regulation of the protection of personal life. Even though these conducts 
take place in the course of the personal life of the employee, professional life flows into 
personal life, as the employee is still bound by certain obligations. In French law, it is 
through the obligation of loyalty that the employee’s off-duty conduct is limited, while the 
HLC expressly states that even outside the workplace the employee is subject to certain 
restrictions.2218 Despite these limitations, the employee’s personal life is protected: neither 
in French, nor in Hungarian labour law can personal life constitute a basis of dismissal – 
unless certain conditions are met. 
805. The main difference between France and Hungary is that in France cases 
relating to the termination of employment already reached the courts (and even the Court 
of Cassation); while in Hungary case law is very limited, although several cases have 
attracted media attention. Also, in France, the doctrine is more abundant as well, although 
certain scholars in Hungary also started to examine the question of SNSs and labour law. 
 
2218 Although in French law it can be derived from the duty of loyalty that even outside the workplace the 
employee is bound by this obligation, an amendment of the FLC specifying the existence of this obligation 
outside the workplace – similarly to the HLC – might be welcomed.  
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
806. Employee privacy and data protection. Protecting employees’ rights, and 
more precisely their right to privacy and right to data protection is not a new phenomenon: 
its main rules were already established through addressing the different technological 
means enabling to monitor employees, such as through applying CCTV surveillance or 
monitoring the use of the Internet/computer/e-mail/telephone, etc. The detailed rules of 
such monitoring are already elaborated both at the international2219 and at the national 
level.2220 It was established that employees are entitled to enjoy these rights not only 
outside, but also inside the workplace – but at the same time, originating from their status 
of employee, certain obligations continue to impose limits on their behaviour even outside 
the workplace, beyond working hours.  
807. The employer’s rights. Neither the right to privacy, nor the right to data 
protection is an absolute right. As opposed to them, the employer has various rights which 
can justify their restriction; e.g. right to property, right to reputation, right to the protection 
of legitimate economic interests – notably manifested in the employer’s right to control 
and right to monitor employees’ activities. In the phase of recruitment he/she is entitled to 
choose with whom he/she would like to contract – in order to assess the capacities of the 
applicant he/she is entitled to obtain information on the applicant. If privacy and data 
protection requirements are respected, this can include SNSs as well. In the case of SNS 
use at the expense of working hours, it follows from the obligations and rights of the 
parties that the employee is obliged to spend working hours performing work, while the 
employer is legally entitled to expect him/her to do so. In addition, as the person 
responsible for the organisation of work, the employer has the right to give instructions, 
define the use of workplace equipment and monitor compliance. When it comes to off-duty 
use of SNSs, the employees’ presence on SNSs (through expressing their opinion or 
engaging in other conducts) can collide with the employer’s right to reputation, the 
protection of business secrets, or with the rules relating to competition. 
 
2219 See, for example, the WP29 or the EDPS. 
2220 Notably through the practice of the data protection supervisory authorities; and in France also through 
courts’ case law. 
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808. SNSs and the intensification of the collision of rights. Despite the fact that 
this collision of rights already existed, the dissertation held that SNSs put it into a new 
perspective, through intensifying the collision between the employees’ right to privacy and 
right to data protection2221 and the employer’s rights (Hypothesis 1). The intensification is 
brought by the fact that on the one hand, through monitoring or regulating employees’ use 
of SNSs, the employer can take a glimpse into the personal life of the employee to an 
extent never seen before, with ease, due to the vast amount of information shared on SNSs 
by users. On the other hand, the employee is capable of jeopardizing the employer’s rights 
in more serious forms (e.g. Facebook “addiction”, which can seriously affect working 
hours, or harming the employer’s reputation in more severe ways as a result of the public 
nature of these sites, the style usually used on them, the possible identification of the 
employer, etc.) due to the change of paradigm brought by SNSs. Therefore, both parties are 
increasingly interested in enforcing their rights, resulting in the intensification of the 
collision of rights. Furthermore, it was also held that SNSs have contributed to the blurring 
of the boundaries between personal and professional life – which also challenges the 
establishment of a balance between the two sides.  
809. French and Hungarian regulation. The analysis of the dissertation 
primarily focused on France and Hungary and was also highly determined by the 
membership of France and Hungary in the same international organisations (especially the 
EU and the CoE). In both countries the general legal framework was already established 
(see particularly the FLC and the HLC), although without expressly mentioning SNSs: thus 
what had to be examined is how exactly existing rules can be applied to SNSs, whether 
there are adjustments needed, what the specific challenges raised by these platforms are. 
Although legislations stayed at a general level not specifying SNSs, there are cases 
dealing with the question of SNSs – employment – employees’ rights. The difference 
found between the two examined countries is that in France more abundant case law exists 
in this field, while in Hungary these cases are mainly reported in the media and have not 
necessarily reached courts (yet). As such, the dissertation held that the rules and criteria 
established by French courts might serve as an example for Hungarian courts in the future 
when they have to establish their own case law. Besides courts, the practice of the DPAs 
 
2221 The use of SNSs can relate to the right to privacy, as in the dissertation the right to privacy was 
understood as the right to decide how to live one’s life, including the possibility to decide whether to engage 
in using SNSs and how. As regards data protection, these sites contain a number of personal data, to the 
processing of which data protection requirements must be applied. 
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must be mentioned: both the CNIL and the NAIH already addressed the question of SNSs 
– employment – data protection, however, neither of them did that in an exhaustive 
manner, they focused on one aspect of the subject. Consequently, the significance of the 
dissertation lies in the fact that it examines the subject exhaustively, aiming to analyse the 
situations which are encountered in everyday life the most frequently. 
From the analysis of French and Hungarian regulations, the following de lege 
ferenda suggestions were proposed. The first de lege ferenda suggestion aims to better 
adapt to the realities brought by ICT and amongst them SNSs: it recommended the 
modifications of the FLC and the HLC, by not only regulating what kind of information 
can be requested from applicants/employees, but the wording of the relevant provisions 
should also include information that can be collected.2222 Such an amendment would 
remove any uncertainty resulting from the strict grammatical interpretation of the existing 
provisions of the labour codes. The second de lege ferenda suggestion relates to the HLC 
and recommends clarifying in Hungarian law – and in French law alike – that the relevant 
data protection regulations of the HLC are applicable to job applicants as well. Such a 
clarification might include the insertion of a subsection stating that these provisions are to 
be applied to job applicants as well.2223 
810. Application of the existing rules to SNSs. The application of the existing 
rules to SNSs was examined in three areas (recruitment, the use of SNSs at the expense of 
working hours, employees’ activities and behaviour on SNSs), as SNSs raise different 
kinds of questions in these areas. 
811. First, it must be examined: can the employer control and monitor 
employees’ use of SNSs? Regarding monitoring, the answer is easy: yes, he/she can process 
publicly available data, but must do it respecting the right to data protection. It means that 
a legitimate legal ground, a legal purpose must be present, with the respect of data 
protection principles, etc. The control of the use of SNSs did not emerge in the pre-
 
2222 Thus, the following solution (suggestion in italics) is recommended as a de lege ferenda suggestion: 
Proposed Article L1221-6 of the FLC: “The information requested from or collected about a job applicant – 
in any form whatsoever – shall only have the aim to assess his/her fitness for the proposed employment or 
his/her professional competence.” 
Proposed Subsection (1) of Section 10 of the HLC: “An employee may be requested to make a statement or 
to disclose certain information, or information relating to him/her can be collected only if it does not violate 
his/her rights relating to personality, and if deemed necessary for the conclusion, fulfilment or termination of 
the employment relationship.” 
2223 Such a subsection might be formulated as follows: “Subsection (6) of Section 10: Subsections (1)-(5) are 
also adequately applicable to job applicants.” 
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employment phase, as in this phase the employer has no right to instruct prospective 
employees and to determine (or prohibit) the rules on how they can engage in SNSs. 
During working hours, it was established that the employer can regulate the use of SNSs as 
the employees are contractually obliged to spend their working hours performing work. 
However, although employees do not have a right to use SNSs in the workplace, they have 
the right not to be completely cut off from the outside world (e.g. to have the possibility to 
notify family members or friends in case of an emergency, etc.). Despite this legal 
possibility, it was recommended that, if possible, the use of SNSs should not be completely 
prohibited but rather allowed to a determined extent. As regards employees’ activities on 
SNSs, it was held that the employer can also impose limitations on their use. 
812. The main arising privacy and data protection challenges. During pre-
employment SNS background checks, it was held that the employer should not base his/her 
decision on the personal life of the employee, but on his/her professional capacities. 
However, as the personality of the applicant can also be taken into consideration, the exact 
boundaries of personal and professional life are blurred. SNSs raised the issue that the 
information that could be legally taken into consideration by the employer and the 
information that cannot are typically present on SNSs in an inseparable way. In addition, 
on SNSs the employer can access personal data in a quality and quantity never seen before, 
allowing him/her to access a wide range of information that would not have been available 
to him/her in the pre-SNS era. Does consulting the applicant’s SNS profile constitute an 
intrusion into his/her private life? It was established that in cases when the individual 
posted certain information publicly, the intrusion was unlikely to occur, as it is not 
reasonable to expect the employers not to consult this publicly available information.2224 
The protection of applicants’ rights can also be approached from the aspect of data 
protection, as accessing and then using these data can be better assessed through data 
protection, since compared to the unclear boundaries between “personal” and 
“professional” information, data protection has a more exact terminology. In the field of 
data protection, data quality principles raised some important isssues, as the enforcement 
of this principle is extremely questioned. 
 
2224 In relation to access it was held that the employer can usually access information that was made publicly 
available. This means that the user has not applied privacy settings and is freely available to other users of 
SNSs. However, using stratagems (e.g. creating a fake profile to “friend” the employee, hacking, asking for a 
password, asking for changing the privacy settings – any method used to bypass the privacy settings or the 
intended audience chosen by the user) is not compatible with legal regulations. 
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As regards pre-employment, one of the main challenges is related to the invisibility 
of SNS background checks, and thus to the enforcement of the protection of applicants’ 
rights. As typically these searches stay invisible, it is highly questionable that the employer 
would subject himself/herself to the strict requirements imposed by data protection law. 
Thus, Hypothesis 2 held that due to these challenges (e.g. invisibility of background 
checks), the adoption of a more flexible regulation is needed, through aiming to make 
employers realize that respecting data protection requirements will lead to more reliable 
decision-making (otherwise they would be counter-effective in finding the most suitable 
applicant), thus constituting a more effective way to protect job applicants’ rights than 
completely prohibiting these searches. 
813. During working hours privacy questions were raised in relation to the 
possible prohibition of SNS use. Employees are entitled to privacy even within the 
workplace, and privacy also means the right to establish relationships with others, and 
today SNSs constitute a preponderant forum for communicating and staying in touch with 
contacts, thus the question was raised whether the employer can completely prohibit their 
use. It was found that the employer can freely determine the use of work equipment: the 
only limitation to be respected is that it must be ensured that in exceptional cases the 
employee is able to communicate. As SNSs are not the only means for communication, the 
employer can decide to completely prohibit their use. After establishing the bans (or 
limitations in the case of a more permissive regulation), the employer is also entitled to 
monitor whether employees complied with the rules. Such a monitoring was approached 
from the angle of data protection. 
In the case of SNS use at the expense of working hours, fewer substantially new 
questions were raised compared to the other fields; as a consequence, Hypothesis 3 held 
that the existing rules established for the monitoring of the personal use of the Internet and 
e-mail are in most regards capable of adequately regulating SNSs as well – despite new 
challenges raised by SNSs (e.g. accessing SNSs from the personal devices of the 
employees or considering that as opposed to e-mail, on SNSs it is more difficult to identify 
their use as personal). 
814. In the case of employees’ presence and activities on SNSs, typically 
conducted outside the workplace, privacy questions were raised in relation to imposing 
limitations on the employees’ freedom of action, by imposing rules on whether – and if 
yes, how – they can participate in SNSs. Following from the employees’ obligations, 
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naturally he/she can be expected to be subject to certain restrictions, however, these cannot 
be limitless. During the establishment of the legal limits of such restrictions, it should be 
taken into consideration that in the light of the intensification that SNSs brought to the 
collision of rights, employers have found themselves in an even more vulnerable position 
(Hypothesis 4). However, apart from certain exceptional cases, completely prohibiting the 
use of SNSs does not seem legally acceptable. Imposing limitations on their use is more 
feasible; however, the exact extent of such limitations is highly dependent on the 
workplace and on the position of the employee. Data protection questions were raised in 
relation to monitoring, when the employer decided to monitor or to use data available on 
SNSs in order to assess compliance or impose certain sanctions. 
815. Recommendations. In the light of the above, different recommendations and 
proposals were made throughout the dissertation. It was held that in order to successfully 
address challenges posed by SNSs, a complex approach should be adopted, containing 
recommendations for the legal sphere (especially to lawmakers, judges and data protection 
supervisory authorities), for the employer (mostly aiming at the adoption of internal 
policies), for technology (encouraging SNS providers to adopt privacy and data protection-
friendly technological solutions) and finally for the individual himself/herself. 
816. Recommendations for the legal sphere.2225 For all actors making decisions 
in the legal sphere (lawmakers, judges, members of data protection supervisory authorities) 
it is crucial to be aware of the exact functioning of SNSs in order to avoid inaccurate or 
hardly interpretable reasoning or rules – as it has already happened on different occasions. 
This can be achieved, for example, through organizing trainings. 
817. Recommendations for data protection supervisory authorities. For data 
protection supervisory authorities it is recommended to issue a document or information 
notice in which they extensively lay down the most important rules with regard to SNSs 
and employment,2226 as such a document can highly contribute to the uniform 
interpretation of the privacy and data protection requirements relating to SNSs and labour 
law.2227 These rules would include, for example, specifying the public-private nature of 
SNSs, clarifying the applicability of the rules to SNSs, challenges and solutions relating to 
 
2225 See the de lege ferenda suggestions above. 
2226 As they did in the case of traditional means of employee monitoring. 
2227 Especially in Hungary, where there is considerably less case law, compared to France. In France, the 
drafting of such a document can rather serve as a summary of the existing rules elaborated by court decisions. 
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data quality,2228 requirement of transparency and participation of the data subject, principle 
of proportionality (in relation to prohibiting or monitoring), assessment factors to be 
considered on a case-by-case basis (e.g. position of the employee, nature of the post, 
frequency and time spent on SNSs, publicity of posts, consequences of the post, 
antecedents, etc.). For the NAIH, it was suggested measuring whether more accessible 
online presence can be achieved – for example, through social media – possibly based on 
the example set by the French data protection supervisory authority. Although this would 
not instantly resolve challenges related to data protection and employment, it would 
constitute an important step in raising awareness and promoting the right to data 
protection. 
818. Recommendations for the employer. The employer also plays an important 
role when it comes to SNSs and employment: as it was seen, it originates from the 
different rights and obligations imposed on the parties that the employer can control and 
monitor the employees’ use of SNSs. It is the employer’s right to determine – in 
accordance with legal regulations – the exact rules of such control and monitoring, 
considering the specificities of the given workplace. In addition to the legal obligation of 
prior information, it was recommended in the dissertation that the employers adopt internal 
social media policies in order to effectively communicate the rules and expectations 
relating to/towards employees. Also, organizing internal trainings in order to raise 
employees’ awareness might be recommended. 
819. Recommendations for service providers. As regards technology, SNS 
providers can also contribute to the protection of personal life by developing technical 
measures to enhance the protection. This can be achieved, for example, through enabling 
the users to use pseudonyms, the possibility of choosing customized privacy settings, and 
also through raising awareness. 
820. Recommendations for the individual. Lastly, the (prospective) employee’s 
role must be mentioned: despite the creation and existence of a protective legal 
 
2228 With regard to data quality, another suggestion proposed by the dissertation is that during the recruitment 
process – in order to handle the challenges relating to the outdatedness of personal data available on SNSs 
and to the right to be forgotten – a time limitation period for the processing of personal data originating from 
SNSs should be introduced. It would mean that in accordance with the general limitation period in labour 
law, posts, pictures and other contents posted on SNSs before that period should not be processed in the 
recruitment process. Source: Hajdú, J. et al. (forthcoming) ‘Közösségi média és munkajog – különös 
tekintettel a Facebook-ra alapított felmondásokra a hazai szabályozás és a nemzetközi joggyakorlat 
tükrében’, De iurisprudentia et iure publico (DIEIP) 
 461 
 
environment, it must not be forgotten that every user is responsible for his/her actions and 
behaviour on SNSs, and that they should actively participate in ensuring the protection of 
their own personal lives. They should be able and expected to make informed decisions as 
regards whether they should post something to SNSs, to what audience (choice of privacy 
settings), whether there can be any legal consequences. They should not upload content 
relating to third persons without their consent and should actively monitor their e-
reputation and make the necessary steps if they detect an anomaly. 
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